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Abstract 
This research addressed the question ‘What is the National Intelligence Model (NIM), 
why did it emerge and how has it influenced police organisational structures and 
investigative practice’?  The NIM embodied the apotheosis of intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) policy in Britain.  Allied to the pre-existing ‘intelligence cycle’, it represented an 
eclectic ‘pick n’ mix’ of strategies that aimed to deliver effectiveness and ‘best value’ in 
policing.  Sir David Phillips, sponsor of the model and President of the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO), during a key period in its development, wanted it to 
overhaul intelligence work, and revolutionise investigative practice in the mainstream.  
Through archival, secondary and primary research, the thesis examined the NIM’s policy 
content in the context of Kingdon’s ‘Agenda Setting’ approach to policymaking.  It 
evaluated the roll-out of the NIM through the lens of Sabatier’s policy implementation 
model, drawing on primary research in the form of case studies that included observations 
and interviews with senior police commanders, officers and other officials.  
Ultimately, Phillips’ plans were confused by commanders’ orthodoxy and 
frustrated both by competing agendas within ACPO and the paucity of evidence that the 
NIM could deliver what he had promised.  Phillips’ policy entrepreneurship was the key 
factor in the model gaining support in ACPO and the Home Office.  However, beyond 
that policymaking arena, few commanders were willing to effect the structural changes 
that the Home Office-codified model demanded.  Instead, they seemed to adopt 
‘compliance’ tactics that disguised resistance and forestalled sanction. Orthodoxy, 
resistance and tradition played significant parts in the resulting ‘NIM-compliant’ activity 
in forces as, with few complaints, officers and staff dutifully applied the model in a 
myriad of inefficient ways.  Ultimately, the NIM added to the burden of bureaucracy but 
the end result was that British policing ended up looking very much the way it had before 
the NIM narrative began. 
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Introduction to the Research 
 
Introduction 
This thesis uses archival and documentary research, and case studies that draw on primary 
research to examine the emergence and development of the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM), and to evaluate its influence on contemporary organisational structures, policing 
policy, and investigative practice.  
 
A Personal History 
In 1977, as a young man, I moved from a small town in Wales to join the Metropolitan 
Police (the ‘Met’).  I knew almost nothing of policing and even less of the history, 
organisation or culture of the detective force but I had idealised the life of a detective and 
I was determined to follow my chosen path.  
34 years on, I reflect on a professional life which largely represents a dream 
fulfilled.  A detective for 25 years, I began my Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
career in London’s West End and worked across the Metropolis.  In 1987, I graduated to 
specialist detective work, with the Met’s Drugs Squad then, in turn, the South East 
Regional Crime Squad, the National Crime Squad, the Met’s Specialist Operations 
Command and finally the Middle Market Drugs Partnership (MMDP) which was an 
innovative project undertaken by the Met in partnership with the City of London Police, 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Serious Organised Crime Agency to combat 
drug trafficking.   
Initially, I was ignorant of the history, tradition and practices of the CID and knew 
nothing of the corruption and abuses of power that had been features of the department in 
the 1960s and 1970s but I soon became aware of the latent resentment to the reforms 
introduced by the recently retired Commissioner Robert Mark.  The CID I joined seemed 
to be cowed by the opprobrium it had recently received but was determined to carry on 
‘business as usual’ as far as it was allowed to by its new uniformed commanders.  
Battered but unbowed, CID officers continued to conform to the ‘work hard, play hard’ 
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media-driven stereotype and this seemed to be encouraged by middle-management which 
despite Mark’s reforms largely remained intact.  
I attended the renowned Hendon CID course where I was instructed in the 
criminal law and indoctrinated into the ways of ‘the department’.  I was taught legal 
practice skills but provided little instruction in the basics of detective work such as, 
searching, interviewing, processing of prisoners, preparing casework or the tradecraft 
associated with intelligence work.  It was expected that most of these skills would be 
learnt ‘on the job’.  I soon realised that with staff costs relatively low, junior detectives 
had every opportunity to observe experienced colleagues at close quarters.  Indoctrination 
into detective culture was so complete that newcomers usually worked in excess of 100 
hours overtime each month without complaint. 
My recollection of the early years of my detective career is that the majority of my 
time, on or off duty, was spent in licensed premises (that is, or at least so it seems to me 
now,  anywhere that alcohol could be consumed and the macho, gendered culture 
reinforced).  Often, the distinction between work and ‘play’ was blurred.  Long hours 
were spent ‘seeking information’ about local crime and criminals, the sessions frequently 
ending with inebriation.  With the benefit of hindsight, the effects of these practices on 
health and on personal relationships are obvious.  However, what strikes me now was the 
normality of it all.  Despite Mark’s reforms, normative detective values and behavioural 
characteristics (which Skolnik (1966) has termed the ‘working personality’ of a group) 
were rarely challenged and CID officers seemed unchanged.    
Members of the detective force shared the conviction that unlike the uniform 
branch they were dealing with ‘real’ crime.  There was an obvious CID hierarchy.  
Specialist detectives believed themselves superior to their divisional colleagues.  They 
were usually indifferent to the work of mainstream officers (although specialists such as 
dog handlers and firearms officers were accorded a little more ‘respect’).  Divisional 
detectives often were dismissive of the efforts of their uniformed counterparts and 
considered themselves over-worked and under-appreciated compared to their specialist 
colleagues.  Most aspired to leave behind the “eclectic assemblage of little tasks” that 
makes up generalist detective work for the excitement and relative ease of the specialist 
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detectives’ world (Thornton and Harper, 1991: 3).  Whenever I recall those relationships, 
I think of the classic ‘Frost Report’ sketch on social class featuring John Cleese, Ronnie 
Barker and Ronnie Corbett.  My version of the sketch has the specialist units (the upper 
class) looking down on the divisional CID.  The divisional CID in turn, looks up to the 
specialist CID but down on the (working class) uniform branch etc. 
Specialist detective work brought status and to some extent was easier than 
divisional work.  Specialists have better equipment and resources and more extensive 
support networks.  On the other hand, the tools and techniques of the work (surveillance 
and other covert methods) meant long hours away from home and family life.  I do need to 
inject balance here.  I had left the drinking culture behind and the work was challenging, 
fulfilling and enjoyable.  However, commitment to the task could result in a blinkered 
approach.  Detectives as a group are ‘can do’ kind of people ready to rise to any challenge.  
Unfortunately, I found that we rarely reflected effectively enough on our work.  Whether 
a task was completed in the most efficient or cost-effective way or even whether it should 
have been undertaken at all, were matters that were seldom considered. 
Returning to ‘the Met’ in 2001 to take up the post of intelligence manager, I first 
learned of the NIM which was being marketed by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) and by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) as the new model for 
operational policing.  In my new post I found management meetings usually included an 
agenda item that referred to NCIS’ plans to revolutionise intelligence work in the 
mainstream.  However, staff remained ignorant of them and few intelligence workers 
understood how the NIM should influence their work.  The problems in intelligence work 
seemed to run even deeper.  There were fundamental deficiencies in the intelligence 
structure and my unit seemed to operate in a bubble.  Intelligence assessments, if they 
were utilised at all, were used as management information and had little impact on 
operations.  I was rarely consulted on operational matters.  Moreover, my unit was used as 
a dumping ground for staff who (because of illness or infirmity) could not be employed 
on the frontline, and for information that did not seem to fit anywhere else in the 
organisation.    
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Despite the claims made for intelligence-led policing (ILP) and innovations like 
the NIM, the divide between intelligence work and the operational world was stark.  Of 
course, as an operational detective I knew that accurate intelligence was the lifeblood of 
any investigation.  I had used the services of the intelligence agencies to inform my 
actions in specific inquiries but equally I knew many detectives pursued proactive 
investigations on the word of a ‘reliable’ informer or on the basis of a ‘hunch’, with little 
reference to those same agencies.  In other words, it was my experience that 
investigations often were informer-led or instinct-led rather than intelligence-led with 
little thought given to the strategic aims of the organisation or the impact of those 
investigations on communities.  From the other side of the operational/intelligence divide, 
the limitations of this blinkered approach seemed obvious.  My concerns about the 
continuing utility of those strategies inspired this research. 
   
Thesis Structure 
Beyond this introduction, Chapter 1 analyses the literature that is relevant to this study 
whilst Chapter 2 establishes its rationale, scope and purpose, the research methods used 
and the challenges experienced.  Beyond that methods chapter, my thesis broadly is 
divided into three parts.  Firstly, Chapters 3-5 represent a study of the NIM’s policy 
content.  These chapters describe and explain the genesis and development of the NIM. 
Chapter 3 sets the model in the context of investigative practice and intelligence 
work in mainstream policing.  It examines the historical development of the CID.  It also 
highlights that the ‘class divide’ in policing, which is at least as old as the CID, may 
undermine the ‘whole service’ approach to operational policing advocated by Sir David 
Phillips, the President of ACPO and the inspiration for the NIM.  Chapter 4 explains the 
policing environment from which the NIM emerged.  It examines the structure of the 
police organisation and considers the policies and processes that influenced investigative 
practice in that period.  Chapter 5 highlights Phillips’ roles in the development of ILP in 
Britain and in the emergence and development of the NIM.  It explains the model’s 
endorsement by ACPO and its codification by the Home Office through the lens of 
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Kingdon’s (1995) ‘Agenda Setting’ approach in which Phillips’ role as ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ was key. 
The second section of the thesis, Chapters 6-8, moves the story of the model on to 
an evaluation of its implementation in the police forces of England and Wales against the 
background of Sabatier’s (1986) model of policy implementation.  Chapter 6 assesses 
those factors that prevented Phillips achieving his ambitions for the model across the 
police service.  Chapter 7, the first of two case studies, evaluates the implementation of 
the NIM in a metropolitan force referred to as ‘Urban’.  It discusses senior commanders’ 
resistance to the model and how that played out at the corporate and at the local levels of 
the force. Chapter 8, the second case study, continues that evaluation.  It examines the 
impact of the NIM on a largely rural force, referred to here as ‘County’.  It discusses the 
attitude of County’s senior commanders to the NIM and to intelligence work more 
generally, and how their attitudes influenced the operation of the model at the corporate 
and local levels of the force.  The purpose of the case studies is to add texture, colour and 
depth to the analysis in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 9 is the final section of the thesis.  Analysis runs as a thread throughout 
the study.  Therefore, there is not a discrete data analysis section.  However, in this 
concluding chapter the key topics and themes uncovered and analysed throughout the 
thesis are summarised and critiqued.  I conclude with a reflection on what the NIM 
narrative reveals about the police organisation. 
 
Key Concepts and Terms 
The key concepts and terms explored in this thesis are: criminal intelligence, intelligence 
models, intelligence-led policing (ILP), policy entrepreneurs, the (police) elite, senior 
management teams, ‘orthodoxy’, and ‘whole service’. 
Criminal intelligence helps investigators to study criminal conduct as a 
phenomenon and to expose its motivations, methods and inhibitors.  Many attempts have 
been made to elevate ‘intelligence’ to a professional standing.  However in this thesis, I 
rely on a description that strips the concept of its professional bias.  Intelligence is 
“information which is significant or potentially significant for an enquiry or potential 
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enquiry” (Brown, 2007: 340).  By this assessment, intelligence is information – nothing 
more and nothing less. 
ILP is usually underpinned by proactive approaches that focus on the environment 
or target suspect individuals or populations on the basis of intelligence.  ILP has been 
explained in many ways.  In the context of this thesis it is best described as “a 
collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and 
community-oriented policing and problem solving” (Peterson, 2005: vii). 
Intelligence models of the kind discussed in this thesis (the Kent Policing Model 
(KPM) and the NIM) represent attempts by the police to impose order on chaos.  Both the 
KPM and the NIM were developed to enable the police to manage the demand for their 
services.  Thereby, allowing them the space to create an operational reserve that would 
not routinely be committed to reactive policing and which therefore could be used to 
resource longer-term problem-solving measures (FIRT, 1998). 
The defining characteristics of policy entrepreneurs are their “willingness to 
invest their resources - time, energy, reputation and sometimes money - in the hope of a 
future return” (Kingdon, 2003: 122).  They are people who seek to initiate “dynamic 
policy change … through attempting to win support for their ideas for policy innovation” 
(Mintrom 1997 cited in Savage 2007: 129).  Invariably, they have a particular expertise, 
political connections or negotiating skills and they are persistent (Kingdon, 2003: 181).  
I use the term elite to describe those at the highest level of the police service.  The 
term includes chief officers and other members of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO).  However, it also includes the most senior civilian staff in the service 
(such as financial directors etc.). 
Senior Management Team (SMT) is the term used in policing to describe the 
group of senior managers in a Basic Command Unit (BCU).  The commander, usually a 
chief superintendent, is assisted by one or more superintendents and a larger number of 
chief inspectors. 
I use the term orthodoxy as shorthand for the innate cultural conservatism of 
police officers of all ranks that has its roots in police culture and traditionalism (discussed 
in the next chapter). 
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Advocates of a ‘whole service’ or ‘single service’ approach to policing argue that 
it can weave together the discrete elements of the police, its organisational assets, 
resources and initiatives, streamlining aims and work processes in cost-effective ways 
that benefit both the police organisation and communities. 
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Chapter 1 - Relevant Literature 
 
Introduction 
The NIM’s sponsor, Sir David Phillips, whilst Chief Constable of Kent Police and 
President of ACPO, together with his supporters in the Association and beyond, wanted 
the model to revolutionise intelligence work in mainstream policing in England and 
Wales, and to underpin a new ‘whole service’ intelligence-led approach to investigation 
and operations.  This research aims to explain the emergence of the model, to examine its 
influence on operational policing and to assess what the NIM narrative reveals about the 
police organisation. 
The successful implementation of the NIM required a significant level of change 
in the police organisation, change that could be achieved only with the commitment of 
those at the apex of the police service and with the full support of the relevant 
Government department, the Home Office.  This review of the pre-existing literature is 
framed closely around my research question, ‘What is the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM), why did it emerge and how has it influenced police organisational structures and 
investigative practice’?  In analysing the literature, I have heeded Dunleavy’s (2003) 
advice to focus on material that readers ‘need to know’ to fully appreciate the contribution 
of this research, and no more.  Therefore the subjects covered in this chapter are: 
intelligence-led policing and intelligence work; the police organisation; oversight of the 
police; and public policymaking.  
  
Intelligence-Led Policing 
ILP underpins the NIM ideal.  Indeed, the authors of the model considered that it 
represented the apotheosis of ILP in Britain.  However, the true meaning of the term has 
never really been settled.  In practice, it is confusingly applied to a variety of discrete 
‘crime-fighting’ processes that rely on the efforts of analysts and intelligence specialists 
engaged in ‘crime mapping’, ‘crime pattern analysis’, ‘data analysis’ and other 
‘problem-solving’ approaches (all of which are explored later in this research) (see for 
example Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2002; Heaton, 2000).  There is another dimension to ILP 
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which also relies on analysts and other specialists but in this second case the emphasis is 
on the targeting of groups or individuals using covert methods with their arrest, or some 
other intervention to prevent further offending, the intended outcome (see for example 
Peterson, 2005; Maguire and John, 1995).   Beyond those approaches, other novel 
strategies also have come to the fore.  It is worth examining them here because each 
challenged the traditional reactive policing paradigm and, as the reader will see later, each 
patently influenced Phillips’ plans for the NIM. 
 
ILP in the Modern Era  
Arguably, it was the introduction of Unit Beat Policing (UBP) in 1967 that provided the 
foundation for ILP in the modern era.  The specialisation of the patrol function that 
accompanied UBP, established the local intelligence system in mainstream policing on 
which the modern intelligence structure is based.  The introduction of the collator (see 
Wilmer, 1970), an individual tasked with collecting and evaluating information collected 
by patrol officers, was a significant milestone in the development of intelligence-led 
strategies and the specialisation of the police workforce.  Though some researchers (such 
as Reiner, 2010 and Waddington, 1999) have been critical of the police’s ‘down-grading’ 
of the patrol function which accompanied those developments.  That is a subject that I 
shall examine in some detail later, through the analysis of archival material and through 
primary research.  
Commonly, the development of ILP strategies is linked to increasing concerns 
about organised (often transnational) crime (see for example Wright, 2005; Sheptycki, 
2000), the search for ‘best evidence’ or at least ‘better evidence’, following the 
discrediting of investigative strategies that ultimately relied on suspects’ confessions (see 
for example Maguire, 2008), and the availability of increasingly sophisticated 
surveillance technologies (particularly information technology) in the modern era (see for 
example Ratcliffe, 2008; Manning, 2001).  Chan (2003: 656) suggested that the appeal of 
ILP to police commanders was that it promised new, problem-solving, intelligence-led 
approaches for dealing with increasingly sophisticated and prolific offenders.  Whilst, 
Reiner (2010: 23) argued that its appeal was that it provided a solution to the problems 
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associated with traditional policing tactics which were “spread too thinly over the 
multitude of potential victims and offenders to be able to achieve much preventative 
cover or detection”. 
The Audit Commission was a significant actor in the search for ‘best value’ in the 
public sector.  Its influential report on ILP, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime 
Effectively (Audit Commission, 1993), argued for intelligence-led, crime reduction 
strategies, which targeted scarce operational resources against the criminal rather than the 
crime.  It had a considerable impact on the Home Office and on the police service.  
Following its publication there was a significant shift in policing discourse.  However, the 
reader will see later that what was lauded as groundbreaking, simply restated observations 
made by police commanders at least 60 years earlier.  Perhaps, this highlights that there is 
little that is new in policing and that the police’s organisational memory may be 
inadequate.  
Reiner (2000: 217) argued that there were sufficient, well-researched examples of 
innovative policing strategies to suggest that targeted policing can succeed in having a 
“significant, if modest” effect on crime and the fear of crime.  However, questioning the 
scale of ILP, Skogan (2008: 23) observed that though there was enthusiasm among 
“academics and the informed public” for ILP strategies, for policymakers and police 
commanders “the political risks involved are considerable, and efforts to change the 
police often fall far short or fail”.  Gill (2000) questioned whether ILP truly represented a 
fundamental transformation of policing in the modern era or whether it was something 
that simply was bolted-on to existing structures.   I will argue later that the real appeal of 
ILP to commanders is limited and that the elite’s innate orthodoxy has meant that it has 
had much less impact in the mainstream than the rhetoric suggests.  The anticipated ‘ILP 
revolution’ did not take place and that undermined Phillips’ plans for policing in the 
modern era. 
 
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) 
POP was another of the proactive approaches putatively embraced by the British police 
service in this period.  Goldstein (1979) is popularly credited with originating the style 
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known as POP in the USA and his ideas spread across the developed world.  Newburn 
(2003: 387) argued that no one has been more influential in moving policing in the 
direction of problem-solving than Goldstein, and that his work has not only influenced 
practical policing across the world in the last 30 years “but has spawned a variety of 
cognate policing models during that time”.   
Goldstein (1979) argued that a continuing emphasis on improving the police 
organisation (evident in policing across the Western world at that time) was unlikely to 
raise the standard of service delivered to communities.  Instead, police departments 
should aim to reduce the volume of problems that came to their attention to a manageable 
level (within their available resources) by embracing a commitment to more systematic 
processes for inquiring into their origins and causes.  That would mean defining problems 
more specifically, collecting information from external as well as internal sources and 
engaging in a broader search for solutions than hitherto (Eck and Spelman, 1988).  The 
reader will see later that these were exactly the kinds of strategies that Phillips wanted the 
British police service to embrace.  
In Britain, POP has usually been enacted through a standardised toolset of 
analysis and environmental scanning.  British analysts have favoured the SARA method, 
a sequential process involving in turn: (environmental) Scanning, (intelligence) Analysis, 
Response and Assessment (or evaluation of the appropriateness of the response).  Tilley 
(2003: 321) has suggested that in practice the process is much ‘messier’ with a great deal 
more overlap than the SARA construct suggests.   Analysts may also use the problem 
analysis triangle (PAT).  The PAT encourages analysts to consider problems from the 
perspective of the victim, the offender and the environment and echoes Felson’s (1998) 
routine activity model. 
A problem-oriented approach requires police to take more of an initiative in 
dealing with problems and might also call for them to be aggressive in forging 
partnerships with local communities (Goldstein, 1979: 258).  Goldstein believed that this 
would be welcomed by the police establishment as it would not be seen as challenging 
“the prevailing value system”.  However, he underestimated the resistance of the police 
rank and file.  For example, researchers found that the introduction of civilian analysts as 
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‘problem solvers’ was not universally welcomed and resistance often led to the “misuse 
and exclusion” of analysis from operational responses (Cope, 2003: 357).  This perhaps is 
unsurprising given the inadequacy and inefficiency of the mainstream intelligence 
structure.  There also has been some cultural resistance to POP.  Read and Tilley (2000) 
argued that though almost every force in Britain purports to engage, to a greater or lesser 
degree in POP, it has not proved to be a popular career choice for action-oriented patrol 
officers and frontline detectives. 
 
Community Policing, Crime Reduction, +eighbourhood Policing 
Community policing builds on a commitment to POP and relies on “decentralisation and a 
reorientation of patrol” so as to facilitate greater contact and dialogue between the police 
and citizens (Skogan and Hartnett, 2005: 428).  In principle, community policing is 
responsive to communities’ needs and is committed to partnership and problem solving 
(Skogan and Hartnett, 2005).  Tilley (2003) argued that the movement was stimulated in 
the 1970s by calls for the police to cooperate more closely with the communities they 
served.   
In Britain, the first authoritative call for a system of policing that was more finely 
tuned to citizens’ needs was made by John Alderson, Chief Constable of Devon and 
Cornwall in 1977.  Others such as Kenneth Newman, Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police (1982-1987) were keen to take up Alderson’s challenge.  Community policing 
strategies are now commonplace in British policing and many of the multi-agency 
problem-solving approaches that they have spawned are consistent with the preventative 
proactive policing strategies that Newman (and others who succeeded him such as Imbert 
and Condon) encouraged.  However in the 1970s, Alderson’s views contrasted sharply 
with the majority, authoritarian, view in British policing expressed for example by James 
Anderton the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police who argued forcefully for the 
maintenance of the crime control status quo (see Savage, 2007: Byrne and Pease, 2003 for 
further analysis). 
Community policing has been linked to crime prevention and reduction 
initiatives, often in partnership with communities.  The first formal partnerships, Police 
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Community Liaison Groups, emerged as a result of the Scarman Inquiry (1981) and their 
further development was encouraged by a variety of Home Office circulars and 
consultation papers.  Commentators agree that the most significant development in this 
context was the Morgan Report (Standing Conference on Crime Prevention) 1991.   
Morgan proposed that local authorities, with their wide-ranging powers, in relation to 
education, housing and planning, that impact “on the development of criminal 
inclinations and their realisation in action”, should play their part in crime prevention 
activities (cited in Byrne and Pease, 2003: 293).   
The idea of partnership was boosted significantly by the introduction of the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), which placed a statutory duty on chief constables and 
local authorities to formulate a crime reduction strategy based on a local crime audit.  
Those strategies evolved into the neighbourhood policing programme that is being 
pursued across Britain by chief officers today.  Tilley (2003) argued that programme is 
best understood as an attempt to merge the key elements of POP and ILP.  The 
identification by Innes of ‘signal crimes’; incidents that “act as warning to people about 
threats to their security and that have a disproportionate impact on the way people, think, 
feel or act” (cited in Quinton and Morris, 2008: 260), added another dimension to that 
debate.  I argue that it also provided sustenance to those who were ideologically opposed 
to the kind of crime control approach favoured by supporters of the NIM. 
  
Intelligence, Knowledge Management and Organisational Memory 
Compared to the subject of policing policy generally, intelligence policy and practice has 
received surprisingly little attention.1  Intelligence has always been core business for the 
armed forces and for the security services, and there is an extensive literature on 
intelligence and information work in those contexts (see Twigge, Hampshire and 
Macklin, 2009; Warner, 2004 and Wright, 1987).  Since the introduction of the Special 
Irish Branch in 1883, intelligence work has been central to the activities of many 
specialist police units in Britain (see Grieve, 2004 and Clutterbuck, 2002).   
                                                 
1 Though the publication in 2007 of Newburn et al’s Handbook of Criminal Investigation sought to address that 
deficit. 
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However, until the last decade of the twentieth century intelligence was rarely 
used to inform investigative strategy in mainstream policing.  Important for its application 
to the discovery of evidence, largely it did not merit much attention as a discipline in its 
own right.  Nor was intelligence a subject that exercised police commanders in the 
mainstream (Flood, 2003).  The reader will see later, that whilst an intelligence 
architecture supporting the higher policing function was well established at the end of the 
twentieth century, intelligence work of the kind needed to support ILP and strategic 
models like the KPM (the precursor to the NIM) and the NIM essentially were ignored 
(see Grieve, 2004; Flood, 2003). 
Flood (2003), argued that Phillips, an acknowledged champion of ILP (see for 
example Tilley, 2008), wanted the NIM to revolutionise operational policing in the 
mainstream.  Grieve (2004: 26) suggested that the model signalled a new way of thinking 
about intelligence, which needed “to be reclaimed from the secret world, made less 
threatening to communities and used in their service”.  Taken together, the statements of 
these two former senior police officers suggest that the NIM was seen by the police as an 
important and far-reaching policy that had the potential to deliver more efficient and more 
inclusive policing practice in the mainstream. 
In recent years, the seeming inability of the police service to use its intelligence 
effectively enough to underpin its protective services (as revealed for example by the 
murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham) or to properly direct its 
operational activities, has been highlighted both in the media and by studies that have 
disclosed inadequacies and inefficiencies in police intelligence management systems (see 
for example, Phillips, 2008; Cope, 2008, 2004 and 2003; Maguire and John, 2006; Innes, 
Fielding and Cope, 2005 and 2003, Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005; Grieve, 2004; 
Sheptycki, 2004 and Gill, 2000).  The NIM itself has been subject only to limited review. 
Tilley (2008), Savage (2007) and Oakensen et al (2002) all investigated the model in the 
wider context of policing policy.  Kleiven (2005) researched the influence of the NIM on 
intelligence gathering in local communities and found that its impact largely was 
negligible.   
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Empirical research into NIM implementation was carried out by Collier (2006) 
and by John and Maguire (2004 and 2003), who examined a pilot project.  The former 
found (in the four forces he studied) that there was tension at the local level “between the 
resources allocated to volume crime and serious crime, and between response-led, 
intelligence-led and reassurance-led strategies”.  This is a subject that I will discuss in 
some detail later.  Collier found that NIM processes were implemented partially and 
ineffectively because of: technological problems; “the bureaucratization of processes”; 
and “cultural resistance”.  He also highlighted an “absence of rigorous evidence linking 
actions, results and contextual issues” (2006: 115).  As the reader will see later, John and 
Maguire (2004) uncovered the same failings in the implementation process as Collier.  
Their research highlighted that significant improvements were needed if the model was to 
achieve its stated purpose.  In part, this research examines whether the improvements the 
researchers considered to be so necessary were ever made.  In that sense, it addresses 
unanswered questions about the NIM. 
More broadly, intelligence work is linked to issues of knowledge management 
and organisational memory.  Earlier, I alluded to the fact that the need to ‘rediscover’ ILP 
in the 1990s, pointed to a defective and partial organisational memory in policing.  
Knowledge management has been described as “the process of creating, capturing and 
using knowledge to enhance organizational performance” (Collier, 2006: 109).  Ratcliffe 
(2008) argues that ‘knowledge’, given context and meaning by the addition of 
organisational ‘wisdom’, is immensely valuable to any organisation and argues that 
knowledge management should be an “intensive activity” for policing in intelligence-led 
environments because it is fundamental to an organisation’s success (2008: 98).   
Collier (2006) argues that the distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘intelligence’ 
is more than mere semantics; it is an important one because allied with good intelligence, 
knowledge can assist all public services, including police forces, to satisfy variable 
demand against fixed budgets.  Bowers, a member of the original ACPO NIM project 
team, suggested that the NIM was an example of that kind of knowledge management in 
action (cited in Collier, 2006: 111).   Collier himself (2006: 115) described the NIM’s 
tasking and coordinating process which is central to the model, as having the potential to 
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be particularly relevant and influential in that context because it might provide a 
framework that would counter the police’s tendency “to put a disproportional emphasis 
on “acquiring rather than retaining and utilizing knowledge”.  The reader will later see 
that this problem may be endemic in British policing. 
Knowledge management in policing has come under the scrutiny of many 
researchers including Manning (2008 and 2001), Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd, 
(2004), Walsh, (2001), Chatterton, 1989, Chan (1996), and Van Maanen and Punch 
(1983).  I discuss the service’s efforts to capture knowledge throughout the thesis.  
Phillips and other supporters of the NIM saw the model as providing the foundation of 
‘doctrine; for policing in the new millennium (Flood, 2004).  However, the proliferation 
of doctrine has not been universally welcomed.  In 2010, the inquest into the police 
shooting of the lawyer Mark Saunders, suggested that the service may have become 
overloaded with codes, guidance and practice advice.  In a letter to the Home Secretary, 
the Westminster Coroner, Paul Knapman, expressed his exasperation over the length and 
complexity of police manuals and their contribution to the failure of the police operation 
he had investigated.  He felt that complex and conflicting advice “could be amalgamated, 
simplified or dispensed with" and that what was left should be “set out in simple and 
unsophisticated language, minimising jargon” (cited in Davies, 2010: 1).  This is a topic 
to which I will return later. 
  
The Police Organisation 
The police service of England and Wales is made up of individual forces, each of which is 
commanded by a chief officer who is answerable both to their local police authority and 
to the Home Secretary.  The simplicity of that statement belies the complexity of these 
arrangements in action, and fails to acknowledge the controversies that this division of 
power has generated.  This section examines some of the key institutions and debates that 
are particularly relevant in the context of the NIM.  
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Structure of Policing 
The police service of England and Wales is made up of 43 separate police forces, under 
the command of a chief constable, each with their own distinctive organisational 
structures that developed according to their individual historical, demographic and 
geographical differences, and the styles and philosophies of successive chief officers.  
The structure of policing in England and Wales in the modern era was established by the 
Police Act 1964 and the Local Government Act 1972.  It is important to explain the 
distinction between the headquarters and BCU functions because an understanding of 
both force and service structures are key to understanding the operation of the NIM.  
Though there were important differences between the two, the reader will see that the 
NIM imposed a duty both on force headquarters and on BCUs to complete intelligence 
assessments that contributed to regional and national forums in support of Phillips’ 
‘whole service’ ideal.  
Typically, a police force is made up of a headquarters which accommodates the 
force elite, specialist units, and the support functions that serve the internal operation of 
the force.  The force headquarters is responsible for delivering policing services at the 
national and regional levels and for overseeing a number of BCUs, which are usually 
aligned to local authority boundaries and which deliver local policing services (Mawby 
and Wright, 2003).  The BCUs policing services usually include “patrol, 24-hour 
response, and investigation of volume crime... and working with local partners to reduce 
crime and disorder” (Audit Commission cited in Mawby and Wright, 2003: 175).  
Those services are usually delivered by uniformed officers.  Indeed, the 
uniformed branch is by some distance the largest in the police service.  Though 
significantly smaller than that branch, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is the 
next largest in terms of the number of staff and resources allocated to it.  Of course, there 
is any number of other specialist departments in the police but the CID (and its 
relationship with the uniformed branch) is uniquely significant in the context of this 
research because of its explicit role in crime control and investigation and its traditional 
monopoly of organised intelligence work. Using a combination of archival, primary and 
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secondary sources, I will trace the development of the CID and the specialist detective 
force later in this thesis. 
Today, BCUs are the main operating unit of police forces and are responsible for 
delivering the bulk of policing services (Loveday et al, 2007).  They should also “gather 
criminal intelligence, conduct criminal investigations and provide rapid responses to 
emergencies” (Loveday et al cited in Joyce, 2011: 21).  BCU performance has been 
measured by the Police Standards Unit (PSU) since it was established in 2001.  The PSU 
developed the Police Performance and Assessment Framework (PPAF).  Introduced in 
2004, the PPAF measured BCU performance in key crime categories and other indicators 
of ‘organisational health’ (Bond, 2003). 
Researchers have noted that BCUs have not developed in a standard fashion and 
they differ markedly in terms of their geographical area, population policed and numbers 
of officers and staff (see Joyce, 2011; Mawby and Wright 2003).  Though they share a 
responsibility as the key sites for engagement between police and local communities.  In 
particular, through their involvement with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRPs) (HMIC, cited in Joyce, 2011).  CDRPs were multi-agency groups set up under 
section 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to tackle crime, drugs and anti-social 
behaviour throughout a geographic area.  Each CDRP agreed an annual partnership plan 
which outlined the priorities it would focus on over the forthcoming year.  That plan was 
informed by an annual strategic assessment that analysed available local data on crime, 
drugs and anti-social behaviour.  Given the pre-existence of these arrangements, the 
reader may question the need for another partnership policing model.  That is an area that 
I will explore later.2 
Since 2001, BCUs have been at the heart of the police modernisation programme.  
Home Office efforts to measure police performance and improve standards meant a new 
focus on BCUs from HMIC and the attention of the PSU which was given a specific 
mandate to focus its attention on BCUs as a way of driving up performance standards 
(Mawby and Wright, 2003).  The reader will see later that the pressure on BCU 
                                                 
2 CDRPs have since been redesignated as Community Safety Partnerships. 
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commanders to meet centrally-imposed performance standards was a significant feature 
of the NIM narrative.   
Phillips’ plans for the NIM required each discrete element of each force, each 
BCU, to be united in a single mission, that of crime control.  This would involve (as one 
research respondent later puts it) ‘pointing all the ships in the same way’.  The history of 
policing hitherto, together with the drive for ‘best value’ that accompanied the New 
Public Management (NPM)-inspired performance regime in policing at the end of the 
twentieth century (described below), suggested that was not likely to be an easy 
undertaking. 
 
ACPO 
ACPO played a key role in the introduction of the NIM so its inclusion here is apposite.  
The Association’s roots are in the borough and county chief constables’ associations 
founded (respectively) in 1858 and 1896.  Wall (1998: 52) described those associations as 
“little more than gentlemen’s clubs”.  Initially, they provided useful forums for members 
to meet and share ideas.  However, their role was enhanced significantly by the 
establishment of the Police Council in 1919 which was created as an advisory body to the 
Home Office, and was made up of representatives of the police authorities and officers 
representing all police ranks.  Rhodes (cited in Wall, 1998: 60) has argued that the 
establishment of the Police Council amounted to the creation of a “policy community” 
which police representatives by “careful and strategic management” manipulated 
policing policy to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others.  That included 
the “ignorant and meddling” Watch Committees (Troup cited in Wall, 1998: 60).   
In 1948, the associations were merged to form ACPO, which throughout most of 
its history was “merely a staff association” (Jones, 2008).  However, the Association’s 
recent history suggests a growing influence on police policymaking (Savage et al, 2000).  
This seems to have its origins in a desire on the part of central government in the 1980s for 
a single police voice on issues relating to policing and policing policy.  ACPO was able to 
exploit its position to become the “main forum for the articulation and formation of police 
policy” (Wall, 1998: 76).  In 1989, ACPO’s position was further strengthened by the 
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appointment of a permanent secretariat which was established on the recommendation of 
a Home Affairs Select Committee and with the full support of the Home Office (Ryan et 
al, 2001).   
There is a consensus that along with the Home Office, HMIC, police authorities 
and the Audit Commission, ACPO exerts huge influence on service-level policymaking 
(Savage et al, 2000; Reiner, 2010).  Savage et al (2000: 153) suggest that the organisation 
has been skilled at managing what they termed “the ACPO dilemma”.  If ACPO was seen 
to be too professional, too calculating and too effective in its lobbying then ultimately this 
could reduce its influence on policy.  ACPO instead has been able to ‘fly under the radar’, 
preserving its “traditional arrangements” of independence and localism whilst achieving 
its aims of representation and influence (Savage et al, 2000, 153).  Such skilled 
manoeuvring by ACPO led one commentator to note that the organisation “managed to 
shift from the position of relative outsider to one very much as an insider” (Grant cited in 
Ryan et al, 2001: 36).   There can be no more desirable position for any lobbyist; ACPO 
exploited it to the full. 
In the same period, the Association carried out an important internal reform that 
Savage et al (2000) termed “the presumption in favour of compliance”.  ACPO expected 
that chief officers would follow the Association line unless they could convince their 
colleagues that there was a very good reason not to (Ryan et al, 2001: 36).  This was 
necessary to unite what had previously been a “somewhat fragmented and disunited body 
unable to ‘get its act together’” (Savage and Charman, cited in Ryan et al, 2001: 36).  The 
result was that once a policy was ratified by ACPO’s Chief Constables’ Council, 
individual chiefs would be bound by it unless they explained to the ACPO President in 
writing why they could not comply.  It was argued that this would enable ACPO to 
regulate its members much more effectively and to ‘professionalise’ the organisation 
making it more “cohesive” (Ryan et al, 2001: 36).  Ryan et al (2001) have argued that the 
‘presumption’ strengthened both internal and external policymaking processes.  
Internally, it was expected to increase ACPO’s influence over its own membership, while 
externally enabling the Association to present a united front to the world.   
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ACPO was a significant actor in the story of the NIM.  Indeed, the ACPO 
council’s decision to adopt the KPM (rebranded as the NIM) as the standard for 
operational policing in the mainstream across England and Wales was a key event in its 
story.  However, I will argue later that the NIM demonstrates as much as anything in the 
modern era, that ACPO’s decisions taken on the basis of a ‘presumption in favour of 
compliance’ have not made the ACPO membership anything like as cohesive as the 
Association or its supporters have claimed.3 
 
Suits and Uniforms 
Detective officers have always held the advantage over their colleagues.  From the 
establishment of the new police, they have been better paid than their uniformed 
colleagues and have been able to supplement their income by claiming allowances 
(Metropolitan Police, 2008).   Detectives have exploited that advantage to the full and 
have taken every opportunity to distinguish between themselves and the uniform 
department, to assert their autonomy (see for example Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006; 
Maguire cited in Matassa and Newburn, 2007).  In effect, the Metropolitan Police became 
a “divided force, partitioned into two separate branches, each with rigidly defined 
functions” (Hobbs cited in Matassa and Newburn, 2007: 44). 
Later in this thesis, I draw on archival material to explore the development of the 
CID.  Researchers have described how at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
technological and organisational changes contributed to the increasing legitimacy of 
detective work and of policing generally (see Moss and Skinner, 2006; Lock, 1993).  For 
example in 1901, the Criminal Records Office was established and the first effective 
fingerprinting system was introduced.  These developments improved working practices, 
encouraged greater specialisation and contributed to the professionalisation of the 
investigative function.  However, they also reinforced the CID and uniform divide, 
enabling the department “to further consolidate its independent position and to 
                                                 
3 The reader should note that ACPO’s star seems to be on the wane.  In 2010, the election of the Coalition 
Government fundamentally changed the relationship between ACPO and central government and the 
Association now finds itself under increasing scrutiny and challenge (see Neyroud, 2011). 
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consolidate its numbers” (Hobbs, 1988: 44).  A view commonly expressed in that period 
was that there was "a tendency [in the CID]… to regard itself as a thing above and apart, 
to which the restrictions and limitations placed on the ordinary police do not, or should 
not apply" (Royal Commission on Police Powers, 1929 cited in Evans, 1974: 108). 
That view was not influenced by any special training that CID officers may have 
received.  On taking up his appointment, Basil Thomson, Assistant Commissioner Crime 
(head of the Metropolitan Police CID, 1913-1919) found the CID to be “well organised, 
though perhaps a little rusty in the hinges” (1921: 3).  Few attempts had been made to 
change a system that accepted former Commissioner Mayne’s assertion (made as far back 
as 1842  when the first detective department was created) that the nature of crime did not 
merit “any complicated architecture for the response”.  Instead “informal apprenticeship” 
continued to be the rule (cited in Morris 2007: 18).  This lack of training was addressed to 
some extent at the beginning of the twentieth century.  However even then, training was 
limited to an understanding of the criminal law and “the practical side… was neglected” 
(Thomson, 1921: 5).4   Most senior detectives were firmly against the idea of extending 
the training of detectives.   
Basil Thomson shared that view.  He divided his detectives into two classes, “the 
detective” and “the thief-catcher”.  Both demonstrated the “method, industry, and local 
knowledge… strongly cultivated at New Scotland Yard” (1921: 5).  However, the 
thief-catcher belonged to a unique class of: 
honest, painstaking policeman without sufficient education to pass examinations 
for promotion, but who made up for this deficiency by his intimate knowledge of 
the rougher class of criminals, his habits and his haunts, and by personal 
acquaintance with the pickpockets themselves, who had the same regard for him as 
a naughty little boy has for a strict and just schoolmaster. 
According to Thomson, the risk in over-educating the detective force was that “little by 
little” the police would eliminate the thief-catcher for whom there was “a very definite 
place in the scheme” (1921: 5-6).   
                                                 
4 Training in the practical skills that might be considered to be central to the work of CID officers (such as 
interviewing, surveillance  or searching  techniques) was not routinely provided until the end of the twentieth 
century. 
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Thomson’s words may appear a little patronising and certainly are idealistic but 
they also reveal much about the attitude of many senior officers in this period (see also for 
example Wensley, 1968).  Thief takers inhabited the criminal world but they could be 
trusted to ‘play by the rules’ - that is, by those informal unwritten detective rules - and to 
get the job done.  For that reason, they earned the admiration and respect of the police 
elite and it was because of that, that they were afforded latitude (far more than any 
uniformed officer would ordinarily be allowed) in their methods of operation.  It was no 
surprise that it was to these kinds of men, the highly-prized thief-catchers, that senior 
commanders turned in times of trouble and it was they who would form the nucleus of 
each of the new specialist detective units that emerged.   
I argue that those attitudes and beliefs endured to such a degree that, throughout 
the twentieth century, whenever the police elite faced a significant policing or social 
problem it almost unquestioningly accepted that the solution to that problem was the 
establishment of another specialist detective unit.  The increasing specialisation of the 
detective force in the twentieth century is noteworthy in the context of the NIM, because 
it confirmed the class system in policing that I later will argue has operated against the 
‘whole service’ approach that Phillips saw as crucial to the success of his plans for 
policing in the new millennium.   
 
Police Culture 
Later, I examine one particular dimension of police culture, the class structure in policing 
laid bare by the division between the detective and uniformed branches observed in this 
study, which has its roots in the history of the new police.  Here, I examine the broader 
topic of police culture, something that I will later argue is also central to the story of the 
NIM.    
The early research into police culture (by for example, Skolnik, 1966; Bittner, 
1967; Westley, 1970; and Cain, 1971) provided the inspiration for increasingly revealing 
analyses as over the following decades, researchers gained greater access (both overtly 
and covertly) to the police organisation (see for example Holdaway, 1989; Punch, 1979 
and 1985; Chan, 1997 and Waddington, 1999).  One of the criticisms of the earliest 
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research was that it failed to take sufficient account of context (see for example Reiner, 
2000 and Manning, 2008).  Later studies identified that rather than being monolithic, it 
was more accurate to describe police ‘cultures’ rather than police culture.  For example 
Reiner’s research identified various ‘cop cultures’ that emerged from the organisational 
division of labour.  He labelled these: Bobbies; new centurions; uniform carriers or 
professionals to differentiate between their differing personalities, job orientations and 
career ambitions (see Reiner, 2010: 132 for further discussion).     
Manning (2008) argued (after Weber, 1947) that there are many ‘rationalities’ in 
policing.5  These are partly the product of “the development of the modern bureaucratic 
form, and in part a function of their traditional mandate.   Patterns of conflict, loyalty, and 
submission are situational and reflect contesting rationalities” which are not necessarily 
mitigated by the development of the bureaucratic organisation (Manning, 2008: 5).  He 
concluded that whilst police organisations “strive to maintain a rational face, a 
professional face, in spite of deep fissures within them”, there are many rationalities in 
policing, and that these change over time to provide the power within the organisation 
(Ibid.).  Despite that continuing state of flux, there is one constant - the value set that 
dominates policing, which at its core is still composed of “mediaeval ideas of duty, honor 
[sic], personal loyalty to superiors and obedience” (Manning, 2008: 23).  The reader will 
see later, that value set (or orthodoxy) persists in British policing.  
Clearly, the police organisation has undergone significant change (see for 
example Manning, 2008; Newburn, 2008; and Sklansky, 2007).  The patrol function has 
been reshaped by community policing initiatives, team policing, problem-oriented 
policing and a myriad of variations on those themes.  However as King-Taylor (1992: 
117) found in her study of the Metropolitan Police’s Plus Programme, even in the 1990s 
many officers felt that the Met was locked into a “paramilitary approach to management” 
that did not allow individuals to be “creative, to be entrepreneurial, to use creative 
thinking, or to take a risk in problem-solving”.  Sklansky (2007: 31) argued that neither 
the attempts to reshape policing nor the new theories of inclusive management that 
                                                 
5 Different approaches to interpreting the ways in which means are oriented to the achievement of ends (see 
Weber, 1947).  
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emerged, at the end of the last century, necessarily delivered greater democracy, 
inclusiveness or accountability in law enforcement agencies.  Instead, policing clung 
stubbornly to “authoritarian management practices long discredited in other, traditionally 
hierarchical sectors” (Sklansky, Ibid.). 
In the recent history of policing in Britain, a consistent theme has been the effort 
to professionalise what traditionally was the seen as the craft of policing.  Debates about 
the modernisation of the workforce began at around the time that NPM principles were 
introduced to policing in the 1980s.  Home Office inquiries into the delivery of policing 
services in that context (such as Sheehy, 1993; Posen, 1995; Flanagan, 2008; and Winsor, 
2011) have focused on achieving best value in policing.  That is, the rationalisation of 
policing services either through civilianisation, reviews of what the police must do (and 
what could be done by others more cheaply), or by reducing police pay or allowances in 
various ways.  Equally, attempts have been made to secure a more accountable and 
transparent police service through legislation (such as the PMCA and the Police Reform 
Act 2002) and through the establishment of new oversight bodies (such as the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission).  By contrast, there have been fewer 
meaningful, direct, attempts to change the management style in policing.6 
The specific driver of more recent attempts to redefine police leadership was the 
‘workforce modernisation’ element of the Labour Government’s police reform 
programme, which initially was set out in the White Paper Building Communities: 
Beating Crime.  Golding and Savage (2008) highlighted that there were three strands of 
that programme that focused on leadership.  These were: enhancing workforce 
professionalism; opening up the service to ‘new talent’; and improving leadership at 
every level of the police.  Golding and Savage (2008: 733) suggested that the search for 
‘transformational leaders’ who value individuals and can empower and enable others is 
frustrated by the tension between leadership and the performance management culture 
that pervades policing.  They argued that the pressure to ‘get results’ from the police is 
                                                 
6 I recognise that just as there are many cultures in policing there also are many management styles.  I am 
referring here to an authoritarian style of management of the kind described by Sklansky (2007), which I argue 
is endemic in the uniformed branch of the service. 
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likely to continue and that there may be “long-term pressure to demonstrate compliance 
with the performance culture” with significant consequences for the quality of police 
leadership (2008: 748).  The reader will see later, that kind of pressure was a significant 
factor in the story of the NIM.   
Neyroud’s (2010) report into police leadership and training argued inter alia for 
the professionalisation of the police workforce.  He recommended the establishment of a 
Police Professional Body, supported by a Charter, and responsible for national standards 
and ‘qualification frameworks’.  Interestingly, he argues that the body should include 
individuals from all levels of the service.  In my view, representation on such a panel 
would be a desirable first step in ameliorating some of the problems of the past.  However, 
it would be no more than that.  Neyroud’s other recommendations, which include ideas 
for new ways of  developing managers that emphasise professional knowledge but also 
leadership and command skills, are equally important in that context.7 
 
Oversight of the Police 
This section consider the tripartite system of governance, established by the Police Act 
1964, which divided responsibility for the executive function of forces between the Home 
Secretary, local police authorities and chief constables.8  Reiner (2010: 79) argued that 
together with the introduction of Unit Beat Policing (UBP) and the Regional Crime 
Squads (which were significant developments in police investigative practice), the Act 
was a significant element in the “transformation of the police organisation in the 
mid-1960s”.  The section also assesses the impact on police management processes of the 
management philosophy known as NPM which in its own way, also was 
transformational.   
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Change on this scale is unusual in policing but it is not without precedent.  Readers may see some similarities 
between some aspects of Neyroud’s plans and Peter Imbert’s PLUS programme in London (see King-Taylor, 
1992 for more details of PLUS). 
8 Except in London where separate arrangements were made for the Metropolitan and City Police forces. 
 39 
Police Governance 
The “complex and much-debated” history of police governance (Reiner, 2010: 227), and 
the wider interrelationship between police chiefs, police authorities and the Home Office 
has already been well chronicled by commentators such as: Marshall (1965 and 1978); 
Lustgarten (1986); Reiner (1991 and 2010); Jones and Newburn (1997) and Jones (2003 
and 2008).  Therefore, this section presents no more than a brief characterisation of that 
debate to contextualise the freedom (or otherwise) of chief officers to deploy staff and to 
determine the distribution of resources.  Waddington (1999: 187) argued that the current 
constitutional position has been shaped by: 
A protracted struggle between competing principles and interests: political 
independence versus electoral accountability; central rather than local power; 
manufacturing and mercantile interests against the landed gentry… [that has] only 
partly been played out in constitutional legislation.   
Oliver (1997: 15) argued that the 1964 Act removed the tension between central 
government and police authorities and between local authorities and chief constables on 
the subject of control.  After its implementation, there was absolutely no doubt that the 
ultimate power lay with the Home Secretary and the responsibility for “operational” 
matters explicitly was limited to chief officers (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984 cited in 
Reiner, 2010).  Police authorities were responsible only for securing the “maintenance of 
an adequate and efficient police force for the area” (section 4.1 of the Act).  The common 
interpretation of the distinction between ‘operational’ and ‘policy’ matters that emerged, 
in reality were “arbitrary and tendentious” and had no legislative basis Reiner (2010: 
227).  However, chief officers certainly have exploited the independence of action that 
distinction afforded them and have taken full advantage of that and other factors (such as 
the increasing influence of the police lobby, discussed later in this thesis) to strengthen 
their powers at the expense of police and local authorities and to assert their own 
‘operational independence’ from the authorities and from central government (see Reiner, 
2010; Loveday, 1998; Brogden, 1977, for further discussion) (Later, I also will discuss 
the relationship between chief officers and the Home Secretary in the context of the early 
development of the detective force).  
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Chief constables, individually and through ACPO, have always been keen to 
assert their right to ‘operational independence’ even though there is no legislative 
authority for such a right (Lustgarten, 1986).  Indeed, Lustgarten (1986: 65) argued the 
essential correctness of the view first put forward by Marshall (1965).  That was to say; 
that the doctrine of constabulary independence was of recent origin, and “no part of the 
tradition of ‘English liberty’” and was undeserving of the status afforded it by the 
judiciary.  In Lustgarten’s view, Lord Denning’s landmark judgement in R v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (see [1968] 2 QB 118, 135-136), 
had “cast a dismal pall over the discussions of police governance” and simply highlighted 
that the term ‘operational independence’ had no legal provenance whatsoever (1986: 78). 
Marshall (1965) characterised the relationship between the police service and its political 
‘partners’ in this period as ‘explanatory and cooperative’.  He contrasted that with the 
‘subordinate and obedient’ kind of accountability to local communities, demanded by 
radical critics (see Reiner, 2010 and Simey, 1988 for further discussion of that radical 
perspective).   
A further criticism of police authorities in the period following the 1964 Act, was 
that they did not even use the limited powers they retained very effectively, often 
deferring instead to chief constables’ ‘professional expertise’ (see for example Loveday, 
1991 and Reiner, 1991).  Subsequent restructuring of police governance by the Police and 
Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (PMCA), delivered what Reiner (2010) called a ‘calculative 
and contractual’ style of accountability that reflected Government’s centralising agenda 
and a new commitment within Government to ‘best value’.  The PMCA inter alia also 
modified the size and composition of police authorities and gave them the responsibility 
for issuing an annual policing plan, ostensibly, in the cause of making them more 
‘businesslike’.   
Reiner (2010: 234) noted that in the “fashionable terminology” of new public 
management (discussed below) central government after the Act would be “steering but 
not rowing”.  This enabled it, rather than police authorities, to increase control of policing 
and to “penetrate the parts... [it] could not reach hitherto”, day-to-day operational 
policing.  This would be achieved through a ‘carrot and stick’ approach (the reader will 
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see later that a similar policy was pursued during the Unit Beat Policing experiment and 
also in the case of the NIM).  The carrot; financial rewards to individual chief officers for 
attaining targets specified in policing plans (Reiner, 2010).  The stick; intervention in 
‘failing’ forces or BCUs, in the modern era, by the newly established Police Standards 
Unit (PSU) which would take over some of the management functions of 
under-performing forces (assessed against a new Police Performance Assessment 
Framework) (Mawby and Wright, 2003). 
In practice, the new powers of ‘direction and control’ that the 1994 Act conferred 
on police authorities benefited them only marginally because, despite Government 
rhetoric, the PMCA was inherently centrist.  The business that the more ‘businesslike’ 
police authorities were meant to be doing was the business of Government, rather than its 
own (Reiner, 2010).  Even where opportunities to influence chief constables emerged, 
authorities demonstrated a continuing reluctance to challenge chief officers who (freed 
from detailed financial control by the PMCA) were at liberty to ‘row’ in any way they 
decided.  Though as Reiner (2010: 233) noted, the reality was that chief officers’ were 
able to choose any course they wished, “so long as it was in the direction ‘steered’ by the 
Home Secretary”.  
 
+ew Public Management 
The PMCA was introduced during a period in which there was a wider search by 
Government for new approaches that could deliver economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  In other words, better ‘value for money’ in the public sector.  Such policies 
were underpinned by the management philosophy known as New Public Management 
(NPM).  Reiner (2010: 24) argued that the application of what essentially was a private 
sector model represented a “neo-liberal belief that private enterprise and market models” 
worked best in the modern era.  The first manifestation of NPM in public policy was the 
Conservative Government’s ‘Financial Management Initiative’ of 1982 which was 
intended to encourage better financial control of the public sector and the more accurate 
measurement of the outputs of investment in public resources.     
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Just a year later, the Conservatives’ aspirations for the public sector were 
translated into police service objectives by Home Office departmental circular 114/1983 
which encouraged the application of NPM principles to policing (Burrows and Lewis, 
1988).  Home Office circulars do not carry the force of law but there is no doubting their 
significance.  For ACPO (2008: 23), circular 114/1983 was “a seminal text that 
influenced the thoughts and actions of police leaders for a decade or more”.  Brooks 
(2010: 1) noted that it introduced into policing the three E's (efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness) and ‘policing by objectives’ but also, more importantly in the context of 
this research, the notion that "what gets measured is what gets done".  I will argue later 
that the idea has skewed operational policing activity because it has encouraged 
commanders to ignore objective intelligence assessments and to forego longer-term (and 
potentially more efficient, effective and economic) solutions to policing problems, in 
their pursuit of short-term performance-related gains in the context of standards imposed 
by central government. 
Others too, identified unintended consequences of the circular.  For example, 
Weatheritt (1993: 26-27) found it encouraged systems geared to the “production of more 
specific local objectives aimed at generating purposeful planned activity” rather than the 
‘three Es’.  Her research indicated that local objectives were often “formulated on the 
basis of poor, irrelevant or incomplete information” and were “unrealistic”, particularly 
when they sought reductions in crime.  She concluded that “organisationally, the results 
of objective-related activity tended to lead nowhere”.  Weatheritt argued that it was also 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which accountability was served by the new systems.  
Feedback to partners was bound to be of lesser quality than that produced for internal 
purposes which, because of inadequacies and inefficiencies in the police intelligence 
structure, already was “patchy” (Weatheritt 1993: 28).   
Wall (1998: 313) noted that the tensions between the public sector management 
ethos and the new business ethos of NPM were “fundamentally different” because the 
former focuses on inputs and outputs whereas the latter involves the much more 
challenging and complex business of “managing physical acts, public perceptions and 
political considerations”.  For this reason the police initially were able to resist the 
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Conservatives’ plans.   However, at the end of the 1980s, as the “love affair” between the 
Tories and the police cooled and cuts in police expenditure were demanded, real efforts 
were made to embed NPM reforms in policing (Rawlings, cited in Reiner, 2000: 73).   
The Conservatives’ ‘setting’ of the Audit Commission on the service was 
followed, in the early 1990s, by the commissioning of the Sheehy (1993) and Posen 
(1995) inquiries.  Together, these moves by the Home Office challenged the power of 
chief constables and sought to engineer radical reform in policing (which despite record 
levels of funding had failed to deliver the reduction in crime that was popularly expected).  
The attempt to increase central control and to ‘contract out’ ancillary tasks were fiercely 
opposed by the Police Federation and, even more effectively, by ACPO which was 
successful in watering-down many of Sheehy’s and Posen’s recommendations (such as 
fixed-term contracts for officers and performance-related pay).  Newburn (2003: 93) 
argued that in the process, the Association demonstrated that it had become “a highly 
organised and effective national coordinating body [and] a supremely effective lobbying 
organisation”.  I will argue later that the NIM provides further evidence of ACPO’s 
effectiveness in that context. 
The new emphasis on efficient, effective and economic criminal catching was 
detrimental to the ‘whole service’ approach that some police commanders (including 
Phillips) saw as so necessary to policing in the modern era.  I argue that it served to 
reinforce the pre-existing divide between the CID and the rest of the service because it 
confirmed the business of detectives, ‘crime fighting’ as ‘real’ policing and many of the 
functions of the uniformed department as ‘ancillary’ to the policing mission.  Certainly, 
the impact of NPM was felt much less in the CID and arguably had no impact whatsoever 
on the specialist detective squads, which deal with a large proportion of the serious and 
organised crime in the UK (see Maguire and Norris, 1992 and Morgan et al, 1996).  
Loveday (1998) argued that NPM actually strengthened the power of the CID (which I 
will argue later had been in serious decline since the 1970s) because the bureaucracy that 
accompanied it was based on a series of mistaken assumptions about policing.  The most 
significant of which was that more specialist departments utilising better technologies 
could make a real difference to crime levels.  This had had the effect of siphoning off 
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officers from mainstream patrol duties so that “more and more non-uniformed officers 
watched fewer uniformed officers do more work that should have been their own” 
(Loveday, 1998: 3). 
 
The Oversight Bureaucracy 
Beyond the police authorities described in the previous section, a ‘new bureaucracy’ was 
needed to monitor the progress of senior commanders in implementing NPM reforms.   
Reiner (2010: 229) argued that rather than trying to achieve this by direct action, central 
government exercised its influence by proxy through its ‘instruments’: “Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), ACPO and national specialist policing units” (such 
as NCIS).  I argue here that one reasonably might add to that list, other arrangements 
inspired by the perceived success of the ‘COMPSTAT’ system in New York City.  The 
Audit Commission too, played a significant part in overhauling policing and investigation 
at the end of the last century and its role is examined here.  The relationship between the 
Home Office and these bodies is complex and is different in each case.  It should perhaps 
be highlighted that central government may have extended its reach through these bodies 
but that together with ACPO; these organisations act as an effective community (or 
network) influencing policing policy at every level (Ryan, Savage and Wall, 2001; 
Savage, Charman and Cope, 2000 and Wall, 1998).  
 
COMPSTAT 
The word COMPSTAT entered the policing lexicon in 1994.  It was coined by New York 
Police Department (NYPD) commanders and represented a shortening of the terms 
‘computer statistics or ‘comparative statistics’ (Maple (1999) one of its chief architects 
has observed that nobody can be certain which of the terms is accurate).  COMPSTAT 
supported a campaign by the new mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, to drive down crime levels in 
the city.  The COMPSTAT message was that tough and ruthless management of 
operational resources was key to achieving that goal.   
Giuliani appointed William Bratton as his police commissioner.  Given a free 
hand to reorganise the NYPD, Bratton embarked on a programme of structural change 
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underpinned by a belief in the new orthodoxy in American police thinking espoused by, 
amongst others, Wilson and Kelling (Bratton, 1998).  The COMPSTAT process was 
intended to ensure that information was gathered and managed in ways that allowed 
resources to be targeted at the most pressing policing problems (which I will argue later, 
was exactly Phillips’ ambition for the NIM).  Bratton (1998) argued that internal 
accountability arrangements were crucial to the success of the project.  Precinct 
commanders were given the authority to address the problems in their areas as they saw 
fit but were called to account for their decisions by the NYPD’s executive.  Weekly Crime 
Control Strategy Meetings, at which the commanders reported their results, took place in 
a “data-saturated environment”; central to those meetings were the statistical analyses 
contained within the weekly COMPSTAT report (Weisburd et al, 2006). 
COMPSTAT meetings increased internal accountability but they could be brutal 
affairs.  Persistent failure to meet standards meant demotion or worse.  Within 18 months 
of taking control, Bratton had transferred a third of his precinct commanders and fired 
four of the five NYPD ‘superchiefs’ (Maple, 1999: 136).  His stated intention was that 
COMPSTAT principles should influence decision-making at all levels of the NYPD.  
However, little evidence has been found to suggest that diffusion of the system’s aims and 
objectives took place in practice.  COMPSTAT concentrated strategic decision making at 
the top of the organizational hierarchy rather than promoting initiative among frontline 
staff in the mainstream (Weisburd et al, 2006), and a survey of US police agencies 
suggested that “the rank and file remain largely oblivious to COMPSTAT and that it 
intruded little, if at all, into their daily work” (Willis et al, 2003: 291).  Tellingly, Willis et 
al (2003a: 77) found that COMPSTAT departed markedly from what had been promised 
and did not “represent a radical transformation in the way these departments have done 
business” rather, they had “transplanted some new ways of doing business without 
making much change to some very fundamental structures of police organizations”.   
Notwithstanding those research findings, the apparent success of COMPSTAT led 
to the implementation of similar processes and widespread interest from practitioners and 
researchers across the United States and beyond.  Hayes (1998) and Griffiths (1998) (both 
senior commanders in the Metropolitan Police Service in the 1990s who visited New 
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York City to see Bratton’s ideas in practice) broadly welcomed the development of 
COMPSTAT and supported its adoption in the UK.  Hayes (1998) believed that elements 
of the COMPSTAT process could be implemented in the UK but that limited resources 
and the need to meet regional and national demands meant that it was unrealistic to expect 
it to succeed in its entirety.  Importantly in the context of the UK debate, neither of these 
senior commanders saw COMPSTAT as a replacement for existing management and 
oversight mechanisms (Griffiths, 1998). 
COMPSTAT was designed to serve the NYPD and New York City’s 
communities.  It was not intended that it should play a part in addressing state level or 
federal challenges and in that respect, the process can be seen as rather inward looking 
(However, the complete lack of state or federal funding for the programme might explain 
this apparent parochialism).  Weisburd et al (2003) have argued that COMPSTAT 
succeeded in the USA because it complemented existing strategic problem-solving 
processes and it seemed to have achieved so much in New York City.  However, the 
greater appeal of COMPSTAT for US police departments was that although it promised 
innovation in organisation, strategies and tactics, in reality it did not “demand a revolution 
in the organisational structure of the military model of policing” (Weisburd et al, 2003: 
449).   
Rather than offering real reform, COMPSTAT served only to reinforce the 
traditional control elements of the rational-legal, bureaucratic, police organisational 
model in the United States which made the system more palatable for US commanders.  
Perhaps that fact points to the relative success of COMPSTAT (as perceived by police 
commanders) when judged against the NIM.  Phillips’ plans for his model required 
wholesale structural change in frontline policing services.  As such, they challenged many 
orthodoxies and traditions in British policing.  I will argue in later chapters that it was the 
British police elite’s resistance to accepting that challenge that was the greatest difficulty 
that the NIM faced.  I will also show that the NIM implementation team learned little 
from the COMPSTAT experience.  
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HMIC 
Since the County and Borough Police Act 1856, oversight of British policing has been the 
responsibility of HMIC.  The first three inspectors of constabulary came from military 
backgrounds; two had previously held the post of chief constable (Wall, 1998).  They 
were required to certify the efficiency of forces by means of an annual report to 
Parliament.    Certification was extremely important for local finances because it meant 
that the force would receive one quarter of its annual pay and clothing costs from the 
Treasury in the form of an ‘efficiency grant’ (Emsley, 1991).  Section 38 of the Police Act 
1964 confirmed the inspectors’ pivotal role in the oversight of police forces.  Mawby and 
Wright (2003) argued that HMIC occupies an unusual constitutional position in that 
inspectors have independent status as servants of the Crown rather than as Home Office 
employees.   However, it has been criticised for favouring the government of the day.  
Hence, Reiner’s (2010) observation that the inspectorate is an instrument of government.  
Mawby and Wright (2003: 188) do not disagree with Reiner’s position but they have 
argued that HMIC’s self-image as a representative of the rational-legal bureaucracy is 
unsurprising given its history.   
From the establishment of HMIC until 1993 (when the first lay inspectors were 
appointed), all HMIs were recruited by government from the senior ranks of the police 
service.  Inspectors were of chief constable or assistant chief constable rank and largely 
were in the final years of their police career.  Therefore, not only did inspectors owe their 
continuing employment in their chosen profession to government patronage but they also 
were steeped in the bureaucratic tradition of the police service.  It was only to be expected 
that the resulting organisation would be conservative to the core and would tend to 
reinforce the traditional hierarchy and orthodoxy of the service.  During the 1980s, 
HMIC’s role was broadened and enhanced (Weatheritt, 1986 cited in Jones, 2003).  
Significantly, the inspection process itself was standardised, lay inspectors were 
appointed as were younger chief officers who were encouraged to see appointment to 
HMIC as offering the prospect of further advancement in the service (Reiner, 2010). 
Currently, HMIC is made up of a total of 10 inspectors or assistant inspectors, 
three of whom are from a non-police background.  Inspectors carry out force and Basic 
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Command Unit (BCU) inspections as well as thematic inspections of discrete policing 
areas (for example, of ‘diversity’ HMIC, 2003 and particularly significant in the context 
of this study, ‘intelligence’ HMIC, 1997).  Since 2004, HMIC inspectors have held the 
primary responsibility for assessing NIM compliance in England and Wales.   HMIC’s 
mission is to “promote efficiency and effectiveness through inspection and assessment… 
to ensure that: performance is improved; good practice is spread; and standards are 
agreed, achieved and maintained”.  Its role has been explained in the Police Acts (1994 
and 1996) and the Local Government Act (1999) (Mawby and Wright, 2003).  HMIC also 
provides advice and support to criminal justice system partners and “plays an important 
roll [sic] in the development of future police leaders” (HMIC, 2004: 2).   HMIC’s work 
therefore is to scrutinise the performance of the police service and it does this through an 
increasingly elaborate matrix of performance indicators (Reiner, 2010); since the 
codification of the NIM on 12th January 2005, one of those performance indicators has 
been the application of the NIM.9  This is a subject of discussion throughout the thesis. 
Though HMIC plays the premier role in inspection activity, since 1988 the police 
have also been scrutinised by “professional outsiders” (Weatheritt 1993 cited in Mawby 
and Wright, 2003: 188).  Chief amongst these has been the Audit Commission.   
 
Audit Commission 
Though the Audit Commission’s influence has declined, in the period that the NIM was 
formulated it played an extremely important role in reshaping perceptions of criminal 
investigation.  The Commission was introduced in 1982 by the Local Government 
Finance Act and its establishment clearly illustrated the shift towards what Reiner (1993) 
called a ‘calculative and contractual’ model of governance.  The Commission’s remit was 
to scrutinize local government spending and NPM principles in the public sector (Mawby 
and Wright, 2003), by assessing the performance of public bodies against a limited set of 
performance indicators (Newburn, 2003).  It first focused its attention on the police in 
                                                 
9 Section 2.3.1 of the NIM Code of Practice directs that “HM Inspectorate of Constabulary will inspect police 
forces in England and Wales to ensure compliance with this code and with the Minimum Standards document of 
April 2003 (and any successor document)”. 
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1988 and in the following 11 years published a variety of reports on: police funding, 
crime management, and police patrol (Mawby and Wright, 2003).   
Jones (2003: 615) argued that the establishment of the Commission was 
emblematic of the increasing national control of policing in the 1980s.  He argued that its 
purpose was to provide “vigorous external scrutiny” for the inspection process conducted 
by HMIC.  Weatheritt (1993) suggested that the Commission quickly became a key 
player in the policing milieu, producing a series of highly critical reports aimed at 
stimulating a new drive for value for money in policing (cited in Reiner, 2010).  Other 
commentators agreed that the Commission played a significant role in influencing 
policing policy at the end of the twentieth century through its continuing focus on 
performance management and the promulgation of best practice (see Newburn, 2003 and 
Savage et al, 2000).   
Savage et al (2000) agreed that the Commission demonstrated skill in identifying 
and disseminating best practice.  However, this was not always valued within the service 
with one ACPO respondent in their study noting that: 
I have yet to read an Audit Commission report that tells me anything I didn’t 
already know... [it] goes around, steals your best ideas and puts it in a flashy, 
excellently prepared and beautifully presented document… and they always seem 
to present it in a way that they’ve discovered the meaning of life and the Holy Grail 
(cited in Savage et al, 2000: 135). 
This clearly was a minority view because the Commission developed close 
relations with ACPO.  It was extremely successful in influencing mainstream policing 
policy, and for a period at the end of the last century the Commission and ACPO worked 
symbiotically so that the latter welcomed investigations as the means of providing 
impetus for reform (Savage et al, 2000).  The Commission often consulted ACPO over its 
selection of topics for investigation and there was even some evidence that its activities 
led some ACPO members to believe that it had overtaken HMIC as the premier 
scrutinising body.  Savage et al (2000) highlighted that the Commission was especially 
influential on policing for only a short period and that by the end of the century it had 
turned its attention to other areas of the criminal justice system. However, commentators 
have acknowledged that its influence on police history was considerable (see Reiner, 
2010; Newburn, 2003; Savage et al, 2000).  
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Public Policymaking 
The essentially “complex and multi-layered” public policy process (Hill, 2009: 4), has 
been the subject of considerable research (see for example, Hill, 2006 and 1993; Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1996; Weaver, 1986; Albrow, 1980; Lipsky 1980).  There is a consensus that 
the sociology of organisations makes an important contribution to the study of the policy 
process because most policymaking takes place within institutions (see for example Hill, 
2009 and Hay, 2002).  Hill (2009: 9) argued that sociology is particularly important in 
interpreting the translation of policies (like the NIM) into action and “exploring issues 
about the behaviour of workers within complex organisations (among which state 
bureaucracies loom large)”.    
 A range of theories has been developed to explain the public policymaking and 
policy implementation processes.  Some concern themselves with bureaucratic power and 
the domination of those within the institutions affected by the policy.  For example the 
‘garbage can’ model advanced by March and Olsen (1996: 251) posits that actors “act 
within definitions of alternatives, consequences, preferences (interests), and strategic 
options” that are strongly affected by their institutional contexts.  
An institutional theory-linked approach which captures the environment within 
which the NIM was conceived and developed is Kingdon’s ‘Agenda Setting’ approach.  
Kingdon conceives of an agenda as a “list of subjects or problems to which governmental 
officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are 
paying serious attention to at any given time” (Kingdon, 2003: 3).  Rather than being 
comprehensive or rational, solutions are connected to problems and both are connected to 
“favourable political forces” (Kingdon, 2003: 20).   The combination of these elements is 
most likely when policy entrepreneurs (such as Phillips) take advantage of “policy 
windows” opened by those problems or political imperatives.  Therefore the prominence 
of an idea on an agenda relies not on its source nor even on the fact that there may be an 
entrepreneur encouraging policy change but rather it is the “climate in government or the 
receptivity of ideas of a given type” that is key (Kingdon, 2003: 72). 
However, Kingdon’s approach is limited in that it does not fully consider the 
policy implementation process.  Hill (2009) argues that once policy leaves the rarefied 
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atmosphere in which it was created, it is influenced by the reality of the outside world so 
that it becomes much more complex as it is translated into action.  Therefore, 
implementation may itself be an ambiguous concept.  Early implementation studies 
focused on examining the process of putting a policy into action (see for example 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).  Later that approach, labelled ‘top-down’ by 
contemporary researchers (such as Hill and Hupe, 2009), was challenged by those such as 
Elmore (1981) who argued for a ‘bottom-up’ perspective that recognised that 
“implementation actors are forced to make choices between programmes which conflict 
or interact with each other” (Hill, 2009: 203).    
In this study, I rely on Sabatier’s approach to public policy implementation to help 
to evaluate the extent to which the NIM was fully implemented.  Sabatier (1986) 
suggested that researchers can synthesise top-down and bottom-up approaches when a 
“dominant piece of legislation structuring the situation” is present (Sabatier cited in Hill, 
2009: 204).  Such was the case with the NIM, which was codified by the Police Reform 
Act 2002.  Sabatier (1986) also highlighted that public policies rarely achieve their aims 
without major revision and that policymakers and those tasked with implementation must 
be flexible, resourceful and willing to reach compromises to achieve their goals.  The 
reader will see later just how flexible, resourceful and acquiescent were those charged 
with NIM implementation.   
 
Summary 
In compiling this chapter of relevant literature, I sought only to establish the context for 
my research of the NIM.  I have included here only those topics or dimensions of policing 
that have a direct relevance to the emergence or implementation of the model and then, 
only as much material about each as readers ‘need to know’ to fully appreciate the 
contribution of this research.  I included abridged analyses of the introduction of: 
innovative policing strategies at the end of the twentieth century; the police organisation; 
governance and oversight of the police; and police and public policymaking. 
I analysed the emergence of the innovative policing strategies that gained favour 
in the last decade of the twentieth century as police forces searched for effective, efficient 
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and economic crime control strategies that promised to be qualitatively ‘better’ than the 
reactive strategies they replaced.  I situated the roots of those intelligence-led approaches 
in the UBP experiment of the 1960s, examined their re-emergence as ILP in the 1990s.  I 
questioned the degree to which ILP really has replaced the reactive policing paradigm.  
Those are subjects that I will explore in some detail later. 
I selected literature on the police organisation.  I focused on research that 
described the contemporary structure of the organisation and those other aspects of the 
police milieu that are key to understanding the NIM.  I will later argue, that understanding 
the operation of forces and relations both between and within individual police forces, 
and between different branches of the service, is crucial to the understanding of the NIM’s 
emergence and implementation.  Issues of governance and oversight add another 
dimension to the debate.  Whilst they provide only limited information about the 
emergence and implementation of the NIM, I argue that to some extent they explain the 
service’s ultimate rejection of the model.    
I highlighted the key role in policymaking that can be played by a ‘policy 
entrepreneur’.  Later, I examine Phillips’ contribution to the emergence of the NIM and 
assess whether he may be considered a policy entrepreneur in that context.  Accepting 
Sabatier’s (1986) assertion that public policies rarely achieve their aims without major 
revision (see Appendix A), I examined the extent to which the NIM policymakers and 
those tasked with implementation were flexible, resourceful and willing to reach 
compromises to achieve Phillips’ goals. 
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Chapter 2 - Research Methods 
 
Introduction 
Examining the NIM offers a valuable insight into public and policing policy, police 
intelligence work, contemporary organisational structures and investigative practice in 
the mainstream.  My research is based on analyses of archival and official records, 
documentary materials, my own observations, and the collected views and experiences of 
the senior police commanders, police officers, police staff, and other officers and officials 
from Government, local government and other bodies who participated in this study.  
 
Rationale 
The research aimed to explain the emergence, development and implementation of the 
NIM, a key piece of policing policy at the beginning of the new millennium.  It aimed to 
evaluate the model against the background of claims (made by the NIM’s architects) that 
its integration into strategic policing plans would revolutionise investigative practice.  
That it would allow the service to make more effective use of its intelligence and its 
people, to reduce crime, improve community safety and encourage the development of 
inclusive policing partnerships.  
The confidence its architects had in the model, perhaps is best illustrated by a 
statement made to a Home Office official by the co-author of the NIM, an NCIS senior 
executive and former senior police officer in Kent (N02).  According to that senior 
executive, the model heralded a new era in investigation in which intelligence work 
would be allied to operational policing activity in the mainstream to deliver a “ten percent 
reduction in crime within two years, probably”.  I argue that in the history of policing, few 
senior law enforcement officers have countenanced making such an ambitious claim for a 
policing strategy and that even fewer would be willing to announce it to their political 
masters in the Home Office.  The NIM demanded explanation and evaluation.   
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Research Aims and Research Question 
The specific aims of the research were to:- 
1. Assess the extent to which developments in investigative practice and 
intelligence work contributed to the emergence of the NIM. 
2. Explain the policing policy environment at the end of the twentieth 
century. 
3. Explain the emergence of the NIM from that milieu.   
4. Evaluate the impact of the NIM on investigative practice and intelligence 
work in mainstream policing. 
5. Evaluate the implementation process. 
A table that describes the aims, research objectives, and the individual chapters in 
which they are addressed is attached at Appendix B. 
Dunleavy (2003: 33) recommended that researchers frame their research around 
“an intellectual problem or a paradox”, focusing on a “set of phenomena that ask for an 
explanation... and for which [the researcher] can formulate an interesting and effective 
answer”.  Ultimately, the question that this thesis set out to answer was simply, ‘What is 
the National Intelligence Model, why did it emerge and how has it influenced police 
organisational structures and investigative practice’? 
 
Research Design 
Hill (2009: 4 - 5) highlighted that research of the public policy process may broadly be 
categorised either as the “analysis of policy” by policy analysts interested in furthering 
the understanding of a particular policy or as “analysis for policy” by those interested in 
improving the quality of policy.  He notes that there is a third category of analysis which 
includes researchers who are interested in combining both activities.  This research falls 
into that third category.    
Having decided on a topic for study, I accepted Guba and Lincoln’s (2009) advice 
that researchers need to make their ontological and epistemological assumptions explicit 
before beginning their research).  The research tools I selected for the study were 
determined both by those assumptions and by the prior research in the field.  In designing 
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my study, I was well aware of Gidden’s (1976) warning that social reality affects both the 
researcher and the researched, and that it is wholly unrealistic to expect that any subject in 
the social sciences could be examined in isolated terms by value free observers.  As the 
introduction to this thesis explains, I could not claim to be a ‘value free observer’.  In 
terms of ‘social reality’, I was particularly conscious of the insider/outsider debate in 
research (as identified for example, by Reiner and Newburn, 2007).  My experiences in 
criminal investigation and intelligence work shaped my preconceptions, attitudes and 
beliefs and my view of the NIM and ILP was bound to differ from those of an ‘outsider’.  
I accepted that position brought with it advantages and disadvantages. 
I used my ‘insider’ knowledge to better understand the intelligence world and to 
describe the change processes involved in terms of the respondents’ own experiences.  I 
had already attended the Metropolitan Police Intelligence Managers’ Course and 
Advanced Informer Management Course.  I exploited my position as a Centrex trainer to 
secure a temporary post in the intelligence faculty at NCPE where I delivered the National 
Intelligence Management and Covert Law Enforcement Managers’ Courses.  Throughout 
that period, I met more than 200 officers from forces across Britain.  Officers visiting the 
training centre often raised the subject of the NIM.  Discussions of the model invariably 
centred on its perceived shortcomings and limitations  
I was also able to secure a place on the Bramshill ‘Fellowship’ scheme which is 
administered by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).  The scheme is 
designed to encourage academic research into topical policing issues.  Other than 
requiring that a single copy of the Fellow’s thesis is presented to the National Police 
Library at Bramshill, it makes no demands on researchers.  The fellowship provided 
official sanction for my research and I credit it with encouraging police officers and staff 
to give freely of their time. 
The next stage in the design process was to use my inside knowledge to identify 
and gain access to key actors in policing.  This included access to Phillips and members of 
ACPO’s NIM Implementation Team who at that time were formulating intelligence 
policy.  Phillips agreed to be interviewed and characteristically took the opportunity to 
offer me advice on my research design.   All the other ACPO members and force 
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executives that I contacted simply agreed to give of their time to discuss ILP and the NIM; 
many of their contributions are recorded in this thesis.  With the exception of one ‘Urban’ 
senior intelligence official (who is identified in the subsequent chapters as respondent 
N050), I had had no previous contact with any of the elite respondents.  I first met the 
senior intelligence official (N050) in 2002 in the course of my work with NCPE where I 
was employed as a visiting trainer.  At her request, I carried out field research into the 
Home Office's 'Safer Streets' initiative on behalf of the Urban force.  At that time I 
expressed an interest in researching the NIM and she agreed to help to facilitate my 
research.   
I welcomed her offer of assistance as I knew that gaining sufficient and relevant 
access would be challenging.  The tools and techniques of intelligence work are carefully 
guarded and intelligence material is subject to the Government Protective Marking 
Scheme (GPMS) (see Cumbria Constabulary, 2004),  and to legislation such as the 
Human Rights Act 2000, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  Thus, access to intelligence officers and to the product of 
their work requires careful negotiation.  I wanted to study forces that were likely to offer 
significantly contrasting perspectives on the NIM.  Fortunately, the senior intelligence 
official (N050) was willing to act as the research ‘gatekeeper’ and offered access to the 
Urban force which is one of the largest police forces in Britain.  She played a key role in 
facilitating my access to senior commanders, Urban executives and to borough 
commanders, and in helping me to overcome the access issues I describe here. 
Lee (1993 cited in Grønning, 1997) highlighted the key role that gatekeepers play 
in research.  Gatekeepers usually are managers in positions that allow them to exert a 
measure of control over the research environment or are otherwise able to influence the 
research.  He identified that they may be concerned with the picture of the organization 
that the research will paint and this can lead them to protect their own, legitimate, 
interests by exercising a degree of control over the research.  Hammersley and Atkinson, 
(1995) have observed that gatekeepers may block off certain lines of inquiry or shepherd 
the fieldworker in directions that present the organisation in the most  favourable light.  
However, to the best of my knowledge, these were not issues that presented themselves in 
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this research.  The senior intelligence official (N050) did not attempt overtly to steer, 
shape or block my work in any way.  I was given complete freedom to choose the BCU(s) 
in which I would carry out my fieldwork.   
I considered a number of Urban’s inner-city BCUs.  Eventually, I settled on a 
culturally and ethnically diverse BCU that had a history of social problems.  This enabled 
me to see the NIM in operation in the most challenging of operational policing conditions.  
I learnt that the BCU fell into the ‘problematic’ (or ‘challenged’ as one respondent later 
described it in interview) category for the Urban force.  This meant that it was subject to 
scrutiny from the force executive but also benefited from extra resources aimed at 
enabling it to meet Home Office performance targets.  The senior intelligence official 
(N050) took no further part in the research in Urban beyond effecting my introduction to 
the BCU commander.  I personally negotiated access to the NIM and other management 
meetings and to other BCU staff.  Unfortunately, as is very common in policing, shortly 
after our initial meeting that commander left the borough to attend a series of courses 
designed to equip him for higher command and he was absent for the duration of the 
fieldwork but I was able to confirm the arrangements with his deputy who honoured his 
commitment.  The temporary commander introduced me to the BCU's senior analyst 
(N039) who became my point of contact in the Urban BCU for the period of the research. 
The second case (designated ‘County’ for the purpose of the study) was one of 
five forces considered for the study.  The factors that influenced the choice of those forces 
were their proximity to the Urban force (thereby facilitating study by a single part-time 
researcher in full-time employment) and the contrast with the first case that they offered 
in terms of their size, social problems and operational capability.  I wrote to the chief 
officer of each force.  My letters highlighted my Bramshill Fellowship, the prior 
agreement of the Urban force and the senior intelligence official’s role as gatekeeper.  My 
communication was acknowledged by all five forces.  County was the first force to 
respond positively.  I was keen to begin my fieldwork and therefore arranged a meeting 
with County’s Deputy Chief Constable at his earliest convenience (which was about two 
weeks after the force had agreed in principle to the research).   
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The senior intelligence official (N050) took no part in my negotiations in County.  
The DCC approved access on the condition that I would not identify it by name.   I agreed 
to this condition as it is one commonly imposed on researchers and I did not consider that 
it would limit or constrain my research in any meaningful way.  The DCC allowed me the 
freedom to choose any of the force’s BCUs for more in-depth study.  I selected the BCU 
that my preliminary research indicated provided the greatest contrast (in terms of 
geography, demography and policing problems) with the selected BCU in the Urban 
force.  I met with the BCU commander (N027).  He agreed to facilitate the research and 
appointed the BCU's intelligence manager (N019) as my point of contact for the research.   
I believe that the senior intelligence official’s association with the research and 
my Bramshill fellowship were significant factors in securing agreement for the research.  
However, that agreement was only the first stage in the research process.  Organisational 
politics present many challenges to the researcher. Carrying out and publishing research 
in any organisation are political acts; when the research relates to one’s own organization, 
it may be considered to be particularly so.  Indeed “it might be considered subversive” 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2001: 64).  My extensive police career made me well aware of 
the potentially hazardous competing and conflicting relationships that exist in 
bureaucratic hierarchies such as the police service.  However, I believe that the strategies 
that I adopted helped me to overcome many of those challenges. 
 
Methods 
My research aimed to establish the NIM narrative, to find the story that best represented 
the emergence and development of the model and its impact on intelligence work and 
investigative practice by drawing on the existing research on the public policy process, 
contexts, experiences and narratives of practitioners.   I located that analysis, 
conceptually, within a wider policy framework.  Qualitative methods have been used 
successfully in this context many times (see for example; Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005; 
John and Maguire, 2003).  Though some may consider qualitative research ‘soft’, 
qualitative data can be rich, nuanced and textured.  In terms of the style of research to be 
conducted, qualitative was the obvious choice.   
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Researchers may aspire to objectivity and give proper regard to the validity and 
reliability of their work but there can be no doubt that “criteria of representation 
ultimately are decided by the researcher” and the researcher alone (Stake, 1994: 240).   
What is important is that the right design and the correct epistemological principles are 
matched to the question set.   So in that context, one of the most important decisions that a 
researcher has to make in planning the research is to match the research design to the 
research question. 
I selected an interpretive approach to the research because such an approach 
“acknowledges the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is being 
explored, and the situational constraints shaping this process” (Rowlands, 2005: 81).  
Interpretive research does not predefine dependent or independent variables, does not set 
out to test hypotheses, but instead aims to produce an “understanding of the social context 
the phenomenon and the process whereby the phenomenon influences and is influenced 
by the social context” (Walsham, 1995 cited in Rowlands, 2005: 81-82).  I complemented 
my interpretive approach with two case studies. 
Dubé and Paré (2003) have argued that case study research involves the 
examination of a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context or setting.  Either a 
single or several entities (such as a person, a group, an organization or a technology) are 
examined intensively in its/their social context.  No manipulation is involved (Dubé and 
Paré 2003).  In both case studies, I carried out research in the form of observations of 
relevant meetings and social interactions.  Carrying out case study research implies the 
use of several collection methods (e.g. document analysis, interviews and questionnaires) 
and data analysis methods (e.g. field notes and coding or other statistical methods to 
provide triangulation) (Dubé and Paré 2003).  All were used in this study. 
Triangulation can contribute both to the reliability (that is, the extent to which the 
application of the same research design produces the same result each time it is used 
under the same condition with the same subjects) and validity (that is, that the research 
leads to valid conclusions) of the case study.  I carried out archival research, examined 
primary documentary sources, carried out semi-structured interviews with police officers, 
police staff and others whose work might have been influenced by the NIM and facilitated 
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focus groups to include the views of those individuals who did not perceive their work to 
be so influenced.  
In order to collect credible and relevant data and to achieve a valid and reliable 
outcome, I spent many hours during the fieldwork conducting interviews with the sponsor 
and author of the NIM, with police commanders, with intelligence workers, with patrol 
officers, with representatives of local authorities and with members and officials of police 
authorities, carrying out direct observations and in examining documents and archive 
materials.  Thus the case study’s “unique strength” (Yin, 2003: 8), the ability to deal with 
a full range of evidence beyond that which might be obtained through a conventional 
historical study, was demonstrated.  
Using a case study for research purposes has been described as ‘one of the most 
challenging of all social science endeavours (Yin, 2003: 1).   The case study is “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context” (Yin, 2003: 13 - 14).  I observed many ‘real-life’ interactions during the course 
of my fieldwork.  The real challenge in that context was the ‘real-life’ aspect of the 
research.  I used my inside knowledge of policing and intelligence work to collect data 
from a wide variety of sources.  This allowed me to cope with the “technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points” wherein 
results rely on “multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion” (Yin, 2003: 13 - 14). 
 
Data Collection 
The research data consisted of archival and secondary material and primary data in the 
form of my own observations of the NIM in action and interview records.  I conducted 
most of the interviews between September 2005 and June 2007.  Though further 
interviews were conducted in 2007 and 2008 as gaps in the data were identified.   
It has been argued that the ‘best’ respondent is “one who has the knowledge and 
experience the researcher requires, has the ability to reflect, is articulate, has the time to 
be interviewed, and is willing to participate in the study” (Morse, 1994: 228).  In this 
study, I anticipated that interviews would provide the richest, most textured data and this 
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was my preferred option for each respondent.  I interviewed a purposive sample of my 
population which included members of the police elite who played a significant role in the 
emergence and development of the NIM, those involved in the management of police 
operations in the mainstream and intelligence workers.  I also interviewed senior Home 
Office officials, police authority members and officials, and local authority members and 
officials.  I preferentially recruited respondents that my preparatory work indicated, had 
knowledge and experience of the NIM and intelligence work. 
In addition, I conducted focus groups with the aim of obtaining a wider set of 
views on the NIM and intelligence work.  Powell et al (1996) have defined a focus group 
as a set of individuals selected and assembled to discuss, from their personal experience, 
the subject of the research.  In this study I wanted to obtain the views of frontline officers 
and staff that had played no part in the emergence of the NIM and were not directly 
involved in intelligence work.  I played no part in the selection of these groups.  
Participants were chosen by their supervisors and simply represented those officers and 
members of staff who were available on the day appointed for the group to meet. 
In 2009, to fill a gap in the data on UBP and the development of the collator 
system I placed an advertisement in the magazine of the National Association of Retired 
Police Officers (NARPO) seeking the opinions of former collators on their experiences of 
intelligence work.  The magazine is circulated to all former officers who join NARPO.  A 
number of former collators or local intelligence officers (N030, N046, N059, N060, 
N061, N062 and N064) initially contacted me by e-mail and later provided written 
responses that reflected on their experiences of UBP and local intelligence systems.   
Also in 2009, to fill a further gap in the research on specialist detectives, a group 
of serving Urban serious crime squad detectives (N034, N048, N079, and N080) provided 
written responses on the nature of their work and their relationship with other branches of 
the police service.   These respondents represented a purposive sample of serious crime 
squad detectives.  Again, I preferentially recruited respondents who, my research 
indicated, had knowledge and experience of the NIM and intelligence work. 
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Units of Analysis 
A detailed breakdown of the research involved interpreting the general history of 
investigative practice, intelligence work and the NIM and the case studies of NIM 
implementation.  The general history was established through archival research at the 
National Police Library, Bramshill, Hampshire; the Metropolitan Police Library at Peel 
Centre, Colindale, North London; the National Archives at Kew, West London and the 
British Library, the analysis of primary documentary material, secondary documentary 
material and through semi-structured interviews.   
The National Archive provided a wealth of material on the development of the 
CID and investigative practice.  I was able to access many Metropolitan Police records 
(mainly from HO 287, MEPO 2, MEPO 3 and MEPO 12) including a very large file that 
contained details of the proceedings of the Home Office Committee on Detective Work 
(1933-1936).  The archived file seems to have been Metropolitan Police Assistant 
Commissioner Norman Kendall’s personal record of the proceedings as it is heavily 
annotated by him.  It is a weighty document though it is probably incomplete.  
Nevertheless, it is an extremely valuable resource given the Home Office’s reluctance to 
share its own record of the committee’s work.  Williamson et al (2007) recorded that in 
2007, the Home Office’s file of proceedings remained classified and unavailable to 
researchers.   
Another important source of data was the biographical (in some cases, 
autobiographical) accounts of former members of the service elite.  I was able to draw on 
the published autobiographies of Robert Mark and David McNee (both former 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police), Gilbert Kelland (former Assistant 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police), Ronald Howe (former Assistant 
Commissioner Crime), William Bratton (former chief of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD)), Jack Maple (former senior commander of the NYPD) and on audio 
recordings of interviews with Arthur Hambleton (former Chief Constable of Dorset) and 
John Alderson (former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall) that were made for 
Granada Television’s World in Action.  I also drew on the published biographies of 
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Charles Vincent (the first chief of the Criminal Investigation Department) and Basil 
Thomson (head of the Metropolitan Police CID, 1913-1919).    
Urban and County forces (and their respective selected BCUs) each represented a 
unit of analysis in this study.  The case studies relied on observations, interviews, focus 
groups and the analysis of various intelligence products generated in the two forces.  The 
case studies used both primary and secondary sources of data.  Three strategic meetings, 
six tactical meetings, two weekly intelligence meetings, daily management meetings, 
daily intelligence meetings and a variety of consultative forums were observed in each 
force. 
 
Investigative Practice, Intelligence Work and the +IM  
The following interviewees provided data on the history of investigative practice, 
intelligence work and the creation, development and implementation of the NIM:- 
Sir David Phillips, Director of NCPE, former President of ACPO and Chief 
Constable of Kent Police 
N01 – ACPO member, with responsibility for crime policy 
N02 – NCIS senior executive, co-author of the NIM 
N03 - ACPO member who played a key role in NIM implementation 
N04 – former ACPO member  
N05 – APA official 
N06 - ACPO member (intelligence) 
N013 - Home Office official 
N017 - detective constable and FIO in Urban 
N050 - senior official in charge of NIM implementation in Urban 
N053 - ACPO member 
N054 – NCPE executive 
N055 - former detective inspector, head of force intelligence bureau (FIB) in a 
West Country force and NCPE trainer 
N063 - former detective chief inspector and NCS commander 
N065 - Home Office senior official 
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N084 – intelligence analyst 
N0100 – former detective chief inspector 
  
I obtained written contributions for the same purpose from:- 
N034 – specialist detective (sergeant) 
N048 – specialist detective (inspector) 
N051- former detective superintendent 
N079 - specialist detective (inspector) 
N080 - specialist detective (sergeant) 
N102 – Police Federation representative 
 
Urban Case Study 
The following interviewees contributed data to the Urban case study:-   
N015 - senior official, strategy unit 
N016 – inspector, corporate tasking and coordination 
N017 - detective constable and FIO 
N030 – former constable and collator 
N031 – member of senior command team 
N033 - BCU commander 
N035 - BCU detective chief inspector 
N036 - BCU chief inspector, ‘partnerships’ 
N038 - BCU detective inspector, intelligence manager 
N039 - BCU senior analyst 
N040 - BCU constable, intelligence researcher 
N042 - BCU detective sergeant, focus desk supervisor 
N043 - BCU analyst 
N044 - BCU analyst 
N045 - BCU constable, FIO 
N052 – local police authority member 
N050 - senior official in charge of NIM implementation in Urban 
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N053 - ACPO member 
N058 – local authority crime reduction manager 
N062 - former detective sergeant and intelligence officer 
N098 – Urban DOI 
 
The following respondents participated in Urban focus groups:- 
N049 – BCU constable (patrol officer) 
N066 - BCU constable (patrol officer) 
N070 - BCU sergeant (criminal justice unit) 
 
To complement the Urban field research, I obtained written responses from:- 
N046 - former constable and collator 
N059 - former constable and collator 
N060 - former constable, collator and local intelligence officer 
N064 - former constable and collator 
N079 – specialist detective (inspector)  
 
County Case Study 
The following interviewees contributed data to the County case study:- 
N08 - county council analyst 
N09 - county council crime reduction manager  
N010 – local authority chief executive 
N011 - chair of the local police authority 
N018 - BCU detective sergeant, intelligence manager 
N019 - BCU intelligence manager 
N020 - BCU intelligence researcher 
N022 - BCU senior analyst 
N023 - BCU analyst 
N024 - BCU analyst 
N025 - BCU assistant analyst 
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N026 - principal analyst 
N027 - BCU commander 
N028 - BCU CDRP chief inspector  
N029 - BCU CDRP chief inspector 
N032 – County DOI  
N074 - BCU police constable, schools liaison 
N099 - local authority chief executive 
 
The following respondents participated in County focus groups:- 
N075 - BCU constable (patrol officer)  
N076 - BCU constable (patrol officer)  
N077 - BCU constable (patrol officer)  
 
Data Analysis 
All four focus groups and most interviews were tape recorded.  The exceptions were the 
interviews with respondents N057 (not recorded because of a malfunction in the 
recording equipment), N08, N09 and N019 (conducted in public places where the level of 
background noise meant that recording was impractical).  I made contemporaneous notes 
of those sessions.  Interview tape transcription was a significant issue.  Just over 43 hours 
and 6 minutes of conversation were recorded.  I transcribed all these tapes myself.   
It has been argued that transcription is “a pivotal aspect of qualitative inquiry” 
(Oliver et al 2005: 1273).   Transcription practices have been described in terms of a 
continuum.  At one end lies “naturalism” in which everything in the interview is 
transcribed with as much detail as possible.  Therefore, the transcript reflects a verbatim 
depiction of speech (Schegloff, 1997 cited in Oliver et al, 2005).  At the other end lies 
“denaturalism” in which any idiosyncrasies in speech are removed (Oliver et al, 2005: 
1273-1274).  I transcribed respondents’ verbal responses in full.  I ignored 
‘idiosyncrasies’ and other non-verbal responses.  I transcribed my questions only to the 
extent that was necessary to make sense of them for me.  I was interested less in the 
specifics of communication than the informational content of the transcript.  
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I collected together all the primary documentary material (including copies of 
official records), the interview and focus group transcripts, the written responses and my 
own field notes in a textual database.  I then coded my data in as objective and 
open-minded a fashion as I was able.  My coding efforts in the main were guided by 
Charmaz’s (2003) advice that when coding in this way one should pose simple questions 
about the data such as: ‘What are people doing’?  ‘What is being said’?  ‘What do actions 
and statements take for granted’?  ‘What is the context’?  Most codes emerged from the 
data.  However, some codes emerged from previous research in the field (particularly the 
research carried out by John and Maguire (2003)) and some (a small minority of the total 
codes used) were influenced by my own assumptions (acknowledged in Chapter 1).  
Data analysis was later facilitated by the use of the QSR NVivo software package.  
NVivo was used to create hierarchical index systems of the ideas that emerged from the 
data analysis.  The software enabled me much more easily to identify appropriate codes, 
categories and concepts and to reduce a mass of date to a manageable resource.  However, 
I adopted this package some three years into the study and thus a large amount of back 
record conversion was required. 
In terms of the presentation of the analysed data, the thesis is somewhat unusual in 
that there is not a discrete analysis section.  I argue that this seeming omission is 
conceptually consistent (in terms of the research itself which separately considers both 
the emergence of the NIM and NIM implementation) and that the strategy I adopted, does 
not limit the strength of the analysis but adds texture and depth to the narrative and allows 
the reader more easily to assess the extent to which the thesis achieves its aims and, 
ultimately, answers the research question.      
 
Ethical Issues 
I carried out the research with due regard for the LSE Research Ethics Policy, the Ethics 
Review Guidance for Researchers and the LSE publication ‘Informed Consent’.  I also 
gave proper regard to the six core principles for ethical research described in the ESRC 
Research Ethics Framework (ESRC, 2009).  
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As this chapter shows, I designed, reviewed and undertook the research in a way 
that ensured its integrity and quality.  I adopted best practice in carrying out interviews, 
focus groups, observation and other similar methods of data collection.  In that, I gave all 
respondents an information sheet that provided them with the aim, purpose and intended 
use of the data.  None of the respondents was a member of what would usually be 
considered to be a vulnerable group.  I ensured that there were no specific risks that arose 
in relation to their participation and none of the research respondents raised any concerns 
about the research or the use to which the material generated would be put.  
The research was carried out openly.  Initially all respondents were guaranteed 
anonymity, with the exception of Phillips whose unique contribution to the NIM is 
identified in the thesis.  This was confirmed in writing in the information sheet.  At the 
beginning of each interview or focus group, all respondents signed a consent form which 
I then stored in an evidentiary database.  Phillips communicated with me by e-mail and 
gave consent for the inclusion of his contributions here.  All respondents other than he, 
were assigned a unique reference number; all their contributions to the thesis are 
attributed to that reference number.  I have retained the recordings and transcriptions.  
Respondents may access their own contributions on request.  The research also will be 
available to respondents from the National Police Library, Bramshill.   
All participation in the study was voluntary.  No deception was practised and all 
respondents freely gave their consent.  I personally informed respondents that they could 
refuse to participate or withdraw from the research at any time.  One prospective member 
of an Urban focus group declined any involvement during my explanation of the research 
and they were allowed to leave the group immediately.  One respondent chose to make his 
own recording of the research interview.  There were no untoward incidents and at its 
conclusion the respondent expressed complete satisfaction with the conduct of the 
interview.   
I conducted the research in a way that minimised harm or risk to the respondents.  
All interviews and focus groups were conducted in places and at times mutually agreed in 
advance.  All respondents chose to be interviewed in their workplaces and I was happy to 
agree those arrangements.  Respondents gave freely of their time.  Senior officers made 
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themselves available during office hours and, as the research had ‘official’ sanction; 
supervisors invariably arranged the duties of junior officers and staff to allow them to 
participate in the study.   To the best of my knowledge no pressure was put on respondents 
either to participate in the research or to present their views in a particular way.  Though I 
recognise that ‘official sanction’ can sometimes result in ‘official’ responses, I do not 
consider that was a significant factor in this research.   
I selected respondents for interview on the basis of their knowledge of intelligence 
work or the NIM.   I applied purposive sampling techniques to ensure both that a broad 
range of understanding or expertise in intelligence work was obtained and that different 
levels of the police hierarchy or partnership structure were represented in the study.  So 
that, for example, the views of ACPO members, police senior and middle managers and 
frontline staff were included.  The views of those not directly employed in intelligence 
work were obtained through focus groups.  Individuals who attended those groups were 
selected by their own supervisors on the basis of their role (that is, other than being 
employed in intelligence work) and their availability.  There were an almost equal 
number of male and female focus group participants.  In my view, no group was 
‘unreasonably’ excluded from the study and to the best of my knowledge no participant’s 
interests were damaged as a result of their participation.   
I tried to ensure that the independence and impartiality of the research was clear.  
There were no obvious conflicts of interest or partiality in the study though it was 
inevitable that my research was influenced by my own assumptions and beliefs as an 
insider.  I have acknowledged all contributions in the thesis as well as the source of my 
funding (through the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme).  I had complete control over the 
results of the study and retain that control over most of the material generated during the 
course of the research; the exception being the NIM intelligence documents produced by 
Urban and County which remain the property of those forces.  As noted above, one 
respondent holds a copy of his own research interview.   
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Research Challenges 
Research at the Bramshill Library produced some interesting material, particularly on the 
subject of UBP.  However, as a Bramshill Fellow and police pensioner I was saddened 
and disappointed, despite my protestations, to be denied access to the collection on 
retirement from the service.  I hope that library staff will realise just how mean-spirited 
such a policy may appear to the objective observer and will take steps to change it for the 
benefit of others who, like me, leave the police service but do not abandon their quest for 
knowledge.  Research at the National Archives was interesting and rewarding.  I 
discovered several handwritten original letters and reports written by the first chief of 
detectives, Charles Vincent, and by his contemporaries.  Deciphering these documents 
was extremely time-consuming but it was an important task given the way in which they 
illuminated and contextualised some of the decisions made by those early detectives.   
A real disappointment was my inability to interview an ACPO member in the 
County force.  Due to illness, I had to cancel two appointments with the DCC and he was 
unable to find me further time in his diary.  I am satisfied that County’s director of 
intelligence (DOI) and principal analyst accurately described the implementation of the 
NIM at force level but the ACPO member’s perspective would have added depth and 
texture to the analysis of those events.   
A further disappointment was my failure to access the ACPO archive.  I was 
granted access by a member of the ACPO Council and hoped to use the recorded minutes 
of the council meetings to inform my research into the discussions about the adoption of 
the NIM.  Neither I nor that ACPO council member was aware that the archive had been 
transferred to the Open University at Walton Hall, Milton Keynes for cataloguing and it 
took several weeks to elicit that fact.   Over the course of several months I attempted to 
gain sight of the archived documents.  My initial attempts were rebuffed by the OU on the 
basis that I would be allowed access only when the data was catalogued.  However, at the 
end of that process I was informed that the OU did not have the minutes for the relevant 
period.  A further inquiry with ACPO was met with the response that all available records 
had been passed to the OU. 
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Generally, respondents gave freely of their time.  Commanders both in Urban and 
County allowed me to observe a variety of NIM meetings.  I took no part but was usually 
provided with copies of the strategic and tactical assessments prepared by the intelligence 
units.  I encountered some difficulties in collecting data.  In County, one strategic meeting 
I expected to attend was rescheduled by the BCU without notification.  In Urban, a NIM 
strategic meeting I expected to attend was held instead as part of a routine performance 
meeting.  I am satisfied that in neither case did this indicate any dissatisfaction with my 
conduct or the research but it does perhaps say something about the lack of rigour in some 
of the NIM processes in the case study forces.  
After initially agreeing to be interviewed, I met Phillips in circumstances other 
than we had arranged and in a situation that prevented me conducting a formal interview.  
I was able to complete a field note of our conversation.  He agreed to a further meeting but 
then cancelled it due to other commitments.  Instead, he made available to me two draft 
papers that he had written on intelligence and the NIM.  He also sent me a number of 
personal communications.  With his consent, I have drawn on those papers and 
communications but I regret that I could not probe his ideas and beliefs. 
I interviewed a range of intelligence unit staff.  Frustratingly, neither the Urban 
nor County BCU intelligence unit heads made themselves available for interview.  The 
intelligence unit head is an extremely important figure within the NIM as they link the 
BCU commander and the intelligence team, translating the commander’s requests for 
information into action and ensuring that credible evidence-based intelligence products 
are delivered in a timely fashion.  In interview, other respondents volunteered their 
concerns about their own inspectors’ level of knowledge of the NIM and suggested this as 
the reason for their reluctance.  At the end of the fieldwork, the Urban inspector 
(respondent N038) provided written replies to a limited number of written questions.  
These provided a useful insight into his attitude to the NIM but I would have welcomed 
the opportunity to probe his answers and to explore his seeming reluctance to participate 
in the study.  No response at all was forthcoming from the County inspector. 
Despite official approval, I experienced difficulties in County in arranging focus 
groups with frontline officers and staff.  It took seven months to arrange two group 
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sessions.   Eventually, the BCU‘s duties office arranged for 10 officers to take part in each 
of two sessions.  However, only three officers attended the first session and just one 
officer attended the second session (which instead became a semi-structured interview).  
My attempts to rearrange the sessions to secure a wider range of views, proved fruitless.  
Therefore, the contribution from County frontline staff to the case study was extremely 
limited.   It was noticeable that few focus group members in Urban could discuss the NIM 
or ILP in a meaningful way which in itself was useful as it confirmed my own experiences 
of the indifference of frontline staff to intelligence work and intelligence models.  
Responses of three Urban group members (of the 17 officers and staff who attended the 
Urban sessions) and each of the four County members informed this thesis.   
 
Summary 
I used archival and secondary research material and primary research to describe and 
explain the genesis and development of the NIM in order to trace how it emerged and how 
it was expected to be implemented.  I examined that process through the lens of 
Kingdon’s ‘Agenda Setting’ approach in which the role of the ‘policy entrepreneur’ is key 
(Kingdon, 1995).  I then went on to use secondary research material and case studies to 
provide a descriptive evaluation of NIM implementation (that is to explain what 
happened rather than what should have happened) in the police service of England and 
Wales through the lens of Sabatier’s (1986) policy implementation model.   
Analysis runs as a thread throughout the whole thesis therefore, there is not a 
separate data analysis section.  However, the key topics and themes uncovered and 
analysed throughout the thesis are summarised and critiqued in the final chapter.  Data 
were collected through archival research, through workplace observations, focus groups 
and interviews with a purposive sample of research respondents.  Whilst the data analysis 
was carried out in an objective and open-minded manner it also was informed by previous 
research into the NIM and, inevitably, was shaped by my own knowledge and experience 
of investigation, intelligence and the police organisation.    
 73 
Chapter 3 - Contextualising the +IM: A Brief History of 
Investigation 
 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to explain the genesis of the NIM as policing policy in the wider 
context of investigative practice and intelligence work in mainstream policing.  I argue 
that the orthodoxy that constrains contemporary operational policing strategies (in the 
ways that I alluded to in my introduction), have their roots in the history of the new police 
and, particularly, in the origins and early development of the detective force.  Relying on 
data collected through archival and documentary research (supplemented by primary 
research material), this chapter examines the development of the detective force and the 
evolution of investigative practice in Britain.  
 
The Police Mission 
The organised, centrally controlled, police force created in 1829 by Peel was anathema to 
many sections of society.  The force “offended against a tradition which held that social 
control should be a private, local and voluntary matter” (Ignatieff, 1975: 25).  To those so 
offended, the police represented “continental despotism” in the form of “standing armies, 
police spies, lettres de cachet and Bastilles” (Ignatieff, 1975: 26).  Peel and the first 
Commissioners, Rowan and Mayne, wanted to avoid the suggestion that police officers 
were government spies (Rawlings, 2002).10  Employing officers out of uniform “smacked 
of spying and of the political intrusiveness ascribed to police institutions on continental 
Europe” (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 7).  Therefore, from the outset, the 
Commissioners prioritised the prevention of crime and the importance of crime detection 
was downplayed to secure public consent for the highly contentious new policing 
arrangements.   
                                                 
10 Rowan and Mayne jointly fulfilled the role of Commissioner from 1829 to 1850.  After Rowan’s retirement in 
1850 aged 77, his position was filled until 1855 by Captain Hay.  After Hay’s death in 1855, Mayne continued 
alone as Commissioner until his death in 1868. 
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 Consequently, senior commanders took a positive decision to employ only those 
who could instantly be identified by their uniform as police officers (Moss and Skinner, 
2006).  Those officers were instructed that the primary object of the new force was to 
ensure the “security of persons and property [and] the preservation of public tranquillity” 
and that prevention of crime would achieve the force’s objectives “better than by the 
detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing the crime” 
(Metropolitan Police Instruction Book (IB), 1829 cited in Moss and Skinner, 2006: 12).  
In fact, the first IB contained no instruction in the investigation of crime and made few 
references to crime detection (Moss and Skinner, 2006). 
Publicly, the force’s Commissioners’ suggested that they had neither the capacity 
nor the desire “to take on the crime investigative and detective activities of the 
magistrates and the officers they employed” and they appeared content to leave the 
business of crime investigation to the pre-existing magistracy and their agents (such as the 
Bow Street Runners) (evidence to the 1833 and 1834 Parliamentary Select Committees 
cited in Roach, 2004: 75-76).  Indeed, Commissioner Mayne took every opportunity to 
allay public fears in that regard (Miller, 1999 cited in Reiner, 2000), and Peel himself 
declared “God forbid that [I] should countenance a system of espionage” (Smith, 1985 
cited in Rawlings, 2002: 168).  However, as so often is the case, the rhetoric did not match 
the reality and it is now clear that those pronouncements largely were made in the cause of 
securing consent (or at least tolerance) for the new the police.  Officers were employed in 
plain clothes for specific operations from the earliest days of the organisation (The Times, 
11th November 1830 cited in Rawlings, 2002).   
It was just four years after the introduction of the police, that the Commissioners 
were forced to admit that in the investigation of robbery “We have found it better done by 
persons in plain clothes, who were not thus known to the thieves, both in preventing them 
and in catching them when they have been going in" (Parliamentary Papers, 1833: vol. 
XII, pages 407 Select Committee cited in Roach, 2004: 61).  Even then, they defended 
those deployments on the basis that they were exceptional and that they were limited to 
detecting offenders when they were “going in” (actually committing offences) when they 
might evade arrest (Roach, 2004: 64).  Nevertheless, it is clear that despite their public 
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protestations, the Commissioners always considered plain clothes work to be an 
important element in crime prevention.  
One interpretation of the Commissioners’ evidence was that they considered the 
distinction between crime prevention and detection to be largely a matter of 
interpretation.  In what Roach (2004: 88) argued was a “unique and important passage” in 
their testimony, they asserted that the distinction between the prevention and detection of 
crime, commonly made by commentators in that era, was false.  They regarded the patrol 
activities of their constables as serving the dual purpose of prevention and detection.  
However, they qualified that statement by stressing that this dual role extended only to 12 
categories of crime (all of which today would be considered to be ‘street crimes’), of 26 
they previously had listed as being within the responsibilities of a street police (Roach, 
2004: 92).   
Recent analyses suggest that in the earliest days of the police, the responsibility 
for performing what today would be understood as ‘detective duties’ fell to the 
magistrates and their agents such as the Runners, just as it had done before the creation of 
the new police (see for example, Roach, 2004).  Though the Runners’ achievements in 
recovering stolen property and making deals on behalf of victims rather than focusing on 
arresting offenders, represented a ‘commodification’ of policing that may once have been 
acceptable but was considered ‘unwelcome’ in the Peelian era (McMullan, 1996).  
Summarising the policing arrangements that Peel oversaw in the earliest days of the new 
force, Clutterbuck (2002: 125) argued that the Home Secretary headed a system that 
performed three discrete functions; “preventative patrol and the control of public order 
via the Metropolitan Police, and the detection of offenders via the Bow Street Runners”.  
Moss and Skinner (2006) agree that it was at least eight years before the new police would 
usurp the Runners’ investigative role. 
 
Plain Clothes Policing 
Plain clothes deployments were so politically sensitive that they delayed the Metropolitan 
Police’s introduction of a separate detective force for many years (Reiner, 2000).  They 
were exceptional but they were common enough for one commentator to conclude that 
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the establishment of a discrete force in 1842, represented “the bureaucratisation and 
professionalisation of the function rather than its invention” (Morris, 2007: 17).  Morris 
(2007: 17) argued that the department’s introduction was an “event-precipitated change” 
driven by public disquiet over the force’s perceived lack of professionalism in the 
Francois Courvoisier and Daniel Good investigations (two notorious murder cases of the 
period – see for example Moss and Skinner, 2006).  Those events and “unfavourable 
newspaper comment” on the investigative effort precipitated a change in Home Office 
policy which (at least publicly) up to 1842, had limited the police to a primarily 
preventive role (Morris, 2007: 17).  Roach (2004) suggested that these events were 
emblematic of a crisis in confidence in the wider criminal justice in that period, which 
provided the stimulus for the statutory reform of investigative practice.  
In 1839, Parliament had limited the powers of magistrates and their agents and 
also ended their ability to undertake the specialist detective duties that the Courvoisier 
and Good cases demanded (through the enactment of the Metropolitan Police Courts 
Act).  Roach (2004: 145) argued that the effect of that Act, and of the Metropolitan Police 
Act in the same year, was to remove both the magistrates' plain-clothes agents and their 
informers from any active role in the criminal justice system.  However, the Courvoisier 
and Good cases demonstrated that this had left a dangerous vacuum that had to be filled.  
The Home Office naturally turned to the police Commissioners who had no other 
alternative than to expand the force’s detective capacity to fill that investigative void. 
Opposition to the establishment of a detective division meant that negotiations 
between the Commissioners and Home Office officials about its formation took place in 
secret.  Certainly, there were no significant public discussions on the subject between the 
two groups (Morris, 2007 and Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006).  Addressing criticism 
by other researchers that this development was “paltry and inadequate” (given that the 
practical difference that the decision to establish a detective force made, was negligible 
because plain clothes work was an intrinsic part of police duty), Morris argued that the 
significance of this decision was that for the first time, detective work received overt 
political endorsement (Morris, 2007: 18).  
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The new detectives eagerly constructed an image of themselves as successful 
crime-fighters.  They were assisted greatly by the emerging mass media.  For example, 
Charles Dickens and his contemporary Wilkie Collins (the author of the first detective 
story published in the UK in 1868, The Moonstone) based their fictional detectives on real 
policemen.  Lock (1993: 15) noted that Dickens viewed detectives rather romantically as 
“upright men who nonetheless gave the impression of habitually leading lives of strong 
mental excitement”.  Certainly, detectives’ own stories contributed to the construction of 
the image of the detective force as “possessing the monopoly on expertise” in 
investigation (Maguire, 2008: 365), and to detective work as “heroic, distinctive and even 
glamorous” (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 131).11   
Reiner (2000: 57) argued from a ‘class conflict’ perspective that the expansion of 
the detective force that took place in this period was not justified by those events.  Instead, 
it was the product of a moral panic which blamed the police for failing to counter a crime 
wave.  This undermined the police’s carefully constructed appearance of effectiveness in 
terms of “its core mandate of crime control and order maintenance” (a construction which 
perhaps is under just as much attack today).  Conservative party demands for the police to 
be “armed with preventative powers similar to those exercised by the Continental police” 
were exactly what the working class feared.  It was for this reason that the detective force 
was expanded by stealth.   
In 1867, the force numbered just 15 officers who worked under Mayne at his 
headquarters (Shpayer-Makov, 2004: 253).  It has been asserted that, lacking specialised 
training or regular duties, those men were “little more than policemen in plain clothes” 
(Thomson, 1936: 173).  However in 1869, the force was substantially enlarged by 
Commissioner Edmund Henderson (Mayne’s successor) so that it numbered 
approximately 200.  Adolphus Frederick Williamson (a considerable figure in policing in 
his own right and later Chief Constable of the CID), the chief inspector in charge of the 
‘old’ force was promoted to superintendent on a salary of £300 per annum and given 
                                                 
11 The work of the early detectives continues to fascinate.  In 2008, Kate Summerskill’s novel, The Suspicions 
Of Mr Whicher: Or The Murder At Road Hill House, an analysis of a murder in Wiltshire in 1860 that 
previously had inspired many writers including Dickens, topped the best-sellers list and won Summerskill BBC 
Four's ‘Samuel Johnson Prize’ for non-fiction writing.  
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command of the new body (Lock, 1993).  For the first time, detectives were posted to the 
21 police divisions that then made up the Metropolitan force (Shpayer-Makov, 2004: 
253).   
These new arrangements were accompanied by a new division of CID labour.  
Scotland Yard central office detectives dealt with murder and other serious crime whilst 
the divisional detectives investigated local crimes and criminals (Shpayer-Makov, 2004, 
2004: 253). Thomson (1936: 173) noted that almost immediately there was friction 
between the detectives who reported to their own (CID) superintendent and the (uniform) 
divisional superintendents.  The latter felt that they should have the final say in the 
detectives’ deployment.  Thus, not only was the distinction between ‘specialist’ and 
‘generalist’ detectives (that I argue has had such an impact on the effectiveness of 
investigation in mainstream in the modern era) established from the earliest days of the 
detective force but so was the tension between the CID and the uniformed branch.  I will 
later argue that both have undermined efforts to deliver the kind of ‘whole service’ 
approach advocated by Phillips and other members of the police elite.12   
Some were publicly disapproving of the path on which the detective force had 
been set and made attempts to change it.  In 1870, Adolphus Williamson proposed a 
reorganisation of the detective force.  According to his plan, all detectives would be 
brought together in a new ‘Detective Division’ responsible for the investigation of “all 
cases of felony undetected at the time of commission” (MEPO 2/134a, report dated 6th 
July, 1870).  Their work would be overseen by a team of detective inspectors supervised 
directly by Scotland Yard although inspectors would report the progress of investigations 
both to Commissioner Henderson and to the divisional superintendents.  However, 
Henderson rejected his plan and the distinction between the central and local branches of 
the detective department was reinforced (Roach, 2004).  
Earlier, I discussed chief officers’ relationship with the Home Secretary in the 
modern era.  I highlighted that though there is no constitutional basis for it, the idea that 
chief officers should be allowed ‘operational independence’ has flourished and taken root 
                                                 
12 The latest incarnation of that approach is ‘Total Policing’ the  policy pursued by Bernard Hogan-Howe in 
Liverpool and, more recently, in London following his appointment as Metropolitan Police Commissioner. 
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since the 1964 Police Act established the tripartite arrangements for police governance.  
In the Victorian period, there was no doubt who was in charge of the force and Home 
Office officials were closely involved in determining the policies and priorities of the 
force.13   In 1878, prompted by the ‘Trial of the Detectives’ (see Appendix C) and by 
wider concerns about the effectiveness of the detective force, the Home Office held a 
‘Departmental Commission’ on the ‘State, Discipline and Organisation of the Detective 
Force of the Metropolitan Police’ (otherwise known as the Ibbetson Commission).    
Its decision inter alia to establish “a career structure that guaranteed a detective a 
whole police career in plain clothes and solely under the command of other detectives” 
(against the advice of Commissioner Henderson) set in place a system that endured, 
largely unchanged, for almost 100 years (cited in Roach, 2004: 143).   The Commission 
also was persuaded of the need for a new detective force and a new leader of that force.  In 
the Home Office there was an appetite for change that only an ‘outsider’ could be trusted 
to deliver.  It “strongly recommend[ed] that an Assistant Commissioner, who should be a 
lawyer having magisterial experience (explicitly an outsider) should be placed at the head 
of the detective branch, ranking next to the Chief Commissioner and having charge of the 
whole force in his absence” (Ibbetson, 1878).  The individual appointed to that post was 
Howard Vincent.14   
 
Howard Vincent and the birth of the CID 
On 8th April 1878, Charles Howard Vincent, a barrister, former soldier and newspaper 
correspondent, was appointed first head of the new ‘Criminal Investigation Department’.  
Vincent was afforded the title ‘Director’ to remove any “uncanny associations” with the 
word detective that had so recently been discredited during the Turf Fraud affair (Jeyes, 
1912: 60) (see Appendix C).  Prior to his appointment, Vincent had established a 
reputation as an innovative and determined administrator (Wade, 2007).  He was an 
                                                 
13 The reader will see later that the Home Office’s influence extended far into the twentieth century as 
evidenced by its Committee on Detective Work in the 1930s and its role in the formation of the Regional Crime 
Squads (RCSs) in the 1960s). 
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“indefatigable” writer and publisher and a gifted linguist (Lucas revised by Emsley, 
2006).  Although considered by some to be a “complete tyro (novice)” (Emsley and 
Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 23) and, a “briefless barrister with… little or no knowledge or 
experience in police matters” (Reynolds' +ewspaper, 1880, 15th August).  
His nomination for the post was the product of careful calculation and assiduous 
planning but may also have owed something to history and timing.  His biographer 
recorded that “it was not purely with the object of assisting the committee in their labour 
that Vincent put himself to all this trouble.  He had anticipated that an important new post 
would be created and he was determined to get it” (Jeyes, 1912: 57).  In 1877, the year 
that detectives’ corruption came to public attention as a result of the Turf Fraud’ trials, 
Vincent enrolled in the Paris Faculty of Law to carry out his own investigation of the 
French detective police.  He presented a thorough critique of that system (redrafted 18 
times with the help of his brother) to the Home Office Commission (Jeyes, 1912).  This, 
and a reference from the Attorney-General (who had prosecuted the Turf Fraud plotters, 
recommended him to Home Secretary Cross (Lucas revised by Emsley, 2006).   
Vincent also benefited from the abandonment of the principle that police recruits 
should be drawn only from the working class communities they served.  Peel’s 
determination to avoid a caste system in the police meant that even though the armed 
forces were rich sources of recruits, for many years ex-warrant officers and 
non-commissioned officers were favoured over ‘gentlemen’ officers.  Wall (1998: 21) 
argued that rather than representing ‘policing of the people by the people’ as Peel publicly 
had claimed, this was an attempt to “ensure that the relationship between the police and 
the public remained close and that control over… the ‘dangerous classes’ was maximised 
while the potential for disorder was minimised” in a cost-effective way.  However, as the 
force developed, it was clear both to the police elite and the Home Office that 
better-educated recruits were needed.  Therefore recruitment was opened up to 
                                                                                                                                                     
14 Fido and Skinner (1999) suggest that this anomaly was only corrected when Vincent left his post to be 
replaced by James Monro.  Monro was given the title of ‘Assistant Commissioner’ and went on to be the 
Commissioner of Police (1888-1890). 
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commissioned officers (Wall, 1998).  Vincent was one of the first to benefit from that 
change.   
Confirming the Home Secretary’s control over the force, Commissioner 
Henderson announced Vincent’s engagement but he played no part either in his selection 
or appointment.  Those responsibilities instead falling to Home Secretary Cross who had 
commissioned the Ibbetson inquiry (Roach, 2004: 164).  Vincent reported directly to the 
Home Secretary over the head of the Commissioner (Fido and Skinner, 1999).  In this 
period, it was the politician rather than the police chief who was in control of the CID.   
The new CID attracted comment and amusement.  Mr. Bridge, the Hammersmith 
Police Magistrate “chafed unmercifully” a detective who appeared before him as a “crime 
investigator” rather than as a detective (The Era, 1878, April 14th).   Another, who styled 
himself a ‘criminal investigator’ was told by a second Magistrate to “Call yourself a 
constable, I suppose you are one” (The Graphic, 1880, September 4th).  There certainly 
was enough work for the new department.  For example in 1879, its detectives made 
4,862 arrests, 65 percent of which resulted in convictions.  In that year, officers conducted 
2,066 inquiries that did not require any arrest and travelled throughout the United 
Kingdom and to Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy 
and Spain in pursuing their investigations (Vincent cited in The Graphic, 1880, 4th 
September). 
Vincent remained in post until 1884.  Despite having no disciplinary power over 
his staff and being “short-handed” due to the “disappearance in disgrace” of many senior 
members of the detective force (Jeyes, 1912: 62), Vincent reformed and reorganized the 
detective department (a task made especially challenging by the ‘Fenian’ outrages in 
London in the early 1880s).  He introduced a shift system of working and supervision 
through the ranks; appointing 60 divisional detectives and 20 special patrols and 
formalising the distinction between Scotland Yard detectives and their divisional 
colleagues.  Vincent also continued the tradition that CID officers remained in that 
department throughout their police careers.  That situation remained unchanged until the 
appointment of Robert Mark as Commissioner almost 100 years later.  During his 
directorship, Vincent maintained the links with the Parisian police that he had established 
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prior to his appointment.  For example, in March 1881 en route to London from a visit to 
the south of France, he visited several branches of the Paris Prefecture of Police (The 
Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times, 1881, 19th March). 
Vincent published widely on legal and police matters.  Notably in the context of 
his role as ‘chief of detectives’, he published in 1882 A Police Code and Manual of 
Criminal Law which was used as a “basic textbook” for police forces both in Britain and 
throughout the British Empire for many years after his death in 1908 (Lucas revised by 
Emsley, 2006).  In the modern era, the investigative environment has come to be 
dominated by ‘doctrine’ (see for example, NCPE, 2005; 2006; 2007); Vincent’s Code 
clearly was the nineteenth century equivalent.  Mr Justice Hawkins wrote the foreword to 
its fifth edition.  His words provide a fascinating insight into the culture of police work in 
that era, elements of which I argue can still be observed in the modern force.  He exhorted 
constables to: 
Obey every order given to you by your superior officer without for a moment 
considering the propriety of it.  You are not responsible for the order, but for 
obedience.  In yielding obedience let the humblest member of the force feel that by 
good conduct and cheerful submission he may himself rise to be placed in authority 
to give the orders that he is now called upon to obey (cited in Vincent, 1886: 5). 
Vincent’s advice to detectives was intended to encourage the whole service 
approach pursued by others in the modern era.  He noted that "the detection of 
criminals… can only be attained by cordial cooperation, the absence of craving for 
individual credit, free interchange of information, great activity, and the constant 
adoption of fresh and unexpected measures" (1886: 53).  The ability of detectives to 
unravel crime; depended upon “the energy, the ability, the judgement, the zeal, and the 
integrity of the detective force” (1886: 109).  Vincent noted that detective work was 
“more varied and interesting than the ordinary street duty”.  However, prospective 
detectives needed to demonstrate “voluntary inclination” for the work and to have “given 
proof of skill” while on beat duty (Vincent, 1886: 109).    
From 1883 to 1884, Vincent edited the Police Gazette (which had been published 
since 1772 - Lock, 1993); the first intelligence circular to transmit descriptions of wanted 
offenders, details of stolen property and other useful information (Lucas revised by 
Emsley, 2006).  The Gazette has gone through many reviews and revisions but is still in 
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use today.  Vincent was an innovator and unlike his predecessors was influenced by 
continental methods.  He favoured using police informers and undercover operatives as 
agents provocateurs (Wade, 2007), though he was rightly wary of encouraging improper 
relationships between detectives and those from whom they sought information.  He 
started a  photographic collection of criminals “with a view to the better prevention and 
detection of crime’ (Stanford, 2007).  Altogether he was “always unconventional in his 
methods” (Wade, 2007: 32).   
He made extensive use of the ‘fourth estate’ (Lock, 1993).  On one occasion he 
used the advertisement section of a daily newspaper to offer a £200 reward for the arrest 
of a ‘dynamiter’ (Jeyes, 1912: 75).  Against the convention of the time, he would 
proactively launch an investigation without waiting for a criminal complaint (Morris, 
2007: 22).  It has been argued that in the six years he held the post, Vincent’s influence on 
detective work in London was immense (Lucas, revised by Emsley, 2006).  Vincent’s 
influence on the development of investigative practice cannot be overstated.  Reflecting 
on his short but significant career as director of detectives, Stead, (1888: 1) noted that 
Vincent had “succeeded in establishing cosmos out of chaos”. 
Vincent’s biographer Jeyes wrote that at first, as an amateur, he had made many 
enemies at Scotland Yard.  Certainly, there were fundamental problems in the detective 
department that remained unsolved (see for example Lock, 1993).  However, Jeyes 
claimed that Vincent’s willingness to give credit where it was due, to deal frankly and 
honestly with his staff and his good humour and “social popularity” earned him a measure 
of respect from his subordinates in the CID (Jeyes, 1912: 104).  Howe (1965: 45), another 
barrister who would later assume command of London’s CID (1933-1945), argued that 
despite the many challenges Vincent faced, “he had a lasting effect on the development of 
the Department”.  However, an unintended consequence of Vincent’s reforms was that 
the CID became even more distanced from the uniform men as the latter resented the 
former’s higher rates of pay and their general air of superiority (Howe, 1965). 
Thomson (1936: 180 - 181) records that in one London division, handbills 
complaining about those differential payments were printed and circulated to sergeants 
and constables with the intention of convening a public meeting to air the uniformed 
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officers’ grievances.  By skill and some guile, Vincent managed to prevent the meeting 
taking place.  In the longer term, the resentment of the CID in the uniformed ranks was 
alleviated by the recommendation of a Home Office committee of inquiry that every 
report emanating from the divisional detectives should be submitted to Scotland Yard via 
the uniformed superintendents (as Williamson had wanted some 8 years earlier).  This 
gave each uniformed superintendent “the feeling that the men were under him and that by 
affixing his initials he was in some measure taking the credit for the efficiency of the 
CID”.  He further noted that the solution “worked like a charm, for thenceforward any 
help that the CID might need from the uniform branch was at once accorded (Thomson, 
1936: 181). 
In 1883, Vincent established the Special Irish Branch, which later (as Special 
Branch) became the first of the specialised squads and units ‘spun off’ from the CID.  
Wade noted that the establishment of this unit was an early example of the police’s 
“tendency to assemble men of special expertise to tackle specific threats or new crimes” 
(2007: 87).  In this case, the event was the failure of the police to prevent an attack on 
Clerkenwell Prison by a group of Irish nationalists, despite having received accurate 
intelligence from the Irish Police warning of the attack (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 
2006: 83).  The new unit brought “added kudos and consolidated [the] CID’s monopoly 
over investigative techniques” (Matassa and Newburn, 2007: 44).  It also signalled a 
significant split between the ‘ordinary’ detective and those tasked with responding to 
events on the world stage (Wade, 2007).  The work of the unit meant that some detectives 
“found themselves acting in quasi-espionage situations and as time went on, in real 
espionage” (Wade, 2007: 88).  Clutterbuck (2002: 351) argued that the establishment of 
the squad represented a “quantum leap” in the operational methodology of the detective 
force as for the first time it signalled a new, longer-term approach to intelligence work of 
the kind that has come to be associated with specialist detective units in the modern era.  
Table 1 is adapted from Clutterbuck’s fascinating account of the emergence of the 
Special Branch at the end of the nineteenth century.  It suggests that the tools and 
techniques now associated with ‘high policing’ (Brodeur, 1983), have their roots in the 
nineteenth century.  However, in that period they were used exclusively to counter 
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‘political’ crime.  Clutterbuck (2002: 244) has argued that there was “scarcely no aspect” 
of the covert investigative work he described, that has not continued to play a part in 
police counter-terrorism operations in the modern era.   
 
Table 1 – Methodologies against ‘political’ crime (from Clutterbuck, 2002) 
 
 
Police Methodologies Against ‘Political’ Crime and the Earliest Identified Year of Use 
Method   Year 
Use of covert officers to gather intelligence   1833 
Covert monitoring of public meetings 1833 
Covert monitoring of target organisations 1833 
Surveillance of target individuals 1866 
Operational use of information from active informants 1867 
Use of detectives to gather intelligence from other UK Forces (by working 
in other force areas or by request for assistance) 
1867 
Use of detectives to gather intelligence from other countries (by working 
abroad or request for assistance) 
1867 
Co-operation with a UK ‘Secret Service’ 1867 
Use of detectives to gather intelligence systematically at ports 1872 
Intelligence gathering from convicts and their visitors/contacts 1888 
Specific tasking of informants 1888 
Lifestyle’ payments to informants 1888 
Gathering overt information from the media 1880 
Interception of communications (postal and telegraphic) 1880 
Systemised collection/collation/recording of intelligence 1880 
 
 
The methods described by Clutterbuck in Table 1 were adopted by the new 
specialist squads which, the reader will see later, were introduced throughout the 
twentieth century and which have become such an influence in policing in the modern era.  
The reader also will see that their monopoly on their use ensured that the specialist squads 
had the best information available to any section of the service and that the squads 
exploited that knowledge in ways which reinforced their power and influence. 
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Cultural Division 
Vincent continued his attempts to ameliorate cultural differences between the CID and 
uniformed branches.  For example, he cautioned detective officers to be “watchful” about 
taking cases away from uniform constables and to be:  
Especially guarded against the arrogation of individual credit, and if they have any 
information which may secure the arrest of a criminal, they should communicate it 
to the officer who is placed in a position to work it out, instead of reserving it for 
themselves. 
Vincent’s identification of the corrosive effect of that cultural divide demonstrated his 
insight and management skills but his influence on long established practices was limited.  
Certainly, as the reader will see later, that divide still exists in policing.    
Fido and Skinner (1999: 42) argued that despite Vincent’s charm offensive, 
designed to “overcome grumblings from uniformed officers”, he left intact an 
environment in which CID officers “held an undesirable belief… that they were 
inherently superior to the uniformed branch”.  Vincent acknowledged that the 
establishment of the CID had erected a barrier between police in uniform and police in 
plain clothes that operated “with much detriment to the public service” (MEPO 2/134d: 
memo dated 26th October 1880).  Given the detectives’ opinion of themselves, it is 
perhaps surprising that Vincent believed that it was their inadequacies that were at the 
heart of that problem.  He blamed the force’s superintendents for selecting CID men who 
were “far removed from the best quality” and by leaving those men to their own devices 
to investigate cases so that “there was neither control nor cooperation, neither intelligence 
nor thoroughness as a general rule” in their investigations.   
In a memorandum that gives a fascinating insight into Vincent’s opinion of 
detectives’ abilities in the earliest days of the CID, he continued that detectives’ dealings 
with other constabularies often indicated incompetence in even the simplest of tasks 
(MEPO 2/134d: memo dated 26th October 1880).  Unfortunately, there is no record of a 
response to Vincent’s proposal that CID superintendents should all be trained “in the 
same school of the Criminal Law” to improve a department that “never had any stability” 
and which was “defective in the time of Sir Richard Mayne” and “defective during the 
period of the divisional detectives”, or alternatively that they be replaced by existing chief 
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inspectors or by local inspectors eligible for promotion who were of “suitable calibre” 
(MEPO 2/134d: memo dated 26th October 1880).  However, it may be assumed that it was 
not until 1935 with the establishment of the detective training school in North London 
that that training was delivered.  Vincent should be afforded much more attention than he 
has garnered hitherto.  As Thomson (1936: 180) records, he “increased the strength of the 
Department... greatly improved the filing of criminal records and took care that the 
various sub-branches of his department worked smoothly together” 
The differences between the Scotland Yard and divisional detectives came to the 
fore once again during the trial of the poisoner Thomas Cream, though suggestions of 
jealousy between the two  publicly were refuted (Lock, 1993).   Lock (1993: 141-142) 
noted that the obvious acrimony between divisional and Yard detectives “cannot have 
been helped by the fact that while many of the former were still grubbing away in 
comparatively primitive surroundings, the latter were moving to quarters in the splendid 
New Scotland Yard” though by the time the building was completed it was already too 
small to house the force’s headquarters staff. 
Detectives did not have things all their own way.  In the wake of the infamous 
‘Jack the Ripper’ murders in London’s East End there was a backlash against the CID.  
For example, the Pall Mall Gazette ran a series of articles that were critical of Warren 
(who held the post of Commissioner from 1886 to 1888) and the conduct of the 
investigation.   Warren stood accused of favouring uniformed men over the detectives 
with the result that the gap between the two sections of the force was widened further to 
the detriment of the investigative effort: 
[Warren] could not be got to see that the detectives were in any way more efficient 
than his ordinary constables. If he wanted any work done that could not be done by 
Z 324, with his helmet on his head and his blue coat on his back, he would simply 
put Z 324 in ordinary clothes and expect him to do the work of a detective (Stead, 
1888: 1). 
Stead argued that as a result, “detectives were discouraged, discredited, and sat 
upon, and the dormant feeling of jealousy and animosity between the two branches began 
to grow apace, to the no small disadvantage of the service” (1888:1).  However, Fido and 
Skinner (1999) countered that criticism of Warren’s treatment of the CID, was but one 
stick with which to beat an individual who had proven to be a most unpopular 
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Commissioner.  Appointed to the post in 1886 Warren, a former Royal Engineers officer 
brought from his command in Africa to take over the running of the force, saw its future to 
be no more than an adjunct of the military and he objected to the control exercised by 
‘civilians’ in the Home Office.  Thomson (1936: 188) wrote that it was characteristic of 
Warren that his annual reports to the Home Secretary “omitted all reference to crime in 
London, though space was given to the question of boots and saddles”. 
At many points in this study, I comment upon the orthodoxy and traditionalism of 
the police service.  In that context, it is worth noting that it was almost 20 years before the 
Metropolitan Police adopted the telephone because many senior officers were horrified 
by the thought of “the public actually being able to make a nuisance of themselves by 
ringing the police direct” (Lock, 1993: 172-173).  It was 1906 before a significant 
proportion of the Met’s divisions were linked by telephone (at least 16 years after most 
provincial forces) and as late as 1917 before the whole force was connected to public 
telephone exchanges (Lock, 1993).   
A defect that became obvious over the course of the years that followed the 
establishment of the CID was that each division and even the Yard detectives, 
increasingly operated as discrete units (Lock, 1993).  Certainly, little thought was given to 
the ‘whole service’ approach that has found such favour (at least at the level of rhetoric) in 
the modern era.  In 1919, Frederick Wensley, CID Superintendent (and later Chief 
Constable), (about whom Howe, 1965, later was to report that he “was involved in almost 
every outstanding case which came before the detective department and later the CID”) 
suggested that a senior detective should be appointed to control the CID in several 
divisions and that a roving group of detectives should be established to counter the 
increasing mobility of law-breakers (the force’s ‘Flying Squad’ is discussed later).  This 
led to the territory policed by the Met being split into four sectors. Each of these was 
covered by a CID superintendent immediately dubbed by the press the ‘Big Four’ (Kirby, 
2011).15  
                                                 
15 The ‘Big Four’ were Albert Hawkins, Arthur Neil, Francis Carlin and Wensley himself (Lock, 1993). 
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Before moving on to examine further developments in detective work 
(particularly the work of the first specialist squad in mainstream policing and the rise of 
the specialist detective force) it is useful to examine the work of the Dixon Committee.  
There have been many inquiries into criminal investigation and the detective force but 
this inquiry was particularly significant because it established the pattern of detective 
work for the rest of the twentieth century, despite the huge expansion of the police service 
and the detective force in that period.  A fuller account of the Committee’s work can be 
found at Appendix D.  In the context of this thesis, its most significant deliberations were 
on the subjects of intelligence work and the fractious relationship between the CID and 
the uniform branch and these are discussed next. 
 
Home Office Committee on Detective Work, 1933-1936 
The committee was established on 12th May 1933 under A.L. Dixon, a Home Office 
official, to “inquire and report upon the organisation and procedure of the police forces of 
England and Wales for the purpose of the detection of crime” (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1).   
It was made up of Home Office officials and chief constables.  Again, as much as 
anything, the establishment of the Committee demonstrated the Home Office’s 
continuing influence over the detective force.  It recorded that in 1933 the aggregate 
number of police officers in England and Wales, across a total of 181 forces, was 60,000.  
The detective force amounted to 2,600 officers.  Predictably, the Metropolitan Police was 
the largest police force with 20,000 officers which included 1,000 detectives.  The 
smallest force was maintained by the Borough of Tiverton with an establishment of 11 
officers (at the time of the report the force was under-strength) (MEPO 2/4967, Section 
1).  Some forces had only “one or two men” set aside for detective work whilst others had 
none at all (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1).   
 
Intelligence Work 
It is indicative of the challenges faced by those seeking to develop police intelligence 
work over the last century, that so many of the Committee’s deliberations in this context 
still have such currency today.  Its minutes highlight huge concern over the collection and 
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sharing of intelligence (by and between the different branches of the service), variations 
in record-keeping practices (MEPO 2/4967 sub-committee B, Section 1 - minutes of 28th 
June 1933), the unsystematic use of records maintained at central collection points (that 
is, force headquarters), the inefficient use of those records by investigating officers and 
the infrequent use of them by uniform officers (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - minutes of 28th  
June 1933).   The Committee also found that the uniform branch was disadvantaged by 
the manner in which crime information was passed to its officers.  In its view, efficient 
detection depended upon the capacity of the police “to obtain, sift and draw deductions 
from information”.  Therefore, unless these problems were solved (or at least 
ameliorated) there was little prospect of improving investigative practice (MEPO 2/4967, 
draft final report - 24).  
Given the importance attached to ‘hotspotting’ and intelligence analysis in the 
modern era (which is a key element of the NIM), the Committee’s decision to reject an 
embryonic geographic information system (GIS) was interesting.  It was “disposed to 
think that no very useful purpose would be served by the preparation of elaborate maps or 
statistics” but it was agreed that developments within forces (particularly the 
Metropolitan Police) would be monitored (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - of 28th June 1933).  
The Committee’s deliberations indicate that senior commanders recognised the need for 
some rudimentary analysis of the intelligence that the service was collecting so that it 
could identify crime trends etc for patrol officers.  However, it made no recommendation 
as to how this should be carried out.    
Stimulating a debate over cross-border crime that has continued to the present 
day, the Committee argued that less importance should be given to force boundaries “in 
the ordinary day-to-day work of crime detection” (MEPO 2/4967 page 28, line 36 – page 
29, line 22).  Arrangements needed to be made that would overcome the inherent 
disadvantages of the existing system so that police action could be “applied to a common 
purpose over a wide area” whenever necessary (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report page 5, 
lines 18-35).  According to the Committee’s minutes (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - 
sub-committee B report), those arrangements should include locally-held records for 
local criminals who did not “habitually travel from place to place” and committed the 
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bulk of crime (the forerunner of collators’ records) and regional or national records for 
those who extended their operations over much wider areas and were often responsible 
for the more serious crimes (arguably, not addressed until the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police’s C9 branch in the 1950s).  The Committee highlighted that local 
police should know the criminals in their area but there also should be some mechanism 
by which detectives in adjoining forces should have access to, and should make effective 
use of, local intelligence records (MEPO 2/4967, main body of report page 32, lines 
29-33).  That is a debate that continues to have currency today. 
Its observation that an effective intelligence system was a fundamental 
requirement of efficient investigative practice (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report page 6), 
may be a statement of the obvious but it is questionable whether any appreciable progress 
in this context was made until the UBP was introduced some 40 years later.  Even then (as 
the reader will see later) that progress was extremely limited.  The Committee’s 
deliberations on intelligence work are important in the context of this thesis because they 
go to the heart of Phillips’ ambitions for the NIM.  For Phillips, fully implementing his 
plans would allow commanders to resolve the kinds of problems described here that beset 
the police service for much of its history.  However, the Committee’s work also shows 
that though Phillips’ proposals were presented as a ‘modern’ solution to the challenges of 
policing in the twenty-first century, those problems and at least some of their solutions 
had been apparent to the police for at least 60 years.   
 
CID and Mainstream Policing 
The Committee established a definition of a ‘detective’ as a police officer “who forms 
part of the detective organisation of a force which is engaged in specialised crime work 
and not routine police duties other than crime”.  A caveat later was added that ‘specialised 
crime work’ extended to “inquiries and intelligence work” (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - 
minutes of 28th June 1933).  The precise nature of that ‘inquiry and intelligence work’ 
was not further defined.  However, what is clear is that the ‘official’ definition of a 
detective then extended beyond commonly accepted descriptions of the role at that time 
(and certainly beyond the ‘detectives’ and the ‘thief-catchers’ described by Basil 
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Thomson).  The effect of the redefinition was that the prestigious label ‘detective’ was 
attached to a wider range of officers than hitherto. 
The Committee acknowledged that cooperation between the uniform and 
detective branches continued to be a significant issue and “positive steps” were required 
to improve it.  There was unanimity that CID protectionism was “undesirable” and 
inefficient; the fractious and difficult relationship between the branches hindered the 
investigative effort (MEPO 2/4967).  At the heart of this problem was the CID’s belief 
that it should have monopoly control of criminal investigation.  The Committee decried 
the department’s contention that the detection of crime was an entirely specialised form of 
work to be carried out solely by detectives (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report: 36-37).  
Even though it acknowledged that was the practice in the Metropolitan Police and other 
large city and borough forces (Home Office, 1938).  The minority argument that “uniform 
officers should not be encouraged to concern themselves” with crime investigation 
because “they may, by precipitate or ill-informed action, prejudice rather than assist the 
work of the detectives” was rejected (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report: 39).  However, 
that argument illustrates that at least some senior commanders were sympathetic to the 
CID’s view. 
A particularly significant event in the wider context of this thesis was an 
observation by Wilson, the chief constable of Cardiff, that the scope of detective work 
should be increased by “working from the criminal to the crime rather than from the crime 
to the criminal”.  Wilson suggested that in the event of an “epidemic of crime” of the same 
type, the police should “keep a careful watch on likely suspects”.  He cautioned however, 
that this type of work “called for a considerable expenditure of manpower” and that 
detective strengths should take this into account (MEPO 2/4967, meeting minutes, 
Section 217).   This is evidence that ILP, the targeting of suspect individuals or 
populations, was considered by the police many years before it was endorsed by the Audit 
Commission in 1993.16  That too suggests that there is little that is truly ‘new’ in policing. 
                                                 
16 Moreover, Stanford (2007: 179) has argued that there is some evidence to support the idea that the police 
targeted offenders , particularly those identified as ‘habitual offenders’, “at a number of levels” during the 
period 1850 – 1914. 
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Specialist Detective Squads 
The increasing specialisation of the detective force in the twentieth century is noteworthy 
in the context of the NIM, because it confirmed the class system in policing that I later 
will argue, has had a detrimental effect on criminal investigation in mainstream policing 
and which undermined Phillips’ notion of a ‘whole service’ approach to crime control.   
Rawlings (2002: 21) argued that increasing the number and remit of specialist squads was 
simply considered “a key strategy for dealing with rising crime” in the modern era.  The 
reader will see later that intelligence gathered by each of the squads become very much 
the property of that squad.  It was guarded jealously and only very reluctantly shared with 
others.  Of course, that too could undermine Phillips’ vision for policing. 
 
The Flying Squad 
Given the social and political history of the Metropolitan Police, it is unsurprising that its 
detective force has always had a huge influence on investigative policy and most of the 
early specialist squads emerged in London.  For 36 years, Special Branch stood as the 
lone example of a police force tailoring a bespoke solution to an emerging crime problem.   
However, in 1919, the Met established the Flying Squad (popularly known as the 
‘Sweeney’ but more commonly known to detectives simply as ‘The Squad’) in response 
to “the development of methods of rapid transit - particularly the motor car – [that] was 
bringing about a state of things in which the detective was placed at a great disadvantage” 
(Wensley, 1968: 195).   
As the reader has seen, it was Wensley (1968: 195) who argued that the 
department needed to adopt a more “fluid” response to these developments in the form of 
a “roving body of detectives under officers of special capacity, who could move rapidly 
and operate in any division where there was an epidemic of crime”.  It has been suggested 
that the really significant advantages that the Flying Squad held over the divisional 
detective force were its mobility and flexibility (see for example Kirby, 2011).  From the 
outset, the squad was provided with a number of ‘fast cars’, vans and tenders to carry out 
its duties.  In 1931, the squad was equipped with 16 cars and three vans giving it a 
capability that would have been the envy of its divisional colleagues (MEPO 2/1880, 
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report dated 10th December, 1931).    Howe (Assistant Commissioner ‘Crime’ 1945 - 
1953) (1961: 82) noted admiringly that Flying Squad officers were the “storm troopers of 
the CID” and that they were detested by the criminal underworld to whom they were 
known as “the heavy mob or the heavies”.  I contend that Howe’s words lend weight to 
my argument, developed throughout this thesis, that the police elite were in awe of the 
specialist detective force to which it would turn whenever its legitimacy was threatened. 
Wensley later argued that the success of the squad had been misrepresented and 
that “the blood and bones of all practical detective work is information” (cited in Lock, 
1993: 177-178).  Rather than relying on “fast cars, wireless, police boxes or any other 
mechanical device” the real value of the squad lay in the calibre of its detectives and the 
quality of the information that they were able to obtain.  He felt that “the Flying Squad 
catches thieves because it knows thieves” (Wensley 1968).  In other words, it succeeded 
because it had the best ‘thief-catchers’ and the best information in the force.  The reader 
later will see that in the modern era, despite many efforts to improve the local intelligence 
system, the specialist detectives hold a near-monopoly on the best intelligence and the 
best detectives. 
Yet, the squad did not always have things its own way.  A detective complained 
that with “smash and grab raids, housebreaking and larcenies in the street… prevalent… 
the need of the cars and vans is felt by the Squad” (MEPO 2/1880, report dated 10th 
December, 1931).  Hence the officer’s outrage that “a regular fast car had to be used both 
night and day for three weeks” as the spare squad car had been taken by Special Branch 
without the squad’s permission to ferry “somebody called Gandhi” around (MEPO 
2/1880, report dated 10th December, 1931).  The squad continues to operate today as 
‘SCD7, the Flying Squad’. 
 
The Special Duty Squad (SDS) or ‘Ghost Squad’ 
The squad was the brainchild of Percy Worth, Chief Constable of the CID (MEPO 
3/2033) and was a response to the huge rise in crime that followed the Second World War.  
The SDS was a small squad of “selected CID officers” recruited from the Flying Squad 
for the “sole purpose of acquiring information concerning the activities of criminals” 
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(MEPO 3/2033, report dated 18th May 1945).  Worth recruited the SDS from the Flying 
Squad because his experience had taught him that “the more valuable information about 
persistent and dangerous criminals invariably emanated from squad officers” and placed 
them under the command of Assistant Commissioner Ronald Howe (MEPO 3/2033, 
report dated 18th May 1945).  Worth considered that those officers possessed a greater 
ability to “contact and control informants” than their divisional colleagues and that their 
informants were “well controlled” and “more productive”.  To Worth, these men 
represented the ‘best of the best’.  In other words, they were the thief-catchers above all 
other thief-catchers. 
Worth accepted uncritically that detectives concealed the identity of their 
informers and that they rewarded them without the knowledge of their senior officers; this 
was a matter of trust.  In Worth’s view, the key issue was to obtain information and act 
upon it quickly.  Money was available to be spent on informers and spent it should be 
(MEPO 3/2033, report dated 18th May 1945).  Gosling, a founding member of the SDS, 
records that Howe’s assessment of the situation was that things were “getting out of hand” 
in the sense that there was both too much crime and too few arrests.  Clearly, desperate 
times called for desperate measures and thus the SDS (or Ghost Squad as it became 
known) was born.  Its express purpose was to acquire information “concerning the 
activities of persistently clever and dangerous criminals” (Worth cited in Gosling, 1959: 
11). 
Howe’s command signalled a remarkable development in detective work as the 
squad were given powers “previously unheard of in the CID” (Worth cited in Gosling, 
1959: 11).   Worth and Howe were operating in a very different policing environment 
from modern detectives.  The latitude afforded to the four detectives who made up the 
new squad was surprising (although perhaps more understandable in the light of Basil 
Thomson’s earlier comments about ‘thief-catchers’). 17   Their sole purpose was to 
“infiltrate into the underworld and establish and maintain contacts with anyone who can 
                                                 
17 Stanley Firmin, the chief crime correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in his book Men in the Shadows (1953), 
records that the squad was made up of 30 or so individuals.  However, that rather exaggerated figure should be 
put down to journalistic licence. 
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give information which will lead to the arrest of criminals” (Gosling, 1959: 14).  
According to Gosling (1959: 14), the squad was “virtually given carte blanche and told to 
produce results”.  ‘Crime control’ was explicitly afforded precedence over ‘due process’, 
detectives were given full licence to operate as they wished.   Tellingly, they were assured 
by Howe that “You will not be asked any questions about the source of any information 
you discover” (cited in Gosling, 1959: 15).18   
 Gosling’s (1959) fascinating account of his SDS career details many interactions 
with informers.  In those post-war years, the police were faced with a new kind of 
criminal; “cruel, ruthless and well informed”; operating in the “thieves market” that was 
post-conflict London.  The SDS was an attempt to “wrest the initiative from the 
criminals” (Gosling, 1959: 20).  He explained his philosophy on informers thus: 
If every policeman ‘worked to rule’ – and a great many of them do – I reckon that 
more than 90% of the crimes committed in Great Britain would remain unsolved.  
That’s the dilemma…  We must use informers – and that means we have to play fair 
with them.  You mustn’t give them away either to other criminals or to other 
policemen (Gosling, 1959: 19). 
In that crime control-dominated milieu, detectives could be investigator, judge 
and jury.  Gosling recalled that there were circumstances in which he “may have to let a 
man go free after he has committed a crime” because then he could “put the squeeze” on 
him afterwards” (1959: 19).  Clearly, these methods were perceived to be effective as the 
squad’s tenure was extended three times.  Over the three years and nine months that the 
squad was in operation it solved 1506 cases, made 789 arrests and recovered stolen 
property valued at ₤253,896.  Scotland Yard paid out almost ₤25,000 in rewards to the 
squad’s informers in that period (Gosling, 1959), representing a considerable increase on 
the ₤3695 spent in the previous five years.  
 
Criminal Intelligence Squad 9 (C9) 
Criminal intelligence as a discipline within the police service (as opposed to intelligence 
work linked to extremism or subversion usually associated with the activities of Special 
                                                 
18 Interestingly, Howe makes no mention of the Ghost Squad in his memoirs (1961) or in his Story of Scotland 
Yard (965). 
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Branch) probably commenced in the early 1950s with the formation of another specialist 
squad, the Metropolitan Police’s ‘C9’ branch.19  The branch was established as a central 
point of contact for provincial officers investigating country house burglaries committed 
by London-based criminals (ACPO, 1975).  A former C9 member (N062) said that the 
squad was not given a name but was known as the “Home and Colonial” by its members.  
In interview, he said that the unit was staffed exclusively by detective officers who were 
specially selected from the Metropolitan Police for their abilities as ‘thief-catchers’ and 
officers from the other Home Counties forces and from the West Midlands (whom he 
assumed had undergone a similar selection process).   
The former C9 member (N062) said that the unit concerned itself only with 
intelligence about serious and organised crime and provided only a very limited service to 
mainstream policing.  He speculated that the collection methods routinely employed by 
the unit utilised the most sensitive covert policing techniques (principally relating to the 
use of informers and undercover police officers) and that there was a consensus amongst 
detectives that these methods and the information that they generated should be protected 
both from public view and from the uniformed branch.   
An ACPO member (N053) said that CID culture also was a factor in that 
protectionism.  In his view, little had changed since the 1930s, the CID had an “uneasy” 
relationship with the uniform branch, and detectives also were guilty of hoarding 
intelligence for personal gain (officers used it to earn overtime payments or to bring 
themselves to the attention of senior officers and thus secure advancement in the force).  
Tangentially, Grieve, (2004) noted that intelligence could not be shared because there 
was no local intelligence structure worthy of the name to receive it, in any force in the 
country.  
Essentially, C9 represented the embryonic intelligence system for the UK.  Its 
officers took responsibility for small groups of constabularies.  The former C9 detective 
(N062) said that during his tenure he was responsible for linking in with the Welsh forces.  
                                                 
19 It should be noted that Thomson (1936) claims that a small number of detective officers had performed 
intelligence duties as far back as 1878.  Certainly at the end of the nineteenth century, a team of detectives was 
responsible for logging descriptions of felons (Aylmer, 1897). 
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Colleagues on other desks linked with the Irish and Scottish.  John Stevens (later 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 2000-2005) looked after Cambridge and East 
Anglia.  Others looked after the north, Cornwall etc.  C9 worked closely with another unit 
at Scotland Yard (CB6) staffed by Home Counties officers, whose staff were responsible 
for checking the Yard’s criminal records for details of the criminal history of offenders 
arrested in their home force areas.  The former C9 member (N062) said that the unit 
represented the single point of contact in the Met for other police forces and law 
enforcement agencies but it was quickly realised that there was a need for a larger unit 
with the capacity to collate and analyse the information that C9 received.  
  
Criminal Intelligence Squad 11 (C11) 
In 1960, the Criminal Intelligence Branch ‘C11’ was established.  The newly designated 
department became the regional criminal intelligence branch for the south-east of 
England.  It was based at New Scotland Yard with a remit to “collect, evaluate and 
disseminate information regarding organised crime and prominent criminals” (ACPO, 
1975: 1).  Kelland, Assistant Commissioner of the Met in this period, noted that “London 
was the natural centre for the densely populated south east region and it was important 
that the Met should take a lead” in the field of criminal intelligence.  As a unit with a 
regional (rather than a ‘Met-wide’) responsibility, C11’s Met officers also were joined by 
officers seconded from other forces in the south-east (Kelland, 1986: 233-234). 
C11 was concerned with the activities of career criminals thought to pose the 
greatest threat to the social order in London and the South-East.  In the 1970s, it became 
the first intelligence unit with a national responsibility.  Echoing the words of Wilson, the 
chief constable of Cardiff in 1936, Grieve (2004: 28) has noted that the motto of the new 
unit was “the criminal not the crime”.  To enable the branch to focus on its central aim, 
C11 was allowed to exercise a high degree of selectivity in the choice of subjects worthy 
of its interest (and to ignore most of the more than three million individuals recorded in 
the records of the National Criminal Intelligence Office) as to do otherwise “would 
completely destroy the objects for which the branch was formed” (ACPO, 1975: 1).   
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Criminals of interest to the squad were known as ‘C11 nominals’.  A former 
collator (N060) said that once individuals were so labelled they remained of interest to 
C11 for life.20  Another former collator (N061) noted that C11 began rather modestly in 
1960 on the first floor of the ‘old’ Scotland Yard on London’s Victoria Embankment in a 
“not very large room… full of boxes of files of various sorts and it also held a couple of 
rows of grey filing cabinets [and] wooden box drawers full of index cards bearing data 
about known and suspected villains”.  He said that in addition to gathering information 
about serious and organised crime for the Met, the unit acted as a regional ‘clearing 
house’ and provided the national lead on intelligence for certain types of crimes 
designated by the Home Office (usually associated with national or international crime).  
The former C9 detective (N062) said that, just like C9, the new unit was staffed 
exclusively by specially selected detective officers and concerned itself only with 
intelligence about serious and organised crime.  Just like its predecessor; it provided only 
a very limited service to mainstream policing.  In 1963, further regional intelligence 
offices (RIOs) were established according to the same model in Birmingham, Cardiff, 
Durham, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester based on the C11 model (ACPO, 1975).   
Several respondents (including a former detective inspector, N055; a senior 
intelligence official, N050; and an ACPO member, N053) argued that there was no 
similar investment at the local level in mainstream policing.  A former collator (N061) 
said that it was intended that the new system should seamlessly link in with the new local 
intelligence system used by collators.   However, C11 officers quickly found that 
although some information that they wanted was held in the local records, most 
information of real value was held in the Criminal Records Office (then known as C4) or 
the Metropolitan Police Registry (which archived a wide variety of official records).  C11 
officers also trawled through intelligence files held by the other specialist squads to find 
information that they could add to C11’s records.  Reflecting the ACPO member’s 
comments about the hoarding of information for personal or gain, a former collator 
(N061) said that “Much of the serious active information was scrounged from the 
                                                 
20 See the section on Unit Beat Policing for a discussion of the collator system.  
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Sweeney (Cockney rhyming slang for the Flying Squad) who were a bit jealous of 
divulging this”.   
In 1971, C11 adopted an experimental criminal intelligence computer system 
(MEPO 3/2033).  However, it was beset by technical and staff difficulties.  It broke down 
frequently and inputting work proved unpopular with staff.  In 1973, having collected 
together all the intelligence available to it, the branch held 130 dockets on individuals 
“about whom so much data is held that it cannot conveniently be held on cards” (that is, 
those of the greatest interest to detectives), intelligence on 2,500 individuals of “major 
interest” and 50,000 nominal records containing particulars of individuals and companies 
(MEPO 3/2033).   At that time, the branch was made up of 82 staff (71 police officers and 
11 civilians) under the command of an officer of the rank of Commander.  As an 
indication of the growth of the branch, by 1983, having successfully computerised its 
data, it held a total of 152,186 records (Hansard, 1983 col. 969-70). 
The criminal intelligence branch is now known by the title ‘SO11’.  Staffed by a 
large number of detectives and intelligence specialists, it represents not just the oldest but 
the largest and most influential police intelligence department in Britain.  The reader will 
see later that despite that fact, the branch had no meaningful involvement in the 
development of the NIM.     
 
Regional Crime Squads 
Another significant addition to the specialist detective force was the Regional Crime 
Squads (RCS).  Section 13 of the 1964 Police Act included a voluntary collaborative 
agreement between constituent police forces to establish the squads which came into 
formal existence on 1st April 1965 (Maguire and Norris, 1992).  Once again, detectives 
were specially selected from their constituent forces for their ‘thief-catching’ abilities.  
The squads’ aim was to counter what was perceived to be a growing threat from organised 
crime, particularly in relation to offenders who crossed force boundaries.  Essentially, the 
nine regional squads were intended to provide the operational arm of the existing regional 
criminal intelligence offices.   
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The arrangements for the new squads were made in the course of a series of 
regional conferences overseen by officials from the Home Office Police Research and 
Planning Branch, representatives of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 
and force elites (HO 287/665).  Each region was headed by a regional coordinator (of 
detective chief superintendent rank) who was responsible to a chief constables’ 
management committee made up of the chiefs of the participating forces, and an HMIC 
representative.  Regional coordinators reported to the national Executive Coordinator 
based at the Home Office (Maguire and Norris, 1992) (which, as I have highlighted 
elsewhere, was evidence of the Home Office’s continuing influence over policing policy). 
Although in the main there was agreement on the need for a regional response to 
the growing problem of organised crime, a personal communication from the HMIC 
representative for Wales to J. Haughton, Head of the Police Research and Planning 
Branch indicates that the squads may have been resisted in some corners.  He commented, 
“I am glad that we can make a start on this venture which I have been campaigning for 
since 1960 and I can only hope that the results will convert such unbelievers as we have.” 
(HO 287/665a, letter dated 4th December 1964).  The same communication indicates that 
Home Office planning for the squad’s new branch offices was not as thorough as it might 
have been.  The (unidentified) HMIC member observed that he was:   
Not very impressed by the need for squads at Hereford, Newtown or Abergavenny.  
Hereford… comes under No. 4 District [that is, in England rather than in Wales].   
Newtown is in the centre of one of the largest expanses of nothing in the country 
and indeed such crime as does occur is worried to death by the existing CID and 
uniform personnel who are fairly numerous. Abergavenny is not a centre for crime 
purposes and has the County Police headquarters there by historical accident only.     
A former RCS branch commander (N063) noted that the squads’ terms of 
reference to combat ‘serious and organised crime’ further reinforced the distinction 
between local policing (and local intelligence gathering) and specialist detective work.  
He said that the squads relied on the collection of intelligence about suspect individuals or 
populations and that their officers made extensive use of informers, telephone ‘tapping’ 
and the other covert policing techniques (of the kind described by Clutterbuck, 2002 – see 
Table 1) that were not routinely available in mainstream policing.  This served to sharpen 
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the distinction between mainstream policing and the specialist detective force even 
further. 
 
Summary of Analysis 
In the early days of the new police, the Commissioners found it prudent to emphasise the 
key role of the force as ‘prevention’ rather than ‘detection’ of crime.  Uniform patrol 
officers were employed instead of plain-clothes detectives who might conjure up images 
of spies and ‘continental despotism’ and provide a focus for resistance to the police.  The 
new force did not represent a clear break with the past.  Instead it shared the responsibility 
for crime investigation with London’s magistrates and their agents.  Continuing concerns 
about the level of crime and the capabilities of the police outweighed suspicion of police 
spies and stimulated the growth of the detective force and eventually the detective 
department assumed monopoly control of criminal investigation firstly in the Metropolis 
and then beyond. 
In 1878, the CID was established in London under Charles Vincent.  He 
revolutionised the detective force, formalising the distinction between divisional 
detectives and specialists and introducing the first specialist detective unit, the SIB, which 
represented a quantum leap in the operational methodology of the detective force and a 
commitment to longer-term approaches to intelligence work and investigation in relation 
to political crime.  However, his reforms also had the effect of dividing the force, creating 
a kind of class structure in policing with the specialist detective at its apex and the 
uniformed branch at its base. 
The development of the detective force was marked out by consistency and 
continuity.  Of course, there have been many inquiries into the police and investigation 
but the Dixon Committee’s report was significant because it established the pattern for 
detective work for the rest of the twentieth century, for its acknowledgement of the 
continuing tension between the CID and the uniformed branch and for its documented 
commitment to ILP in the mainstream some 60 years before Phillips’ ‘novel’ plans for 
policing.  The Committee was concerned enough about the obvious divide between the 
CID and the uniform branches to make a number of recommendations intended to 
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ameliorate the problem.  However, it did nothing to prevent the increasing specialisation 
of the detective force which continued to be staffed by highly-valued ‘thief-catchers’ who 
utilised investigative tools and techniques that were rarely available in the mainstream. 
I have argued here that over time, investigative expertise was concentrated in 
specialist detective squads at the expense of mainstream policing and any idea that 
intelligence might form part of routine policing was ignored.  Progressively, the cultural 
divide between the detective force and the uniformed branch and within the detective 
force between divisional and specialist officers (who snobbishly regarded themselves as 
an elite) continued to widen.  Even though those divisions were obvious to those at 
highest levels of the police service (not just within the CID), few effective measures were 
taken to resolve them so that developments in intelligence work and investigative practice 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century set in 
place what I will later argue are some of the limiting factors that contributed to the 
challenges faced by the NIM. 
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Chapter 4 - Contextualising the +IM: Intelligence-Led 
Investigation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the NIM narrative up to the rediscovery of ILP strategies at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  Specifically, the chapter assesses the extent to which those 
developments in the police organisation concentrated expertise and resources in the 
specialist detective squads.  I examine the development of a kind of class structure in 
policing that ultimately undermined Phillips’ ‘whole service’ vision for the NIM.  I also 
examine the policing milieu at the end of the twentieth century.  I argue that it is important 
to consider the policing and policy contexts of criminal investigation and detective work 
in that period because their influence on the sponsor and authors of the NIM was 
considerable. 
 
UBP, Intelligence Work and the CID  
This section is largely informed by previously unpublished primary research carried out 
across England, between 1967 and 1969; the research was completed by officers 
attending the Bramshill ‘Special Course’ and was part of their formal summative 
assessment.  I discovered it in the archive of the National Police Library at Bramshill.  
The material itself, forms part of the police archive but unfortunately appears not to form 
part of the police’s organisational memory.  I analyse UBP here as the foundation of ILP 
in Britain in the modern era and as the precursor to the NIM.  The reader will see that the 
architects of the NIM could have learnt much from the implementation failure associated 
with this policy.  That they seem not to have reveals much about the shortcomings of the 
organisational memory of the service.  
I argued earlier that many public sector change programmes have suffered from 
implementation failure.  The UBP system, introduced in England and Wales in 1967, 
provides a good example of the kinds of challenges that change programmes in this sector 
face.  It is also particularly relevant to this analysis of the NIM because UBP provided the 
foundation upon which ILP has been constructed in the modern era.  UBP represented a 
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shift away from a system of patrol that had existed almost unchanged since its 
introduction in 1829 by Commissioner Rowan.  Rogers (2004) suggested that UBP was 
an attempt by the Home Office and the police service to address significant staff shortages 
across England and Wales, to respond to the dramatic increase in the use of vehicles since 
the Second World War and to modernise a rigid beat patrol system that had changed little 
in almost 140 years.   
However, others such as Reiner (2010) and Newburn (2003) argued that 
‘revolutionary’ policing tactics like UBP are as much about legitimating the role of the 
public police as they are about reducing or preventing crime.  Rather than being a 
response to the police’s inability to tackle crime they are, at least in part, a response to 
government and public identification of the limits of policing.  That is, they are about 
re-establishing the role of the public police as the primary agency of social control 
(Newburn, 2003).  By that analysis, UBP was essentially an attempt by the police elite to 
retain (or regain) its legitimacy in the face of public and political disquiet about its 
apparent inability to meet the challenges of that era.  It introduced relatively modest 
changes ‘dressed up’ in the values of the time: scientific progress and modernisation.   
 
UBP’s Influence on Patrol Strategies 
Rand (1970: 14) noted that the old ‘Shorncliffe’ system of patrol that had been introduced 
by Mayne “had little to commend it other than tradition” and that changes were needed.21  
However, he highlighted that the selection of a model that favoured mobile over foot 
patrol was odd, given the success of schemes elsewhere that did exactly the opposite.  
Rand (1970: 14) referred specifically to schemes in the Netherlands which identified that 
“owing to the increased use of police motor cars, officers were losing touch with the 
public and consequently, efficiency was falling off and morale was low”.  In a scheme 
implemented in Arnhem, the municipality was divided into areas of “5,500 to 10,000 
                                                 
21 See Chappell (2004) Wellington’s Peninsula Regiments: Light Infantry v. 2 (Men-at-arms).  London: Osprey 
Publishing, for further discussion of the Shorncliffe System.  Rowan's instruction book directed that “[the 
constable] should be able to see every part of his beat at least once in ten minutes or a quarter of an hour; and 
this he will be expected to do” from Metropolitan Police (2008) The History of Beat Patrol retrieved on 
28/02/2011 from http://www.met.police.uk/history/beat_patrol.htm. 
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inhabitants and of between 237 and 1,284 acres”.  Every one of the “mature” officers 
selected to work in those areas was supplied with a moped, a telephone and (for the 
purpose of maintaining a “modest” card index) a typewriter.  The result was that: 
The public were getting better service in the matters of petty crimes and 
complaints… there was a drop in offences… [and] information began to flow from 
quarters where previously there had been none.  The conclusion drawn from the 
experiment was that ‘for most municipalities the area officer scheme is the only 
effective method of making up for the disadvantages of motorisation’. 
Nevertheless, following experiments by the Home Office Police Research and 
Development Branch into the preventive capacity of foot patrol in Manchester, Sheffield, 
Newcastle and Cardiff a small-scale UBP scheme was piloted in Kirkby, Lancashire in 
the spring of 1967.   Rand (1970: 14) noted that the Kirkby experiment produced fast 
response times to calls for assistance but that “communication with the public was 
diminished and therefore information did not flow”.  Consequently when the UBP 
experiment was extended to Accrington Lancashire, an attempt was made to incorporate 
the best features of the Kirkby and the Dutch schemes with the four new mobile patrols 
being supplemented with eight area officers.  Rand (1970:15) argued that as a result of the 
claimed success of the Accrington pilot, on 3rd July 1967 UBP was introduced 
throughout the city of Birmingham.  Therefore in just one year, UBP went “from a small 
experimental scheme to total adoption in an entire police force” despite the fact that: 
There had not been time to ascertain if there was any significant difference in crime 
figures, nor had there really been time to allow operational problems to show 
themselves properly.  Even in 1970, it is arguable that there has been an insufficient 
time interval to satisfactorily review the trends in the matter. 
Williamson (1971: 5) noted that the introduction of area policing in Newcastle in 
March 1967 (as a precursor to UBP) resulted in an 8.3 percent fall in recorded crime and 
an increase in the detection rate from 40.8 percent to 45.1 percent and as a result, UBP 
was introduced in the force almost a year later.  Williamson clearly was not persuaded by 
the police data that emerged.  He commented that “The figures may be spurious but they 
were taken as evidence of the success of the area system by senior officers and men.  It 
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was this climate which forms the background against which UBP was introduced” (1971: 
5). 
Home Office encouragement to implement UBP often meant tangible rewards for 
police commanders (the ‘carrot and stick’ approach that I referred to earlier, which may 
be familiar to the police elite in the modern era).  For example, in Newcastle upon Tyne, 
the decision to accept the change from the Shorncliffe style of patrol to UBP meant that 
“more equipment – cars and radios” was made available to local commanders 
(Williamson, 1971: 6).  Enthusiasm for additional resources overrode issues such as the 
need to consult staff over the changes; two thirds of all the constables affected were not 
given any choice in their new duties, and the lack of prior discussion with staff 
associations led the Newcastle upon Tyne Police Federation to make a formal complaint 
to the chief constable (Williamson, 1971: 10).  According to Williamson (1971), the 
‘discrepancy’ between the elite’s conception of UBP and its interpretation by operational 
officers was a significant factor in its failure.  In my view, poor communication of the sort 
described here is endemic in policing.  The reader will see later that it certainly was a 
factor in the story of the NIM.  
Other difficulties were experienced in implementing the system.  For example, 
UBP was not welcomed by communities in Durham where many complaints were 
received about the low visibility of police officers, particularly in town and city centres 
(Gearon et al, 1969).  Whilst in rural areas of Bedfordshire it was found that due to the low 
levels of crime and problems with radio coverage the system had to be ‘adapted’ to meet 
local conditions (Evans et al, 1968).  A major issue across England and Wales was the 
shortage of staff available to implement the new patrol strategy.  In the main, these 
difficulties were attributed to the formula applied by the Home Office to calculate force 
strengths (Coe et al, 1968; Gearon et al, 1968). 
Though it was expected to improve relations with the public (Gregory, 1967), 
UBP since has been criticised for damaging police community relations by introducing an 
overly-reactive ‘fire brigade’ policing style that alienated officers from the communities 
that they served (Mawby, 2008; Reiner, 1992).  The redeployment of ‘street police’ to 
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motor vehicles to create ‘car police’, did not achieve the development of strategy and 
tactics in the ways envisaged by Gregory and other advocates of the system.   
 
UBP and Local Intelligence 
An important feature of UBP was the new local intelligence system represented by the 
‘collator’, a significant development of the criminal intelligence process in mainstream 
policing because previously there was almost a complete absence of “timely information” 
available to the beat officer and crime investigator (Rogers, 2004: 3).  In interview, a 
former detective sergeant (DS) (N070) said that before the creation of the collator system 
there were no formal arrangements for collecting information from beat constables.  
Officers were issued with a ‘beat book’ which described their beats and patrols and which 
gave them hints on how to work those beats.  He noted that the “women police” (then a 
distinct entity) “had some ‘good’ files on women and children” though the assimilation of 
that department into the main body of the service in 1973 meant that “all that was thrown 
away” (rather than being added to the organisational memory).22 
Gospel et al (1969: 11) noted that the appointment of collators represented “the 
start of an entirely new era in police records” because prior to introduction of the new 
system; information held by individual constables (about the areas that they policed and 
the communities and individuals that they came into contact with) was lost whenever an 
officer transferred, resigned, or retired from the force.  The former DS (N070) said that 
before the advent of collators, information was held in “old experienced officers’ heads” 
and nowhere else.  Collators collected information from a wide variety of sources and 
forwarded it to others who might need it (Rogers, 2004).  They maintained a daily record 
sheet containing evaluated information, a main index of offenders or suspects living on 
(or who were known to frequent) the division, a suspect vehicle index, an index of serious 
or unusual crimes, a prostitutes index and a street index (which included various premises 
of interest to the police such as licensed premises) (Gospel et al, 1969). 
                                                 
22 The Metropolitan Police’s A4 Branch (Women Police) was established in 1930 as a separate section of the 
force.  The branch was dissolved in 1969 and women assimilated into the main force in 1973. 
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However, they usually were given no training for their work.  Several respondents 
(N030, N046, N059 and N060) said that the selection criteria for the new posts were 
applied arbitrarily.   A former collator in south-east London in the late 1960s (N046) said 
that when the system was implemented in his division, the job was given to “the laziest 
man at the station”.  While a former collator in central London (N059) said that he was 
offered the post when it was recognised by supervisors that the incumbent “was not up to 
the job”.   Essentially, it was not the most talented of officers that were appointed to the 
role but those who for, whatever reason, were out of favour with their supervisors.  In that 
sense, for some the collators job was almost a ‘punishment posting’. 
Many other factors served to undermine the effectiveness of the new 
arrangements.  Two former collators (N059 and N030) said that they worked with little 
assistance and without any of the technological aids available to intelligence staff today.  
As a result of their research in the South-East Region, Coe et al (1968) found that in some 
forces, collators were regularly given ancillary tasks that took them away from their 
intelligence duties.  In the North-East Region, collators often worked in cramped and 
inappropriate conditions (Gearon et al, 1968) and even the strongest advocates of the 
system admitted that it could be inefficient.  For example, an early evaluation found that a 
large amount of the information that was passed to the collator was never used (Gregory, 
1967).  The system did not address the lack of interconnectedness in the national 
intelligence system as it was essentially intended to be a repository of information for 
local officers.  Though collators were instructed to forward information on offenders to 
the clearing houses at headquarters level, this was an inefficient process and local police 
received little intelligence in return.  A point made repeatedly by former collators 
(including N030, N046, N059 and N060).  
UBP’s impact was intended to be felt far beyond intelligence work.  Gregory 
(1967: 8) argued that it would change the role of supervisors so that leadership would 
become more important than supervision.  Inspectors would become “strategists” keeping 
themselves up to date with crime trends and directing the daily work of sergeants.  Rather 
than spending their time checking up on constables, sergeants would utilise “modern [sic] 
communications and mobility” to become “leaders and tacticians” so that supervisors 
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would be able to mobilise forces very quickly.  Gregory (1967: 8) imagined “a sergeant in 
the early hours… marshalling his units and carrying out a sweep through the area, 
checking persons and property”.  He argued that: 
With this method of rapid, unexpected action, the police are on the offensive, using 
modern and sophisticated equipment to catch offenders when they are off their 
guard, and to harass them by the necessity of being more on guard than before. 
The research evidence available, suggests that Gregory’s vision of proactive policing was 
overly-optimistic.  Certainly no accounts of such events were uncovered in this research.  
Instead the reactive paradigm continued to dominate. 
  
UBP and the CID 
The popular perception of the changes brought about by UBP, reinforced by the image of 
the panda car popularised by contemporary British police dramas such as Z Cars, is that it 
was focused almost exclusively on the uniform department.  However, the CID was 
meant to play a crucial role with divisional detectives being part of the new ‘area’ units so 
that the car beats would have been supplemented by ‘area’ uniformed officers and 
detectives but in practice detectives’ involvement was minimal (Rogers, 2004).  It was 
therefore predictable that as early as 1975, a Home Office study would report “inadequate 
implementation” of UBP (Mawby, 2008: 280).  
In principle, UBP meant that for the very first time, some CID officers would be 
supervised by local police commanders rather than by their detective chief 
superintendent.  This, explicitly, was a measure that was intended to break down the 
continuing divide between the uniform branch and detectives (Gregory, 1967).  However, 
it was unsuccessful.  Just one year into the experiment, Gregory was moved to observe 
that UBP demanded “a certain basic structure for the CID which was not the same as that 
in use in many forces” (Gregory, 1968: 46).  It was also clear that the new commitment to 
joint working was restricted to the divisional CID with no attempt at all made to bridge 
the continuing divide between the divisional CID and specialist squads.23   
                                                 
23 Specialist CID units are not referred to at all either in the Home Office (1967) Report on Police Manpower, 
Equipment and Efficiency or by informed commentators such as Gregory (1967). 
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In practice, the extent of CID involvement in the new units varied from force to 
force.  For example, in Kent and Durham, divisional CID officers were not allocated to 
the new area teams (Coe et al 1969; Gearon et al, 1969 respectively).  In Bedfordshire, 
CID officers were attached to the teams.  However, detectives were overwhelmed by the 
volume of crime they were expected to investigate (Evans et al, 1968).  In Manchester, 
Salford and Birmingham, it was found to be impractical to attach CID officers to the new 
teams because of differential crime rates; in some areas, detectives carried an enormous 
caseload while colleagues in other areas were under-employed (Watson et al, 1969; 
Gospel et al, 1969; Bennison et al, 1968).   
Similarly in Kent, differential caseloads meant that the divisional CID undertook 
all crime investigation.  Though in an attempt to comply with the spirit of the system a 
liaison system was established between beat constables and local detectives (Coe et al, 
1969).  In Birmingham, it was decided that many of the beats “did not lend themselves to 
be used as a basis for the organisation of the CID” (Gospel et al, 1969: 9).  Rawlings 
(2006: 65) has argued that though UBP provided new opportunities for improved 
“cooperation and information flow between the uniform and detective branches” the 
cultural divide between the two was never overcome because these policies were 
presented by police managers without any real conviction.  He speculated that to do 
otherwise would undermine “the important image of detection as complex and skilled” an 
image which the CID had carefully constructed (Rawlings 2006: 65).  UBP was intended 
to revolutionise patrol but its success depended inter alia on the cooperation of the 
detective force.  As the reader has seen, this was rarely forthcoming in practice.   
Writing in 1970, some three years after UBP was introduced, Rand (1970: 15) 
noted that it was “far too soon… to say whether there has been any effect upon crime 
figures which can be directly attributed to the system” rather than to factors such as 
legislative change or force reorganisation.  However, by the 1970s, UBP had become the 
standard method of delivering local policing (Mawby, 2008).  Clearly then, 
implementation was something of a leap of faith, there was no formal evaluation of UBP 
before it was implemented nationally and in fact “scant evaluation research” to assess and 
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support its continuation (Weatheritt cited in Mawby, 2008: 280).  I will argue later that a 
similar leap of faith was taken by those who invested in the NIM. 
As the reader has seen, rather than collaborating with the uniformed branch to 
deliver a new system of area policing, the CID was able to sidestep the changes that 
occurred in the mainstream by citing differential crime rates or caseloads.  I argue that 
these amounted to the “avoidance” strategies that Skogan (2008: 27) has argued are often 
employed by elite police units.  Those strategies allowed the CID to maintain its distance 
from the uniformed branch, to continue to operate according to its established values and 
traditions and to maintain the ‘professional’ image it had constructed for itself.   
Today there is almost universal agreement that UBP was a failure.  Commentators 
have described it as at best “misconceived” (Newburn, 2003: 59) and at worst “a disaster” 
(Mainwaring-White, 1983 in Newburn, 2003: 60).  As far back as 1971, there were 
indications that the model was fundamentally flawed.  Williamson (1971: 13) argued that 
the experiment was always “unlikely to achieve some of its major goals” and that any 
gains made in terms of mobility and response times were far outweighed by the 
deterioration in the relationship between police and public.  UBP failed because it was 
never fully or consistently implemented.  Arguably, it was understood inconsistently by 
those who were intended to implement it and, consequently, different people interpreted it 
in different ways.   
I argue that a significant factor in the ‘misinterpretation’ of UBP was the failure of 
commanders to harness the experience and expertise of the detective force (particularly 
the specialist detective force) in crime-fighting.  In his policing models, Phillips sought to 
overcome that division by developing a ‘whole service’ approach linked to a new 
proactive paradigm.  However, the reader will see later that he was only partly successful.  
Given the history of policing, the division and the continuing dominance of the reactive 
paradigm were always likely to challenge Phillips’ plans for a whole service approach.   
 
Scrutiny of the CID 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Home Office made a concerted effort to address what it 
saw as the CID’s abuse of its powers.  Mark’s appointment as Metropolitan Police 
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Commissioner in 1972 was as a result of a major corruption scandal involving the CID in 
London (see Appendix C).  As much of an outsider as Vincent had been almost 100 years 
earlier, Mark found, just as Vincent had done before him, that the relationship between 
the detective and uniformed departments was problematic.  He noted that the uniformed 
officer continued to bear "the brunt of violence...and he has long resented the airs and 
graces of the CID [which continued to regard]... itself as an elite body, higher paid by way 
of allowances and factually, fictionally and journalistically more glamorous" (cited in 
Hobbs, 1988: 72-73).  
Mark’s reforms were aimed at eradicating CID corruption.  He overhauled the 
department, removing CID commanders, replacing them with senior officers from the 
uniformed branch, and bringing in a system of ‘interchange’ between the branches so that 
detectives no longer had CID jobs for life.  He believed that his changes fundamentally 
altered the balance of power between the CID and uniform branches in London.  
Incidentally, Mark has claimed to be the first Commissioner to implement ILP strategies 
(though they were not known by that name in that period), arguing that he was forced into 
that action by “the refusal of successive governments… to allow the police adequate 
resources to fulfil their primary function of prevention” (Mark, 1978: 293).  The police 
“long had a shrewd idea of the patterns of major crime and of those involved” which 
justified Mark’s concentration of “comparatively small numbers of hand-picked men and 
women to specialise in intelligence gathering and surveillance” in specialist squads.  
However, as he attested, the numbers involved in such work were small and the vast 
majority of the force continued to operate in orthodox ways. 
Hobbs (1988: 183) argued that despite Mark’s efforts in London, the culture of the 
CID in the 1970s and 1980s remained elitist by virtue of “historical precedent, 
occupational requirements and internal organisation”.  He highlighted the significance in 
this context of a distinct detective culture that combined “elements of ritualistic formality 
with patronage and individualistic entrepreneurial action” (1988: 184).  Those qualities 
are unique to the ‘new centurion’ personality type, the dedicated crime fighter described 
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by Reiner (2010) in his typology of police culture, and can be easily identified in the 
makeup of Thomson’s ‘thief-catchers’ (Thomson, 1921).24 
Hobbs’ account of the interaction of detectives and criminal entrepreneurs in the 
East End of London at the beginning of the 1980s, offers a fascinating insight into the 
reflexive occupational culture of the CID in the “urban milieu” (1988: 2).  He argued that 
the working personality of detectives was marked out by “deceit, evasiveness, duplicity, 
lying, innuendo, secrecy, double talk and triple talk” (1988: 197).  Once CID status was 
achieved, new detectives “quickly meld[ed] into the department’s style, pursuing its 
rituals to form a new link in the tradition of the CID (Young, 1991: 81).  These traditions 
required recruits to adopt the dominant culture and priorities of the department which 
included distancing themselves as far as possible from the “formal administrative 
restraints” of uniformed policing to allow themselves to deal with ‘real’ crime (Hobbs, 
1999: 1).  The elevation of mainstream uniformed officers to the CID enhanced their 
power and reach, signalling a switch from the ordinary to the extraordinary “from the 
maintenance of order to thief-taking” (Hobbs, 1988: 210).  The reader can see that in 
almost 100 years little had changed in that regard. 
 
Specialist Detective Squads at the End of the Twentieth Century 
The enthusiasm for the specialist squad system continued unabated into the modern era.  
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the development of new detective 
departments that had an explicitly national (and increasingly, international) focus.  In this 
section, I examine the national detective bodies, the differential treatment of divisional 
and specialist detectives and the continuing resilience of the squad system. 
 
+ew +ational Detective Bodies 
In 1972, the Metropolitan Police established the Central Drugs Intelligence and Illegal 
Immigration Unit (CDIIIU), the first detective unit with an explicitly national remit.  A 
former RCS branch commander (N063) said that the unit was staffed with specially 
                                                 
24  Reiner’s analysis of police culture describes officers as either Bobbies, new centurions, uniform carriers or 
professionals (see Reiner, 2010: 132 for further discussion). 
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selected Met CID officers and detectives from other Home Counties forces.    At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the Home Office appointed a National Coordinator for Drugs 
Intelligence to oversee the creation of a National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) and in 
1985 the NDIU took over the functions of the CDIIIU and took up occupation of the same 
suite of offices at New Scotland Yard.  The metamorphosis of the CDIIIU into the NDIU 
largely reflected a desire on the part of the Home Office to develop a national strategy to 
combat the growing problem of drug trafficking.  Met detectives were soon joined by 
others from across the UK and HM Customs and Excise drugs investigators on lengthy 
secondments to the unit.   
Neither the CDIIIU nor the NDIU possessed an operational capability.  Their role 
was to collect, evaluate and disseminate intelligence ‘packages’ to operational teams 
within the police or HM Customs.  Though the scope of their work was limited by this 
lack of operational capacity, the units provided a single point of contact for UK and 
foreign police departments, for Customs and border agencies and for others such as 
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry.   Though it was located at New Scotland 
Yard, the NDIU reported directly to the Home Office-appointed National Coordinator.  
The former RCS branch commander (N063) said that the NDIU was the first truly 
multi-agency intelligence unit established in the UK in the modern era and that apart from 
its intelligence function; the unit also played an important role in informing Government 
policy in this period. 
Matassa and Newburn (2007: 59) observed that at the end of the 1980s there was 
increasing support within the police and the Home Office for further development of the 
“de facto policing establishment” and the appointment of a national body headed by an 
individual with the status that would allow them to speak for UK law enforcement and 
with the executive authority commensurate with the role.  Hebenton and Thomas (1995) 
noted that there was broad agreement on the need for such a development.  However, 
much of the debate surrounding the establishment of the new body focused on whether it 
should have an executive operational capacity besides its intelligence gathering function.  
The head of the NDIU and the executive coordinator of the RCS were in favour of such a 
change, whilst others such as the chair of the Police Federation were strongly against it.   
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Ultimately, the Home Office’s decision was to limit the function of the new body 
to intelligence gathering and to charge the existing RCSs with the operational response.  
In 1992, the Home Office established the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
and appointed at its head, a Director General with the status and authority that the police 
service had sought.  The NDIU and the National Football Intelligence Unit (NFIU) (that 
had been established in 1989) were merged into the new agency (Matassa and Newburn, 
2007), as were various HM Customs intelligence units.  The new body took on the 
responsibility for managing intelligence on national and international crime and also for 
producing an annual ‘threat assessment’ for the UK.  The assessment considered the 
various threats to the nation from serious and organised crime, attempted to forecast 
developments in those areas and was intended to inform policy.  However, the former 
RCS branch commander (N063) said that the assessment very much represented NCIS’s 
view of the world because it was not informed by any intelligence analyses from forces.   
An intelligence analyst (N084) said that in the early days of the NIM, there was a notion 
(part of Phillips’ original ‘Big Idea’ for the model) that intelligence assessments 
generated in forces would be used to inform the threat assessment.  However, she said that 
those aspirations seemed, “very quietly” to have been abandoned during the 
implementation process (discussed later). 
Soon after NCIS was established, further plans were announced for a national 
detective agency.  The Police Act 1997 created the National Crime Squad (NCS) from the 
existing RCSs and placed NCIS on a statutory footing (Uglow and Telford, 1997).  The 
expectation was that the NCIS managed the intelligence and the crime squads provided 
the operational capability and expertise that the CDIIU and the NDIU had lacked.  In 
interview, a former RCS branch commander (N063) said these acts were rarely carried 
out by divisional detectives though the powers were used increasingly frequently by 
specialist detective units.  
The former RCS branch commander said that detectives’ perception of the 
national policing arrangements was that the NCS was first amongst these equals.  Though 
on the surface NCS and NCIS enjoyed a symbiotic relationship, in practice the NCS 
generated most of its operations itself and would happily have ignored the NCIS except 
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for the latter’s monopoly control of telephone interception by the police.25   A serious 
crime squad detective (N079) said that the popular perception of NCIS within police 
circles was that with no operational capability of its own, it was no more than a talking 
shop which occupied “the ivory towers of Spring Gardens (its HQ in Vauxhall, London) 
without much real purpose”.   NCIS’ lack of credibility was commented upon by many 
respondents in this study.  Given the status of specialist detectives in policing, it is 
perhaps surprising that it was thought of in this way.  I argue that one reason was the 
relative invisibility of NCIS’ work but other factors such as the high proportion of civilian 
support staff employed in the agency (for a discussion of the opposition of police officers 
to civilianisation see Jones and Newburn, 1997) and the attitude of the modern police 
service to intelligence work (which is explored later in this thesis) were also significant. 
The reader will see later that NCIS played a key role in developing the NIM 
(incidentally, the NCS played no meaningful part in its development) and promulgating it 
across the police service.  However, the reader will also see that the organisation’s 
‘distance’ from the mainstream (both in terms of its national and international remits and 
the secrecy with which it generally operated) meant that NCIS’ message that the NIM 
could revolutionise intelligence work and investigative practice never carried the weight 
that an objective observer might expect. 
 
Controlling the Detectives 
At the organisational level, the accountability of the detective force is established through 
a hierarchical rank structure that provides a level of supervision aimed at producing a 
disciplined and responsible force.  Just like their uniformed colleagues, detectives are 
subject to a police disciplinary code that may punish inappropriate conduct.  Maguire and 
Norris (1992) argued that understanding the supervision of detectives and criminal 
investigations was the key to understanding CID inefficiencies and malpractice.  In their 
view, the continuing “frequent, informal contact” with criminals (that caused concern to 
Reiner, 2010 and also those tasked with investigating detectives’ corruption) was but one 
                                                 
25 Under the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA) and later under Part 1 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
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factor in what they perceived to be the wider problem of ‘supervision’ (Maguire and 
Norris 1992: 23-24).   
Maguire and Norris (1992: 24) felt that supervision in the CID was problematic 
because even though the supervisory ratio was higher than in the uniform department, 
there was much less actual supervision of detectives’ work and CID officers of all ranks 
saw supervision as “of necessity different to that in the uniform branch… Supervision had 
to be based on trust rather than ‘checking up on people’”.  The final element of ‘the 
problem’ was the tendency of supervisors to carry their own individual caseload and to 
engage in activities similar to those undertaken by their juniors so that the supervision 
was pushed into second place “behind the job of clearing up crime”.  
Divisional CID work largely was more transparent and accountable to uniform 
commanders than specialist detective work (Maguire and Norris, 1992).  The dual chain 
of command, under which divisional detectives worked, pulled staff in different 
directions.  As divisional personnel, they were responsible to the local uniformed 
commander but they also had answered to the head of the CID at force headquarters.  
Maguire and Norris (1992: 26) argued that the system reinforced the idea of the CID as a 
‘firm within a firm’ because it “generated periodic controversy and argument exacerbated 
by traditional rivalries… and resentment… of the tendency of CID officers to by-pass 
local uniform branch structures”.   
Research into specialist detective squads, revealed much about their ability to 
operate ‘in the shadows’, to distance themselves from internal supervision and scrutiny 
(Morgan et al, 1996).26  Most squads professed to support force objectives.  However, in 
practice those rarely translated into measurable operational standards and there was little 
use of performance indicators to monitor their work (Morgan et al, 1996).  Maguire and 
Norris (1992) found that there was rigorous managerial control over activity and 
personnel in the squads they visited.  However, this was not replicated across all forces.   
Morgan et al (1996) were critical of the way in which force executives failed to 
scrutinise squad work.  Squads accumulated only a very limited amount of management 
                                                 
26 The research was carried out between October 1993 and December 1994 in the Metropolitan Police Area; 
Northamptonshire, Thames Valley, West Mercia and West Yorkshire. 
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information so that their total running costs were rarely calculated (Morgan et al, 1996).  
Moreover, day-to-day operations were conducted independently of BCUs, and little 
information was available (either to the researchers or the BCUs) about how they 
generated work.  Formal agreements to provide assistance to BCUs existed only in 
respect of surveillance.  This severely limited BCUs’ ability to obtain assistance for 
policing problems in the mainstream (Morgan et al, 1996).  The reader will see in the 
‘County’ case study that this continued to be a significant issue in policing and that in that 
regard, the NIM had no effect on the police organisation. 
The relationship between the specialist detectives and the other sections of the 
service was an uneasy one.  This was partly attributable to organisational history and 
partly to mutual suspicion over each other’s motivations and aims.  As the foregoing 
analysis has shown. suspicion hindered effective information sharing between the two.  In 
interview, a NCIS senior executive (N02) pointed to a further divide between the CID and 
the uniformed branch.  He said that there was never a culture of intelligence, or of 
intelligence work, in mainstream policing.  Detectives were reluctant to share information 
freely for fear of compromising investigations or revealing that they were interested in 
particular individuals or groups and, in the NCIS executive’s view, there was never 
enough of a drive to get information out of people’s heads into some kind of 
organisational memory.   
Often, the best sources of intelligence were kept from local officers.  Information 
from informers, described by a former detective inspector (N055) as the life blood of the 
specialist squads, was never entered into the local intelligence system.  Clearly, there 
were issues that today would be included under the heading of ‘duty of care’ (particularly 
in relation to the well-being and safety of the person providing the information).  
However, in the view of a former South London collator (N046), this was because 
informers were “in the main down to CID staff” with whom collators had a “bad” 
relationship.  He said that as a local collator in the 1970s, he had never once received 
information from the CID.  Echoing the earlier comments of the ACPO member (N053), 
he remained convinced that even when appropriate safeguards were put in place, CID 
officers believed that “knowledge was power” therefore it should not be shared.   
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In the same vein, a former collator in West London (N030) said that officers from 
specialist squads refused to share intelligence with their uniformed colleagues.  They 
routinely carried out “night raids” on the collator’s office so that local officers could not 
identify those subjects of interest to the squads.  A former collator in south London 
(N046) said that when officers from specialist squads visited his office during the day, 
they would go straight to the intelligence records without any invitation and often had to 
be asked to introduce themselves and to explain the purpose of their visit.  It was the 
experience of another ACPO member (N03), that the CID made a contribution to local 
intelligence in this period but “it was on their terms” and usually “historical rather than 
current” and therefore in practice rather less valuable.  There was little recognition by the 
CID of the benefits of a ‘whole service’ approach. 
 
The Resilience of the Specialist Squads 
As I argued earlier, both the Home Office and the police elite recognised the advantages 
of reforming the CID by bringing it under the control and influence of the traditionally 
more disciplined and better supervised, uniformed branch.  However, attempts in the 
1960s (through the UBP experiment) and in the 1970s and 1980s (as a response to the 
uncovering of CID corruption and malpractice) were only partially successful.  Given the 
foregoing analysis and the sequence of events that led to Mark’s appointment as 
Commissioner, it is incongruous that reforms that brought divisional detectives under the 
control of local uniformed commanders should leave specialist squads (which were 
perceived by many to offer the greatest scope for corruption) under the control of CID 
commanders.  However, the reader will see that the squad system has proved, and 
continues to prove, to be extremely resilient.    
 Morgan et al (1996: 3) argued that there was a need for a wide-ranging review of 
the very existence of specialist squads.  In their view, the case for the squads was not 
made because of the lack of information about what they actually produced and too little 
attention was paid to weighing up the balance between the “classic alternatives - squad or 
BCU” (1999).  Waddington (1999: 232) criticised specialist squads in this period for 
exacerbating problems in mainstream policing by allowing the more capable officers to 
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escape from the “drudgery” of uniform patrol thereby ‘deskilling’ mainstream policing 
which was left to deal with the “rump” of tasks for which no one else in the police 
organisation wanted responsibility.  Whilst Reiner (2010: 92) argued that the uniformed 
branch was treated as merely a reserve from which “high-flying potential specialists 
could be drawn”. 
Squad managers emphasised their compliance with the administrative aspects of 
guidance from central authorities but in practice they focused on complying with those 
guidelines rather than attempting to achieve intended outcomes (in other words, squads 
were well practised at achieving what Goldstein (1979) has called ‘administrative 
competence’) (Morgan et al, 1996).  This seemed to satisfy force executives who, despite 
the fact that their forces fell short of meeting centrally-imposed targets, continued to view 
specialist units as permanent and did not periodically review whether the arguments for 
setting up, continuing or disbanding the squads were relevant.  It has been noted that one 
supposed advantage of specialist units is that they can be “dissolved when conditions and 
priorities change” (Waddington, 1999: 233).  However, Morgan et al (1996) found that 
alternatives to the squad system (such as providing a central source of expertise and 
guidance which could be accessed by investigating officers from BCUs) received little or 
no consideration.   
The argument was advanced that forces could consider a middle ground “such as 
one where an individual or smaller specialist teams operate centrally and provide the 
necessary professional support for mainstream investigations to be carried out within 
BCUs” as a viable alternative to their traditional specialist squads (Morgan et al, 1996).  
Some limited evidence was found in this research to suggest that, from time to time, this 
was a course adopted in some forces in response to events.  However, Waddington (1999: 
233) argued that specialist squads are adept at lobbying to protect their own interests even 
when they are in conflict with the interests of the organisation as a whole.  Lobbying 
activity may reflect “genuine concerns”, by squad members but it could “militate against 
the most rational allocation of resources when viewed from the perspective of the 
organisation as a whole”.   As the reader will see later in this study, the County case study 
provides an excellent example of such a conflict. 
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At the end of the twentieth century, commentators acknowledged that the divide 
between the CID and the uniform branches was as wide as it ever had been.  Though some 
researchers highlighted the differential treatment of the specialist detective force, little 
attention was given to why the police elite continued to afford it that latitude and that is a 
question that is worth some attention here.  I argue that in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the elite saw the detective force and, increasingly, the specialist detective force, 
as the means by which many of their most challenging policing problems would be 
resolved.  The analyses of the formation of the Flying Squad and the Special Duty Squad 
in particular, provided compelling evidence to support that contention.   
The establishment of the Special Duty Squad also demonstrated that in response 
to political pressure, the police elite was not averse to turning a blind eye to ethically 
questionable means to secure what it perceived to be morally good ends (for further 
discussion of what has been termed The Dirty Harry Problem see Klockars, 1980).  Its 
reluctance to challenge the CID, to bring it into line, was based on self-interest.  
According to that thesis, the continuing divide between the branches was a price worth 
paying.  It is my contention that the work of Maguire and Norris (1992) and Morgan et al 
(1996) explored in this section, demonstrates that senior commanders continued to defer 
to an unreconstructed specialist detective force in the second half of the century.    
That is not to suggest that the specialist force always had things its own way.  
From time to time, the elite was forced to take, very public, action against particular 
squads (such as the Obscene Publications Squad in London (see Cox, Shirley and Short, 
1977) or the Serious Crime Squad in the West Midlands (see HC Deb 25th January 1989 
volume 145 cc1155-60) but otherwise commanders rarely asked questions about the 
methods squads used.  Where reform was considered, this usually was only in the context 
of the dissolution or reorganisation of individual squads rather than the reform of a system 
which despite its successes reinforced the divisions between different elements of the 
service and, as the reader will see later, challenged Phillips’ ambitions for a ‘whole 
service’ response to policing problems in the modern era. 
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Policing with Intelligence 
Good intelligence might be considered to be essential for policing but as the foregoing 
analysis has shown, though specialist detective units recognised that intelligence work 
was core business, it was not considered important in the mainstream.  Partly, this was a 
consequence of the policing styles that were adopted (or that evolved) in the mainstream, 
so that routine policing was essentially reactive in nature whilst specialist detective work 
became more proactive.  Reactive approaches represent the ‘traditional’ style of policing 
that gives priority “to responding to day-to-day demands” (termed ‘fire brigade policing’ 
by Reiner, 2000 and others).  Proactive approaches often prioritise “longer-term planning 
and agendas set by the police” (Maguire, 2008: 437).  Employed by the specialist 
detective force those approaches invariably involve the targeting of suspect individuals or 
groups.  However, it must be highlighted that specialist detectives represent only a very 
small proportion of the detective force and that most detective work follows the reactive 
tradition.      
Flood (2004: 1) argued that a factor in the apparent neglect of intelligence work 
was that traditionally most forces were too preoccupied with investigating reported crime 
“even where they accepted the possibility that the predictive ability of good intelligence 
systems might eventually help to reduce the overall level of crime”.  Therefore the 
mainstream reactive policing tradition meant that “too great an act of faith was required” 
to invest more widely in the intelligence function as there was no history of intelligence 
gathering in any formal sense outside the Special Branch and other specialist detective 
units. 
It was not until 10 years after the introduction of the collator system (as part of 
UBP) that any serious attempt was made to raise the status of intelligence work in the 
mainstream.  In 1974, ACPO established a sub-committee on ‘Criminal Intelligence’ 
chaired by G.H. Baumber, ACC of West Midlands Police.   Between August 1974 and 
May 1975, the Baumber committee set to its task by visiting a number of police forces in 
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England, Wales and Scotland and an RCS headquarters.27   Baumber also commissioned a 
survey of the chief constables of England and Wales.  He identified the absence of a 
common vision or strategic aim for intelligence and identified that in the 1970s there was 
not even a commonly accepted definition of the term in mainstream policing (ACPO, 
1975). 
Baumber found that the training offered to intelligence staff, where it was offered 
at all, was extremely limited.  The selection and training of staff involved in intelligence 
work has always been an issue.  Many have questioned the adequacy of intelligence 
training in mainstream policing in this period (for example, see Innes, Fielding and Cope, 
2005 and Innes, 2003).  In summary, local intelligence officers received little instruction 
for the duties they were expected to undertake with many posts being filled by officers 
who were unfit for (or otherwise unable to carry out) operational duties.  This was in stark 
contrast to British military intelligence and the security services where intelligence work 
was always considered the preserve of the sharpest and most able minds (see for example 
Herman, 2001). 
In an attempt to remedy what he had called a “haphazard and controversial 
subject”, Baumber recommended minimum standards for the collection and management 
of intelligence and a process for the development of intelligence, known as the 
intelligence cycle, that remains fundamentally unchanged today (see Figure 1) (ACPO, 
1975: 26).  Baumber (ACPO, 1975: 27) recommended improvements in the police 
intelligence structure (for example, by establishing new intelligence units at force, 
regional and national levels to provide an “accountable chain of responsibility” for 
intelligence work) and in the training of intelligence staff (highlighting, for example, that 
it should be a “countrywide requirement” for every police officer to be “educated as to the 
criminal intelligence process”).  However, this was long before the ACPO membership 
had agreed its policy of ‘presumption in favour of compliance’ and Baumber seems to 
have been well aware that there was no guarantee that his recommendations would be 
                                                 
27 These were: the Metropolitan Police, Ayrshire Constabulary, Glasgow City Police, Leicestershire 
Constabulary, West Mercia Constabulary, Merseyside Police, Thames Valley Police, South Wales Police, 
Hampshire Constabulary and No. 4 Regional Crime Squad (Baumber, 1975: 4). 
 125 
accepted.   Sensitive to those considerations, Baumber favoured the implementation of 
“general principles” for intelligence work which could be adapted to local conditions 
such as “the nature and density of the population… the crime rate and the actual police 
establishment” (ACPO, 1975: 6).   
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The Intelligence Cycle (Dixon, 2001) 
 
Interestingly, in terms of the subsequent development of intelligence work, 
Baumber and other committee members visited Thames Valley Police headquarters to 
view an experiment in “computerised criminal intelligence”.  He concluded that work was 
not sufficiently advanced to allow the committee to come to a decision on the potential of 
the end product (ACPO 1975: 27). 28   The result was that the possibilities that 
computerisation of intelligence records in mainstream policing offered, were largely 
ignored for a generation. 
                                                 
28 It is worth noting that the Metropolitan Police Service, by far the largest force in the UK, did not establish a 
computerised intelligence system for mainstream policing until 1998. 
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In 1986, frustrated with its lack of progress in implementing a national 
intelligence system worthy of the name, ACPO commissioned a further study under A.B. 
Ratcliffe, ACC of Cambridgeshire Constabulary.  Ratcliffe credited Baumber with being 
the first in the service to acknowledge that intelligence was more than the information 
obtained from informers.  However, he found that few of Baumber’s recommendations 
had been implemented.  (ACPO, 1986).  Intelligence staff remained untrained and 
existing intelligence units were ill-equipped to meet the challenges they faced at the end 
of the twentieth century.  Few chief officers had established force intelligence bureaux 
and even where such units were introduced, there was wide variation in their staffing and 
the capability, and the proposed national intelligence office received little further 
consideration (ACPO, 1986).  Just as Baumber had done before him, Ratcliffe 
emphasised the need to coordinate intelligence gathering activities, to police in a more 
intelligent way by making better use of information to direct operational activity and to 
guide resource allocation.  However, he was no more successful than Baumber in 
effecting meaningful change (Grieve, 2004).   
Flood (2003) and Grieve (2004) separately argued that the service ignored the 
ACPO reports because it did not value intelligence, and Skogan (2008: 29) also noted that 
intelligence was an important organizational function that often was “short changed”.  
Moreover, interviewed for this research, an experienced former RCS detective (N063) 
reflecting on his experiences of police intelligence work said that “I always thought that 
we were the worst at what we should have been best at”.   Now, one can only speculate 
why established models such as those used by the armed forces, the security services, and 
others highlighted by academic research in the USA (see for example Kent, 1967), appear 
to have been ignored.   However, it may be that a different analytical framework is 
required.  Sharing intelligence means sharing knowledge which can mean relinquishing 
power and control.  Conversely, it may be argued that establishing new knowledge 
systems can mean gaining power and control.  Perhaps, it is that gain (or loss) of power 
and control that chief officers have resisted.  As the reader will see that certainly was a 
factor in the Urban case study. 
 127 
Unresolved, the debate about intelligence raged on and in 1997 yet another 
inquiry was commissioned; in this case by HMIC rather than by ACPO.  The inquiry took 
the form of a thematic inspection of the intelligence capacity of the police forces of 
England and Wales.  The inspectors made a number of recommendations to improve 
intelligence work in the UK (HMIC, 1997: 34-35).  Most relevant in the context of this 
study were: that forces should appoint a senior officer, a ‘director of intelligence’ (DOI) 
to take ownership of the intelligence assets held by the force; that forces should publish an 
intelligence strategy with clearly defined aims that should be communicated to all staff; 
that they should establish a properly integrated intelligence structure from BCU through 
to force level and, that forces should adopt “formal tasking criteria” for the deployment of 
its specialist units and introduce costing and evaluation of completed operations (all of 
which in due course became key elements of the NIM).   I argue that HMIC’s instructions 
signal that these structures and processes, which the reader might consider essential for 
effective, efficient and economic investigative strategies, largely were lacking in most 
forces in this period.   
Stevens (2001) (a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police) described an 
intelligence ideal.  He likened the police intelligence system to a pyramid.   At its base 
were the basic command units, going up through force headquarters to upper levels 
populated by national and international agencies (such as NCIS and then SOCA).  
Stevens said that for the model to work effectively, it had to have structures that allowed 
intelligence to flow freely at and between every level and between agencies.  The most 
important structures were at the local or BCU level because it was there that most officers 
operated and that most intelligence was collected.  However, the intelligence process was 
just as important.  It had to be clearly defined and understood by everyone. 
As the reader can see, in setting out his ideal, Stevens glossed over many of the 
problems in intelligence work.  Though a more objective commentator may question 
whether the evidence revealed by the inspection justified the optimism expressed in its 
report, HMIC (1997) professed itself impressed with the progress that many forces were 
making in developing their intelligence capability according to Stevens’ ideal.  However, 
its description of the different directions that forces across the UK were taking (praised by 
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the inspectors as “indicating an increasing focus on intelligence-led policing styles”) also 
illustrated the lack of coordination of intelligence work in this era.  Notably, one of the 
forces singled out for approval was Kent Police.  Kent was commended for having 
restructured its “policing philosophy around an intelligence led, proactive approach” 
particularly in its piloting of a new crime management model (HMIC, 1997: 39).   I will 
go on to examine those developments later.  What was obvious was that a real 
commitment to intelligence work in the mainstream could open up the policing habitus to 
a variety of new approaches.  It is to those approaches that this thesis now turns. 
 
Summary of Analysis 
The second half of the century witnessed repeated attempts by the police to assert their 
role as a core institution in the face of government and public discontent with their 
performance.  One such attempt, the introduction of UBP, was meant to revolutionise 
police patrol and crime investigation to demonstrate to the Home Office and communities 
in a very public way that the police were willing to change.  However, the system was 
bound to fail because the management change strategy selected was incapable of 
translating policy into effective practice.   
 In the particular context of this study, UBP failed because inter alia it did not 
harness the efforts of divisional detectives effectively enough and it had no discernible 
impact on the work of the specialist squads so that the most capable and experienced 
detectives continued to operate outside the mainstream.  A significant development was 
the creation of a local intelligence system for mainstream policing.  However, collators 
(as the new local intelligence officers were named) were poorly trained and resourced and 
there was resistance to the new system particularly from the CID.  The reader will see 
later, that the UBP experiment did not inform the work of those who created the NIM a 
generation later.  As much as anything, that signalled a complete failure of the 
organisation’s memory.    
Mark’s appointment as Commissioner signalled a renewed commitment to reform 
the CID and investigative practice.  He felt that his changes fundamentally altered the 
balance of power between the CID and the uniformed branch in London.  Now, the 
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consensus is that despite his best intentions, Mark left the elitist detective culture 
fundamentally intact.  Moreover, his failure to reconcile the differences between the 
branches was particularly significant in the context of this study because the continuing of 
that divide between the divisional CID, specialist detectives and the uniformed branch 
that Mark’s reforms were meant to address, continues to the present day even if it is 
expressed with considerably more subtlety.   
This chapter examined the CID, investigative practice and the wider policing 
milieu from which the NIM emerged at the end of the twentieth century.  Researchers 
identified ‘the problem of supervision’ in the CID as key to understanding detectives’ 
inefficiencies and malpractice but organisationally these were to all intents and purposes 
ignored and the governance and management arrangements of the detective force were 
little changed in this period.  Research into the operation of the specialist detective squads 
revealed their ability to operate ‘in the shadows’ and to distance themselves from internal 
scrutiny.  The raison d’etre of specialist squads was never questioned and their day-to-day 
operations were conducted independently of BCUs with little information available about 
how squads generated their work.  Police organisational culture continued to accord high 
status to the action-orientated specialist CID units and neither senior commanders nor 
police middle managers demonstrated any real enthusiasm for implementing meaningful 
change.  Additionally, the class structure that had developed in the service was 
maintained and was even reinforced by the introduction of the new national units.  
Managerialist reforms introduced a new system of audit and performance 
indicators in detective work but most significantly in the context of this study, they 
heralded a new era where policing was redefined explicitly as ‘crime control’.  The focus 
on crime control imperatives appealed to detectives’ traditional value systems but this 
was to the detriment of the wider police organisation and the mistaken assumption that 
more specialist departments utilising better technologies could make a real difference to 
crime levels served only to siphon off officers from mainstream patrol duties and further 
insulate the specialist units from the challenges of the mainstream.  The Audit 
Commission, HMIC, new specialist detective agencies (such as NCIS and NCS), the 
COMPSTAT system and ACPO represented both a new bureaucracy to oversee senior 
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commanders and a policy community in which the discrete bodies worked together to 
influence policing policy.  However, a continuing commitment to ‘traditional’ reactive 
practice and/or an ideological commitment to what I have termed ‘preventative’ proactive 
policing meant that intelligence work, the reorganisation of the CID and the 
reconfiguration of investigative practice remained firmly off the policy agenda in this 
period. 
It should be stressed that the shift in crime control strategies in this period was not 
as great, nor the rejection of the traditional reactive model as complete, as the popular 
discourse suggests.  I will later argue that a distinction should be made between the 
administrative function that underpins most ILP in the mainstream and ‘operationalised  
ILP’.  The former focuses on problem-solving, partnership and longer-term approaches to 
changing the social environment and is more closely associated with a ‘preventative’ 
proactive policing style.  Specialist detectives hold a near-monopoly on the latter, which 
targets groups and individuals using covert methods and is much more associated with the 
crime control policing philosophy. 
What all these innovative approaches had in common is that they were 
undermined by a failure to establish a credible intelligence structure capable of 
supporting them.  I argue that at the end of the twentieth century a policing model like the 
NIM was ‘heaven-sent’ for those who wanted to demonstrate that they were responding to 
the challenges that policing faced at this time and who recognised the weak foundations 
on which proactive strategies were built.  I explore the ways in which Phillips and his 
colleagues in the Kent force took up that challenge in the next chapter.  It should now be 
clear that from the very beginning of public policing there has been a split between what 
might on the one hand be thought of as a reflective, thoughtful, intelligence-led approach 
to criminal investigation and on the other a reactive task-focused outlook.  Put simply, 
many of the barriers to the successful implementation of the NIM have their roots deep in 
the histories of British policing and detective work that I have outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 - The Emergence of the +IM 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the emergence of the NIM from the policing milieu described in the 
previous chapters.  It traces the development of ILP strategies in Kent in the 1990s, which 
presaged the emergence and development of Phillips’ policing models.   It explains how 
the NIM emerged, how it was meant to be implemented, and how something generated 
within a single police force came to be endorsed by the wider police service and codified 
by the Home Office as the model for operational policing in England and Wales in the 
modern era. 
I examine that policymaking process through the lens of Kingdon’s (1995) 
‘Agenda Setting’ approach which highlights the role of the ‘policy entrepreneur’.  I argue 
it was Phillips’ policy entrepreneurship that allowed him, at least on the surface, to 
engineer a ‘whole service’ solution to the policing problems of the modern era.  
 
David Phillips’ Influence on Policing in Kent 
One of the pioneering forces in the development of proactive policing strategies in Britain 
was the Kent County Constabulary (now Kent Police) where it is popularly believed that 
ILP in the mainstream began in the early 1990s (see for example Tilley, 2008).  In 1993, 
Phillips, the Chief Constable of that force introduced the KPM, a “holistic” system of ILP 
that he claimed would revolutionise the delivery of operational policing in Britain 
(Maguire, 2008: 455).  He then went on significantly to influence investigative policy 
throughout England and Wales through his sponsorship of the NIM.   
The driving force behind both projects, Phillips wanted alternatives to the reactive 
policing styles that had dominated policing since the failed experiment of UBP in the 
1960s.  He wanted particularly to break what the Audit Commission (1993: 40) described 
as the “vicious circle of reactive policing” in which crime threatened to overwhelm the 
police and criminal justice systems.  An ACPO member who played a key role in the NIM 
(N03) said that ACPO agreed that there was a clear need at the beginning of the 1990s to 
move the police organisation from an entrenched reactive position “to get it into a 
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position where it started to focus its efforts… on those people who were causing the most 
problems”.  The challenge was to focus the investigative effort in a smarter, more 
proactive way.  This was considered by some to be revolutionary but in reality it simply 
mirrored debates within the Dixon Committee some 60 years earlier.  
Tilley (2003: 313) described Phillips’ KPM as “the most extensive and 
influential” ILP project demonstrated across England and Wales in that period.   I will 
argue that the KPM signalled an important development in policing at the end of the 
twentieth century.  In terms of its influence on proactive policing in England and Wales, it 
was not surpassed until the implementation of its direct descendent, the NIM, at the 
beginning of this new century.  Maguire and John (1995, cited in Maguire, 2008) have 
argued that although many forces in England adopted some of the tools that could have 
helped them implement ILP strategies in that period, very few undertook the significant 
level of reorganisation that could produce a “genuinely integrated system”.   
Phillips’ priority for his models was that they should manage police business more 
effectively.  Intelligence work should be focused on outcomes.   Crime would be reduced 
by reinforcing discrete areas of policing activity.  That is, in ways that Phillips believed 
would have the greatest impact on the general level of crime (Phillips, 2006).  It is clear 
that like other innovators in that period (such as Bratton in New York City) Phillips was 
influenced by right realists such as Wilson and Kelling and by structural changes in 
policing in the United States (particularly Bratton’s COMPSTAT experiment).   
The NCIS senior executive (N02), Phillips’ chief aide in the development of the 
KPM and the NIM, said that whatever the influences upon Phillips “The police service 
owes him a great debt for overturning or freeing it from the shackles of the opportunistic 
approach to police business”.   Though I argue that praise for Phillips should be qualified.  
In fact, the NIM process largely mirrors the ‘intelligence cycle’ described by Baumber 
(ACPO, 1975; see Figure 1).  Phillips’ power and influence certainly were key factors in 
driving forward both models but there was little that was truly new about his intelligence 
models.   
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Kent’s Crime Management Model 
In 1993, Phillips established the ‘Force Intelligence Review Team’ (FIRT) with a brief to 
formulate an ILP strategy for the Kent force.  The team subsequently produced the ‘Force 
Intelligence Review’ which established the framework for the KPM (Anderson, 1997).  
The NCIS senior executive (N02) was an ally of Phillips in that period and he became a 
significant figure in the development of Phillips’ ILP models.  He was responsible for 
coordinating the work of the FIRT and translating Phillips’ plans into documented 
strategies.   
In interview, the senior executive said that FIRT members shared Phillips’ vision.  
He suggested (albeit with a degree of levity) that in Kent in this period, crisis management 
was the norm.  He said “We just used to sit around and wait for the wheels to fall off and 
then [when they fell off] hid all the bits of paper that talked about wheels falling off”.  The 
NCIS senior executive (N02) said that Phillips and the FIRT shared a realisation that the 
force was “running faster and working longer hours to achieve less” and a collective view 
was that a complete overhaul of the way in which the force conducted its business was 
required.  The result was the KPM, later described by HMIC as “an intelligence-led, 
proactive, problem solving approach to policing with crime reduction as its primary 
objective” (HMIC, 1995: 1). 
In my view, the NCIS senior executive’s plans for ILP in Kent must have been 
influenced by his experiences in Europe, particularly his work in the Netherlands where 
he had spent four and a half years as a liaison officer, and where he found that much more 
attention was being given to crime mapping and the emerging science of crime analysis.  
It is  worthy of note that just as with UBP in the 1960s; innovative strategies that were 
used in the Netherlands seem to have informed the development of policing practice in 
Britain.  The FIRT team’s work was presaged on the assumption that policing practice 
and policy in the county needed to be less reactive; its efforts needed to produce a vision 
of a more promising alternative.  Therefore, the KPM was founded on two principles.  
The first, acknowledging the findings of the Audit Commission (1993), was that most 
offences were committed by a very few, known, offenders.  The second, that identifying 
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offending patterns required a strategic direction that relied on the “increasing 
specialisation of the work force” (FIRT, 1998: 3).   
The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that he had previously tried (and failed) to 
implement changes that would move the force away from the traditional reactive model.  
He said that his attempts foundered, partly because of the kinds of resistance to changing 
the CID that I explored earlier and partly because of the competition for the scarce tactical 
resources that he needed to respond to the emerging threats his intelligence work 
identified.  He said:   
I was threatened with death by the CID for trying to change things…  It was a 
frightful period.  They absolutely hated me because I’d been one of them and was 
seen as a renegade and a traitor but I’d tried something like this in 1983… when I 
was the DCI in East Kent.  I’d just got sick of the fact that we couldn’t deal with 
serious crime…. I tried to hack out a deal with our surveillance unit that we would 
try to put a targeting regime in place across the divisions… In the end, it foundered 
on the predictable number of murders that they were trying [to cope with].  They 
were the first deployable assets to any murder scene.  You couldn’t argue with the 
CID about the reactive requirements for murders.   
The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that the police needed to become more 
proactive in their approach to policing problems.  He felt that the problems were rooted in 
the service’s history and culture and essentially were of their own making.  In his view: 
The tradition [was] all about opportunity; demand and opportunity.  You look back 
over the years – the cops go around waiting for the next disaster to strike, the next 
call, or the next incident.  All their effort and careful consideration and planning, 
insofar as they do it, and in some places to be fair they have been quite good at it – is 
about how you manage events better once the event has occurred. 
Without actually using the phrase ‘problem-oriented policing’ or referring 
directly to Herman Goldstein’s (1979) work, he captured the essence of Goldstein’s ideas 
to improve the operations of police agencies in providing an example of the way in which 
the police failed to address the issue of horses wandering onto the A2 - a busy trunk route 
running between south-east London and the Kent coast.  He said: 
I remember standing there at 3 o’clock in the morning with bits of horse all over the 
carriageway, cars all over the place, arguing with the Met about where the boundary 
was.  Half a dozen horses had been killed, people had been injured, cars were all 
over the shop and the road’s closed and it’s chaos.  Just out of interest one of the 
things I was recently looking for was information on the ‘gypsies’ horses A2 issue’ 
and guess what … they still get gypsies’ horses on the A2 but they’ve got an 
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absolutely shit hot response for it.  On the shelf is the battle plan for gypsies’ horses 
on the A2.  The question you ask of course is ‘Where’s the plan for stopping the 
horses getting on the A2 in the first place’?  There wasn’t one.  In 30 years, they’d 
learnt nothing about prevention.  They’d learned a hell of a lot about how best, and 
quickest, and most safely, you could respond to these incidents - but they hadn’t 
solved the problem. 
The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that Kent CID’s response seemed to typify 
the police mentality at that time which was essentially about getting better at dealing with 
“those things that come at us from all directions”.  He said that “trying to get out there and 
find out which way they’re likely to come from is not something that the cops ever 
devoted much time to”.  The FIRT (1998: 1-2) also identified that police intelligence 
systems of the period were not configured in a way that readily could support problem 
solving approaches.  Instead, they tended to be “passive, recording inputs [and] acting as a 
reserve bank of information”.  The review team’s aim therefore, was to create a model 
that was based upon “cyclical and analytical approaches” that might manage the demand 
upon the force’s services and would enable the force to switch “more effort into planned 
operations and away from response deployment”.   
According to the NCIS senior executive (N02), law enforcement needed 
something comparable to British Defence Doctrine (described by the Ministry of 
Defence, 2008: 1, as a “pragmatic basis for action, decision and reflection” that 
recognised and delineated the contributions of “individual initiative, enterprise and 
imagination”).  He argued that British policing needed something in the same vein that 
imposed a new set of disciplines on the police service and that would standardise policing 
responses.  The KPM (and thereafter the NIM) was to provide the solution.   Though it 
was not acknowledged by any respondent in this study, the FIRT’s starting point seems to 
have been the British military intelligence model.  Certainly, Herman (1996: 350) has 
argued that the new coordinating structure for intelligence work that was being advocated 
by “professional policemen” in that period was “an almost exact replica of the JIC model 
as it evolved in the Second World War and after”.29    
                                                 
29 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) emerged during the Second World War for the purpose of bringing 
“greater rationality into bitter strategic debate” (Omand, 2005).  The committee continues to sit and is made up 
of senior officials from across Government as well as intelligence professionals. 
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The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that his aim was to establish what worked 
(or at least what can work in a modern democratic society).  The team found that: “in one 
place it was target selection; in another, focusing on prolific offenders; in another, it was 
linking series of crimes; in another, it was ‘hot spotting’; and in another, it was through 
the use of preventatitive measures”.  However, each of the measures was “short-lived”.  
The senior executive felt that if it was possible to link the different strategies together into 
a longer-term plan, the force would be able to reduce crime over extended periods.  A 
former detective superintendent (N051) who was a member of that team said that it 
proved difficult to persuade frontline officers of the utility of these approaches because it 
was “not the sexy side of the business” albeit that, as I argued earlier, the underpinning 
philosophy of the new arrangements explicitly was crime control. 
The architects of the KPM acknowledged that response (or reactive) policing 
would continue to feature heavily in the mainstream.  However, they hoped that the new 
strategies would lead to the implementation of a new management system that might 
reduce the demand for its services.  In turn, that would break the force out of the response 
mode which took up all of its operational resources, and prevented the development of 
longer-term problem solving (and intelligence-led) responses (FIRT, 1998).  They 
anticipated that the KPM would allow Kent the space to create an operational reserve not 
routinely committed to reactive policing.  As a result, operational commanders would 
have more flexibility in the way they approached policing problems.  This would provide 
them with the capacity to resource the longer-term problem-solving measures that FIRT 
members had identified.  The first stage in this process was the introduction of a new 
Crime Management Model (CMM).  
When the CMM was launched, new crime and incident desks were introduced.  
Their purpose was to screen incoming telephone enquiries from the public, to establish 
those which required police attendance.  Calls that did not require attendance would be 
dealt with quickly and efficiently by telephone so that the force’s scarce operational 
resources could be directed to those that really required attendance (FIRT, 1998).  The 
CMM was the key to establishing the “tactical capability” that hitherto had been lacking 
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(FIRT, 1998: 4).  In practice the system allowed the force to manage demand but, for the 
NCIS senior executive (N02), it simply did not go far enough.  He explained:  
We’d got all these crime management units trying desperately to manage more out 
of the system rather than deal with it - manage it out of the system… to find ever 
more sophisticated reasons for not dealing with it.  Now that would have been OK if 
behind it they’d put in heaps of analysis to enable you to say – well actually all those 
96 incidents, we can treat them as one incident rather than 96 separate ones but they 
weren’t really doing all that. 
According to the NCIS senior executive (N02), the major problem in that context 
was the force’s CID which controlled the crime management units.  In his view the 
department had become “hidebound” and were locked into “old reactive investigative 
concepts”.  Therefore, the solution was to take the units away from the CID and at the 
same time supplement them with the analytical capability that was lacking.  This suggests 
that the division between the CID and the uniformed branch had still not been tackled 
effectively and it was still a major obstacle to intelligence-led proactive policing in the 
mainstream.      
 
Kent Police Model 
Phillips approved development of the intelligence, investigative and analytical capacities 
of the CMM which soon evolved into the KPM.  That development included plans to 
ensure that the force had sufficient specialists; officers and staff who had received a high 
degree of training to equip them for their new roles (FIRT, 1998).  Indeed, the success of 
the KPM depended on the increasing specialisation of the force (Amey et al, 1996).  The 
FIRT (1998) anticipated that new ‘Crime Scene Units’ would receive forensic training to 
enable staff to identify linked crime scenes and to gather evidence to identify offenders.  
New, ‘Area Crime Units’ would deal with less serious crimes where there were 
‘promising’ lines of enquiry while ‘Tactical CID Teams’ would replace the specialist 
detective units and work upon serious cases where greater investigative expertise was 
required.  ‘Case Investigation Teams’ would continue the investigation once an arrested 
person arrived at the police station. 
The foundation of the new structure would be the new ‘Intelligence Unit’.  
Headed by an Inspector as intelligence coordinator, the purpose of the unit was to provide 
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local commanders with short, medium and long term intelligence forecasts.  To 
accomplish this purpose, units were to be made up of: source coordinators (informant 
handlers); following the Dutch example, crime analysts; technical officers (to carry out 
covert observations etc.),and field intelligence officers whose key function was to 
maintain the informant strategy (i.e., to recruit informers to fill identified intelligence 
gaps) and to develop intelligence packages for tactical officers (FIRT, 1998: 6).  What is 
obvious from these plans is that, essentially, the CID was excluded from intelligence 
work and its officers were very much in the minority in the new units which reported 
directly to BCU commanders (through the intelligence manager) rather than to CID 
managers.   I argue that although this allowed Phillips to overcome the CID’s resistance to 
his plans, it also suggests that the units were not able to draw upon the whole range of 
detectives’ skills and experience in intelligence work in the mainstream.   
Phillips intended that the new intelligence staff would use the tools and techniques 
of intelligence work that were not routinely trained in any force and previously were 
usually used only by specialist detective units (see Table 1).30  Given that the lack of 
sufficient or appropriate training for intelligence unit staff has been a feature of most 
analyses of intelligence work in the last fifteen years (see for example Maguire and John, 
1995; Gill, 2000; Sheptycki, 2004), the development of the force’s staff in this way was 
perhaps the most ground breaking of all Phillips’ plans.  Whilst the sidelining of the CID 
from intelligence work in the mainstream set a precedent, I argue that the decision (not 
least because the same decision was then taken by most senior commanders in the UK) 
had a significantly detrimental impact on operational policing in the mainstream. 
The architects of the KPM claimed to recognise the fundamental importance of 
community intelligence in policing.  The FIRT (1998) argued that the KPM afforded an 
opportunity for improved community relations which in turn might contribute to 
improved intelligence flows from the community.  In interview, the NCIS senior 
executive (N02) explained the FIRT team recognised that “Actually, you do not build 
intelligence from the top down; you build it from the bottom up.  You’ve got to have those 
                                                 
30 Nor was this common currency in any other force in England and Wales.  Police informant handling in this 
period had come in for particular criticism (see Dunninghan and Norris (1998) and Cooper and Murphy (1995). 
 139 
flows from the bottom or you’re not in business”.  Formalised police/community 
partnerships were still some years away so perhaps it is unsurprising that the emphasis in 
the KPM was on finding local people who could help the police achieve their aims.31  
However, the executive’s words highlight just how little progress the police service had 
made in this context in the 17 years since John Alderson wrote his seminal work on 
community policing, Policing Freedom...  
The KPM emphasised a two-pronged approach by the police.  Local officers 
should be in regular communication with “as many local institutions as is possible, in 
particular, town and parish councils”, while uniformed officers should patrol particular 
localities such as problem housing estates or town centres (what have come to be known 
as crime ‘hot-spots’) to provide a visible presence, to sustain local contacts and to support 
local volunteers (such as special constables and neighbourhood or business watch 
schemes).  The FIRT (1998: 7) considered that the KPM was primarily relevant to BCUs 
“because that’s the focus of the business”.  It recognised that there was a need to establish 
a process to coordinate the affairs of these different groups and thus the phrase “tasking 
and coordinating” entered the policing lexicon.  In interview, the NCIS senior executive 
(N02) explained that: 
We put in place the principles of the intelligence units providing the fundamental 
information, which enables strategic planning, and tactical decision-making.  We 
put in place the decision-making process in the tasking and coordinating 
arrangements and specified for them the tactical options. 
The KPM was piloted in the Thanet BCU.  Thanet (which includes the towns of 
Margate, Broadstairs and Ramsgate) is a holiday centre; its population of about 123,000 
increases in the summer months and both public order and crime problems increase as a 
consequence.   In 1993, the police recorded 15,108 crimes.  The range of offences 
recorded is typical of many towns with the figures usually dominated by the offence of 
burglary though drug offences and credit card fraud also were problems (Amey et al, 
1996).  The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that Phillips accepted the 
FIRT’s plans and completely restructured the BCU.  Over a 12-month period, “key roles 
                                                 
31 Police/community partnership arrangements were formalised by the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998. 
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of intelligence management, tasking and coordination, operational review and analysis 
were created”. 
Phillips’ reorganisation was intended to produce the tactical capability that 
enabled the intelligence to be worked through effectively.  A former Kent detective 
superintendent (N051) said that initially the CID resisted the KPM in Thanet but that this 
was easily overcome by appointing one of the FIRT members as intelligence manager.  
The ACPO member (N03) said that because Phillips’ passion was intelligence he 
recruited into the intelligence world only officers “who were the brightest of the bunch” (I 
argue that this was consistent with practice in military intelligence and the security 
services and it is a policy that should be pursued much more rigorously in mainstream 
policing).  Phillips said that officers would not be promoted to a chief inspector post in 
any part of the county unless they had been an intelligence manager for at least 15 
months.  Even though that gave rise to some succession planning and stability issues it 
made command teams particularly aware “peculiarly aware”, of intelligence issues.  An 
intelligence career path was created so that officers could progress through the ranks to 
the DOI role.  Intelligence posts also attracted additional competency-related payments.    
Amey et al (1996) noted that the BCU’s resources were realigned exactly 
according to the KPM ideal.  This was a significant commitment by Phillips and his force 
executive.  However, the former Kent detective superintendent (N051) said that Phillips 
left little to chance. The Thanet BCU was “self-contained” with few notable policing 
problems and a community that fully supported the police.  Thus, it was a safe choice for 
Phillips.  In the former superintendent’s view, “if the KPM could not succeed there it 
could not succeed anywhere”. 
The ACPO member (N03) explained that as a result of implementation there was a 
significant reduction in crime in Thanet.  “The figures were dramatic for reductions in 
those four key areas [of robbery, auto crime, burglary and drugs].  Dramatic, you’re 
talking in certainly some areas of reductions of crime of 50% and it was very impressive”.  
However, he conceded that it proved difficult to relate that success to the new model 
alone as the FIRT made no attempt to separate out and evaluate its discrete elements: 
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Was it the introduction of models and intelligence and the use of human sources, a 
dedicated source unit as it is now known, or was it the extra patrolling of certain 
staff?  That was never fully [explained] but the bottom line was not too much else 
had changed and this had dramatically [improved performance]. 
 
KPM Roll-Out 
Amey et al (1996) attempted to evaluate the success of the CMM in four areas: the extent 
to which it delivered a reduction in reported crime; whether it was capable of ensuring the 
efficient and effective deployment of available resources; levels of victim satisfaction; 
and police job satisfaction.  In terms of crime reduction, the results were equivocal.  The 
ability of the CMM to reduce crime was “not proven” (Amey et al, 1996).  Significantly, 
Amey et al’s (1996: 33) research highlighted that the CMM was “designed to reduce the 
levels of those crimes which the force prioritises (those were: robbery, auto crime, 
burglary and drugs and not [to reduce] crime in general)”.  This is an important issue that 
is equally relevant today.  As I argue in later chapters, the tension between priority crime 
(routinely measured by the Home Office) and other, relatively minor, crimes that may be 
of great concern to communities but are not measured in the same way, became a key 
concern for BCU commanders operating in the NIM environment.  
Amey et al (1996: 33) found that in terms both of victim satisfaction and police 
job satisfaction, the CMM had made an important contribution to Phillips’ aims of 
managing the demand for policing services and creating a tactical capability by showing 
that it was “possible to free resources to be used in a proactive and productive fashion… 
[without] a noticeable decline in levels of public satisfaction with policing”.  Staff 
enthusiastically welcomed the challenges that the new systems brought and, with only 
with a few exceptions, “perceived their roles to be more constructive and fulfilling” than 
under the ‘old’ system of working. 
The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that as the KPM was rolled out across the 
county, performance data indicated that crime levels in BCUs were falling.  However, it 
was difficult to explain the reasons for that success.  He conducted his own research, 
visiting each BCU in turn to assess the results for himself.  He felt that the success of the 
model was dependent on more effective intelligence-led responses by officers, though the 
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tactics employed in each BCU varied dramatically ranging from “the targeting thing of 
offenders who are disproportionately responsible for volumes of crime… to connecting 
up series… to ‘hotspot’ management”. 
The former detective superintendent (N051) said that the new tactics had some 
success but that each of them was short-lived.  FIRT members gave a great deal of 
thought to linking those discrete measures together into a longer-term plan with the aim of 
reducing crime over a sustained period.  However, he acknowledged that this task would 
be very difficult.  In interview, the NCIS senior executive (N02) argued that the strategies 
he had observed were based on “practical experience and proven crime reduction in 
Kent”; the same strategies were capable of reducing crime across the board in England 
and Wales.  Following the successful pilot of the KPM in 1994, county-wide 
implementation of the model took place in 1995 (Anderson, 1997).  Implementation was 
accompanied by a programme of investment in information technology systems.  Amey et 
al (1996: 30) noted that the KPM’s  
introduction coincided with the beginning of a major upgrading of IT systems. The 
result, in 1995 was a slight decrease in performance (crime up by 1.3%)… 
[However] considering the scale of the changes, that performance itself is now 
viewed as an achievement... Total crime in 1996 fell by 6.5% to 143,000 offences 
and in 1997, it fell by 16.3% to 119,000. 
There were “inherent problems” in using the pilot sites as justification for a 
force-wide roll out of the model (HMIC, 1995: 5).  The Thanet experiment was 
“unscientific” in the sense that there was no control site against which to measure 
developments, and it proved impossible to prevent other Kent Police areas from adopting 
their own versions of the model (HMIC, 1995: 5) (which, it may be argued, given 
Phillips’ commitment to the KPM, was surprising and was certainly worthy of further 
analysis).  It also was considered that the timescale for the evaluation was too short to be 
conclusive “given the scale of the change and the focus on crime reduction” (HMIC, 
1995: 5). 
HMIC fully supported Phillips’ decision to establish the model force-wide.  In its 
view the risks involved were “understood properly” and were “being managed 
effectively” (HMIC, 1995: 5).  However, the decision to roll out the KPM was not based 
on any meaningful data.  The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said (in a 
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statement reminiscent of Weatheritt’s comments on the implementation of UBP) that 
“there was no academic evaluation of the KPM or any consideration of any other external 
driver that might have been an influence”.  Instead, implementation was based on little 
more than Phillips’ unshakeable belief in the model. 
The implementation of UBP and the KPM are just two events in the long history 
of policing.  Nevertheless, they are noteworthy in the context of this study because they 
reveal a willingness on the part of police commanders to commit significant resources on 
the basis of scant information.  Subsequently, HMIC commended Phillips for providing 
“a clear sense of direction to the force through the KPM” and commented that the work 
that was being carried out in Kent was “deserving of success… timely and has a 
significance which extends well beyond Kent to the police service nationally” (HMIC, 
1995: 7).  However, it conceded that there “was an element of calculated risk” in reaching 
that decision (HMIC, 1995: 7). 
 
The +IM 
HMIC’s (1997) thematic inspection on good practice in ILP, discussed in Chapter 1, was 
critical of the police national intelligence structure and called for an improved 
intelligence effort but it was complimentary about the changes that Phillips was effecting 
in Kent.   It was clear that HMIC and ACPO shared a common vision of integrating an 
intelligence-led approach within the culture of all forces (HMIC, 1997).   The putative 
success of the KPM persuaded Phillips that it could provide a template for ILP across 
Britain.  An ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that Phillips persuaded his 
peers to develop the KPM to be “a national model that everybody would buy into”.  In 
1998, ACPO and NCIS agreed that the NCIS senior executive (N02) would join NCIS to 
develop the new national model. 
Mindful of the need to make the model acceptable to all, one of Phillips’ first steps 
was to rebrand the KPM and thus the NIM was born.  In 1999, it was announced to the 
service in the ‘the Blue Book’ (NCIS, 1999).  In interview, the ACPO member (crime 
policy) (N01) said that Phillips used his position as ACPO crime business area chair and 
then as President of the Association, to market the NIM.  In April 1999, the ACPO 
 144 
member (N01) was appointed chief constable of an English force.  He said he 
immediately implemented Phillips’ model because he wanted his force to be one of the 
leaders in intelligence management.  He persuaded his police authority to spend £2.3 
million “to put in resources and change the way we did our business” to accomplish that 
aim.   
The ACPO member (N01) was completely committed to the NIM.   He 
surmounted the resistance of others in his force by confronting those who had little 
enthusiasm for the model and by asserting his authority in much the same way as Phillips 
had done in Kent.  He appointed a NIM ‘champion’ and forcefully instructed his senior 
commanders to support him.  The reader will see later that this was just the kind of action 
that was necessary to overcome the orthodoxy and tradition associated with police 
organisational culture.  However, the reader will also see that this was a course that few 
other ACPO members were willing to follow.   
In September 2000, ACPO met the Home Secretary Jack Straw at Lancaster 
House in London to discuss police reform.  Interviewed in 2005, the NCIS senior 
executive (N02) recalled that at that meeting, Phillips put forward the NIM as a police 
response to the Government’s Police Reform agenda.   However, two other ACPO 
members (N03 and N06) said that Phillips was not speaking for the Association as a 
whole, which remained divided.  There was a significant section that believed that the 
NIM belonged to NCIS.  That it was suitable for dealing with international or organised 
crime but not something that the wider police service needed.   The ACPO member (crime 
policy) (N01) said that even amongst those who were implementing NIM there was wide 
variation in practice:  
What I was finding was that... we were all doing it differently.  So there was no 
national interpretation, no singular [sic] interpretation, of what a tasking meeting 
looked like or [what] a strategic assessment was or what it looked like. 
The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that despite the resistance of some 
members, Phillips succeeded in ‘selling’ the model to the Home Office.  Despite 
members’ reservations, Ministers wanted the NIM for British policing.  The ACPO 
member (crime policy) (N01) said that in early 2001, he assumed a key policy role in 
ACPO.  He used that role to encourage other members setting about the task with 
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enthusiasm; “convincing, explaining, and persuading people that they should buy into” 
the NIM.  He agreed an implementation timetable with officials at the Home Office’s 
Police Reform Unit who, like Phillips, were frustrated at the slow take-up of the model.   
A Home Office official (N013) said that the department’s view of implementation 
in that period was that “the picture was mixed”.  However, it was satisfied that the top 
down approach that had been adopted by ACPO (targeting ACPO leads and champions) 
was “bearing fruit” and it was content that the policy should be continued.  The ACPO 
member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that his perception of that period was 
somewhat different.  Though some forces were implementing the model, the police 
service was “missing a trick” because ACPO was not driving it, “it was under-resourced 
[and] there were no standards”.  He said (in my view, rather presciently) that his opinion 
was that implementation was “doomed to fail” unless more support was forthcoming 
from chief officers.   
The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that Phillips who “was getting a bit 
concerned about the rather flaky implementation” expressed those concerns in ACPO 
council.  He said there was an obvious need to “grip it a bit more”.  Phillips pushed ACPO 
hard to accept his plans.  Assuming the presidency of the Association in 2001 allowed 
him to redouble his efforts.  The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that in 
2002 he attended a presentation on the NIM to the ACPO council.  The resolution to 
support the model was approved without any meaningful challenge.   
An ACPO member (N06) said that this was a key period in the development of the 
NIM.  He said that NCIS received £7-8 million which enabled it to maintain the NIM 
team on a full-time basis.  He said that the team’s focus was on proactively contacting 
individual chiefs “knocking on a few doors” to drive home the key messages of ILP to 
forces.  To assess progress, the ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) commissioned a 
baseline assessment of implementation to be carried out by the NIM team.  It visited every 
force in England and Wales to inspect progress towards compliance.   
I have already questioned the notion of aiming for mere ‘compliance’.  In this 
context, it is the goal that organisations aspire to in their efforts to ensure that staff 
acknowledge and comply with relevant rules.  Referring to the seeming inability of police 
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organisations to move beyond such limited aims, Goldstein (1979, 393) argued that even 
when the police achieve what they consider to be a sufficiently high level of “operating 
efficiency” they seem unable to shift their focus to “the end results” of their efforts.  He 
noted: 
The police seem to have reached a plateau at which the highest objective to which 
they aspire is administrative competence.  And, with some scattered exceptions, 
they seem reluctant to move beyond this plateau – toward creating a more 
systematic concern for the end product of their efforts. 
Goldstein was writing about US police agencies more than a decade before the 
NIM was introduced in Britain.  However, that argument is just as relevant in the context 
of British policing in the twenty-first century.  A senior intelligence official (N050) also 
was disdainful of the police service’s lack of ambition in this regard.  In her view, NIM 
compliance was “farcical”; policing should be measured against the desired outcomes of 
a process not according to the degree of compliance with that process.  I will argue later 
that the efforts of the NIM’s supporters to claim any successes for the NIM have 
foundered on the absence of any meaningful evaluation of outcomes.  Even where it can 
be claimed that NIM compliance has been achieved it has proved impossible to link that 
compliance to positive outcomes.      
The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) said that the baseline assessment 
showed that the gap between the six forces that he had previously assessed as having 
embraced the model and the 18 “hardest to reach” forces, had not closed.  In other words, 
even that limited aim of administrative compliance was not being achieved.  The Home 
Office was disappointed with the assessment but against a promise from the ACPO 
member (N01) that the Association would put its house in order, the Home Secretary 
(David Blunkett) agreed that he would “pull back a bit” from forcing ACPO to accept the 
model, which perhaps suggests that he and Phillips had established an alliance to see the 
NIM through.  A former ACPO member (N04) said that Phillips’ success should be 
attributed to the “disproportionate power and influence” the ACPO Presidency gave him 
and to his having the ear of a receptive David Blunkett and New Labour “who were so 
desperate for answers - that they would drive through in a 'kick ass' fashion - on what they 
saw as a recalcitrant and underperforming police service”. 
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The ACPO member (N01) said that he committed the Association to full 
implementation by 1st April 2004.  He persuaded Phillips to write to chief officers 
individually, “It wasn’t difficult!” demanding they describe the progress they had made in 
their force.  He said: 
I got David Phillips to sign these letters – Dear, (personalised) your force has been 
visited by the baseline assessment team and we find the following.  You will need to 
do… if you are going to be ready by the 1st April.  There were… two chiefs when 
they got the letters they were straight on the phone… Various colleagues went out, 
talked to them and talked to their teams and they squirreled around and started 
getting things done… Everyone then started to move towards April. 
The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that the key was finding common 
ground between members who supported Phillips’ crime control agenda and those 
committed to what I have called a ‘preventative’ proactive approach.  He said that ACPO 
wanted “to avoid the argument between the David Phillips’ extreme enforcement position 
and the community policing people”.  He said that one way in which this was achieved 
was by emphasising shared interests and common values and maintaining focus “on the 
75 percent that both sides had in common and not worrying too much about the wings”.   
He said that ACPO’s own research suggested that the NIM team’s ‘diplomacy’ in not 
issuing prescriptive guidelines to forces was problematic.  Members needed greater 
clarity about what ACPO required of them.  Therefore, a decision was made to issue 
members a set of minimum standards so that they could see what full compliance “looked 
like”.   
The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) suggested that together, the publication 
of the baseline assessment, the new NIM minimum standards and the ACPO President’s 
letter resulted in a new synergy in the efforts of ACPO, forces and the Home Office to 
deliver on the implementation plan.  He said:   
I think that’s why it caught the imagination of a lot of us.  I mean cops and Home 
Office and others because for the first time there was something really practical that 
we could implement that would demonstrably make a difference.  We could 
actually say that if we gather intelligence, set out the priorities, we then [could] put 
our resources behind those priorities. 
It was in this period that John and Maguire (2004) carried out their evaluation of 
the model.  Commissioned by the Home Office, the researchers visited a total of 25 BCUs 
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across three forces (Lancashire, Surrey and the West Midlands).  They observed NIM 
meetings, examined intelligence assessments and interviewed intelligence analysts.  The 
researchers also interviewed members of the NIM team and used its assessments of the 
implementation process to contextualise their own findings.  They found that forces were 
making progress towards implementation of the model but there remained significant 
failings which had still to be addressed.  Those were: that the commitment of local 
commanders was inadequate; there was limited input from partners; consultative 
meetings were dominated by conflicts over competing priorities and concerns about 
performance; there was a lack of appropriate training; there were large ‘knowledge gaps’ 
amongst all ranks, and resistance to the NIM based on ignorance and on dislike of its 
overly ‘academic’ structure and language. 
These were significant issues that the researchers hoped would be resolved as the 
model matured.  However, I argue that the number and seriousness of the problems they 
identified should have persuaded the NIM team to pause and reconsider the plan it was 
pursuing.  It appears that it did not and, as the reader will see later, unresolved at this stage 
of the implementation process, many of these problems proved to be intractable. 
 
The Philosophical Roots of the Model 
It is worth questioning the model’s philosophical roots and examining exactly what 
Phillips intended it to achieve.  I argue that beyond his interest in and commitment to 
intelligence work, Phillips (and those who developed the NIM under his leadership) drew 
on the pre-existing intelligence cycle (see Figure 1), intelligence structures and systems 
developed in the first half of the twentieth century by British military intelligence and the 
security services, and each of the new approaches to crime control that emerged in the 
1980s that I described earlier.  ILP strategies highlighted the importance of Phillips’ 
passion, intelligence.  Community policing and POP strategies pointed to the limitations 
of public policing and emphasised the key role of partners in solving policing problems.   
POP also emphasised the importance of intelligence analysis.  Just like COMPSTAT in 
New York city, the NIM sought to empower police commanders to deal effectively with 
policing problems. 
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Moreover, the NIM ideal was supported by a commitment to best value that was 
emblematic of the philosophy of new public management that was a feature of 
government policy in this period.  It could reasonably be argued that the NIM represented 
little more than an eclectic ‘pick’n’mix’ of those pre-existing intelligence models and 
innovative policing strategies that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
However, a business process that at its core is underpinned by a real commitment to 
collecting, analysing and evaluating the best available intelligence to produce meaningful 
outcomes has a compelling logic that would be appealing on both common-sense and 
business levels at any time.  I argue that the NIM was a product of the zeitgeist.  In that 
context, it is easy to see how in a period in which government was proclaiming that 
“policy making must be soundly based on evidence of what works” (Cabinet Office, 
1999), that the NIM would be particularly attractive to policymakers and professionals 
keen to demonstrate their commitment to that ‘evidence-based’ policy (see Davies, 2004 
for further discussion of that subject).   
The architects of the NIM felt that the extent to which policing activity can ever be 
planned depends on a diverse array of factors that are far beyond the control of the police.  
For example, Phillips’ early efforts were aimed at breaking the Kent force out of its 
‘response mode’ by implementing a new system of demand management that might 
mitigate the routine demands made upon it by the public. Kent’s introduction of its Crime 
Management Model was the first step in that process.   ‘Smart’ policing initiatives like the 
NIM acknowledge that targeting scarce resources efficiently and effectively is key to 
preventing crime, improving detection rates and protecting victims more effectively.  
However, as Reiner (2010) has argued, they cannot ‘magically’ solve the problem of 
crime.  The extent to which the demand for policing services can be managed also is 
questionable.  Police work goes far beyond dealing with crime; the police also fulfil the 
public’s demand for a range of services under the broad headings of order maintenance, 
social service and service delivery (Brodeur, 2007).   
Despite the NPM-inspired reforms of the 1990s, as a proportion of the overall 
requirement for policing services, there is little prospect of that demand being reduced.  In 
interview, an ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that whilst the model was 
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simply about “intelligently understanding the threat that you face and policing it 
accordingly”, the NIM can only influence “proactive planned activity” (emphasis added).  
In his view, the NIM’s aim therefore was to provide an answer to the question, “How can 
we police out problems effectively and resource them accordingly in terms of general 
criminality?”  He elaborated by saying “By that I’m talking about drugs, burglary, and 
auto crime.  One thing it can’t do is - it can’t be used in that way for an unplanned 
spontaneous activity”.  In other words, the NIM could never be a factor in those situations 
that involve “something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had 
better do something now” (Bittner, 1974: 30), which make up such a large proportion of 
routine police activity.    
This is an extremely important point that merits further examination.  The 
comments of the ACPO member (N03) make it clear that despite the public claims that 
were made for the model’s ability to reduce the overall level of crime, the NIM team felt 
from the very beginning that the model could provide only a framework for pre-planned 
policing interventions against those crimes that have come to be described collectively as 
‘street crime’.  Certainly, the NIM was expected to be no more successful in that context 
than its predecessor the KPM (see Amey et al, 1996: 33).  I argue that this lends weight to 
my earlier argument that the NIM was inspired by a crime control philosophy rather than 
one which prioritised community policing and public reassurance.    
Given the ‘whole service’ nature of plans for the NIM, it was surprising that its 
architects seemed to take few meaningful steps to ameliorate the divide between the CID 
and the uniformed branches that I described earlier in this study.  I argued earlier that the 
Kent CID’s antipathy to the plans of the NCIS senior executive (N02) (then a senior 
officer in Kent) meant that the department remained on the sidelines as the KPM was 
developed.  This seemed to set the pattern for intelligence work in the mainstream 
thereafter.  Certainly, the Kent local intelligence structure (with just a little ‘fine tuning’), 
set the pattern for the local intelligence units that subsequently emerged to replace 
collators’ offices across the service.  The two case studies carried out in this research 
confirmed the preponderance of uniformed officers and civilian staff in the new units.  In 
the Urban case, just four out of 40 staff employed in the unit were detectives whilst in the 
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County case there was a single detective, the intelligence manager.  Many respondents in 
this research expressed unhappiness or unease with this situation.  I argue that the 
exclusion of the CID from local intelligence work created and has maintained a skills 
deficit that has fundamentally undermined the capability of those units and the credibility 
of their work     
 
The +IM ‘Ideal’ 
Before going on to examine the Home Office’s interest in the NIM, I want to explain the 
basic structures and processes that Phillips wanted the service to sign up to.  The reader 
will see that at the heart of the NIM lies, what appear to be, a simple set of arrangements 
that Phillips envisaged would underpin operational policing. 
 
Intelligence Collection 
Force intelligence bureaux (FIB) and local intelligence units should oversee intelligence 
collection.  Bureaux usually are controlled by the force’s director of intelligence (DOI) 
and are staffed by intelligence officers and analysts.  Offices vary in size, according to the 
size of the force and the demands made upon it by regional and national bodies.  Local 
intelligence units based on the Kent model replaced the collator offices.  They were 
developed in response to HMIC’s (1997) criticism of intelligence work.  Typically, local 
units were headed by an intelligence manager of the rank of DI and were staffed by 
intelligence officers, field intelligence officers, analysts, researchers and briefing officers.  
The intelligence manager plays a pivotal role in developing the capabilities of the 
intelligence unit and in delivering accurate and relevant intelligence assessments.  They 
should mediate between the operational and intelligence worlds, between the 
action-oriented and more thoughtful reflective milieus, to ‘add value’ and operational 
credibility to what otherwise might be evidence-based but operationally-naïve analyses. 
 
Collation, Analysis and Evaluation 
The key to the NIM’s aim, to manage and make sense of the large amounts of information 
collected by the police, is intelligence analysis (NPIA, 2007).  There is an extensive 
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literature on the subject.  Some of the better accounts can be found in: Manning (2008 and 
2001); Ratcliffe (2008 and 2005); Cope (2008, 2004 and 2003); and in Innes, Fielding and 
Cope, (2005).  A brief description of ‘analysis’ and a synopsis of analytical techniques 
used by analysts working with the model are included here to explain: their role in the 
NIM.  
Analysts collect, review and interpret a range of quantitative and qualitative data 
“to develop and support recommendations for tactical and/or strategic police activity” 
(Cope, 2003: 10).   Most are police support staff who attend a variety of training courses 
that teach them the basic tools of their trade (Cope, 2003).  The NIM codified existing 
practice around nine standardised products and techniques (NCPE, 2005).  However, not 
all techniques are equal; the techniques predominantly used by police analysts are: 
Subject Profiling, Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) and Network Analysis (Cope, 2003).  
Manning (2008) argued that the real utility of crime mapping and crime analysis has not 
been proved.  He notes that they owe their popularity to “those aspects of policing most 
appealing to the police themselves – their capacity to intervene and reduce officially 
recorded crime” (2008: 21). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Example of Crime Pattern Analysis showing vehicle crime ‘hotspots’ (Source – Home 
Office Police Standards Unit, 2005) 
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Subject profiling is the gathering of all available intelligence on a particular 
individual.  CPA is the spatial analysis of crime patterns.  The CPA-type analysis most 
commonly used is ‘hotspot’ analysis which identifies clusters of crimes or incidents (see 
Figure 2).  Its ultimate aim is to identify the nature and scale of crime trends and patterns, 
or linked crimes or incidents (NPIA, 2007).   
Network Analysis assesses links between offenders to identify criminal networks.    
At the preliminary stage of an operation, the aim often is to persuade commanders that a 
criminal network exists and/or that some intervention is necessary.  However, an 
intelligence analyst (N084) said that where the investigation is further forward, the aim 
usually is to identify intervention opportunities.  Figure 3 is an example of a network 
analysis.  All such analyses are of course constructs; analysts’ representation of the social 
milieu.  The techniques described here are a feature of investigation in the modern era.  
However, both Manning (2008) and Gill (2000) have questioned the ‘rationality’ that 
these maps and charts purport to deliver.  Manning (2008: 244) criticises the attempt at 
“ritualized control” that crime maps may represent.  Whilst, Gill (2000: 10) warns that 
network analyses can be “over-invested with explanatory power”.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Example of a network analysis chart (from Tovek, 2011) 
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Presentation of Evidence/Intelligence Assessments 
Analyses and other data should be presented in an intelligence assessment.  The NIM 
process begins with a Strategic Assessment, an overview of the policing problems that 
commanders may face in the following 12 months.  They should be prepared by each FIB 
and BCU.  The FIB’s assessment should inform the chief constable; the BCU’s, the BCU 
commander.  Force assessments should aggregate the BCU assessments. Completed 
every three months, subsequent assessments simply update the original unless the 
environment changes.  The assessments should be discussed at the Strategic Meeting. 
Tactical Assessments should be completed periodically thereafter (weekly or 
bi-weekly as directed).  They should address only the priorities identified at the strategic 
meeting thereby ensuring that commanders remain focused on those problems that have 
been identified for action.   These documented intelligence assessments should enable 
communities to assess the ability of the police to tackle policing problems in their areas.  
That is to say, if the intelligence picture remains unchanged then the quality of the 
assessments and/or the police commander’s decision-making might reasonably be 
questioned.   
 
Consultation 
Strategic meetings should be attended by: the force executive or BCU command team 
(depending on whether it is a force or BCU meeting); together with resource owners such 
as the finance director; middle managers; the intelligence manager, the senior analyst and 
policing partners (particularly those involved in CDRPs) (NCPE, 2006a: 18).  The 
purpose of the meeting is to discuss the strategic assessment with partners and to decide 
on priorities, adding them to the Control Strategy (the ‘what will be dealt with’ list) or the 
Intelligence Requirement (the ‘deferred but monitored’ list).   The purpose of the tactical 
meeting is to ensure that the plans made at the strategic meeting are carried through.  The 
meeting should always be chaired by a senior manager.  At force level this should be an 
ACPO member; at BCU level, the BCU commander (NCPE, 2006). 
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Monitoring Identified Problems 
Prioritisation is the norm.  Problems selected for the control strategy are allocated to 
middle managers who take personal responsibility for them.  These Plan Holders should 
be of inspector or chief inspector rank.  Partners should nominate a manager with 
sufficient control over the resources necessary to see plans through (NCPE, 2006a).   
The responsibility for monitoring problems lies with the intelligence unit.  In the 
final act of the strategic meeting the commander should issue a set of instructions to that 
unit requiring it to collect information in support of the control strategy priorities and 
those other problems included in the intelligence requirement (NCPE, 2006a).  This 
action completes the NIM cycle. 
 
Home Office, Policing Policy and the +IM 
A Home Office official (N013) said that the NIM first came to his attention in 2000.  He 
described the treatment of the model by the Home Office as “a bit schizophrenic”.  
Officials were unsure about the most appropriate section of the department to handle the 
model and at one time it was being administered by two directorates.  First, the NIM was 
part of a project in the Organised Crime portfolio then for a period of six months or so it 
moved over to the Crime Reduction portfolio.  The Home Office official (N013) was 
employed in the Crime Reduction Directorate and represented the Home Office in a 
number of discussions with ACPO over the future of the NIM.  As a result of those talks 
he believed that the model would “sit better” in the Policing Policy Unit.  His 
recommendation to move the NIM for a second time (to Policing Policy) was agreed in 
the spring of 2002.      
He said that the transfer of the project from Organised Crime to Policing Policy 
signalled a change in the department’s attitude to it.  He said “that certainly was the 
perception at the time.  This was something that was a pretty fundamental overhaul away 
from reactive policing towards intelligence led policing”.   Noting the enthusiasm with 
which the Home Office embraced the model, the ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said 
that the NIM was an attractive proposition because it was seen as a rational model that 
offered the accountability and transparency that previously had been lacking.  He felt that 
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though Phillips made some ambitious claims for the model, its principles were generally 
sound.  He said, “I think some of his [Phillips’] people over-egged its claims but they said 
to Government if you have this you will reduce crime because that is what it’s done in 
Kent.  That was definitely a selling point”. 
Prior to the attachment of the ACPO member (N03) to the implementation team, 
the NCIS senior executive (N02) ran the implementation programme from NCIS 
headquarters.   He described an extraordinary meeting there in 2000, with an official from 
the Policing Policy directorate of the Home Office.  This took place soon after Phillips 
had pitched the NIM to Jack Straw at the Lancaster House conference.  He recounted with 
some amusement: 
They were looking for some new initiative… I was talking to her [the Home Office 
official] about the NIM and she said ‘If everybody did it what would the effect be’?  
I said ‘I reckon if everybody did it we would get a 10% reduction in crime within 2 
years probably’…  Of course, her eyes lit up – you know, ‘We can tell the Minister 
we can get a 10% reduction in crime’.  So, she said ‘How much would it cost’?  I 
said ‘A rough estimate – looking at what it cost Kent to put intelligence units in 
place.  You’d probably want about £12 million’.  She said ‘You can have it’.  I fell 
off the chair!32 
Consequently, in a move that echoed the introduction of UBP in the 1960s, and 
against the background of New Labour’s public commitment to ‘evidence-led policy’ 
(announced in the 1999 White Paper Modernising government), with little discussion and 
with no meaningful  evaluation of Phillips’ plans, policing policy was made.  The NCIS 
senior executive (N02) recalled that the offer of funding was not followed up 
immediately.  However, it eventually was approved by Charles Clarke who was Minister 
of State at the Home Office (1999-2001).  By the end of 2001, the £12 million was 
provided and was soon spent.  This initial allocation of funds was dispersed through the 
ACPO Crime Committee to forces around England and Wales to fund ‘NIM-compliant’ 
processes.33  The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that despite the funding, progress in 
                                                 
32 Amey et al’s (1996: 33) assertion, based on the only research evidence available at that time, that concluded 
that the ability of the CMM (and by extension the KPM/NIM) to reduce crime was “not proven” and is only 
likely to “reduce the levels of those crimes which the force prioritises and not crime in general” seems 
particularly relevant here. 
33 The identity of the forces concerned and the amounts that were allocated have been something of a secret but 
the list is believed to include Lancashire, Surrey and Hertfordshire. 
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implementation was “erratic”.  However, the Home Office was sufficiently persuaded of 
the contribution that the NIM could make to tackling crime that it included in the 2001 
White Paper Policing a +ew Century: a blueprint for reform, an instruction that: 
All forces will be required to adopt the core elements of the NIM, which sets out a 
focused approach to gathering and using intelligence. The model has been 
validated, and it is approved by HMIC as representing best practice in the use of 
intelligence to fight crime (Home Office, 2001: Ch. 3 sec.9).34 
The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) said that police executives and Home 
Office officials that he spoke to, demonstrated real enthusiasm for the model.  Another 
ACPO member (N06) said that the Home Office liked the NIM because it was a rational 
model for policing.  In that context, Phillips was pushing at an open door and just 
happened to be in the right place at the right time.  The NIM had the twin merits of 
promising crime reduction and of being inexpensive so it was no surprise that it would be 
welcomed by the Home Office.  However, the extent to which he was the right man in the 
right place at the right time should not be underestimated.   
In that context, Phillips should be considered a ‘policy entrepreneur’.  The 
defining characteristics of policy entrepreneurs are their “willingness to invest their 
resources, time, energy, reputation and sometimes money, in the hope of a future return” 
(Kingdon, 2003: 122).  They are people who seek to initiate “dynamic policy change… 
through attempting to win support for ideas for policy innovation” (Mintrom 1997 cited in 
Savage 2007: 129).  Invariably, they have a particular expertise, political connections or 
negotiating skills and they are persistent.  In combination with the other qualities 
described, persistence is “disarmingly important” (Kingdon, 2003: 181).  Phillips 
certainly fitted that bill. 
Mintrom (1997) has argued that policy entrepreneurs promote their ideas by 
identifying problems, networking with other influential actors in relevant sectors to 
influence policy debates and by building coalitions of support that advance their causes.  
Examples can be found in every public policy sector.  In the recent history of policing, 
chief officers such as John Alderson, Kenneth Newman and Peter Imbert are recognised 
                                                 
34 This was later codified in the +IM Code of Practice (NCPE, 2005: 2). 
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as policy entrepreneurs (and also ‘police entrepreneurs’) who made a significant 
contribution to the refocusing of policing, reworking the implied contract between police 
and communities in ways that emphasised partnership working and preventative activity 
(Savage, 2007).  However, the influence of policy entrepreneurs in the development of 
investigative practice has received relatively little attention.  In Phillips’ case, he 
networked with other significant actors in ACPO and (to a lesser but nonetheless 
significant extent) HMIC to build a coalition of support for ILP and the NIM. 
Policy entrepreneurship is an important factor in the formulation of public policy.  
The organisational environment is another.  Cohen et al (1972) advanced the ‘Garbage 
Can’ model as a means of understanding the policy process in organisations.  They argue 
that in those organisations, people often fail to define their preferences sufficiently 
clearly, they tend to have only a partial or fragmentary understanding of the 
organisation’s vision and aims, and they tend to drift in and out of the decision making 
process.  Kingdon (2003: 87) has offered a revised ‘garbage can’ model.  In this case, the 
‘garbage’ consists of three process streams; “problem recognition, the formation and 
refining of policy proposals, and politics”.  The three streams operate independently of 
each other but they come together in the policy ‘garbage can’ to create the policy agenda 
and to determine the character and extent of policy change.  Policy is produced when “a 
problem is recognised, a solution for change is available, the political climate makes the 
time right for change and the constraints do not prohibit action” (Kingdon, 2003: 88).  
The policy entrepreneur is often the catalyst for policy change, bringing together the 
different streams to deliver solutions for ‘receptive’ audiences who often are neither 
logical nor rational. 
By this analysis, decision-makers in organisations more often seek problems to 
which they can apply identified solutions and decision-making bodies function as “a 
collection of choices looking for problems.  Issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might 
be the answer, and decision-makers looking for work” (Cohen et al, 1972 cited in 
Kingdon, 2003: 85).  Each “choice-opportunity” is a “garbage can into which various 
kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated” 
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(Cohen et al, 1972 cited in Kingdon, 2003: 85).  The concept of the policy ‘garbage can’ 
may explain why it was that plans for the development of investigative practice advanced 
by Phillips (and to a lesser extent Charles Vincent and Robert Mark) that are assessed in 
this study, were favourably received.   Perhaps the success of these ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
can be explained in the context of an idea ‘whose time has come’.  At the right time and in 
the right political and social circumstances, an idea may represent an “irresistible 
movement” sweeping over politics and society that “captures a fundamental reality” 
about the public policymaking agenda (Kingdon, 2003: 1).   
 An agenda in this context was conceived by Kingdon as a “list of subjects or 
problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying serious attention to at any given time” 
(Kingdon, 2003: 3).  From that perspective, solutions are connected to problems and both 
are connected to “favourable political forces” (Kingdon, 2003: 20).   Kingdon (2003: 72) 
has argued that the combination of these elements is most likely when policy 
entrepreneurs take advantage of “policy windows” that may have been opened by 
compelling problems or political imperatives to produce the idea whose time has come 
(Kingdon 2003).  Therefore the prominence of an idea on an agenda relies not on its 
source nor even on the fact that there may be an entrepreneur encouraging policy change 
but rather it is the “climate in government or the receptivity of ideas of a given type” that 
is key (Kingdon, 2003: 72).  Kingdon’s ‘institutionalist’ approach has been criticised on 
the basis that policy processes and systems are more organised than he suggests (see for 
example Hill, 2009).   However, the reader has seen that the policymaking process in the 
context of the NIM was just as disorganised and haphazard as the process depicted by 
Kingdon. 
I argue that Phillips’ policy entrepreneurship was the key factor in the Home 
Office’s acceptance of the NIM. The policy window was opened by the Home Office’s 
mounting frustration with the police because of their seeming inability to reduce priority 
crime (even though the overall level of crime was declining).  It calculated that it was 
politically necessary to do something to improve the situation and it welcomed the NIM 
as an almost perfect answer because it looked like a cheap option and, backed by ACPO 
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and HMIC, it was unlikely to get Ministers into political trouble.  Phillips took full 
advantage of this opportunity.  A Home Office senior official (N065) said that his 
credibility as an operational leader and his powerful advocacy for the model meant that 
the case for the NIM was “compelling”.  Phillips’ credibility was underpinned by his 
membership of an increasingly influential ‘policy network’.  Policy networks are founded 
on the principle of cooperation “stemming from shared interests and interdependence that 
underpins [policy] networks” (Cope, 2001: 1).  In this case, the key actors were ACPO 
and HMIC members and other senior police officers and officials.   
Certainly, there are examples of the policing network’s success in this context (see 
for example, Mawby and Wright, 2008).  However, reform or change in policing is far 
more difficult than may be supposed and there have been many occasions when the 
network has failed to influence public policy.  Two recent examples are ACPO’s efforts to 
prevent government micro-management of policing through its ‘street crimes’ initiative 
(see Newburn, 2008), and the Police Federation’s inability to influence government to 
remedy a perceived skills and experience shortage in general CID offices across England 
and Wales (see Chatterton, 2008 explored later). 
In the context of this study, a Home Office senior official (N065) was in no doubt 
about the importance of Phillips’ advocacy of the model.  He described Phillips as, “a 
very powerful ACPO President by the standards of chief officers, very analytical… [who] 
sounded like he knew what he was talking about, he probably did know what he was 
talking about”.  Phillips’ credibility as an operational leader meant that the NIM was 
“compelling” to Ministers.   He said that the NIM: 
also sounded logical because it was and is logical… this was by far the clearest 
example… where ACPO’s own capability drove Government policy… because 
actually David Phillips talked about the way you processed intelligence, the way in 
which you develop priorities as a consequence, in ways which were quite helpful to 
ministers because it wasn’t about ‘We need more money’, it was about, ‘We need to 
use what we’ve got in a much more effective way’. 
Thus, the NIM became a plank in the development of policing policy at the 
beginning of the new century.  The Home Office official (N013) said that the department 
took a calculated risk in embracing something that arrived out of nowhere and said “’This 
is the way that police should be doing things’ not ‘This is the way they are doing things’.  
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There’s a big difference between the two”.  It was the “synergy” between ACPO and the 
Home Office that was fundamental to the adoption of the NIM.  The senior Home Office 
official (N065) said that Phillips spoke a language that Ministers could understand and 
easily accept.  Ministers welcomed that Philips was honest; “scathing” about the way the 
police service did not make the best use of its resources or people. 
A former ACPO member (N04) said that Phillips was certainly passionate about 
the NIM and that he became powerful through a “confluence of circumstances” which 
included the ACPO presidency and New Labour’s search for “silver bullets”, and also the 
“the rising power base” of the specialist detective units “NCS and NCIS and all things 
'central'”.  However, the Home Office senior official (N065) was quick to refute the claim 
that the NIM was yet another attempt to centralise public policing.  He said that the 
model’s appeal was that in a landscape heavily driven by a centralising regime of targets 
it was police-led, service-owned and was unlikely to get Ministers into political trouble.  
Particularly when the other service-led initiative of the period, the National Crime 
Reporting Standard (NCRS) was seen as “a disaster”.35   The senior official’s words lend 
weight to Weaver’s assertion that “politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to 
avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones” 
(1986 cited in Hill, 2009: 164).  
The senior official (N065) was candid in his assessment of Phillips’ importance in 
convincing the department to support the model.  He said: 
David Phillips is a very, very effective advocate for it.  I’m not saying it’s all about 
personalities, but I really wouldn’t understate that if David Phillips hadn’t been 
President of ACPO, if it had been someone there completely different… I don’t 
think NIM would have got formally adopted in that way. 
However, the senior official also felt that there were unresolved questions of 
resources, compliance and outcomes, and whether there was any evidence that 
NIM-compliant forces performed better than non NIM-compliant forces.  He said that his 
sense at the time was that the model tended to be “far too difficult”, to have “too many 
                                                 
35 The NCRS has been criticised as overly bureaucratic, and inefficient.  See for example: 
http://www.politics.co.uk/opinion-formers/National-Association-of-Retired-Police-Officers/response-to-the-r
view-of-policing-$365656$6.htm (retrieved 24/02/2011) and 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr3203intro.pdf (retrieved 24/02/2011). 
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variables” but in principle ACPO and the Home Office were in complete agreement.  He 
said that even though the model represented “quite a leap of faith”, he could not think of 
any other example in that era of “ACPO and the Home Office coming together in quite 
such a unified way”.  He believed in the model as a “good way of managing our business” 
and that “almost as an inevitable consequence”, it was bound to bring a new focus on 
achieving more successful outcomes.  The senior official’s words suggest that the Home 
Office recognised the potential of Phillips’ vision for policing and offered the NIM its 
unqualified support.  However, the reader will see later that even at this stage, the police 
elite’s real support for the NIM did not match its rhetoric. 
The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that in advance of the publication of the 
first National Policing Plan (NPP), the Home Office’s increasing interest in the NIM was 
evident.  He said that Home Office Minister of State Charles Clarke spoke at the ACPO 
conference to “put some beef” behind the model.  After Clarke’s address, it was the NCIS 
senior executive’s turn to explain the NIM.  He said that he was not well received.  “I said, 
‘This is what it’s all about’ and it made the usual impact on ACPO, as you can imagine, 
‘Oh yeah, very interesting, thank you’”.  However, in his view, the Home Office was 
more serious about implementing the model than anyone realised because “behind it 
came the requirement for a plan and an implementation date” (which as the reader saw 
earlier, the ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) had negotiated ‘behind the scenes’ with 
the Home Office). 
In November 2002, the NIM was included in the inaugural NPP presented to 
Parliament by then Home Secretary David Blunkett (Home Office, 2002).  The Home 
Office official (N013) said that whether or not there was any real evidence that the NIM 
could deliver any of the improvements that it promised, the Home Secretary considered 
the model important enough to the future of policing to include it in the first NPP as the 
changes in police structures and processes that it presaged represented such a “step 
change” for the police.  The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that 
“There was no other way of conceiving it.  It had to be in there.  That was from the Home 
Secretary – it had to be in there”. 
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The NPP promised that the NIM would underpin “ILP at force, cross boundary 
and national levels” (Home Office, 2002: Para 3.21).  According to the Home Office, the 
NIM already had a “demonstrated ability to improve the collection, analysis and 
management of police intelligence and the effectiveness of police deployment” (2002: 
Para 3.21).  Though as the reader will see later that point is open to question.  Reflecting 
the agreement between ACPO and the Home Office, the latter was unequivocal in its 
instruction that “the NIM should be implemented by all forces to commonly accepted 
minimum standards by April 2004 at the latest (emphasis added)” (2002: Para 3.21). 
The Home Office official (N013) felt that given the level of investment the Home 
Office provided for the model there was “no going back”.  Whilst the ACPO member 
(intelligence) (N06) said that “actually any model that allocates resources on the basis of 
risk, in line with objectives, is a damn sight better that anything we had before… It is a 
rational model for policing.  What did we have before” (emphasis added)? 
 
Summary of Analysis 
Phillips’ vision of setting intelligence work at the heart of proactive policing strategies in 
mainstream policing inspired the creation of the KPM and later the NIM.  CID opposition 
was brushed aside and intelligence work in the mainstream in Kent came to be dominated 
by newly trained intelligence workers (often uniformed officers) and, increasingly, 
civilian support staff.  From the outset therefore, the idea that these intelligence models 
could rely on a ‘whole-service’ response was questionable.   
Relying on intelligence analysis, the increasing specialisation of the workforce 
and the adoption of policing tools and techniques that formerly were the preserve of 
higher policing, the KPM, at least at the level of rhetoric, signalled a clear break with the 
reactive past.  However, Phillips explicitly ‘crime control’ models seem also to have 
represented a rejection of the kind of preventative proactive activity associated with, for 
example, community policing initiatives.  Phillips and his supporters in Kent were 
convinced of the utility of the KPM but the evidence that it could deliver the claimed 
improvements in mainstream policing was questionable.  Following the introduction of 
the KPM, crime fell in Kent.  However, even the model’s most ardent supporters were 
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forced to concede that it proved ‘difficult’ to relate the force’s success to the KPM as 
there was no proper evaluation of the model.   
Phillips’ policy entrepreneurship and membership of the policing policy network 
were significant factors in pushing through NIM implementation and ‘selling’ the model 
to the Home Office.  Phillips exploited a policy window to persuade the Home Office to 
accept the NIM as a model for policing for the UK.  Considered capable of supplying a 
solution to a pressing problem, Phillips’ credibility as an operational leader and his 
powerful advocacy for the model meant that the case for the NIM was ‘compelling’.  The 
NIM’s time had come.   
Given the paucity of evidence for the KPM’s success in achieving its stated aim of 
reducing crime, it is reasonable to question the appeal of its successor, the NIM, to the 
police and to the Home Office.  The NIM’s attractiveness both to senior commanders and 
to central government may simply have been a product of the zeitgeist.  This period was 
characterised by disillusionment with the police and traditional crime control strategies 
and a search for alternative approaches to policing and community safety.  The NIM 
appeared to offer the police service (and the Home Office) a more promising future, a 
means of reasserting its legitimacy as the primary agency of social control even if the 
evidence that it could do so was equivocal.   
However, the story of the NIM does not end with its introduction.  Following the 
model’s implementation, the police elite’s hitherto latent resistance to, and resentment of 
the imposition of the NIM soon became apparent.  In the next section of the thesis, I 
continue the NIM narrative by evaluating the implementation of the NIM in the police 
forces of England and Wales. 
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Chapter 6 - Evaluating the +IM: Challenges to the Model  
 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the NIM narrative by evaluating its putative implementation in 
police forces in England and Wales.  The chapter highlights ACPO’s inability to 
coordinate the activities of its fiercely independent membership.  It explains Phillips’ 
diminishing influence on NIM implementation.  It also analyses senior commanders’ 
opposition to his plans for the model.  These are important next steps in explaining the 
NIM because the contrasting ways in which the model was received by senior 
commanders explains why the NIM took the shape that is revealed in the case studies 
explored in the following two chapters. 
 
Models of Policy Implementation 
Of course, in determining whether or not a policy can be considered to be adequately 
implemented, one must first establish the criteria by which its success, or otherwise, 
should be judged.  Skogan (2008) argued that management-inspired programmes must be 
made relevant for officers in the mainstream.  They must be underpinned by regulation or 
they are bound to fail.  That involves making otherwise “abstract concepts” into “lists of 
practical, day-to-day activities enshrined in enforceable orders” (2008: 26). 
 Earlier, I referred to Sabatier’s (1986) contention that a dominant piece of 
legislation structuring the situation can help researchers to make sense of a public policy 
and its implementation process.  He argued that the ability of a statute to structure 
implementation depended on several factors.  Those were, that the policy: had clear and 
consistent objectives; incorporated an adequate causal theory; was financially viable; was 
integrated into the hierarchy of the implementing institution; satisfied the decision-rules 
of the implementing agency; was supported by an implementing official, and allowed 
formal access by outsiders. 
 Sabatier (1986) argued that policies often need to be revised during 
implementation to reflect ‘real world’ demands and that to achieve success, those tasked 
with implementation must be flexible, resourceful and willing to reach compromises.  I 
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argue that it is by these criteria, taken together, that the NIM implementation process can 
be judged.  The model was underpinned by a statutory code of practice.  It was funded by 
the Home Office and had clear and consistent objectives that were set out in the statutory 
code and the accompanying minimum standards.  The reader will see later that with the 
backing of ACPO, the NIM was integrated into the police hierarchy and satisfied the 
service’s decision-rules.  It also was supported by an ACPO implementation team and 
further officers and officials in police forces, tasked with ensuring compliance. Therefore, 
it met both Skogan’s ‘regulation’ and (substantially) Sabatier’s ‘structure’ criteria.  The 
reader will also see later that the model’s implementation was characterised by 
inflexibility, an unwillingness to reach compromises with those expected to work with the 
model, and an inability to explain its relevance to the police service. 
 
ACPO’s Lack of Influence Over its Membership   
Even though the NIM had been approved by the ACPO council, many members 
continued to resist the model (ACPO member, intelligence, N06).  ACPO’s practice of 
taking decisions in its council meetings on the basis of what Savage et al (2000) called a 
‘presumption in favour of compliance’ was described in Chapter 1.  Whilst Savage et al 
found no evidence that members failed to comply with decisions taken in that way, they 
noted that the principle of chief officer’s independence was given prominence by the 
organisation and that it was clear that “chief constables at no stage have to comply with 
ACPO policy” (2000: 83).  The reader will see that the NIM implementation process 
provides a clear example of a decision taken in principle in council being resisted in 
practice.  Savage et al’s questioning of ACPO’s ability to coordinate the activities of “43 
fiercely independent chief constables” when the Association’s sanctions for rule-breaking 
were so limited, was prescient (2000: 62).   
Shapland (1988: 189-190) argued that the protection of individual ‘fiefdoms’ in 
this way is a significant factor in the policymaking process in the criminal justice arena.  
Criminal justice agencies (including the police) see themselves as individual bodies rather 
than as parts of an interconnected and efficient system.  Those who control fiefdoms 
jealously guard their independence and workload and will not easily relinquish either, no 
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matter how ‘sensible’ the alternatives that are presented to them.  She argued that 
NPM-inspired reforms aimed at making criminal justice agencies more ‘businesslike’ 
may actually have encouraged further division and strengthened those areas of control 
(2000 cited in Crawford, 2001).  This phenomenon is not limited to the criminal justice 
arena.  For example, Crawford (2001: 63) argued that similar concerns exist about those 
whom criminal justice agencies often turn to as partners and the Audit Commission 
(2000) also highlighted how the activities of departmental fiefdoms restrict local 
councils’ room for manoeuvre.   
In the modern era, the line of accountability for Britain’s chief officers 
undoubtedly has tilted increasingly to the centre, with the result that the Home Office is 
seen by senior commanders as the most powerful and influential of the central institutions 
of policing (see for example Reiner, 2010 and Newburn, 2008).  Given the obvious 
strength of that argument, senior commanders’ resistance to the NIM in the face of the 
department’s codification of the model is surprising.  However, in my view, their 
ambitions for their own forces outweighed their concerns about any sanction from the 
Home Office for breaching the NIM code (but perhaps explain the ‘veneer’ of compliance 
that ultimately was applied to the implementation process).  Even though Phillips was 
President of ACPO, he did not outrank any other chief officer and could not direct other 
chiefs to comply with his plans.  Instead, he had to rely on the force of his argument, his 
powers of persuasion and, his policy entrepreneurship.  I argue in this chapter, and in the 
case studies that follow, that ultimately those were not enough.       
 
Challenges to +IM Implementation 
This section analyses the challenges that the NIM’s supporters faced, in persuading the 
ACPO membership and others in the police service to accept Phillips’ vision for policing 
in the new millennium.  To Phillips, the NIM was no more than a “profoundly simple set 
of fundamentals” for policing in England and Wales (Phillips, 2006: 4).  However, as the 
reader will see, few others understood it in those terms. 
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Home Office Performance Targets 
The NIM highlighted pre-existing tensions between the policing of local crime problems 
and of national/transnational crimes.  There is some evidence that the NIM encouraged 
the police to focus on priority crime at the expense of second order criminality.   For 
example, John and Maguire (2004) found that police managers applying NIM principles 
were putting too great an emphasis on meeting centrally-imposed performance targets 
(that measured performance against Home Office-proscribed priority crime) and were 
taking insufficient notice of local concerns.   
In interview, a former detective inspector (N055) said that he too felt that 
community concerns were often ignored.  He said that in a training session for police 
executives, he was told by a BCU commander that his NIM strategic intelligence 
assessment reflected only those problems measured by the Home Office and for which he 
would receive central funding.  The former inspector (N055) said that in the same session, 
a BCU superintendent confessed to a kind of conspiracy between the police and the local 
authority to obtain the maximum possible amount of Government cash.  He said that the 
superintendent told him that: 
He had persuaded his local authority chief executive that, if asked, to reply that his 
problems are street crime and drugs.  He said ‘We all know that the real problem is 
anti-social behaviour but the Minister has said we’re focusing on street crime so 
we’re focusing on street crime because that is what will bring us the funding’.  
A County chief inspector (N029) said that from senior commanders’ perspective, 
the decision to focus on performance rather than outcomes was a wholly pragmatic one.  
Commanders who failed to ‘get the job done’ risked their bonus payments from their 
police authorities.  Referring to chief officers’ bonus payments, which hitherto had not 
been widely reported (though which since has received media attention, including one 
report that chief officers had received annual bonuses of up to ₤74,000 - O’Neill, 2009), 
the chief inspector said: 
The police authority, in negotiating their contracts, sets them a bonus target.  The 
policing plan is about priority crime because it’s about Government objectives and 
very clear targets to hit… and they are going to receive 10 or £20,000 bonus if they 
hit certain bits… Their heart might be more in what their bonus targets are about, 
rather than what the actual people really want. 
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This was not a view expressed by any other respondent in the research but it does add an 
interesting dimension to the debate. 
In September 2004, ACPO (2004: 3) felt obliged to admit that a focus on ‘priority’ 
crime measured by the Home Office (which, erroneously, has come to be associated with 
the NIM), at the expense of those issues of greatest concern to local communities, meant 
that neighbourhood policing in many forces was “at best, patchy and under-resourced”.  
Neither programme was introduced in a policy vacuum and it probably is as simplistic to 
blame the NIM for the ills of neighbourhood policing as it is to blame neighbourhood 
policing for the failures of the NIM.  However, ACPO’s statement highlights the failure 
of the Home Office and the police elite to ‘join up’ policing policy in this period. 
The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) was concerned that in some 
BCUs performance had assumed so great an importance that COMPSTAT-type meetings 
replaced the NIM meetings.  He said that too great an emphasis on current performance 
could undermine the forward planning element of the NIM and that could “directly and 
singularly influence tactical delivery”.  However, he said that he was enough of a realist to 
understand that performance mattered.  He said that:  
You would be living in ‘cloud cuckoo land’ if you didn’t think that the meeting of 
targets and performance wasn’t going to drive tactical delivery.  However, if that 
was the only influence on your decision-making around tactical delivery you would 
be unable to see what is coming up and what’s going to bite you significantly in the 
future. 
He felt that nominated individuals should be held to account for their decisions but 
that process and outcomes should not be confused.  He said it would be “pie in the sky, 
nonsense” to think that performance targets would not affect tactical delivery but balance 
was essential if longer-term challenges were to be met.   A BCU commander (N027) said 
that in his experience the need to meet performance targets meant that BCU commanders 
put short-termism before long-term planning.  He said that they were always under 
pressure to “live in a day” because “in the long run you’re all dead.  In the short term 
[performance] is where you’re at”.  He felt that this was one of the greatest weaknesses in 
policing.  I argue that ILP (and by extension the NIM) was meant to transform police 
work, to allow the police to make better use of their intelligence to address policing 
problems in more cost-effective and efficient ways.  However, as the reader can see (and 
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as the later case studies also will demonstrate), performance continued to far outweigh 
any other consideration. 
 
Ideological Resistance 
Perhaps the most significant of the challenges that confronted the NIM was the 
intransigence of the police elite.  Manning (2008: 163) argued that “attempts to reorient 
policing to information-based or evidence-based operations implicitly challenges many 
assumptions about how policing ought to work”.  The ACPO member (NIM 
implementation) (N03) said that chief officers were divided over the NIM from the 
beginning.  Many in the Association did not welcome Phillips’ plans and there was a 
significant section that saw no role for it in their own forces.  Surprisingly, there was even 
resistance within NCIS where the NIM had been developed.  For example in May 2002 at 
the ACPO annual conference, an NCIS executive argued that the model was “contrived”.  
The ACPO member (N06) said that criticism of the NIM at that time was “a sin worse 
than death because this was David Phillips’ baby because it had come out of Kent and it 
was fantastic (respondent’s emphasis)”.  He said that Phillips had “gone bananas” over 
the NCIS executive’s complaint that the NIM was “over engineered, too complex” and 
that because of Phillips’ reaction the NCIS official “probably learned to be more guarded 
in his critique” after that meeting.36 
 The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that even after the model’s 
incorporation into the NPP, the implementation process was characterised by resistance 
and antipathy.  In his view, those early attempts to persuade some chief officers to 
implement the model were frustrated by resistance based on what they perceived to be a 
competing ideology of policing.  Though many chief officers saw the value of making a 
new commitment to intelligence work, others were more attached to POP and 
problem-solving and they just could not make the links between those strategies and 
Phillips’ model.  He said that one force which resisted the NIM was Humberside Police 
which had a “real issue about how it fitted in with their [neighbourhood] policing 
                                                 
36 The fact that the same official now holds an elite position with the Serious Organised Crime Agency may 
explain (at least in part) that agency’s rejection of the model which in itself is revealing. 
 171 
model… because they believe[d] in Bobbies on the beat in big hats and that intelligence 
didn’t fit in to all that”.37  Those words highlight that there were indeed (at least) two 
‘camps’ within ACPO; one which supported Phillips’ crime control agenda and another 
which was committed to policing strategies more closely aligned with multi-agency 
approaches that sought to address the root causes of crime. 
Many in the rival camp supported the plans for a ‘neighbourhood policing’ 
programme and in November 2004, just six months after the NIM was announced in the 
NPP, the Home Office set out its plans for just such a programme in the White Paper 
Building Communities: Beating Crime.  This was a significant policy document, which 
set out plans for the ‘democratisation’ of policing, encouraging ‘active cooperation’ 
rather than the traditional doctrine of policing by consent (McLaughlin, 2007).  On one 
level, that programme could be seen simply as a natural development of the community 
policing arrangements introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (discussed 
earlier).  In the context of this research, it was significant because it suggested that the 
policy entrepreneurship of Phillips’ rivals in ACPO, although not quite as visible as 
Phillips’ own, may have been equally effective.  However it also suggests that, despite the 
support it had given Phillips, the Home Office did not necessarily understand his plans or 
share his vision for the NIM.   
Implementing the neighbourhood policing programme and the NIM at the same 
time, was bound to be problematic because if a force used the NIM correctly (according to 
Phillips’ design), it would continually move resources around the force to the areas that 
its, intelligence assessments indicated, needed them most.  Whereas, the underpinning 
ethos of neighbourhood policing was that community teams remained with their 
communities no matter what the level of demand elsewhere (effectively, they are 
‘ring-fenced’).  It is this kind of tension that the ACPO member (N06) acknowledged as 
existing in Humberside, and which Oakensen et al (2002) identified in many other forces 
in England and Wales. 
                                                 
37 There are some rather obvious implications to be drawn from this statement in the light of the Soham Murders 
and the Bichard Inquiry Report (2004).  
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ACPO (2004a) sought to ‘square the circle’, by recommending that the NIM 
should be enhanced to embrace partnership and local priorities.  In ACPO’s view this 
could be achieved by integrating “community intelligence and tension monitoring” into 
NIM intelligence assessments and by emphasising both the police and other agencies’ 
roles in crime prevention and reduction.  That recommendation was incorporated into the 
2004 White Paper (which proposed the extension of the neighbourhood policing 
programme), which included a commitment to use the NIM to target resources against 
local priorities (Tuffin, 2008).  However, the reader will see later that though ACPO 
wanted the NIM to dovetail into the new neighbourhood programme, it was neither 
well-enough understood by police or partners, nor was it well-enough established as a 
policing process to be able to deliver the community focus that was required (see for 
example, Kleiven, 2006). 
Deficiencies in the neighbourhood policing programme bear further examination 
in the context of ACPO’s (2004a: 3) claim that its apparent failing was “a direct 
consequence of increasing demands and a growing focus on investigation, organised 
crime and terrorism, protection of the vulnerable and the targeting of prolific offenders”, 
given that these all are areas that the NIM was also intended to address.  In ACPO’s view, 
the situation could be remedied only if more money was made available to the police 
service.   It explained the service’s inability to establish a sustainable community policing 
programme in terms of the “Neighbourhood Policing Reinvention Cycle” (see Figure 4) 
(NCPE, 2004a: 15).  This analysis has a certain logic but ACPO brought forward little 
evidence to support its case.  Certainly, in the context of the 
establishment/disestablishment of detective squads and the ‘whole service’ approach 
advocated by Phillips, ACPO’s conclusion does not accord either with Morgan et al’s 
(1996) or Rawlings’ (2006) findings and I argue that much more independent research 
would be needed to support its claims.   
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Figure 4 - the +eighbourhood Policing Reinvention Cycle (source – +CPE, 2006) 
 
It should have been obvious to senior commanders that NIM principles (even if 
they were implemented faithfully) would contradict some of the fundamentals of 
neighbourhood policing.  Both ACPO and the Home Office should have considered 
making plans to reduce the tension between the two before the demands on the service 
implicit in NIM implementation were mandated by the NPP.  It was only after this 
development, when the service’s room for manoeuvre was much more limited, that either 
ACPO or the Home Office acknowledged a potential conflict (see for example, Home 
Office, 2006).   A former ACPO member (N04) said the implementation of different and 
obviously competing policy initiatives at the same time simply was not strategic.   
Phillips’ NIM represented a ‘Big Idea’ for policing in the new millennium.  
However, what seems clear is that neither the ACPO membership nor the Home Office 
ever really appreciated what Phillips’ plans involved.  During the period of the research, 
the NIM was not seen by either party as a way of bringing together these disparate strands 
of policy or as a means of coordinating strategy.  As a result, operational policing policy 
remained fractured and disjointed.  The 2004 White Paper demonstrates as much as 
anything in this research that the Home Office never saw the NIM as the means by which 
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operational policing would be revolutionised.  I argue that instead it suggests that like ILP 
more generally it was just the latest fad that was being ‘bolted-on’ to existing structures 
(Gill, 2000: 2). 
 
The +IM’s Association with +CIS 
Earlier, I discussed the attitude of the police service to NCIS.  In the light of that 
discussion it is clear that the NIM’s subsequent association with NCIS also was a barrier 
to its acceptance by chief officers.  The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) said that 
initially, the consensus within the Association was that NCIS was the logical place to 
complete Phillips’ vision for policing but in hindsight it was the wrong choice.  Because 
of NCIS’s involvement, ACPO members’ associated the NIM only with intelligence 
gathering.  Whereas it was intended to be much more than that; it was intended to be the 
cornerstone of operational policing in the new millennium.  The ACPO member (NIM 
implementation) (N03) said that the NIM was not just about intelligence, it was about 
“much more than that, a grander plan than that”.  These are really important statements 
because they establish the true standard against which the success or otherwise of the 
NIM, according to Phillips’ plans, should be judged.    
The ACPO member (N03) went on to say that though NCIS was the national 
intelligence service it lacked credibility in the eyes of operational police officers: 
It did not have… the sort of leverage you would expect an intelligence agency to 
have.  That goes back to slightly before 1992 when NCIS was started up.  It was 
going to be all things to everybody and ended up not doing anything like as much as 
people hoped because there weren’t the funds and resources there.  So people 
always have been disappointed in NCIS. 
He said that this manifested itself in many of the meetings that the NIM 
implementation team held with force elites:  
They said ‘You can give us advice and guidance but don’t tell us what to do.  You 
are a national agency.  You’re working at level three (national and international 
crime).  This isn’t going to work at level 1 (volume crime).  Thanks a lot, leave us 
alone’.   
A senior intelligence official (N050) questioned ACPO’s resistance to something 
which appeared such a “simple and sound model for policing”.  She said that confusion 
stemmed from a lack of clarity about the areas of policing the model was meant to drive, 
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about whether it was an overarching business model or whether it simply was meant to 
drive proactivity (rather than response or demand based policing) in the mainstream.  It is 
worth noting here that the NIM achieved even less success at the national level; the model 
effectively was ignored by senior commanders and the high profile national specialist 
detective agencies.  In interview, the NCIS senior executive (N02) said that the Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), also completely rejected the NIM as a model for 
its business. 
The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) said that the NIM’s identification with 
the Kent force was a significant factor in member’s resistance to the model.  The ACPO 
member (intelligence) (N06) agreed that the identification of the NIM with Kent meant 
that some of his peers found it difficult to accept the model into their own forces and 
problems were exacerbated by the fact that ACPO’s NIM team was slow to recognise the 
need to translate something intended for an internal audience in Kent, into something that 
would be acceptable to all the other forces in England and Wales.  Though a senior 
intelligence official (N050) questioned whether the police elite recognised the value of 
the NIM as an enabler; a process for delivering operational policing strategies (of 
whatever form) more effectively.  She said “It is the whole ethos of the model [that] 
people don’t get”. 
The ACPO member (crime policy) (N01) said that perhaps the NIM was 
presented in too complicated a manner for busy chief officers who at that time were under 
no obligation to implement the model (or at least under no stronger obligation than was 
represented by a ‘presumption in favour of compliance’) and who were “busy doing other 
things”.  Some ACPO members’ complied with the NIM more in spirit than in deed 
(ACPO member N06).   The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that 
believing they could ignore the model without any real sanction; many chief officers did 
exactly that. 
A further ACPO member (N053) criticised NCPE doctrine because it was 
developed in a “rarefied atmosphere” far above the reality of the environment in which 
people actually had to deliver.  In his view, the doctrine developers (including those who 
added to the extensive library of NIM guidance) had moved so far ahead of the frontline 
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of mainstream policing that “the people who are left can’t understand what then comes 
out of it”.  Doctrine should be about “Let’s make it as simple as possible as opposed to as 
complicated and detailed as we can”.  A former ACPO member (N04) said that the 
service became so overwhelmed by doctrine that it arrived on his desk “like London 
buses”.   
 
Inadequate Implementation Strategy 
According to the ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) the Association took a conscious 
decision to use a ‘top-down’ approach to implementation because it lacked the full 
support of Centrex, the national police training organisation (now part of the NPIA).  He 
and his ACPO colleagues on the NIM project board directed Centrex’s National 
Specialist Law Enforcement Centre (NSLEC) to deliver training in the model’s process.  
The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that the Association took a further 
decision to use NSLEC’s limited resources to take a ‘top-down’ approach, to persuade 
only senior and middle managers of the model’s benefits. An NSLEC executive (N054) 
said that this meant that there was no meaningful engagement with the detective force.  
Indeed the national detective agency, the National Crime Squad, played no part in the 
NIM’s introduction.   
The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that as a result of those decisions, 
NIM implementation was wholly senior management-driven.  Goals and objectives were 
not agreed with senior or middle managers or frontline staff.  He said that this caused 
problems “down the line” in persuading operational staff in the mainstream to accept the 
new processes required for compliance with the model and that those staff failed to “buy 
in” to the model’s aims.  He said that “We were trying to get people at the top of the 
organisation to understand [the model’s aims]… Now, that is like anything.  You can 
push for a certain length of time but really you need to be pulling don’t you”?  In other 
words, because there was no process of negotiation with those who were meant to 
implement the model, the ‘abstract’ concepts of the NIM were never translated into the 
lists of practical, day-to-day activities that would have meaning for frontline officers.  
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I argue that comparisons may be drawn with the implementation of UBP in the 
1960s.  In neither case, was the knowledge and expertise of the detective force enlisted 
appropriately (the specialist detective force, which by most objective analyses would be 
expected to have the greatest investigative expertise, appears to have played no part in 
either process) and the goals and objectives that accompanied the new policies were never 
properly conveyed to frontline staff (see for example, Williamson, 1971 and John and 
Maguire, 2003).  In that sense, the arrangements made for the implementation of the NIM, 
just as they were for UBP must be considered wholly inadequate.   
A prime example of that inadequacy was the lack of NIM training provided to 
frontline staff.  In its written evidence to the Select Committee on Home Affairs (29th 
July, 2004), Centrex blamed its “lack of capacity” for the delivery of intelligence training 
which it admitted was a “real limitation and a matter of concern” (NCPE, 2004a: 7.3).  
There was “a pressing need” to provide a range of training for “intelligence specialists” 
because even though the NIM was “at the heart of police business, the training of 
intelligence managers, analysts, field operators and assessors [was] piecemeal and 
inadequate” (NCPE, 2004a: 8.2).   NCPE (2004a: 8.2) expressed its desire that training 
would begin before the end of 2004,  However, the ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) 
noted in August 2005 that Centrex still was at least five months away from delivering on 
its training promises.  
Two ACPO members (N03 and N06) regretted Centrex’s inadequate support of 
NIM implementation.  One (N03), observed that the amount of NIM training that Centrex 
eventually offered was extremely limited, amounting only to a series of presentations for 
student constables and intelligence managers.  Though the NIM implementation team 
delivered some workshops for police commanders, these were on the specific subject of 
tasking and coordinating and not on the wider aims of the model.  Even then, because of 
limits on the NIM team (in terms of staff and resources); it was not able to sustain the 
training that it offered.  He explained that “We never ever had the ability to take it further 
than grass-roots, bread and butter stuff really”.   
An NSLEC executive (N054) blamed ACPO for the delay.  Its training 
requirement was poorly defined and the Centrex training staff was unable to clarify it 
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because of poor communications between Centrex and the ACPO project team.  He said 
that he had contacted six members of the ACPO project team for guidance or direction but 
had received only one response.  He believed that the “top-down” approach to training 
meant that those who would actually implement the model knew the least about what was 
expected of them.  He said that the NIM team, “talked about strategic assessment, they 
talked about tactical assessment, they talked about all the different problem and target 
profiles [but] no one knew what they looked like… so that didn’t help the initial 
implementation”.   In his view, NIM training was “a bit of an afterthought”.   
The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that as an emergency 
measure, 5,000 CDs that detailed the NIM’s structures and processes were produced and 
issued to police forces but this did little to raise standards or to ameliorate concerns about 
the lack of classroom-type training available.  The Centrex executive (N054) decried the 
issuing of the CDs as a token effort that “didn’t actually persuade, motivate or convince 
anybody about what [the NIM] actually looked like”. 
The ACPO member (N03) said that a combination of the pressure to implement 
the NIM by the Government’s April 2004 deadline, and the lack of training support either 
from the NIM team or from Centrex meant that some forces resorted to delivering their 
own training.  He said that the training was “not necessarily nationally qualified and 
accredited and may not [have been] the right stuff which then in turn means that people 
are getting the wrong message locally and will continue to do so because there’s no 
quality assurance mechanism on it”.   
Few police trainers understood the NIM (ACPO member, N03) Even though 
ACPO wanted to do more to explain the model to frontline staff; the “national expertise 
pot” was just too small.  The few trainers with sufficient knowledge were either attached 
to forces whose chief officers would not allow them to be released (a prime example of 
protectionism) or because of competing demands on their time, were able to offer only an 
ad hoc service.  The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) said that NSLEC eventually 
provided more support in the form of seminars for BCU commanders only.  He said that 
this was no more than “Band Aid training”.  He wished, with hindsight, that he had been 
more robust in pushing Centrex to deliver what ACPO needed.  However as the foregoing 
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analysis has demonstrated, it is questionable whether, in Phillips’ absence, he would have 
got the support he needed in that context from his ACPO peers. 
Earlier, the ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) argued that the model 
could not work effectively unless the commander, the intelligence manager and the 
analyst were working together in harmony.   However, the obvious inadequacy of NIM 
training meant that two of those three were completely unprepared for the demands made 
upon them and the third was provided with only the most basic of knowledge.  Given the 
recent history of high profile intelligence failures, the reader may question ACPO’s 
training strategy.  In my view, the consequences of failing to train people for these key 
roles were never properly considered.  Even though the police service lacked the 
necessary knowledge or expertise, it would be reasonable to surmise that it might be 
available in some other government department.  However, that alternative seems never 
to have been considered and that perhaps provides more evidence of the ‘silo’ mentality 
in policing (referred to by many researchers including Shapland, 1998 and Fleming and 
Rhodes, 2004).     
Both ACPO members considered that despite the lack of training, the NIM 
delivered some improvements in intelligence work.  One (N03) said that intelligence 
assessments had improved marginally since implementation but further development was 
dependent on improvements in information technology.  The other (N06) noted that 
whilst the overall standard of intelligence assessments had improved, he continued to see 
a “mixed bag” that were “overly crime related” and that ignored those problems of 
concern to local communities.   However, O’Connor (2005: 36) has argued on the basis of 
assessments seen by HMIC inspectors that despite the rhetoric around the model, the 
picture was uniformly poor.  NIM intelligence assessments had only “a narrow base and 
[that] in many places the analytical and other products appeared to have had only a 
limited influence on decision making”. 
A further example of that fractured and disjointed approach to strategy and 
policymaking is provided by efforts to estimate the scale and extent of policing problems 
in BCUs and in forces.  As the reader has seen, police intelligence units produce the NIM 
intelligence assessments but the crime audits required by the Crime and Disorder Act 
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1998 (that are used to formulate a three-year plan of how the local crime reduction 
partnership will address crime and disorder in their area) were produced by completely 
different departments (usually those with responsibility for community relations).  Forces 
also were obliged to produce annual policing plans which often were written by a third 
department.  One can only speculate how forces managed their business well enough to 
respond to a NIM strategic assessment refreshed every six months, the NPP (now 
National Community Reassurance Plan) refreshed every three years, crime audits 
refreshed every three years (but not according to a pattern that coincided with the NPP), 
and the annual policing plan prepared for the police authority (see Fletcher and Stenson, 
2009 on the growing complexity of these arrangements).  That neither those involved in 
the creation nor implementation of the NIM appeared to have considered these 
requirements provides further evidence of their failure to reflect ‘real world’ demands and 
their unwillingness to compromise the NIM arrangements.    
The NIM structures and processes could replace some if not all of these other 
strategic plans and indeed, proposals to merge the NIM strategic assessment and the 
crime audit set out in the 2004 White Paper seemed eminently sensible.  The ACPO 
member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that he held a series of meetings with 
representatives of the Association of Police Authorities (APA).  According to an APA 
official who participated in those meetings (N05), there was an expectation that the model 
would become ever more important as a business plan for police authorities.  The official 
(N05) said that the APA saw the NIM as being capable of strengthening accountability in 
ways that pointed “fundamentally to a better relationship” between police and partners. 
There is some evidence that in some areas there has been such a development.  For 
example, established at the end of 2003, the Greater Manchester Against Crime (GMAC) 
Partnership Business Model is based upon an ‘interpretation’ of the NIM (GMAC, 2011).  
The GMAC model aims to provide common methods for the ten Community Safety 
Partnerships in Greater Manchester to manage their core business.  However, interviewed 
for this research, respondent N08 an information officer employed by the County local 
authority, highlighted that plans to develop those arrangements in his force area were 
developing much more slowly than he wanted and that other authorities he worked 
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closely with, including Greater London, had abandoned their plans because they found 
them unworkable. 
 
The +IM’s Language and Style    
Factors in the resistance to the NIM that I have not yet properly acknowledged were the 
language, style and even the name of the model.  John and Maguire (2004) found in their 
study that there were large ‘knowledge gaps’ amongst all ranks and some resistance to the 
NIM based on ignorance and on dislike of its ‘academic’ structure and language.  Many 
respondents in this research (for example, two ACPO members (N01 and N06), an FIO 
(N017) and a former detective inspector (N055)) cited the management jargon and 
exclusive language contained within the NIM as impediments to comprehension of the 
model in mainstream policing.   A typical observation was that the model was ‘too full of 
terminology and was not user friendly’.  A senior intelligence analyst (N039) said “It just 
blinds you with the language and the unnecessary jargon”.  An ACPO member (N053) 
said that the NIM had earned a bad reputation because it was “overly bureaucratic… 
overly complicated and it needed simplification”. 
The NIM’s inaccessible prose gave insufficient consideration to the reader.  
Jargon and exclusive terms may be common currency in policing but the NIM raised their 
usage to new levels of obfuscation and impenetrability; this was a classic example of the 
medium obscuring what was meant to be a very simple message. The ACPO member 
(crime policy) (N01) suggested that: 
with the benefit of hindsight, the 20/20…  I think that had it been written in simpler 
terms, had it not been so elegant, elegantly written, if it had been conceptualised in a 
different way I think it would have taken off much easier. 
The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that for the ordinary police 
officer the model was, “very high-powered, very high-level, and principally sound 
without question... but little practical application within it”.  In interview, the NCIS senior 
executive (N02) accepted that he had made mistakes in formulating the NIM.  In writing 
the model, his central aim had been to describe a management process that put 
intelligence at the heart of policing activity but he had assumed a level of knowledge that 
just did not exist in mainstream policing.  He said: 
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I acknowledge that we wouldn’t start from here now.  Of course we wouldn’t… I 
suppose, this is inevitable, not only was [the NIM] a child of its time, it was a 
product of the people of that time.  Even though we were being innovative, I joined 
the cops in 1964 so I’ve kicked around it for 40 odd years and inevitably times 
change.  
‘Management speak’ of the kind found in the NIM is one of the curses of the age.  
Often it is used to make something seem more impressive or complex than it really is.  
Caulkin has argued that in that idiom, “imaginary concepts and attributes are earnestly 
described and referenced, as if they really existed” (2005: 1).  The model is littered with 
examples.  For instance, the NIM terms “knowledge products” and “system products” 
mean, respectively, ‘knowledge’ and ‘systems’.  The knowledge and systems described 
by the NIM possess no attributes beyond those commonly understood but their meaning is 
obfuscated as a means of elevating the terms and inflating their importance.  As many 
respondents in this research commented, elaboration of this kind is neither desirable nor 
necessary and it certainly was a barrier to understanding, yet examples of this kind of 
mystification are sprinkled throughout the model. 
The case against management or marketing speak of this kind perhaps was put 
best by Sir Ivor Roberts, formerly the British ambassador to Italy.  In 2006, on leaving his 
employment with the Foreign Service, Sir Ivor noted wearily:  
Too much of the change management agenda is written in Wall Street management 
speak which is already tired and discredited by the time it is introduced.  ‘Synergies, 
value for money, best value, benchmarking, silo working, roll-out, stakeholder, 
empower, push back, deliver the agenda, fit for purpose’, are all prime candidates 
for a game of ‘bulls**t bingo’ (in Parris, 2009: 1).  
Readers of the NIM and its associated codes and manuals of guidance will 
sympathise with Roberts’ sentiments.  Disappointingly, even though ACPO eventually 
recognised the challenges that the model faced in this context, the ACPO member 
(intelligence) (N06) confirmed that it made no effort to change the NIM’s prose.  I argue 
that ACPO’s subsequent efforts, through NCPE, to produce ‘doctrine’ for the police 
service (see for example, NCPE, 2006 and 2006a) demonstrate clearly that it learnt little 
from this failure.   
Even though the NIM essentially described a business or planning process (John 
and Maguire, 2003), several respondents in this study referred to the inappropriateness of 
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the term ‘National Intelligence Model’.  To many, it suggested an unwelcome association 
with particular policing styles or specialisms (that is, criminal intelligence or crime 
control) and in the minds of many confirmed the NIM’s role in what Reiner (2010: 206) 
has called the  “managerialist-cum-populist stress” on crime-fighting, prevalent in this 
period.  An ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that the model was named 
“incorrectly”.  In his view, the NIM was “a policing model that is all about resourcing; all 
about information” but the inclusion of the word intelligence “skews things a little bit”.   
He suggested that more accurate names for the NIM would have been the “National 
Information Model” or the “National Resourcing Model”.  The NCIS senior executive, a 
co-author of the model, agreed that, the NIM was “very much a business model rather 
than an intelligence model” as the term implied.  The ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) 
agreed that the model’s designation was misleading.  However in his view, the debate on 
that topic already had been fruitlessly rehearsed “a zillion times”.  He said, “Yes the name 
is misleading but would I change it at this stage?  Probably not”! 
 
UK Intelligence Architecture 
The reader has already seen indications that the police intelligence architecture in 
England and Wales during the period of this research was fragmented and inefficient.  I 
argue that even if senior commanders had been completely committed to the NIM, the 
inadequacy of that architecture would have prevented the model from making the impact 
that Phillips’ anticipated.  In this section, I highlight some of the most significant 
inadequacies and inefficiencies. 
During this study, national responsibility for managing criminal intelligence was 
vested in NCIS.  A tasking and coordinating inspector (N016) said that most forces 
managed their responsibilities for local and regional intelligence through force 
intelligence bureaux.  A significant exception to that rule was the largest force in the 
country, the Metropolitan Police.  This led the NCIS senior executive (N02) to suggest 
that the Met was “hazarding its future” because without that single point of access it was 
unlikely that it could fulfil its information management responsibilities, under the Data 
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Protection and Freedom of Information Acts.38  He also felt that the Met needed to make a 
bigger contribution to the national intelligence architecture.39     
In the mainstream, local intelligence units have long since replaced collators.  
However, a former detective inspector (N055) said that the notion of local intelligence 
staff as less capable and less valuable than their operational colleagues persisted.  The 
NCIS senior executive (N02) said that the lack of training and support offered, meant that 
those who worked in BCUs probably were the least well trained in the police service and 
also the least well paid for the work that they did.  In his view, the service was simply “not 
geared up” to intelligence work at the local level because the service had “never seen it as 
an area for people investment”.  He cited as an example, the intelligence failure connected 
to the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman by Ian Huntley.  He said that the 
systemic failure, in every one of the 43 forces in England and Wales, to properly train and 
support intelligence staff meant that an event like Soham had been “an accident waiting to 
happen”.  Though in his view it was no coincidence that it was Humberside, a force that 
had “invested so little in its intelligence and information management” which had 
suffered the most. 
Cope et al (2003: 29-30) posited that the shift to ILP demanded an intelligence 
system based on network principles that employed a ‘production line’ approach in which 
intelligence units “function as ‘knowledge centres’ within the ‘intelligent organisation’”.  
In such systems, the unit takes responsibility for developing information on individuals or 
groups which it then passes to other units who enact the investigation.  This approach has 
a compelling logic in the modern era and, at least in part; it is consistent with 
contemporary practice.  However, Fielding (cited in Cope et al, 2003) highlighted that it 
was difficult for the network logic to overcome “the established values of the 
occupational culture, together with the tradition of hierarchical organisation”.  I argue that 
events following the putative implementation of the NIM demonstrate that Fielding’s 
words were particularly insightful.  The NCIS senior executive (N02) said that instead of 
                                                 
38 The reader will have seen that the Met established a criminal intelligence branch in 1960.  The senior 
executive’s words suggest that the NCIS senior executive was sceptical about the ability of that department to 
manage the intelligence from all of the force’s headquarters units and BCUs. 
39 The Metropolitan Police Intelligence Bureau (the ‘MIB’) was finally established in 2007. 
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applying that kind of logic, the service just used the intelligence system as a place to 
“chuck everything you haven’t got a home for”. 
In the aftermath of the Soham murders, the Bichard Report identified fundamental 
errors in police intelligence processes and inter alia recommended the establishment of a 
national intelligence database and protocols for the management of intelligence (Bichard, 
2004).   ACPO’s response; the IMPACT Programme, was formulated to encompass a 
comprehensive change in police information management.  This included the 
computerised IMPACT Nominal Index (expected to enable forces to establish whether 
data of interest in criminal investigations might be held elsewhere) and the Police 
National Database (meant to provide a single access point for data held across all of the 
police’s local and national information systems) (NPIA, 2009).  The programme also 
established a new code of practice for the Management of Police Information (the MoPI) 
(NCPE, 2006b).   
Interviewed in 2005, the NCIS senior executive (N02) said that Bichard should be 
a catalyst for a major change in policing because “the one thing that the cops are 
responsive to is getting smacked about the head and Bichard has given them something to 
think about”.  However, he was critical of NPIA over its MoPI guidance (NCPE, 2006), 
which approached the problem of information management “from the old police 
perspective… you pile all the stuff in a pot somewhere and ransack it at will”.  NPIA 
failed to recognise that police systems did not provide the fundamental integrity in 
records management required.  That made the service intensely vulnerable around 
information not managed properly according to the law.  Interviewed in August 2005, the 
ACPO member (intelligence) (N06) regretted that he had not been more robust in his 
response to the Bichard Report.  He said that the opportunity to talk about the failure of 
intelligence was missed.  Data protection was only a small part of the problem yet this is 
what, in the main, Bichard had focused upon and ACPO had not challenged this 
effectively enough. 
The capability of intelligence staff should have been a matter of much greater 
concern to ACPO.  In interview, a former detective superintendent (N051) recalled his 
experiences as a teacher at Bramshill Police College during 2008.  He found that his 
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students (in the main, senior police officers) complained that their intelligence units were 
made up of “the sick and the lame”.  In that context, the situation clearly had improved 
little since the Audit Commission (1993: 37) made that same observation some 15 years 
earlier.  He said that the officers’ comments demonstrated that there was an inability 
amongst senior officers to understand that “if you don’t make any investment in 
intelligence then you will get back exactly what you put in”.   
The ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) believed that the police service 
could resolve the situation by creating a national career pathway for intelligence officers 
(just as Phillips had done in Kent).  He questioned the need for sworn police officers to 
hold intelligence posts.  He said that the precedent of ‘civilian’ intelligence officers was 
well established in “the security services, the military and in NCIS”.  However, there is a 
certain irony (given the support of the President of ACPO and another key figure in 
intelligence in the Association) in the fact that ACPO does not appear to have made any 
move to develop this as policy and also that none of the services that the ACPO member 
(N03) identified, was called upon to resolve the intelligence training deficit in policing he 
identified.   
According to another ACPO member (N053), the inadequacy of police 
intelligence work could not be attributed to a lack of resources.  He felt that the 
“generosity” of successive governments, meant that the police had sufficient resources to 
meet most challenges they faced in this context but (in his view) the police needed a 
model based upon the service’s twin strengths, its people and its information.  The failure 
to train staff in the NIM was symptomatic of a wider malaise in police training; forces did 
not tell their staff how to use information.  Police training was all about “training to 
respond to incidents and being able to deal with incidents in a capable fashion”.  Whereas, 
training needed to be approached in a more holistic manner. 
A senior intelligence official (N050) said that the police struggled to use their 
information effectively.  She felt that the service did not have the necessary infrastructure.  
Essentially, in her view, policing was hamstrung by the “response” culture (that Phillips 
had identified in Kent and which was one of the factors in the development of the NIM).  
She was critical of the police’s information-gathering processes observing that, “policing 
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doesn’t think about what information it wants to gather… most of the information is 
brought to it by the people who use its services.  It still doesn’t do an awful lot of 
pro-active information gathering”. 
A further problem was the reluctance of officers to share the information that they 
collected (which could of course also be attributed to the failure of the training regime).  
An ACPO member (N053) said that even though some key individuals stood out like 
beacons and “realised that actually understanding the information is critical”, the general 
level of resistance was “just truly truly magnificent”.   He considered that Centrex’s 
introduction of the MoPI (NCPE, 2006b), had failed to achieve its intended aim.  The 
MoPI had gone some way to persuading officers that they should not conceal intelligence 
from their supervisors.  However, the hoarding of intelligence by different units and 
departments remained problematic for the police organisation.  He said:  
It may have moved beyond the individual but it’s now very clearly in teams, units, 
stations, boroughs… and it’s exactly the same argument, magnified up.  It’s exactly 
the same as it was in the 1970s.  It’s now actually much bigger on an organisational 
level.  If the organisation wants to embrace information-led rather than 
intelligence-led policing then it needs to actually find a way to get rid of all those 
cultural barriers, all that protectionism, that exists. 
The ACPO member’s words reflect both the findings of Innes and Fielding 
(2002), and of Manning and Hawkins (1989: 145) who noted that “the social organisation 
of police work ensures that information... remains located primarily in the heads of 
officers, and secondarily in their own case files, private notes or log books”.  According to 
the ACPO member, the new infrastructure Centrex had attempted to establish (through 
the MoPI and other intelligence doctrine) had been only partially successful in 
overcoming the cultural resistance to the sharing of information.  The hoarding of 
intelligence in the ways described is not just significant in the context of police culture but 
could have serious implications for the service in terms of its compliance with a range of 
legislation from the Data Protection Act 1998 to the Human Rights Act 1998.  I argue that 
the issues described in the foregoing paragraphs should have been of much greater 
concern to police managers.  That they were not, suggests a lack of understanding of the 
consequences of inadequate and inefficient data management. 
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Phillips’ Retirement from the Police Service 
A rather obvious question that arises from the foregoing analysis is, ‘if there was so much 
resistance to the NIM then how did it achieve the measure of success claimed in the 
previous chapter’?  I argue that the most important factor in that context was David 
Phillips’ policy entrepreneurship which allowed him to overcome his colleagues’ 
objections and to secure ACPO’s mandate.  Phillips exploited his influence on the Home 
Office to persuade it to codify the NIM as the model for mainstream policing in England 
and Wales.  However, with hindsight, it is now obvious that his position as President of 
the Association was critical to his success and his departure from that post in March 2003 
meant that his star (and the prospects for the NIM) soon began to wane.   
The Home Office senior official who lauded Phillips’ advocacy of the NIM and 
the impression that he made on the department (N065) said that Phillips’ influence on the 
Home Office was diminished by his retirement from the police service.  He said that the 
model: 
Started to lose its focus when David Phillips moved from being ACPO President to 
NCPE because NCPE for him was all about applying NIM in practice even more 
rigorously and demonstrably... the whole lustre if you like of being President of 
ACPO and a full time chief as well - you know, going to a quango like NCPE - he 
was very frustrated in that role because the influence was nothing like as significant.  
Following Phillips’ departure, lacking its former President’s personal (not to say, 
crusading) commitment to the NIM, the priorities of the Association seemed to change.  I 
argue that the latent resistance to the NIM described earlier by the ACPO members (N03 
and N06) came to the surface.  Thereafter individual members gave greater priority to 
their own ideas, their own ambitions, for policing in the modern era (for example, those 
ideas captured in the neighbourhood policing programme) and to other challenges that 
were emerging (at least at the rhetorical level, these included the need to deal more 
effectively with cross-border crime and questions about force restructuring).   
However, by persuading the Home Office to codify the model (under section 39A 
of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Section 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002); Phillips 
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had set the service on a path from which it could not easily deviate.40  This presented 
ACPO members with a problem.  Few matched Phillips’ enthusiasm for the model but the 
NPP and the statutory NIM code of practice meant that they could not easily ignore it.  In 
the following chapters, I argue that typically the compromise solution favoured by the 
service elite was to adopt a policy of ‘NIM compliance’ that ‘ticked boxes’ but which 
paid little meaningful regard to business outcomes. 
 
Cross-Border Crime 
The service’s inability to respond effectively to cross-border crime undoubtedly was a 
complicating factor for those advancing the NIM as the solution to the challenges of the 
twenty-first century.  In 2005, HMIC identified a significant gap at this level and 
questioned the ability of the service’s 30 year-old, 43-force structure to provide a solid 
platform for a future policing environment that it considered to be characterised by; 
“widespread, enterprising, organised criminality; proliferating international terrorism and 
domestic extremism; a premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity and 
an increasingly risk-concerned public and intrusive media” (O’Connor, 2005: 7).   
In interview, the ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) said that 
cross-border crime was “something which will significantly hurt you if you take your eye 
off it and if you don’t police it because you’re concentrating on performance targets and 
[local] issues”.  He said that an example of a force that “took its eye off” the emerging 
problem of cross-border crime with significant consequences was Nottinghamshire.  In 
the first few weeks of 2005, the force’s command team had publicly acknowledged that 
they had done so.  He said that as a result the force’s performance around local crime was 
“completely off skew” because it took commanders all their resources to try to resolve the 
cross-border problem.  In turn, that meant that local problems began to build up because 
the force did not have sufficient resources to police them effectively (see Ford, 2010 on 
the continuing difficulties of the Nottinghamshire force in that context). 
                                                 
40 The code of practice was issued by the Secretary of State “in relation to the discharge of the functions of chief 
officers of police”.  A chief officer of police shall have regard to this code, as will the members of the police 
force for whom the chief officer of police is responsible”.  
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I argue that the distinction between cross-border and local criminals is false and 
that it is a barrier to effective intelligence work and investigative practice.  A former 
detective inspector (N055) said that in his experience ‘professional’ criminals (usually 
associated with cross-border offending) fell into one of two categories, either they were 
“lifestyle criminals; people who found that they had no other alternatives in life” or they 
saw life as challenge and made “a conscious choice to engage in crime”.41  He said that 
popular representations of professional criminals failed to acknowledge that individuals 
can operate at any level depending on the circumstances that pertain at any given time.  
He said: 
Individuals exploit opportunities.  Someone who is involved in international drug 
trafficking today, can be involved in illegal gambling tomorrow and at the same be 
buying other types of drugs for their personal use, getting involved in pirate DVDs 
or fiddling their VAT or income tax.  All these activities present law enforcement 
with opportunities.    
In my view, those opportunities are rarely capitalised upon as well as they might 
have been.  The reader need only consider the lived reality of many local communities 
facing for example; widespread drugs problems or gun crime, to see that a priori there are 
clear links between those ‘professionals’ and local policing problems.  I argue that every 
professional criminal, every gang boss, every member of every criminal network lives 
within a community and on some local police officer’s ‘patch’.   Properly exploited, the 
local intelligence opportunities routinely afforded can be useful adjuncts to the more 
sophisticated intelligence gathering methods that one might associate with specialist 
detective squads.  This would go some way towards achieving Phillips’ ‘whole service’ 
approach.  
The closing of the perceived gap between local and cross-border crime was one of 
the drivers of the plans for force reorganisation that emerged in 2005 (O’Connor, 2005).  
HMIC argued that the policing environment required a service that could deal effectively 
with “volume crime [and] the current performance focus, but [would] also have 
demonstrable readiness to tackle complex, volatile threats to individuals, neighbourhoods 
                                                 
41 Demonstrating once again the fallibility of the police organisational memory, Stanford (2007) argued that the 
challenge of combating ‘professional’ criminals has been recognised since the Victorian era when the problem 
was legislated against by the Habitual Criminals Act 1869.   
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and businesses”.  To achieve this, the police service needed not only to change its 
structure, but the “whole configuration of policing” (2005: 6).  Ultimately, Home Office 
reorganisation plans were shelved due to opposition from police authorities.  However, 
that debate has rumbled on with ACPO continuing to favour replacement of the existing 
structure with larger regional bodies that may be better placed to tackle national and 
international serious and organised crime and finding support from Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Constabulary, Hugh Orde (BBC News, 2009).  Force restructuring as a 
means of reforming the service to make it ‘fit for purpose’ in the twenty-first century 
remains firmly on the agenda.  
In the context of that debate ACPO (2008) argued, perhaps counter-intuitively 
given the foregoing analysis, that the NIM is a cohesive model that is capable of 
coordinating operational activity from the national to the local and from the local to the 
national.   According to ACPO (2008: 56), the NIM can also enable “information to move 
freely between local level community intelligence and ‘developed intelligence’ to trigger 
covert investigations”.  Arguing against, as it saw, the effective disintegration of the 
service, ACPO cautioned the Home Office that future mechanisms for “funding, 
governance and accountability” must recognise “that the whole spectrum of policing 
activity must be given due priority in parallel” so that the service is not “balkanised [sic] 
into separate structures for neighbourhood policing; cross border policing activity and 
national security” (ACPO, 2008: 57).   
Just as with its ‘Neighbourhood Policing Reinvention Cycle’ hypothesis there is 
logic to ACPO’s argument.  However, the reader has seen in this study that the 
commitment of many ACPO members to the NIM was questionable.  Whether the 
Association’s new claims for the model amounted to a Pauline conversion of its 
membership to its aims or whether the NIM simply was enlisted as a means of influencing 
policy is surely open to debate.  Notwithstanding that consideration, there already is a 
division in policing which is entirely of the police’s own making and which undermined 
Phillips’ ‘whole service’ philosophy, the persistence of the silo mentality in policing 
exemplified by the divide between the uniform branch, divisional detectives and the 
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specialist detective force which has been accommodated for more than 125 years and to 
which I have referred throughout this thesis.  
As a postscript to this analysis it is worth highlighting that in 2007, a survey 
carried out by the Police Federation (the staff association for the police rank and file) 
found that across England and Wales, trainee recruits were being used to “prop up” 
overstretched CID offices  and that, nationally, there was a shortfall of 2,000 detectives 
(Doward, 2007: 1).  In 2009, the Metropolitan Police was forced to admit that 800 of its 
3,000 strong detective force was untrained (Davenport, 2009).  This prompted 
commanders to order a “sweeping reform” of the department and to return to its 32 BCUs, 
some of the highly-trained officers that staffed its specialist detective squads.  
Henceforth, if a detective completed five years attached to a specialist unit such as the 
Flying Squad or the Task Force, they should expect to be transferred to a BCU post for at 
least two years before they were allowed to apply for a posting back to the specialist 
detective units (Davenport, 2009).  The situation in London at that time was summed up 
by Alan Gordon, vice-chairman of the Police Federation who said that: 
The lack of experience and properly trained detectives is of particular concern. As 
with uniformed colleagues, their attention is very often directed towards incidents 
that fulfil targets and there is frustration that they are unable to concentrate on 
investigative detective functions (cited in Davenport,2009). 
However, another representative of the Police Federation (N102) said that despite the 
rhetoric, the policy was applied in a somewhat “haphazard and chaotic fashion”.  A 
former detective chief inspector (N0100) said that he felt that the force’s senior 
commanders feared that the taking of experienced detectives away from specialist squads 
would leave the force vulnerable in the face of the policing and security challenges 
presented by the 2012 Olympic Games.  I argue that this aspect of the debate very much 
supports my earlier argument about the traditional reliance of police commanders on their 
specialist detective squads, identified earlier in this thesis as the police service’s 
‘Praetorian Guard’ or ‘Storm Troopers’.  
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Summary of Analysis 
This chapter analysed the challenges that Phillips faced in convincing his peers that the 
NIM was ‘fit for purpose’ as the model for operational policing in the twenty-first 
century.  Despite’s ACPO’s explicit support and the Home Office’s codification of the 
NIM, few chief officers were willing to make the same far-reaching structural changes 
that Phillips had effected in Kent.  Whilst President of ACPO, Phillips’ policy 
entrepreneurship was sufficient to drive his plans forward but once he left that post, his 
influence on the Association began to wane and the scepticism of his peers became clear.    
 In this chapter, I described the resistance of the ACPO membership to the NIM 
and analysed the reasons for it.  Phillips’ retirement from the police service was hugely 
significant because it meant that at a crucial stage of its implementation, the model lost 
the policy entrepreneur that it needed.  Without his advocacy, commitment and support, 
individual chief officers could not be persuaded to make the significant structural and 
organisational changes that his plans required.  ACPO’s decision to recommend the 
model to chief officers did not carry as much weight as Phillips might have anticipated; 
that in itself said much about the relationship between the Association and its members.  
 There was a significant body of opinion that saw the NIM as no more than a 
diversion from the real business of policing, central to which was the achievement of 
centrally-imposed performance targets.  An ideological commitment to preventative and 
reassurance policing strategies (which also were being ‘pushed’ by the Home Office in 
the same period) explained the scepticism of some.  The resistance of others was 
variously explained as a product of:  the association of the NIM with NCIS and the Kent 
force (which confirmed the resilience of the ‘fiefdom’ mentality in policing); the 
fundamentally flawed implementation process, in which persuasion and education were 
replaced by prescription and diktat; and the language and terminology of the NIM.  This 
analysis suggested that ACPO’s claims that the NIM was a ‘cohesive model’ capable of 
coordinating information flows and cross-border policing activity was barely credible.  
 Just as in the UBP experiment, there was no meaningful engagement with that 
section of the service that most independent observers would expect to have the greatest 
knowledge and expertise in matters of intelligence and investigation, the detective force.  
 194 
The NIM contributed nothing to ameliorating the divide between the CID and the 
uniformed branch of the service.  All this was compounded by the fact that the police 
intelligence system was so dysfunctional that at the beginning of the new century it could 
not support the ‘simple set of fundamentals’ that the NIM was supposed to represent. 
 However, Phillips had set ACPO on a path from which it could not easily deviate.  
The NPP and the statutory codes of practice that emerged from it meant that the NIM 
could not be ignored.  The solution favoured by many ACPO members was to implement 
the model only partially or at least only to the extent that it was necessary to satisfy 
inspectors that they had complied or at least were attempting to comply with it.  The result 
of that ‘compliance’ was that all the relevant HMIC inspection boxes were ticked but the 
ethos of the NIM was lost and there were few meaningful changes in the police 
organisation or in practice 
In principle, the NIM may have been capable of delivering all that Phillips 
promised but in practice the challenges to the model, not least in overcoming structural 
and cultural resistance, were immense.  In the next two chapters, I continue my evaluation 
of NIM implementation process by the examining its impact on the investigative and 
intelligence practices of two police forces ‘Urban’ and ‘County’.  Those case studies add 
significant degrees of depth, colour and texture to the foregoing analysis. 
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Chapter 7 - Evaluating the +IM: Urban Case Study 
 
Introduction 
This chapter, the first of two case studies, evaluates the implementation of the NIM in the 
‘Urban’ force.  It examines how a large police force in England and Wales, rejected the 
NIM as a business process for the corporate level of the force but mandated its BCUs to 
implement the model.  The chapter discusses Urban senior commanders’ resistance to the 
NIM and how that played out at the corporate and at the local levels of the force.  It also 
examines how Urban met its statutory obligation to achieve ‘NIM compliance’ against 
the background of that resistance. 
The influence of the NIM on intelligence work and investigative strategy in the 
force is analysed by assessing the effect of the NIM in an Urban BCU on: the practice of 
intelligence collection; intelligence collation, analysis and evaluation; the presentation of 
evidence in intelligence assessments; consultation with partners over the ranking of 
investigative priorities and, the implementation and monitoring of operational policing 
plans.  
That analysis is based on observations of management and NIM meetings, 
interviews with officers and staff and with policing partners.  It also draws on the views of 
a broad range of frontline Urban officers collected in focus groups. 
 
Reaction of the Urban Elite to the +IM 
I chose Urban as a case for study because it is one of the largest and most influential 
forces in Britain.  It has often taken the lead on policymaking, has a long history of ‘going 
it alone’ and was likely to offer a significantly contrasting perspective on the NIM to the 
second case ‘County’.  Against the background of the resistance to the model within 
ACPO, the failings of the national police intelligence architecture, and the inadequacy of 
the implementation process, as described earlier, and also Urban’s pre-existing 
commitment to the introduction of one of the most ambitious programmes for 
neighbourhood policing in England and Wales, NIM implementation was always going to 
be a challenge for the force.   
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In interview, the NCIS senior executive (N02) said that whilst it “never showed 
any inclination to do so” Urban’s size and influence meant that the force could have 
“killed off” the NIM before the idea of a national model for operational policing in the 
mainstream became established.  Given ACPO’s ‘presumption of compliance’ in favour 
of the model, it might be considered that talks between the NIM team and Urban’s ACPO 
members about the model would be straightforward.  However, providing further 
evidence of ACPO’s lack of cohesion (see Savage et al, 1996), the NCIS senior executive 
(N02) said that talks between the two aimed at persuading the force to accept the model 
were difficult and negotiations were a “long painful process”.  Nevertheless, the meetings 
convinced him that Urban would support it.  He said that at one stage of the negotiations 
he was offered the job of implementing the NIM in the force.  His response that he was 
“not looking for a fast track to the grave”, indicates his opinion of the scale of the 
challenge facing Urban.   
In 2002, following the meetings with the NCIS senior executive, Urban 
established its own NIM implementation team.  Ostensibly, the role of the team was to 
prepare the force for the NIM.  However, team members quickly recognised that despite 
the agreement that Urban had made with the NCIS senior executive, its senior 
commanders were not persuaded of the merits of the model.  A senior intelligence official 
(N050) (who had been employed by the force as a ‘special advisor’ on the NIM) said that 
she personally saw the potential of the model but that it was far from certain that the chief 
officer would accept it for the whole force, and that there was never any chance that he 
would restructure in the same way as Phillips had done in Kent.  She said a further barrier 
was that some (one may reasonably assume, those who were not party to the meetings 
with the NCIS senior executive) believed that the NIM was being foisted upon them 
without adequate negotiation.  A senior Urban official (N015) said that the key issue in 
the force was that the NIM “wasn’t invented here and therefore they (the senior 
commanders) just would not have it”.   
There were other concerns about the model.  Research respondents, including the 
Urban DOI (N098) and the senior intelligence official (N050), indicated that at least some 
of that opposition was founded on the model’s perceived conflict with the commanders’ 
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own strategic plans for the force, which extended to establishing a new intelligence 
structure overseen by the specialist detective branch.  The senior official said that a 
section of the senior command team expressed doubts about Urban’s ability to dovetail 
the model into its existing strategic management processes.  Those doubts increased as 
they learned more about the NIM (which suggests that anecdotal accounts - provided by 
several respondents – which suggested that Urban’s commanders essentially had ignored 
the NIM, hoping that it would be dropped by the Home Office, may have had some 
validity).  Naturally, this research was unable to capture every development in Urban but 
according to the senior intelligence official (N050), with limited input to Urban’s elite 
decision-making forums its NIM team found it impossible to sustain commanders’ 
interest in the model even though none of the command team were willing to come out 
and publicly reject the model.   
 The official (N050) said that initially she had welcomed the model but she too 
came to the realisation that the NIM was “fundamentally flawed” as a strategic business 
model.  She said that she spoke for many at the top of the force who believed that its 
advocates just had not fully appreciated the complexity of business planning in modern 
policing.  As much as anything this demonstrates that senior commanders were unwilling 
or unable to accept the NIM as the organising framework for the force’s business.  Their 
rejection of the model meant that Urban’s executive (that is, at the level below the senior 
command team) made few efforts to embed it in the business processes of the wider 
organisation.  Tellingly, the head of Urban’s strategy unit (N015) said that the executive 
perceived the resistance to the NIM to be so great, so entrenched, that a decision was 
made not to refer to the model in any new corporate plans because to do so would mean 
that senior commanders would not sign off on them. 
Predictably therefore, during the period of this research, the NIM played no 
meaningful part in coordinating operational activity at the organisational level.  That is to 
say, it had no impact whatsoever on any of the force’s major decision-making forums.  
Despite her efforts to complete something that accurately described the challenges that 
Urban faced, the senior intelligence official (N050) said that no NIM intelligence 
assessment “worthy of the name” was produced at the organisational level.  According to 
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Urban’s tasking and coordinating inspector (N016), the very best that could be said about 
the NIM’s impact on senior commanders was that it was “extremely limited”.   
A member of Urban’s senior command team (N031) said that Urban’s focus on 
other strategic priorities took precedence over any planning for the NIM.  He said that as 
someone committed to streamlining Urban’s management processes and to finding 
solutions aimed at preventing the force “hurtling in crisis mode from one issue to the 
next” he should have been the NIM’s strongest advocate.  However, in interview, he 
seemed bemused that the subject was being raised at all.  He said that since joining Urban 
in 2005, he had done nothing to encourage discussion of the model and his “honest 
observation” was that he could not remember the NIM coming up “in any meaningful 
way in any measurable discussion” he had been party to.  He said: 
It is interesting that we have just not confronted [the NIM] in any meaningful way.  
So even in the context of where we were looking very carefully at how to get a more 
rationalised joined up effective way of using our intelligence, NIM has been 
invisible.42 
A member of Urban’s police authority (N052) said that he had been briefed on the 
NIM by the force’s NIM team in 2004.  Initially, he had been concerned about Urban’s 
ability to adopt the model because it represented such “a revolutionary approach to 
strategic management for the force”.  Three years on, his sense was that it was the norm in 
policing and had become “embedded” in Urban because (since that briefing) the model 
had been referred to so rarely in his meetings with the force’s commanders.  However, the 
comments of the senior command team member (N031) in this section suggest that, 
regardless of the NPP and of ACPO’s decision to implement the NIM, to all intents and 
purposes the model was ignored at the elite level of the force.  
Urban’s DOI (N098), a second member of the Urban elite to declare their support 
for the NIM, expressed his frustration with the attitudes of his peers.  In his view, the 
greatest problems for the NIM in Urban were “the cultural barriers [and] protectionism” 
that existed in the force.  He said that even if the earlier rhetoric (that emerged from their 
                                                 
42 In the context of the NIM’s ‘invisibility’ it should be noted that in his 2008 Review of Policing,  Sir Ronnie 
Flanagan  examined: the future of policing, policing risk, structures and systems to support 21st Century 
policing, developing the police workforce, and working in partnership (all of which are central to the NIM).  
However, he did so without making a single reference to the model (see Flanagan, 2008).  
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meetings with the NCIS senior executive) suggested otherwise, most of the senior 
commanders were unwilling to embrace the changes that the NIM was bound to bring and 
some members simply would not share information and resources as the NIM required.  
He cited as an example, his peers’ attitude to plans for the new intelligence structure 
which included at its apex a new FIB controlled by the specialist detective branch.  He 
(N098) considered the bureau essential to the success of the NIM in Urban. 
He said that even though the chief officer and his deputy were persuaded that a 
new structure was needed, the majority of senior commanders were ambivalent and some 
were publicly and implacably opposed to the plan.  The DOI (N098) said that the ACPO 
member with responsibility for local policing services was “dead against it” and the 
member in charge of the force’s Special Branch (SB) was “vehemently and venomously 
against it”.  In his view, the former feared that he would lose staff and resources 
(including knowledge) to the new (specialist detective-controlled) intelligence unit, and 
the latter was concerned that he would be surrendering to the new unit, his exclusive 
access to intelligence received by SB from the security services.   
As I noted earlier, commentators such as Skogan (2008), Flood (2003) and Grieve 
(2004) have argued that the service has undervalued the intelligence function.  Whilst that 
may have been a factor in this case, the DOI’s words suggest that a much more significant 
factor was the reluctance of senior commanders to give up the power and influence that 
their positions at the top of their profession had brought them.  Gill (2000: 7) has argued 
that in this context, information is a currency or a commodity that can be traded to obtain 
more information so that “power thus comes to be defined not in terms of hierarchical 
office but in one’s reputation for having ‘knowledge’”.  This case demonstrated 
conclusively that ‘hierarchical office’, ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ are inextricably linked 
(see also Manning, 2008 in that context).    
Something that should be acknowledged is that the NPM-inspired reforms 
discussed earlier may themselves have been a factor in that protectionism.  Gilling (2005: 
749) has noted that the accountability mechanisms that are features of regimes 
underpinned by NPM, usually establish a “heavily top-down, vertical structure of 
accountability” that places a significant emphasis on the measurement of performance.  
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Crawford (1998: 248), too, has argued that “managerialist reforms may actually serve to 
push... public sector agencies into prioritising their own introspective needs”.  Considered 
against the background of recent COMPSTAT-inspired reforms in policing, it is easy to 
see how a police manager might be sensitive to any changes in their departments that 
reduced their resources without also diminishing their responsibilities.   
Whatever the reasons for the senior command team’s resistance, its continuing 
intransigence meant that even though a modified plan for the FIB eventually was 
accepted, the NIM did not go on to assume any greater prominence at the highest level of 
the force.  A member of the senior command team (N031) confirmed that the model had 
little effect on the wider organisation and its impact even on the new FIB was limited.  
This was substantiated in 2008 when an independent inspection of the force found that 
rather than complying fully with the NIM, the bureau had decided not to apply the model 
consistently and had even unilaterally determined that the NIM model was “not 
compulsory” for some categories of the intelligence it managed (HMIC, 2008: 23).  In my 
view this development was predictable - FIB executives were simply following the lead 
of Urban’s commanders. 
Against this background, I will now go on to examine the impact of the NIM at the 
local level of the force, where despite (or maybe because of) senior commanders’ 
reservations about the model, it was implemented partially and with little enthusiasm.  I 
draw on the observations of a variety of operational policing meetings and interviews 
with a BCU command team, intelligence workers and frontline staff. 
 
+IM at BCU Level 
I argued in the previous section that the NIM simply was not implemented in Urban at the 
elite level.  However, the senior intelligence official (N050) said that even though she 
believed that the model could not help to organise the business of the force (as an 
individual entity), she was persuaded (and in turn, as their special advisor, persuaded 
senior commanders) that it would have some value for BCUs where she felt it might be 
able to organise the policing of local communities in a relatively straightforward way.  
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Urban’s senior management mandated its NIM team to work with its BCU commanders 
to introduce the model at the local level.   
This decision brought the additional benefit of demonstrating to the Home Office 
and to HMIC (which was tasked with monitoring forces’ implementation of the model) 
that Urban was fulfilling its duty under the NPP to implement the NIM even though that 
decision meant that the impact that the model would have on the strategic direction of the 
force was marginal.  The reader has seen that, together, the NPM-inspired management 
ethos (a feature of policing since the 1980s) and the HMIC inspection regime (and also, 
more recently, the presence of the PSU) encouraged police commanders to demonstrate 
compliance over any meaningful consideration of outcomes.   
In this case, the senior commanders’ decision allowed them to continue to 
administer their force according to their own plans and also to achieve the required 
standard of compliance with the centrally-imposed model.  It could be argued that in so 
doing, the force’s commanders wanted to move beyond that plateau that Goldstein (1979) 
criticised as ‘administrative competence’.  However, in my view, the decision was 
confusing for staff and resulted in inefficiency and waste.  The Urban tasking and 
coordinating inspector (N016) said that he just could not understand why commanders 
were “hammering” boroughs with the compliance message but essentially were ignoring 
the NIM themselves.   
BCU senior management team (SMT) members generally were unaware of the 
tensions surrounding either the NIM or intelligence structures at the highest level of the 
force.  For them, there was no negotiating; the NIM was just another policy they were 
obliged to implement.  Just as at the highest level of the force, views on the NIM were 
inextricably bound up with attitudes and beliefs about the broader topic of intelligence 
work.  The BCU SMT members interviewed said that they welcomed its emphasis on, and 
support for, intelligence work.  However, they had reservations about whether the 
changes they were obliged to make to their operating practices could be effective in the 
long term. 
The BCU commander (N033) said that the model brought structure to her 
operational planning.  She said that it meant that officers better understood how their 
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individual efforts fitted into the broader picture of intelligence, which Urban collected to 
support its investigative activity (though little evidence was seen in this study to support 
that belief).  A detective chief inspector (DCI) (N035) said that the NIM meeting structure 
offered more accountability and the chance of better engagement with partners, and it also 
allowed the BCU SMT to demonstrate that it both understood the policing problems it 
faced and that it was managing its resources effectively.  Though as this chapter will 
show, at least in terms of partnership and resource management, that analysis was flawed. 
The SMT’s commitment to intelligence work was evident in its resourcing of its 
local intelligence unit which was made up of approximately 40 staff.  Headed by a 
detective inspector (DI) as the intelligence manager, the work of the unit was divided 
between a number of ‘focus desks’ overseen by sergeants (some detectives, others police 
sergeants), staffed by civilian analysts and researchers, and sworn police officers as 
FIOs. 43   Though CID officers accounted for most of the supervisory posts, they 
represented only a very small minority of the staff (only four out of the 40 staff in the unit 
during the period of the research).  During the study, the unit operated focus desks for the 
principal concerns of the SMT: robbery, motor vehicle crime, burglary, major crimes and 
safer neighbourhoods.  In the BCU chosen for the study, the NIM meeting cycle was 
followed faithfully, and the BCU’s analysts prepared NIM intelligence assessments in the 
recommended manner.  On the surface at least, the NIM was in place and was fully 
operational. 
The inspector, tasking and coordinating (N016), confirmed that similar 
arrangements were in place across the force, though he acknowledged that their efficiency 
and effectiveness were inconsistent.  A member of the senior command team (N031) was 
more direct on that subject.  During his visits to BCUs across Urban, he found that 
intelligence capability was “very variable” and the whole picture of NIM implementation 
was not as “clear cut” or positive as he had expected to find.  It became clear to him that 
there was no consistent approach to the NIM and that it had not provided a framework 
capable of developing that consistency.   He was particularly concerned that what he 
                                                 
43 As the name suggests, focus desks represent small groups of staff that concentrate on particular crime types. 
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observed seemed to contradict the endorsement of Urban’s efforts that he personally had 
received from HMIC.  I argue that this once again raises an important question about 
inspection processes that prioritise process over outcomes.  The senior commander’s 
words confirm not only that the NIM was perceived to have been implemented 
inadequately across Urban but also ask important questions of an inspection process that 
could determine otherwise. 
Few frontline officers interviewed for this research were able to relate the NIM to 
their daily work; those that attempted to do so discussed the model only in the vaguest of 
terms.  Given the lack of NIM training discussed earlier, it was entirely predictable that 
this would be the case.  Intelligence staff had a better understanding than most, of what 
the NIM was intended to achieve because (as the ACPO member (NIM implementation) 
(N03) confirmed earlier in this thesis) intelligence managers and analysts had been 
provided with a limited amount of training.  An intelligence team leader (N042) said that 
on balance the model was seen as a positive development.  A senior intelligence analyst 
(N039) said the NIM provided clarity, structure and common points of reference.  
However, like many before her, she criticised the delivery of that information.  Echoing 
the views of some senior commanders, an Urban DCI (N035) said that the NIM had been 
imposed without sufficient consultation and without sufficient account being taken of 
local differences (that is, without reference to context); this made the NIM “a very 
difficult beast”.   
Tensions between the intelligence manager, the analysts and the SMT were 
revealed by the manager (N038), who should have been a key figure in the process.  
However, he felt that he had been marginalised by the NIM.  He said that he had been cut 
out of the chain of command (and the information loop) so that the BCU commander 
tasked the senior analyst and other analytical staff without any reference to him.  He said 
that he played no part in the preparation of the NIM assessments and was not invited to 
the consultative meetings.  He, quite rightly, recognised that his role should have been to 
oversee the intelligence function.  However, he said that “In this BCU, the role may as 
well not exist as the SMT seemed to hijack and countermand” any proposals he put 
forward.   
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For her part, the senior analyst (N039) criticised the manager for failing to 
perform his duties.  She was critical of his lack of knowledge of the NIM, and of 
intelligence pathologies generally, which she said were the root causes of the problem.  
However, she also was critical of her force for appointing individuals to such important 
posts without properly assessing their suitability for it.  Choosing her words carefully, she 
said that in her experience:   
Most intelligence managers do not know what goes into a strategic assessment let 
alone be able to project-manage it.  That is the case here (emphasis added).  You get 
the odd keen intelligence manager but most of them don’t get involved and don’t 
want to get involved…  They should be told - that is their role.  You know, don’t 
just dump a DI in the role. 
A field intelligence officer (FIO) (N045), one of the sworn officers in the unit, 
sided with the analyst.  He said that intelligence managers needed to play a more 
proactive role in the preparation of the NIM assessments.  He said that every intelligence 
unit needed a “really good leader… somebody who will fight your corner and bat away 
anything that is inappropriate; but also when you’ve got something that needs doing, 
press for it to be done”.  Tellingly, he added “I think you need somebody who is pretty 
much unrelenting and we just don’t get it at the moment”.  
Rather than blaming his SMT, the manager (N038) laid the blame for this 
situation at the feet of the NIM which (in his view) had created a divide between police 
officers and civilian analysts so that analysts reported directly to the BCU commander 
and sworn officers (such as he) had “zero input” into the NIM.  This was very much a 
personal view that was not confirmed by other respondents (and of course was 
contradicted by the senior analyst and the FIO).  However, it does at least demonstrate 
that there was disagreement over the role the manager should have played (which 
according to the NIM ideal is to act as the mediator between the operational and 
intelligence worlds).  As the reader will see later, that misunderstanding was significant 
because it perpetuated the inefficiency of the intelligence unit (for example, in terms of 
the prioritisation of analytical work). 
One consequence of the manager’s disillusionment with developments in the unit 
was that, without official approval, he maintained his own intelligence database using a 
stand-alone computer to record information on those suspected of crime in the BCU area 
 205 
(essentially, reinventing the collator system but with a personal computer rather than a 
rolodex and card indices).  This breached both the force’s data security rules and data 
protection principles.  The FIO (N045) said that the database was insecure and amounted 
to a “ridiculous duplication” of the official records and it was clear that the database was a 
continuing source of tension between the intelligence manager and the rest of his team. 
I highlighted earlier in this thesis, that for many years the police service has failed 
to properly resource its local intelligence units.  In this case, the major problem was the 
lack of NIM training provided to those described as key actors in the NIM (by the ACPO 
member (NIM implementation), N03).  To paraphrase his concerns about the 
consequences of failing to prepare those individuals, ‘where the BCU command doesn’t 
actually understand the model, where the analyst is poorly trained and where the 
intelligence manager is working on their own – that’s where the NIM breaks down’.  
These were exactly the issues in the Urban BCU.   
At the heart of this problem was not the NIM itself but the lack of commitment to 
it by the force’s senior commanders and BCU SMT’s.  The dysfunctional relationship 
between the SMT, the intelligence manager and the senior analyst that I have described 
here, demonstrated in a very real way, the consequences of the service’s failure to meet 
the challenges of the NIM (described in the previous chapter) which included its failure to 
speak with a single voice on the model, its seeming inability to manage the competing 
demands upon it, a fundamentally flawed implementation process, and a failure to 
remedy what should have been obvious failings in the police intelligence architecture.  
These were bound to result in the kind of issues that were only too evident in Urban.  
 
The +IM Process in Urban 
Having established the environment into which the NIM was introduced, this section now 
examines the model’s influence on intelligence work and investigation in the force.  
   
Intelligence Collection in Urban 
The intelligence unit’s primary purpose in the new environment was to collect 
intelligence around the BCU’s priorities in accordance with the NIM’s code of practice.  
 206 
However, what may appear to be a simple task for 40 intelligence unit staff was 
complicated by poor supervision of those frontline staff who contributed much of the 
unit’s data, and by the BCU’s focus on generating performance data rather than 
intelligence analyses. 
The unit relied heavily on police data for its analyses.  Many intelligence reports 
were entered into the intelligence database by patrol officers via any one of the more than 
100 data terminals located across the BCU.  This was convenient for the officers but 
respondents said that it gave the unit little control over what was entered.  Cope et al 
(2003: 26) highlighted that in the modern era officers provide so much extraneous 
information in their reports that it creates an ‘information glut’ that proves problematic 
for analysts.  This was confirmed by a DCI (N035), who said that the NIM encouraged the 
collection of so much data; it was difficult to extrapolate essential intelligence from “the 
mire”.  The huge number of intelligence reports did not necessarily translate into useful 
intelligence.   
The intelligence manager (N038) attributed this to poor supervision and the 
insistence of the SMT that the quantity (rather than the quality) of reports submitted 
should be a performance indicator.  The intelligence manager (N038) and a patrol 
constable (N049) detailed the effect of that decision.  Duplicate reports could be entered 
by officers from the same team for the same incident or, where multiple persons were 
stopped at the same time, separate entries for each person could be made without them 
being linked.  So for example, where four officers stopped three individuals, in theory, a 
total of 12 intelligence records could be created.   The result was no more useful 
intelligence than would have been generated by a single entry.  The manager (N038) said 
this was a significant factor in the perception of the unit as a ‘black hole’ into which much 
data entered but little came out again (see Ratcliffe, 2005 and Sheptycki, 2004 for further 
discussion of that subject). 
A constable attached to the telephone crime reporting unit (N067) and a detective 
sergeant attached to the criminal justice unit (N070) felt that the major reason for the 
inclusion of “inappropriate” reports was that officers were working in a “blame culture”.  
They were afraid to leave out any information that might later be needed to rebut a 
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complaint made against them.  Williams (2005) argued, in the context of claims made 
against state actors (such as the police) accused of regulatory failure, that the rise of a 
blame or compensation culture in contemporary society may be an urban myth.  Myth or 
not, the need to ameliorate the perception of a blame culture in policing has been 
commented upon by, amongst others, the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC, 2011) and Flanagan (2008).  The respondents’ comments lent weight to 
Flanagan’s argument that a national debate on risk aversion was required.  
 
Collation, Analysis and Evaluation in Urban 
The NIM was expected to focus the work of intelligence analysts.  An individual piece of 
analysis is often the product of many hours of work by analysts and researchers.  
Therefore, analysts should produce assessments only around identified priorities (or 
otherwise if directed by the intelligence manager).  In practice in the Urban BCU, most of 
the analysts’ work reflected those priorities but a significant proportion was 
commissioned by individual SMT members, other BCU staff (usually detectives or 
neighbourhood policing staff) or by Urban’s headquarters.  Those extraneous analytical 
products did not always reflect the BCU’s priorities and deflected the intelligence 
analysts from their work. 
A BCU analyst (N044) said that the intelligence manager and senior analyst tried 
to filter those requests but protocols were not always followed and the consequences for 
the analysts’ workload were “massive” because it took them away from the BCU’s 
priorities and from the preparation of the NIM intelligence assessments.  I argue that there 
was an obvious need for a ‘business analyst’ but it appeared that this was never 
considered. The senior analyst (N039) said that her staff could also be diverted from the 
BCUs priorities by requests from Urban’s HQ.  These could often be imprecise and vague 
to the extent that the analysts would question the value of the analytical product required.  
She gave an example of a request to provide a profile of ‘youth crime’; it did not specify 
what it meant by youth crime, the time period covered, or any other limiting criteria: 
It was hard going and it just ended up being a crime pattern analysis with (at the 
end) a conclusion as to whether we thought we had a youth crime problem on this 
borough.  It just felt like we rushed to do it and I know all the other boroughs did 
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[the same] and then we didn’t hear anything back.  You just kind of get a ‘Thank 
you very much’ and no feedback, no results, no nothing. 
As the reader can see, the imprecision of the request resulted in confusion and 
inefficiency.  I argue that those are words that are far too often associated with local 
intelligence work. 
Many examples of crime pattern analyses and subject profiles were seen during 
the fieldwork for this research.  No results analyses (the analytical technique 
recommended to commanders by the NIM as providing a better means of evaluating their 
operations) were carried out by the intelligence unit.  Gill (2000) has described an ideal 
model of an intelligence system in the modern era.  That system orientates around 
information and control and utilises feedback to steer future action.  However, Innes and 
Fielding (2002: 14) have argued that Gill’s system represents a “’normative model’ of 
what should happen, rather than a ‘descriptive model’ of what actually occurs in 
practice”.  In particular, they argue that the feedback loop that is fundamental to the model 
usually is missing.  I argue that the lack of results analysis carried out in Urban lends 
weight to Innes and Fielding’s criticism and suggests that in this case the NIM did not 
make the BCU any ‘smarter’ in evaluating its operational endeavours than it had been 
under the previous regime.   
 
Presentation of Evidence in Urban 
Strategic analyses were collated by the senior analyst and every six months they were 
presented to the BCU commander at a strategic meeting.  After three months, the 
assessment was reviewed at a further meeting (so that there were a total of four strategic 
meetings each year).  Each week, the intelligence unit produced a NIM tactical 
intelligence assessment for the tactical meeting which reported on the progress of the 
BCU’s strategic plans.  To that extent, the BCU faithfully followed the NIM guidelines.  
However, both the BCU commander (N033) and senior analyst (N039) questioned the 
value of these assessments. 
The former said that the requirement for each BCU to complete a strategic 
assessment did not represent the ‘best value’ that was expected in policing in the modern 
era.  She agreed with the senior command team member (N031) that the standard of the 
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assessments was variable and inconsistent.  She felt that they were completed too 
frequently because “the strategic impacts don’t change that quickly” and that Urban 
should establish a strategic analysis unit to compile thematic assessments for the force 
(though she clearly was unaware of the resistance to the development of new intelligence 
structures at senior commander level, discussed earlier in this chapter, which suggests 
that communication between senior commanders and their BCUs was not all that it should 
have been).   
The senior analyst (N039) questioned whether her SMT understood the 
assessments were intended to provide the basis for a discussion about future priorities, 
rather than simply confirming what the SMT already knew about its policing problems.  
She said there was a danger that it saw the assessments as “paper exercises” that did not 
influence the day-to-day business of the BCU; assessments that would be referred to for 
administrative purposes but otherwise were “shelved”.  The need to meet Home Office 
performance targets meant that the control strategy would always include burglary and 
robbery.  Those were the crime types that would attract its scarce proactive resources 
because the BCU commander directed it so no matter what the intelligence assessment 
recommended.   
What this forcefully demonstrates is that the NIM did not overcome those 
established values of the occupational culture and the hierarchical tradition of the police 
organisation.  A former ACPO member (N04) said that the “big push” on performance 
management was “inimical” to the NIM and that in his experience if “strategic and/or 
tactical assessments indicated anything contradictory to national priorities, the latter held 
sway”.  That HMIC inspectors did not identify this as an issue in their inspections of the 
force, suggests one of two things.  Either, this issue was unique to the selected BCU or, it 
was of little concern to the inspectors.  The foregoing analysis (which highlighted 
inspectors’ enthusiasm for compliance) suggests that the latter is much more likely to be 
true.     
Earlier in this study, the ACPO member (NIM implementation) (N03) argued that 
commanders should beware of focusing on performance to the exclusion of all other 
considerations because failing to see the ‘bigger picture’ could allow new threats that may 
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have been just over the operational horizon to emerge unchallenged.  That warning was 
not heeded in this BCU (in the next chapter the reader will see that County was similarly 
unprepared to meet those challenges).  I argue that the setting of the BCU’s control 
strategy according to centrally-imposed priorities rather than according to local 
intelligence assessments, demonstrates as forcefully as anything in this research, the 
reality of ILP.  That is, that intelligence is often ignored in favour of compliance.  In my 
view, the NIM would have struggled to gain acceptance in the mainstream even if the 
antipathy of the force’s senior commanders had not been a factor because the tensions 
between the model and the neighbourhood policing programme and between the reactive 
and proactive policing paradigms, together with the pressure to hit performance targets, 
manifested themselves just as forcefully in BCUs as they did at the force level.    
I argued earlier that the lack of training offered to frontline staff was a significant 
factor in the failure of the NIM.  A senior analyst (N039) said that she had struggled to 
write the intelligence assessments because of lack of guidance.  Assessments seen during 
the research period were weighty documents that clearly had taken a great deal of 
preparation.  For example, the shortest assessment seen was 73 pages.    At the end of the 
study, looking back at the previous year, the senior analyst (N039) said that they remained 
too long and complicated because she had not received sufficient training or support to 
complete them in a simpler manner.  She continued to prepare lengthy and complex 
assessments because she simply did not know what to leave out.  Her concerns about the 
assessments were shared by another BCU analyst (N043) and an intelligence team leader 
(N042).  The former said that the NIM tactical assessments were largely worthless 
because they simply repeated information that the SMT already knew from its daily 
management meetings (also known as ‘morning prayers’).  Once again, this highlighted 
the value that police commanders attached to compliance. 
Something that received little attention in Urban was the NIM intelligence 
requirement.  In interview, the NCIS senior executive (N02) said that the intelligence 
requirement was “terribly, terribly, terribly, terribly difficult” to explain but he felt it was 
important to get right so that local intelligence could be fed into the fight against serious 
and organised crime being carried on by specialist detective units.  However, that was a 
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message that was not understood in Urban.  The senior intelligence analyst (N039), the 
only respondent to refer to the requirement in this study, said that its completion 
effectively was a paper exercise to ensure compliance with the standards set by ACPO.  
She said that the intelligence requirement: 
Stays in the PowerPoint and the Word document and doesn’t really go any further 
than that.  I’m not really sure what should happen to it to be honest… I think we 
write the intelligence requirement because we need to - that’s all. 
The willingness to continue to expend organisational time and energy in 
demonstrably inefficient and ineffective ways like this, even when the shortcomings of 
the NIM process were obvious to everyone, reveals much about the organisational culture 
of policing.  It was hard to escape the conclusion that at every level of the BCU, 
individuals and groups carried out activities simply because they were told do so by those 
above them in the hierarchy.  The compliance imperative pervaded the whole 
organisation and few were willing or able to challenge that orthodoxy even when it was 
obvious that there was a need either to adapt the model for the existing system or vice 
versa.  Wright (2007: 605) has argued that effecting any behavioural change in police 
organisations is a long-term process that requires “a clear understanding of the pervasive 
culture... and the individual and collective needs it fulfils”.  He highlighted that it is not 
enough that change programmes like the NIM adhere to a “compliance agenda”, they 
must also “be highly credible to experienced practitioners and address the real difficulties 
inherent in the job” (Wright, 2007: 606).   
Some researchers have highlighted that there has been a shift in police culture 
symbolised by the increasing dominance of ‘bureaucratic management cops’ whose focus 
is on the professionalisation of policing in the modern era (see for example Foster, 2003 
and Wall, 1998).  However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the collective 
failure of the BCU SMT and its staff to challenge obvious inefficiencies, explored here, 
suggested that the model was not made sufficiently credible to practitioners.  It also 
suggests that there remained a substantial gap between the realities of day-to-day police 
management and the rhetoric of the NPM business ethos, with too much emphasis placed 
on compliance at the expense of a proper examination of inputs and outcomes.  I argue 
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that this provides further evidence that Urban failed to grasp what it really meant to be 
intelligence-led.     
 
Consultation with Partners in Urban 
Phillips’ plans for the NIM highlighted the importance of effective police/community 
partnerships.  NCPE’s subsequent guidance elaborated on his plans (see NCPE, 2005 and 
2006), setting out clear directions to police commanders to consult a range of partners 
when deciding on priorities and on the allocation of operational resources.  However, in 
the BCU selected for this study there was only very limited evidence that the NIM 
contributed to that inclusive model of decision-making. 
Many commentators have expressed concerns about police/community 
partnership forums (see for example, Gilling, 2005 and Byrne and Pease, 2003).  Byrne 
and Pease (2003) argued that the police have become frustrated with the partnership 
experience because it has not delivered what they expected.  However, Gilling (2005) 
highlighted that this frustration is born out of a flawed perception (on the part of the 
police) of the pre-existing CDA arrangements.  He argues that many fail to recognise that 
partnership actually represents a complex social phenomenon.  Individual actors bring 
their own ‘baggage’; each has their own “professional ideology, occupational culture and 
organisational culture” and partnerships need time and energy from all participants if they 
are to be effective (Gilling, 2005: 737).  Gilling (2005) argues that the advance of ILP 
strategies has seen ‘partnership’ becoming more of a one-way street with non-police 
bodies increasingly being used to address ‘second order’ problems that usually would 
come under the heading of anti-social behaviour (ASB). 
I argue that, in theory, the NIM should have offered the Urban BCU’s partners a 
chance to influence policing priorities in much more effective ways.   However, there 
were a number of ways in which practice fell short of the theory.  First, relatively few 
attended the NIM meetings.  These were chaired by the BCU commander and were 
attended by the SMT and a range of police managers and analysts.  The only non-police 
attendees at the meetings observed during the research were officials from the local 
authority’s crime reduction department.  I found no evidence that any meaningful effort 
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was made to discover what it was that partners who failed to attend the meeting needed 
from the police.  Whilst the views of those who did attend were sought, on no occasion 
were BCU plans changed to accommodate their needs.  In part, this was due to the fact 
that partners made few demands on the police (I discuss some of the reasons for this 
later). 
There was one particular issue that seemed to be of concern to the local authority.  
The subject of anti-social behaviour (ASB) was raised at each strategic meeting observed 
but complaints from the local authority’s crime reduction department, that the BCU was 
ignoring ASB, were dismissed by the BCU commander.  Providing a perfect example of 
the tension between priority crime and those harms of greatest concern to communities 
that I discussed earlier, the senior analyst (N039) said that despite demands from the local 
authority for ASB to join the “few crumbs” for the partners in the police control strategy, 
it was not included because of the BCU’s focus on achieving performance targets for 
those crimes (robbery, burglary and vehicle crime) measured by the Home Office.  
On the basis of the strategic assessments seen in this research, it was highly likely 
that a more objective appraisal of the intelligence would have led to the inclusion of ASB 
in the BCU’s control strategy had the NIM guidelines been followed faithfully.  However, 
the decision to set the strategy before the meeting (and to exclude partners from that 
discussion) was the BCU commander’s and hers alone.  The senior analyst (N039) 
expressed her sympathy for the local authority.  She blamed the commander’s flawed 
interpretation of the NIM process for the exclusion of the authority from the discussion 
over future priorities.  She said: 
It’s like they are coming to be informed about what we are discussing rather than 
them being involved in the discussion.  It is the process that is wrong.  They always 
raise anti-social behaviour and want to know why it is not on the control strategy.  I 
get the feeling that they go away thinking that they are all out of the loop.  I get the 
impression that they don’t get much out of it. 
  The DCI (N035) suggested that this debate masked fierce competition for 
resources between priority crime and the “key public issue” of ASB which, as I will show 
later in this chapter, was being played out outside of the strategic NIM meeting.   The 
chief inspector ‘partnerships’ (N036) said that some in the BCU recognised that the same 
individuals who committed the robberies and burglaries were responsible for the ASB 
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and that they could be targeted through anti-social behaviour orders and the like.  
However, there was little evidence of this in the strategic meetings observed.  At those 
meetings, the senior analyst (N039) presented the BCU’s future priorities which changed 
little over the research period.   
In reality there was little to discuss in the meeting in that context, as she explained 
that she agreed the priorities with the commander in advance.  It was the SMT’s 
expectation that meeting the performance targets for priority crime would always be more 
important than anything else and therefore there was little room for manoeuvre.  The 
analyst wanted the commander to follow the NIM guidelines, and to seek the views of 
staff and partners in the meeting.  However, she said that her lack of training and her 
inexperience meant she never had the confidence to challenge the latter on that point.   
It was obvious from the exchanges observed, that the BCU’s performance against 
Home Office-imposed targets was by far the most important consideration for the 
commander with the result that she allocated a disproportionate amount of resources to 
those areas in which the BCU was under-performing.  The chief inspector ‘partnerships’ 
(N036) said that although this went completely against the principle of the NIM, 
“borough commanders ‘live and die’ by their performance targets” and they could not 
afford to do otherwise.  That tension was apparent at the first strategic meeting observed 
and was never resolved during the period of the research.   
The conflict between demands on the police to deal effectively with ‘priority’ 
crime and at the same time address those areas of concern for local communities has long 
been recognised.  Like Gilling (2005), Crawford (2001: 63) highlighted the competing 
agendas of partners in this context.  He argued that the managerialist reforms of the last 20 
years not only encouraged a kind of individual introspection on the part of the police but 
also have strengthened intra-organisational control at the expense of collaboration.  They 
may also have hindered the cause of partnership by buttressing ‘baronial fiefdoms’ in the 
criminal justice arena (see Shapland, 1998).  Indeed, Shapland (2000) has argued that 
these managerialist reforms may actually have strengthened those spheres of influence.   
The NIM tactical meetings also demonstrated the imperfect application of the 
model.  These were large meetings chaired by the BCU commander and divided into two 
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sections.  The first phase was usually attended by around 25 police officers and staff and 
representatives of the local authority’s crime reduction department.  They were lengthy 
affairs, often lasting longer than two hours.  As in the strategic meeting, there was a heavy 
emphasis on the BCU’s performance throughout this phase, although the NIM tactical 
intelligence assessments were also given some prominence.   
Once again, local authority crime reduction staff were the only non-police 
attendees.  The local authority CRM (N058) said that she was always made welcome at 
both the strategic and tactical meetings.  However, she recognised that her ability to 
influence the police was extremely limited because her contributions amounted to no 
more than “chipping in a comment about this or that decision”.  She believed that 
decisions made in the meetings were police decisions and there was not the “genuine 
shared responsibility” that the NIM’s advocates envisaged.  Explaining the fact that she 
made few demands upon the BCU, she said that she felt that the NIM meeting was largely 
irrelevant to her work and was therefore happy to see her role simply as that of an 
observer.  Interviews with the BCU commander and the CRM confirmed their shared 
commitment to partnership working but the CRM did not view the NIM as important to 
future success in that context.  According to her, other partnership forums established as a 
result of Urban’s neighbourhood policing programme offered better opportunities for 
liaison and joint working which again demonstrated the separation of the two 
programmes.     
At least at a rhetorical level, other members of the BCU SMT seemed equally 
committed to the development of that relationship.  For example, the DCI (N035) said 
that she wanted to see more engagement with local partners and much more effort put into 
working together to find solutions to policing problems.  Both the DCI (N035) and the 
CRM (N058) welcomed the Home Office proposal for the preparation of a joint strategic 
intelligence assessment.44  The argument in favour of a joint assessment was best put by 
Oakensen et al (2002: 9).  They argued that crime audits should be joined together with 
NIM strategic assessments so that they complemented rather than duplicated each other 
                                                 
44 Proposals to merge the NIM and CDA assessments were recommended in the CDA review (Home Office, 
2006).   
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“especially where analysis of underlying causes of a particular crime or disorder problem 
also identify longer term issues that only other social agencies have the ability to address 
within a reduction strategy”.  This was something that both the DCI and the CRM said 
that they wanted to implement in this borough but no progress was made in that context 
during the period of the research. 
The most significant partnership forum established by police and partners in this 
BCU was the Joint Action Group (JAG) which, ironically, had absolutely no connection 
with the NIM.  The JAG was meant to coordinate multi-agency working in the Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP).  Nominally, the JAG was headed by the BCU 
commander and the local authority’s chief executive, though in practice it was managed 
jointly by the Superintendent ‘Communities’ and the authority’s Director of 
Environmental and Cultural Services.  JAG meetings were hosted at monthly intervals by 
the local authority and were broadly equivalent to the police tactical NIM meeting.  They 
represented the ‘practical’ meeting recommended to local authorities by the Home Office 
in its web-based crime reduction toolkit Using intelligence and information (Home 
Office, 2003a).  A wide-ranging list of attendees included local authority housing 
managers, licensing officers, council ASB officers, representatives of the Parks 
Department, the local fire and rescue service, representatives of the BCU’s 
neighbourhood policing teams, drugs action team members and environmental health 
officers (many of whom the police would have liked to have seen at the NIM meetings).   
The JAG was informed by an intelligence assessment written by the local 
authority analyst.  He relied principally on the authority’s databases but was also 
permitted full access to the BCUs data records.  As a former police analyst himself, he 
was very well-informed both about local crime problems and the pressures on police 
analysts to focus on priority crime.  However, lacking the police’s obsession with 
performance, the local authority’s assessment was a much more focused report on local 
problems (including local policing problems).  The meeting oversaw a number of joint 
activity sub-groups which were largely focused on ensuring the delivery of projects 
funded by the local authority.  These operated according to action plans agreed by the 
BCU in its annual policing-plan.   
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The chief inspector ‘partnerships’ (N036) said that initially the JAG had been seen 
by some officers in the BCU as a threat to their monopoly on operational decision-making 
but that most had come to realise that it presented a “massive opportunity” for the police 
to engage more effectively with their community partners.  The CRM (N058) argued that 
the JAG was still developing (there had been only four meetings) but that it 
complemented the NIM meetings and offered a useful indication of the path that the 
police and the authority should follow in the future: 
I would say that there’s a huge amount of work to do... the theory is all there but in 
terms of really genuinely, hand on heart, being able to say that everything that we 
do is driven by intelligence.  That is a long way away.  There’s still far too much of 
this is what we do because this is what we always have done – on both sides. 
The level of cooperation between the police and the local authority through the 
CDRP, JAG and policing-plan forums raised the rather obvious question of the impact of 
the NIM on those relationships.  The BCU commander (N033) said that the NIM was 
helpful because it provided a structure for partnership working and that any suggestion 
otherwise simply highlighted the need for it to be marketed more effectively.  However, 
the CRM (N058) felt the NIM over-complicated what at heart was a very simple process 
and, in effect, she ignored the model and its processes.  Gilling has argued that 
police/community partnerships can be slow to develop.  They often rely on the individual 
agencies getting to know one another and establishing “the antecedents of 
trustworthiness” in each other (Gilling, 2005: 751).  Whilst the JAG arrangements 
seemed to offer some scope for the development of an effective local partnership, the 
NIM offered much less prospect of a constructive alliance because the absence of partners 
from the NIM meetings meant that there was simply no opportunity for the partnership to 
develop.   
In the BCU selected for study, the NIM added very little to the police’s 
partnership with the local authority.  The de facto exclusion of partners from decisions 
about operational priorities meant that the NIM meetings were no more inclusive than any 
of the pre-existing partnership forums.  This was far from Phillips’ vision for the model 
and suggests that the police continued merely to pay ‘lip-service’ to real partnership in 
terms of operational decision making.  As Foster (2002: 190) notes “there are no quick 
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fixes” for building effective partnerships but one can see that something that would have 
demonstrated real commitment to partnership in this case would have been to merge the 
NIM tactical and JAG meetings.   There would of course be a number of practical 
difficulties to overcome such as satisfying the police’s obsession with performance 
indicators, deciding on the frequency of the new meeting and accommodating such a 
large group at regular intervals but none of those should have been insuperable.  
However, the police’s silo mentality and orthodoxy (for example, in being unwilling or 
unable to challenge traditional practice in the way described in this section) meant that 
such solutions were never seriously considered.  During the period of this research, the 
merging of the meetings simply was not discussed.  
 
Monitoring Problems in Urban 
The operational plans made in the NIM meetings did not conform to the NIM code of 
practice (NCPE, 2005a).   In none of the strategic meetings observed were middle 
managers (or in NIM terminology ‘plan holders’) given responsibility for carrying out 
operational plans.  In another example of police managers’ orthodoxy, the chief inspector 
‘partnerships’ (N036) suggested that this could be explained, at least in part, by the fact 
that each SMT member already knew their responsibilities and therefore did not need to 
be reminded of them.  However, the senior intelligence analyst (N039) argued that the 
failure to identify operational heads in the way envisaged in the model led to a duplication 
of effort and a wasting of the BCU’s scarce resources.   
The Urban tasking and coordinating inspector (N016), who was usually based at 
Urban’s HQ, said that he had visited a NIM meeting at this BCU and was concerned that 
middle managers seemed to take little responsibility for the operational activity of their 
staff.  He said: 
I was sitting there… [wondering] ‘Where are all the chief inspectors and 
inspectors?  Inspectors in particular are getting paid a lot of money to perform that 
role aren’t they?  I know it sounds awful and I don’t mean to have a go at them but I 
was thinking ‘Well why aren’t they here?’ and ‘What could they do if they were 
here?’ and ‘Would there be more effective delivery if they were here? 
However, for reasons known only to him, he never raised this point with the BCU 
commander and the meetings continued according to the same format.  
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A central principle of the NIM is that the BCU commander should make all 
operational plans in the strategic meeting.  In that way the commander should have all the 
resources of the BCU at their disposal.  However, the senior analyst (N039) described 
how a separate system, completely divorced from the NIM process, had emerged in the 
BCU.  Ironically, under this parallel system, police middle managers were identified as 
operational heads and given defined action plans for the reduction of priority crime.  
However, those plans were never discussed at the NIM meetings.  The senior analyst said 
that she was “completely in the dark” because the SMT had: 
been having meetings that I haven’t been going to because I didn’t know about 
them.  Apparently, they have burglary, robbery and motor vehicle action plans but I 
don’t know if those are the action plans that are supposed to come out of the control 
strategy or something else.  I don’t know what they’re basing it on.  I don’t know 
what is going on. 
This case clearly shows once again that compliance with the formal rules 
introduced by the NIM was largely presentational and did not significantly affect 
orthodox practice.  Operational activity was coordinated through action plans because 
that was the way that the BCU had always worked (this could of course also explain the 
demand for analytical work that did not match the control strategy priorities, discussed 
earlier in this chapter).  The senior analyst (N039) believed that this parallel process could 
have been brought within the NIM structure to the benefit of the BCU.  This would have 
had the effect of making middle managers more accountable for the actions of their staff.  
However, when interviewed for this research, she had not yet had the opportunity to 
address the issue.  What was clear was that in this period the intelligence unit was 
marginalised and excluded from discussions about the allocation of a significant quantity 
of the BCU’s resources because the BCU SMT prioritised the meeting of performance 
targets over any other consideration; the result in that context was that the NIM simply 
was ignored.  It also suggests that the BCU’s scarce operational resources were not 
deployed as intelligently as they might otherwise have been.     
In the first phase of the NIM tactical meeting (which was known by participants 
and other BCU staff alike simply as ‘the tasking meeting’), current proactive operations 
were reviewed and new operations (usually to reduce crime in newly identified hotspots) 
were commissioned by the commander.  The second phase of the meeting was attended 
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only by the commander, the DCI, a representative of the BCU’s duties office and the 
supervisors of the BCU’s proactive teams.  The aim of this (in effect) second meeting was 
to assign operational staff to various operations over the forthcoming week.  The 
commander and DCI used a weekly ‘duties planner’ prepared in advance by the duties 
office.  Some tasks and commitments had already been entered into the planner.  In those 
cases, the commander decided on the number and type of resources that were to be 
assigned to the task.  Supervisors then ‘bid’ for the remaining operational resources.  For 
example on one occasion, an inspector in charge of a neighbourhood policing team asked 
for extra staff to be assigned to assist in an eviction.  Disappointingly, as no partners 
attended this phase of the meeting there was no opportunity to enlist their help in solving 
the BCU’s problems.  
Crucially these meetings highlighted just how few resources the BCU was willing 
to devote to proactive policing.  Its own assets amounted to approximately 50 uniformed 
officers (divided into small teams) and a ‘crime squad’ made up of detectives and 
uniformed officers employed in plain clothes.  This represented less than five percent of 
its staff.  The rest were allocated to core teams (responsible for responding to all 
emergency calls and for routine patrol activity), ‘ring-fenced’ neighbourhood policing 
teams, or support duties.  Neither the national detective agency (SOCA) nor the force’s 
specialist detective units were ever referred to by BCU staff as possible sources of 
assistance.   
The BCU was able to bid for certain categories of extra resources from Urban’s 
HQ.   The tasking and coordinating inspector (N016) said that each week, BCUs entered a 
competitive bidding process with other BCUs and departments for Urban’s HQ resources 
(such as the dog section, mounted branch, the surveillance department or the tactical 
support department).  Applications were assessed in the light of the current performance 
of the BCU then passed to an operations group meeting at Urban HQ overseen by the 
specialist detective branch.  The inspector (N016) said that the group relied almost 
exclusively on performance data to reach its decisions.  Bids were usually assessed “on 
the basis of need”.  If a BCU or department’s performance was dragging down the 
performance of the force for a particular crime type then it was almost certain to be 
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granted that assistance.  However, he admitted that there was a consensus within Urban 
that the process was dysfunctional; resources were not being deployed where they were 
most needed.  Because of this, the system was in a state of almost permanent flux.  It had 
been changed on a number of occasions and he expected it to change again when the 
force’s new FIB was introduced.  It was striking that not one respondent in Urban 
suggested that the NIM might be the vehicle to effect change in this regard.  
 In another illustration of the protectionism that this research suggests is endemic 
in policing (perhaps indicating that in policing, there are fiefdoms within fiefdoms), the 
inspector (N016) explained that it was both the structure and membership of that group 
that were in issue.  Its chair (to which he himself reported) was subordinate in rank to 
many of those applying for assistance.  Decisions taken by the group were often criticised 
for favouring the specialist detective branch which was taken extremely seriously by the 
heads of the other branches who felt that branch performance would suffer if their needs 
were denied.  Urban inspector (N016) felt that the conflict could be resolved only if one of 
the highest ranking ACPO members (the chief or their deputy) chaired the meeting to 
provide objectivity and greater transparency but also to give the chair greater authority. 
I argue that the management processes described in this section could have been 
much more effective, efficient and economic had they followed the NIM’s principles.  Of 
course, as this section has shown, both local and corporate systems of resource allocation 
were made to work (it is significant that the Urban inspector (N016) commented in 
interview that this BCU was considered to be one of the best in the force) but the 
processes described here not only represent a significant departure from the NIM ideal but 
also a diversion from the ideals embodied in POP, community policing, the principles of 
best value, and the normative rules of bureaucratic hierarchies that police managerialism 
(underpinned by the principles of new public management) were meant to address.  
Collectively, they provide further evidence of the service’s misconceptions of what it is to 
be ‘intelligence-led’.   
The arrangements described here raise questions both about the efficiency and the 
accountability of the management processes and about the extent to which the formal 
rules established by the NIM (which ostensibly were accepted by the Urban elite and the 
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force’s executives for Urban’s BCUs) and the NPP were merely presentational, justifying 
conduct but not affecting practice in the way that Reiner (2010) has identified in other 
policing contexts.  I addressed the apparent willingness to continue to expend 
organisational time and energy in inefficient and ineffective ways, earlier in this chapter.  
Police rhetoric suggests that these kinds of inefficiencies have been ameliorated by 
changes in management practices and in new commitments to transparency and 
accountability in the new millennium (see for example ACPO, 2004).  Yet, as this section 
has shown, there remained a substantial gap between the realities of day-to-day police 
management and that rhetoric.  
In summary, I have sought to demonstrate that despite the rhetoric around ILP and 
the NIM, the picture of policing in Urban basically remained unchanged.  The specialist 
detective force’s contribution to mainstream policing in Urban was as limited as it had 
been under the other schemes (such as UBP) that were meant to deliver significant 
improvements  and the police continued to pay lip-service to real partnership working.   
Ninety-five percent of the police resources remained undisturbed and the model remained 
at the periphery of operational policing.  This, of course, was very far from Phillips’ 
vision for the model. 
 
+IM and +eighbourhood Policing in Urban 
The selected BCU was a ‘pathfinder’ site for the implementation of neighbourhood 
policing.  Each of the 43 Home Office forces had selected one BCU as its neighbourhood 
policing pathfinder.  Forces were expected to focus their implementation activity on those 
sites so that they could identify implementation problems before they rolled out the 
programme fully (see ACPO, 2006d and Quinton and Morris, 2008 for further 
discussion).  According to the chief inspector ‘partnerships’ (N036), the Urban BCU had 
struggled to reconcile the NIM with the neighbourhood policing processes.  Implying that 
people at a variety of levels had not thought any of this through, he said that competing 
and contradictory demands were often made upon the SMT and that accommodating two 
new policing models at the same time had resulted in the division of the BCU’s 
operational resources.   
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A challenging situation was made more difficult by the senior commanders’ 
decision to ‘ring-fence’ the new neighbourhood policing teams.  This meant that they 
could not be deployed outside the wards to which they were assigned and this often 
limited the options available to local commanders.  The neighbourhood policing teams 
were not counted as BCU assets and this made it much more difficult for the BCU to 
reach its Home Office-imposed performance targets.  This was a force directive intended 
to demonstrate Urban’s commitment to implementing its neighbourhood policing 
strategy.  However, it was very much against the NIM ethos which essentially is to put all 
of one’s assets into one pot and then use them according to a single set of priorities, and it 
was bound to bring the two into conflict.   
The DCI (N035) admitted there was a bifurcation of the BCU’s resources and 
energies which somehow had to be devoted both to the NIM and to neighbourhood 
policing.  That was usually played out in the tasking meetings where the BCU’s ‘bottom 
up’ NIM assessments which highlighted anti-social behaviour (the explicit focus of the 
neighbourhood policing programme) were often overlooked  in favour of Home Office 
and organisational requirements in relation to priority crime.  The DCI said that she 
recognised the need to get more from her staff to somehow reconcile those competing 
demands.  The BCU commander (N033) said that this had been made more difficult 
because neighbourhood policing was considered ‘a soft option’ by staff and this had 
undermined the BCU’s overall investigative effort.   
She felt that the neighbourhood teams were not as effective as they should have 
been because they neglected the crime fighting element of their role.  She said that some 
teams also had a tendency to neglect their intelligence-gathering duties and to believe that 
simply providing a visible presence in communities was enough and they ignored their 
duty to carry out “intelligence-led identification of community concerns – prompt, 
effective, targeted action against those concerns” (NCPE, 2006:4).  Certainly few acted as 
the BCU’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the community as proponents of the neighbourhood policing 
programme had anticipated.  Kleiven (2005) has argued that despite NCPE’s (2006, 
2006a) rhetoric, the police have failed to develop their community intelligence gathering 
capabilities.  The BCU commander’s comments may explain, at least in part, that failure.  
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However, it also has to be acknowledged that if the NIM had been implemented properly 
then there would have been just a single set of priorities and significantly less tension 
between the two programmes.     
 
Urban’s Intelligence Architecture 
Many research respondents wanted to discuss shortcomings in the intelligence unit and 
Urban’s intelligence systems which they perceived to have been highlighted by the NIM.  
As intelligence was meant to be at the heart of the model, the highlighted failings should 
have been obvious to commanders from the outset.  However, problems in the 
intelligence architecture extended from the top to the bottom of the force. There were 
many challenges to the development of the force’s FIB.  As I discussed earlier, one of the 
fiercest came from Urban’s specialist detective units, particularly its Special Branch (SB).  
The Urban DOI (N098) said that the branch was unwilling to share its information with 
the rest of the force.  He felt that it took the ‘need to know’ principle to a ridiculous 
extreme.  For example, shortly after the London bombings in 2005, he had challenged the 
branch to identify the threat to Urban posed by the radicalisation of young Muslims.  He 
said that he wanted it:  
to come up with an intelligence requirement for those boroughs that have 
significant Muslim communities.  Their response was just absolutely incredible.  
‘Can’t do that’.  I said ‘Why can’t you do that’? [The SB officer told me] ‘Well it 
might just let people know that we’re interested’.  Well you just think, for ****** 
sake, absolutely unbelievable. 
He said that its attitude demonstrated it failed to recognise the challenges that the 
force was currently facing but he also saw in the branch’s reluctance, the reaffirmation of 
“the little boundaries, people working in their own little areas as opposed to seeing the 
force as a whole”.  It also demonstrated forcefully that seeing over the operational horizon 
is not just a question of box-ticking or compliance but can have real consequences for 
communities (see Innes et al, 2007 for an analysis of violent radicalisation and extremism 
within the UK’s Muslim communities – of particular relevance in the context of the 
DOI’s concerns). 
At the local level there was a consensus amongst the uniformed officers, 
interviewed for this research that the local intelligence unit was not up to its task.  Cope et 
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al (2003: 27) found that perceptions of intelligence units often are associated with 
“unrealistic expectations about what intelligence could produce and what could be 
achieved based on intelligence”.  The Urban FIO (N045) was candid in his assessment of 
the popular perception of his unit by frontline patrol officers.  Their view was that it was 
“completely shit”.  A BCU uniformed sergeant (N066) suggested, rather more 
diplomatically, that the intelligence unit was seen as taking up too many resources so that 
something that was no more than a support function was detracting  from the ‘real’ 
policing of the streets.  This is a subject that has exercised many researchers (see for 
example Reiner, 2010; Manning and Van Maanen, 1978)   
Predictably, this contrasted sharply with the view from within the unit.  Reflecting 
Cope et al’s (2003) findings, the intelligence team leader (N042) said that it simply did 
not have sufficient proactive resources to manage the intelligence it received.  He said that 
too few officers were capable of being deployed to support operations, and that his staff 
often were taken away by the SMT to spend time “doing performance and compliance”.  
The intelligence manager (N038) said that the unit suffered from having far too few 
healthy, sworn, police officers and was simply being asked to do too much.  Even after the 
extraneous material had been filtered out, the intelligence unit did not have the resources 
to work on what remained.  In his view, having more sworn, fit, officers would provide a 
better service to the proactive teams to help them in their operational policing duties.  This 
complaint was echoed by other intelligence staff.   
The team leader (N042) explained that he and half of the police officers in the 
intelligence office were on (or had been on) restricted duties, which the force’s medical 
department had determined, required their employment in roles that limited their contact 
with the public.  The FIO (N045) said that whilst most of the unit’s supervisors were 
willing volunteers, just as in the case of UBP and local collators in the 1960s, many staff 
were essentially conscripts.  That is to say, they were limited to office duties by ill-health 
or infirmity.  The result was that the operational capability usually amounted to no more 
than two or three constables.  This is a common complaint about intelligence work in 
mainstream policing (see for example, Innes et al, 2005: Cope et al 2003; Innes and 
Fielding, 2002).  However, it was not one that appeared to have been resolved in Urban. 
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For example, the FIO (N045) described a “really frustrating” deployment where, because 
no other intelligence unit staff were allowed to leave the office, two field intelligence 
constables (including the FIO) were supervised by three sergeants.   
The office manager (N040) said that weekend cover also was a problem for the 
unit.  The SMT had decided that there should be skeleton coverage of the office but few 
staff had the skills necessary to cover all of its functions.  The result was that the same two 
‘multi-skilled’ people were always called on to provide that cover.  In my view, this case 
suggested that the SMT did not see intelligence work as central to the delivery of policing 
services.  That raises important questions about the purpose and point of the extensive 
intelligence collection activity and also wider questions about the structure, composition, 
staffing and purpose of the intelligence unit.  
The kinds of deficiencies in the police intelligence architecture described here 
were first identified in the 1930s by the Dixon Committee and the continuing inadequacy 
of the intelligence system was a significant factor in the failure of the UBP system almost 
40 years later.  Despite those failures, subsequent internal reports (notably, the Baumber 
Report, 1975; the Ratcliffe Report, 1986, the HMIC report Policing with Intelligence, 
1997 and the Bichard Report, 2004) and external research projects (see for example, 
Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005 and Innes, 2003) continued to highlight: the police’s 
failure to invest sufficient resources in intelligence; to use those resources properly; to 
really value intelligence work; and to embed the intelligence process ‘intelligently’ in 
mainstream policing.  The introduction of the NIM in Urban seemed to have made little 
difference in any of those contexts.  
Over and above those problems, in this particular case the BCU SMT’s indifferent 
attitude to the physical integrity of the unit perhaps indicates better than anything else the 
standing of local intelligence work in Urban.  The intelligence team leader (N042) said 
that he was obliged to leave the office open ‘around the clock’ even though unit staff were 
present for only 16 hours a day and the office walls were covered with confidential maps 
and plans and there was no clear desk policy.  He said:    
You come into our office on a Monday morning after the [uniform teams] have used 
all our computers.  You’ve got kebabs rotting on people’s desks, Coke cans 
everywhere.  They treat it like a dump.  But it’s not just that, you’ve got the cleaner 
 227 
who walks in whenever she wants and you’ve got operational targets everywhere 
and plans written everywhere and maybe a subject profile on somebody’s desk that 
shouldn’t be on that desk. 
The FIO (N045) said that the SMT accepted that the physical security of the unit 
was a problem but it had failed to address it as such because it was considered a long-term 
accommodation problem.  The implications for the security of the unit’s information 
should be obvious.  Certainly, failing to store personal data in a secure environment is a 
breach of the Data Protection Act and it is difficult to conceive that allowing unrestricted 
access to such material would comply with Urban’s own operational security protocols.  
Failing to address these issues suggests that in mainstream policing, relations between 
patrol officers and intelligence workers and between middle managers and their 
intelligence units need fundamental reappraisal.  Without such a review, Phillip’s whole 
service approach could never to be considered to be anything more than a pipedream.  
 
Summary of Analysis 
Urban did not establish the NIM at the corporate level of the force.  Some of the Urban 
elite saw the model’s potential for underpinning the development of the force’s 
investigative and intelligence capabilities but they were very much in the minority.  The 
majority of senior commanders were either apathetic or actively resistant to the model.  
Some were guilty of being too protective of their individual spheres of control and 
influence.  Others were ideologically committed to other policing models (principally, 
neighbourhood policing) or simply were not persuaded of the NIM’s merits.  Whatever 
the reasons for that resistance, without an effective policy entrepreneur for the model at a 
very senior level, it proved impossible to overcome that resistance.  
Despite the rejection of the NIM at the corporate level, Urban’s implementation of 
the model at BCU level allowed its elite (by accident or design) to achieve a veneer of 
‘NIM compliance’ with the standards set out by NCIS (2004) and NCPE (2005a).  
Predictably, the elite’s lack of commitment to the model at the organisational level 
resulted in a partial and inconsistent implementation of the NIM at the local level.  Just as 
at the national level, the apathy of Urban’s elite meant that few efforts were made to reach 
compromises with those who were expected to implement the model, to persuade 
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frontline staff of its merits or to harness the expertise or resources of the specialist 
detective force to develop ILP strategies in the mainstream.  This translated into an 
implementation process in Urban that was fundamentally flawed. 
In the BCU selected for in-depth study, it was striking that not one respondent 
criticised the NIM.  Overwhelmingly, it was seen as a positive and welcome 
development.  However, the rhetoric did not match the action and even when NIM 
processes were implemented this was only at a superficial level and they had little 
meaningful impact on the BCU’s business.  Though intelligence workers welcomed their 
command team’s initial commitment to the model, persistent and obvious problems in 
their work were never addressed and executive commitment to ILP seemed also to be 
little more than rhetoric.  Rather than replacing existing structures and processes, the NIM 
was simply ‘bolted-on’ to existing management structures, and operational practice 
continued to owe more to orthodoxy and custom than to ILP and the NIM.  Given that 95 
percent of the BCU’s resources continued to be devoted to traditional, reactive policing 
this outcome was perhaps predictable. 
The NIM made little contribution to resolving the pre-existing tension between 
priority and second-order crime, brought into sharp focus during the period of the 
research by Home Office initiatives to combat anti-social behaviour.  However, for all the 
reasons outlined earlier in this study, the NIM did not fundamentally change the way in 
which operational policing was organised and resourced and certainly not in the way that 
David Phillips had envisaged.  The NIM had negligible impact on police/community 
relations and partnership working at both the organisational and the local levels.  In the 
BCU selected for study, NIM meetings were dominated by the police, and partners’ 
involvement in decisions about the BCU’s priorities was extremely limited.  In the words 
of the local authority’s CRM, the NIM was insignificant, “neither here nor there”.  That 
lack of participation meant that the NIM meetings were no more inclusive than any other 
partnership forum and suggested that the police merely paid lip-service to real 
partnership.  The rather obvious solution of merging the police-dominated NIM meeting 
and the community-driven JAG was never considered as an option.     
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Overall in Urban, few meaningful changes were made to existing organisational 
structures and processes and the police went about their business as they always had done.  
Though the representation of operations and intelligence work in the mainstream 
changed, in reality there were few meaningful changes to traditional practice.  
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Chapter 8 - Evaluating the +IM: County Case Study 
 
Introduction 
This chapter, the second of the case studies, continues the evaluation of the NIM 
implementation process.  It examines the extent to which a largely rural police force in 
England, referred to here as ‘County’ implemented the NIM.  It begins with an 
assessment of the structure of the force at the time the model was introduced.  It was 
significant that County’s relatively small size meant that it simply did not present the 
same management issues that were evident in Urban.  County differed from Urban in that 
even before the NIM emerged it had already carried out a far-reaching reorganisation that 
was intended to improve intelligence work and to make the force truly ‘intelligence-led’.  
That was an important factor in the story of the NIM in County because (at least on the 
surface) the force was much more prepared than the Urban force to accept the model.   
The chapter discusses the County elite’s attitude to the NIM and to intelligence 
work and how that played out at the elite and the local levels of the force.  It also examines 
how County met its obligation to achieve ‘NIM compliance’.  The influence of the NIM 
on intelligence work and investigative strategy in the force is analysed by probing the 
effect of the NIM in a County BCU on: the practice of intelligence collection; intelligence 
collation, analysis and evaluation; the presentation of evidence in intelligence 
assessments; consultation with partners over the ranking of investigative priorities and, 
the implementation and monitoring of operational policing plans.  
Just as in the Urban case, this analysis is based on observations of management 
and NIM meetings, interviews with officers and staff and with policing partners and the 
responses of frontline County officers collected in a focus group. 
 
Force Reorganisation 
In 1995, against the background of the drive for greater value for money in policing, 
County implemented a new crime strategy in the force which was inspired by the 
innovative ILP models described earlier in this thesis.   The force introduced local 
intelligence units to each of its divisions and these were expected significantly to improve 
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intelligence work in the mainstream.  However, later that same year, an independent 
inspection found that the new units were not achieving expected standards, intelligence 
analysis was “rudimentary”, the tasking of operational resources was “inconsistent, slow 
and bureaucratic” and the assistance that the force’s specialist detectives offered to BCUs 
was “limited” (HMIC, 1995a: 38 and 41).   
A County BCU commander (N027) (who became a significant figure in the 
subsequent development of the NIM in County) said that the policing style which evolved 
in this period “hamstrung” the force with unnecessary bureaucracy; there was too great an 
emphasis on “the administrative function” instead of “positive investigative outcomes”.  
This is a subject that I have raised at several points in this thesis; it was not an issue unique 
to County.  The BCU commander (N027) said that in 1997 the new (Labour) 
Government’s renewed focus on performance management persuaded County that it 
needed to change that approach and operate within a new culture.  He said the force elite 
finally recognised that crime fighting, community safety, and reassurance should be given 
greater priority.  The most obvious manifestation of that recognition was a further 
restructuring (along similar lines to Phillips’ changes in Kent) with the aim of delivering 
an intelligence-led force  
In October 2001, the force’s operational policing arrangements were completely 
reorganised, boundaries were realigned and ward-based teams introduced (HMIC, 2004).  
Officers were reassigned either to intervention, roads policing or neighbourhood policing 
teams.  Senior commanders also enhanced the proactive capability of each BCU and 
increased the size and capacity of its intelligence units.  Each was provided with 
additional reactive crime investigation and proactive resources (though those available 
for proactive deployment represented less than 10% of County’s human resources).  Case 
investigation units, crime management units and minor crimes units were created as well 
as new area intelligence units that were intended to gather and analyse data, enabling 
crime patterns to be identified more quickly and operational resources to be targeted more 
effectively (HMIC, 2002).  
The reorganisation of intelligence work was not universally welcomed.  In 
HMIC-facilitated focus groups, a recurring complaint was the remoteness of the new 
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intelligence units from the bulk of operational work, and the relative invisibility of 
intelligence staff.  This resulted in a significant deterioration in relations between the 
units and mainstream officers (HMIC, 2002).  The County director of intelligence (DOI) 
(N032) said that the criticism indicated that County perhaps had “missed a trick” in 
realigning its staff.  Too much emphasis was placed on getting the operational policing 
teams right, and too little on getting the intelligence units (that were needed to support the 
operational teams) up to the same standard.  She said that:  
What tended to happen [was that] the sick, the lame and the people who they 
couldn’t redeploy anywhere else got put into intelligence because that was quite a 
large office with lots of computers that they think ‘Well as long as somebody knows 
how to type they can sort out the intelligence’. 
The very same complaint had been made in Urban (indeed it has regularly been 
made about intelligence workers), so it was no surprise to see it expressed here.  However, 
given that the inadequacy of local intelligence work has been highlighted so consistently 
over the last 50 years (certainly since the introduction of UBP in the 1960s) it is worth 
trying to ‘unpack’ the DOI’s comments.  She argued that in developing its intelligence 
units, County focused on selecting a staff that was IT-literate rather than people who were 
able to make “really good sound and rational decisions on things”, which arguably should 
have been the greater priority.  That opportunity was missed.  Consequently the 
perception of the new units was that they were simply concerned with “housekeeping” 
and that real intelligence work would be done elsewhere. 
Local intelligence officers traditionally were drawn from the ranks of the 
uniformed branch.  However, the rationale for that choice has always been questionable.  
Baumber (ACPO, 1975) recommended inter alia that the service should employ officers 
from the uniformed branch as collators, because in that way forces could avoid paying 
plain clothes allowance to post holders.  As much as anything in this thesis, that 
recommendation demonstrates the importance that senior commanders in that era 
afforded to local intelligence work.  The tradition developed that experienced officers 
(often coming to the end of their service) took on the role but while many of these were 
capable and committed, too many had little aptitude or enthusiasm for the role and hence 
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the image of the local intelligence officer as lazy or inept became established in policing 
discourse.    
I have highlighted at several points in this thesis, detectives’ lack of involvement 
in intelligence work in the mainstream.   The reader has seen that goes back to the first 
formal structures for local intelligence work in the 1960s.  The County DOI suggested 
that the deployment of skilled and experienced detectives in local intelligence work 
would provide the obvious solution to what has proved to be a persistent and seemingly 
intractable problem.  That suggestion has merit.  However, Chatterton (2008: viii) has 
argued that the divisional CID is already under huge pressure to meet the demands made 
upon it in the face of the “haemorrhaging of detective experience and expertise through 
transfers to specialist units, squads and major incident teams”.  It seems unlikely that 
police managers would welcome further abstractions from core policing.  In interview, 
Phillips and an ACPO member (N03) both argued in favour of the direct recruitment of 
civilian specialists for intelligence roles.  Whilst civilian analysts and researchers have 
been directly recruited to intelligence posts by many forces (with some success, see for 
example Cope, 2004 and Cope et al, 2003), the problems described in both cases suggest 
that a more fundamental re-evaluation of intelligence work in the mainstream is surely 
long overdue. 
 
County Elite and the +IM 
Though County’s senior commanders were more receptive to the idea of the NIM than 
their Urban equivalents, the implementation of the model was delayed at the highest level 
(and was hamstrung at the BCU level) because of deficiencies in the force’s intelligence 
structure and processes (despite the recent restructuring).  According to County’s 
principal intelligence analyst (N026), despite the reorganisation that was intended to 
make the force truly intelligence-led, there was “no strategy for intelligence at all” in 
County.  This had to be addressed before the NIM could be embraced.   
In 2003, the principal analyst was appointed as the intelligence ‘champion’ for the 
force.  Her brief was to develop the systems and structures needed to accommodate the 
NIM.  However, the establishment of that post in the corporate affairs department 
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(because the NIM was largely seen as an administrative function)  rather than in either the 
crime management department or the specialist detective division (where most of the 
intelligence functions were located) was problematic because it removed her from the 
day-to-day business of intelligence.  She said that implementation of the NIM was further 
set back when an assistant chief constable (ACC) who had been a great supporter of 
intelligence and analysis in County was promoted out of that post.  When the ACC moved 
on, County lost its focus on intelligence because when he moved “that moved with him 
and it all just... slipped off the agenda”.  According to the principal analyst, in the absence 
of the ACC, there was no one at the elite level who truly believed in the value of 
intelligence.  Therefore, she did not get the support she felt she needed and which this 
research suggests was so essential.  The NIM slipped down the force’s reform agenda 
because, just as in Urban, senior commanders gave priority to meeting Home 
Office-imposed performance targets.   
The importance of an effective advocate for change with sufficient power, 
authority and energy to drive the change process has been highlighted in this thesis so it 
was perhaps inevitable that with the departure of the ACC, the momentum for change was 
lost.  The principal analyst said that even though the NIM processes were in place: 
Two and a half years down the line, we still can’t get even the tactical tasking and 
coordination to work.  We have a lot of structures in place and we have a lot of 
process but… we’re saying to ourselves that it doesn’t actually make a great deal of 
difference… You know, would it make a difference if we didn’t have it? 
The County elite’s commitment to the NIM and its understanding of what it truly 
was to be intelligence-led are brought into question by the principal analyst’s words.  
Though there was not the outright resistance to the model that there was in Urban, there 
was little appreciation of what NIM really meant for the force.  County was one of the first 
forces to embrace the NIM and it might have been expected that the model would have 
matured as the organising framework for ILP in this arena that its advocates anticipated.  
However, even the most basic of the NIM’s procedures failed to operate effectively and 
although there was lots of NIM-related activity, the model made a negligible impact on 
the business of the force.  I argue that, once again, this demonstrates the way that police 
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organisations prioritise being administratively competent over focusing on the benefits 
and outcomes of a particular policy (see Goldstein, 1979).  
As I discussed earlier in this study, since 1998 all forces have been expected to 
appoint a senior detective to the post of director of intelligence (DOI).  The DOI should 
assume responsibility for all of the force’s intelligence functions.  At the beginning of 
2004, County’s elite appointed a detective superintendent (N032) as DOI.  She tried to 
change the perception of the NIM in County but the impact she was able to make was 
extremely limited because senior commanders lacked the commitment to the substantial 
structural and cultural changes that the model required.   
Rather unusually (a priori, I argue, uniquely), the DOI’s responsibilities in 
County were limited to intelligence policy, the authorisation of covert policing activity by 
the detective force, and to managing the local intelligence units.  As a member of the 
crime management department, she did not have management responsibility for the 
force’s intelligence analysts nor did she control the key intelligence resource, the FIB, 
which instead was managed by the head of the specialist detective department.  All key 
intelligence functions above BCU level were managed by someone other than the DOI.  
To complicate the situation even further, she was of course separated from the person who 
should have been her key lieutenant, the force’s principal analyst (who remained in the 
corporate affairs department).  
The DOI (N032) attributed these irregularities to a successful coup by her 
immediate predecessor that was designed to put power in the hands of the specialist 
detectives.  She summarised the difficulties that she faced in developing the force’s 
intelligence strategy thus.  The principal analyst reported to ACC ‘A’.  She wrote the NIM 
intelligence assessments for the force tasking meeting which also was controlled by ACC 
‘A’.  The DOI and BCU intelligence units reported to ACC ‘B’.  ACC ‘B’ separately 
‘owned’ the specialist detective department (including the FIB) and the force surveillance 
assets.  According to the DOI (N032), the result was poor communication, duplication 
and wasted effort because “If something came in that was vaguely NIM, vaguely 
intelligence, vaguely analytical, it would get tasked out three different ways”. 
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The DOI (N032) said that she was slow to remedy this wholly unsatisfactory 
situation but she recognised that she had to resolve that constant conflict over intelligence 
issues with senior managers in the other departments.  She wrote a force intelligence 
strategy (as required by her role - see HMIC, 1997), which aimed to resolve these 
difficulties and to ensure that intelligence actually supported the operational work of the 
force.  However, she made extremely slow progress in persuading senior commanders to 
adopt her plans (which included the amalgamation of all the force’s intelligence functions 
into a new intelligence directorate).  She said that senior commanders’ continuing 
emphasis on meeting Home Office targets made them reluctant to instigate the changes 
that were needed.   
The DOI took the initiative to kick-start the process, introducing a pilot scheme in 
one of County’s BCUs and briefing “virtually all the supervisors in the force” about the 
intelligence strategy and the NIM.   She said that the success of the pilot eventually 
persuaded senior commanders to approve the introduction of the new strategy.  In 
September 2006, the new intelligence directorate (which included all the force’s 
intelligence units and the principal analyst) was established with the DOI at its head.   
Interviewed at the end of this study, the DOI said that the new system had allowed her to 
introduce a formal quality assurance framework for intelligence and to bring a more 
consistent approach to adding value (through intelligence work) to operational policing in 
the mainstream.  However, coming as it did at the end of the fieldwork, that statement was 
not tested in this research 
   
+IM at BCU Level in County 
Just as in Urban, County’s BCU managers were largely unaware of the tensions around 
the NIM at the highest level of the force.  The BCU SMT members interviewed, said that 
they welcomed it as a further development of the force’s ILP strategy.  Despite the delay 
in implementing the NIM at the highest level, the model was quickly introduced to each 
of County’s BCUs.  A BCU commander (N027) said that the NIM was welcomed 
unequivocally at that level because commanders felt it organised their business in a more 
effective way.  Personally, he felt that the NIM could underpin a new body of knowledge, 
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an institutional memory, for a police service which in his view, had “no tradition of any 
sort of professionalism”.   
He said that the NIM symbolised the police service’s desire to change.  Though I 
argue that in that regard the commander’s analysis was flawed; the major problem for the 
NIM was that the actual proportion of the service that really wanted that change, was 
relatively small.  The commander contrasted the service’s approach to its institutional 
memory, with that taken by the British Army: 
What are the courses at Bramshill for if you’re not just there to stare at your navel 
rather than look at a body of researched historical experience around policing?  We 
never do that do we?  You know, trying to work out what works.  Who lectures at 
Bramshill?  Generally, pretty hopeless people.  If you go to the Army Staff College, 
the lecturers are the people that have won battles. 
Reflecting the Urban DOI’s (N098) earlier comments, the BCU commander 
(N027) hoped that the NIM would help to create a body of professional learning which 
could be called upon to provide a structure for operational work that would remove 
County’s reliance on ‘inspired individuals’ for results.  In that regard, the commander was 
echoing the NCIS senior executive’s earlier demand for a policing doctrine.  However, 
the police service does not necessarily speak with one voice on that subject (which, in my 
view, suggests that the corpus of guidance notes, advice and directions should not be 
afforded the label ‘doctrine’).   
Earlier in this thesis, I referred to an ACPO member’s (N053) criticism of NCPE 
for writing doctrine in so complex a way that frontline staff could not understand it.  Not 
one respondent in either case study had read any of the NCPE doctrine documents that 
related to the NIM so their understanding (or otherwise) of the content of the documents 
was not a factor.  However, given that there are well over 600 pages of NIM doctrine, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the sheer volume of instruction and advice was a significant 
issue for staff.  I argue that so much information was overwhelming for staff who also had 
busy ‘day jobs’.  Westminster Coroner Paul Knapman’s criticism of doctrine in the case 
of Mark Saunders (referred to earlier) suggests that the senior intelligence official (N050) 
was right to fear the “programmed responses” that doctrine can deliver.  The events 
surrounding Saunders’ death add real weight to Knapman’s further observation that 
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officers should rely on "common sense rather than slavish adherence to written 
documents and protocols”. 
The BCU commander (N027) said that because it described the social and 
policing environments within which he was operating, the NIM allowed him to better 
manage his business.  He was a great advocate of the model and his support was evident in 
the way that he tried to embrace the NIM’s structures and processes.  As much as anyone 
in County, he was the policy entrepreneur that the model needed.   His support for local 
intelligence work was evident in his resourcing of his intelligence unit which was made 
up of approximately 35 staff performing broadly similar roles to their Urban counterparts.   
The unit was headed by a DI (who initially, was the only detective officer so 
employed, though later he was joined by a DS) but in a departure from the NIM ideal, the 
title of intelligence manager was given to a civilian member of staff who oversaw the 
day-to-day running of the unit.  An intelligence researcher (N021) said that the unit 
suffered from a lack of continuity in management, that there had been continuous and 
ongoing change which “doesn’t help anybody”.  He felt that problems with the unit went 
back to its creation in 2000.  In his view, the unit was “given first aid when it needed 
surgery”.  I argue that the researcher’s words could be applied to the whole system of 
local intelligence.     
The intelligence manager (N019) represented the unit at the NIM meetings.  She 
said that she recognised that as a member of police staff, she was not qualified to make 
decisions on operational matters but she provided support to the unit’s police staff and 
bridged the gap between those staff and the police officers in the BCU’s ‘intelligence 
world’.   However, given her (admitted) lack of knowledge of operational policing, it 
could be argued that she was not able to mediate between the operational and intelligence 
worlds as well as the model required.  
Focus groups held with frontline BCU staff in this study were poorly attended so it 
was possible only to assess a limited range of views on the NIM from the uniformed 
branch.  However, it was clear that the BCU commander’s views on the importance of the 
NIM to the policing mission had not been fully embraced on the frontline.  Perhaps the 
youth and inexperience of the research respondents was a factor in that context but the 
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similarity with the Urban case was obvious.  Of the three patrol officers interviewed 
(N075, N076, and N077) the longest-serving had been a police officer for only 15 months.  
None of those officers expressed any view on the local intelligence unit nor did they 
possess any knowledge of the NIM even though an introduction to intelligence work had 
been part of their student officer training.  They were completely task-focused, their days 
taken up either with responding to emergency calls from the public or carrying out work 
allocated to them by the force control room.  A ‘fire brigade’ or “AA or RAC patrolman” 
style of policing typically was the norm just as previous research has shown (see Bayley, 
1994 and Waddington, 1983: 34 respectively).  According to one of the officers (N075) 
“We do whatever’s in front of us”.   
A schools liaison officer (N074) had a rudimentary knowledge of the model.  She 
said that she had read the ‘Blue Book’, the first version of the NIM but displayed little 
understanding of it.  However, as a former collator, she had some understanding of the 
intelligence cycle and the fundamentals of intelligence work.  She said that she applied 
them to her role as a schools officer; a substantial part of which was feeding intelligence 
on problem children and families to her operational colleagues via the intelligence unit.   
Just as in Urban, the intelligence unit staff broadly was supportive of the NIM.  An 
intelligence researcher (N021) argued that it made the unit much more efficient and 
cost-effective whilst an intelligence manager (N019) welcomed the consistency and 
uniformity that the model brought.  The senior analyst (N022) said that she was optimistic 
about the effect of the NIM on the profile of intelligence and analysis in mainstream 
policing and on the SMT’s understanding of its policing problems but she could no more 
attribute any fall in crime levels or increases in detections to the model than others before 
her.  She felt compelled to question the real influence of analysis on operational outcomes 
“because it’s still the same names coming… up all the time, the same crime issues we are 
dealing with all the time so are we actually any further forward than we were back in 
October 2001”. 
The senior analyst’s comments reinforce Amey et al’s (1996) and HMIC’s (1995) 
earlier observations on the limitations of ILP models like the NIM.  Despite the claims 
made for it in terms of its ability to reduce the overall level of crime in a policing area, 
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County’s senior commanders simply did not know what impact the NIM had on their 
business.  I argue that County’s commanders were not alone.  Nobody knows what impact 
a properly implemented NIM might have on operational policing because there is no 
evidence that anyone has implemented it faithfully, according to Phillips’ ideal (see for 
example Collier, 2006; Kleiven, 2005; John and Maguire; 2004). 
 
The +IM Process in County 
This chapter now moves on to examine the model’s influence on intelligence work and 
investigation by examining those processes in County.    
 
Intelligence Collection in County 
There was a huge divide between County’s specialist detective force and the rest of 
County’s investigative resources.  I argued earlier that the specialist force maintains a 
distance from the rest of the service and operates according to its own values and 
traditions.  In County, the specialist detective force maintained complete control over its 
own operations but had gone a step further and enlisted County’s FIB as an auxiliary.  The 
DOI (N032) said that the FIB worked almost exclusively for the specialist detective force 
and it took no part in the preparation of the NIM intelligence assessments for the wider 
force. 
At the BCU level, intelligence meetings were held according to the NIM 
timetable.  The meetings departed from the NIM ideal in that all reported crime was 
discussed, rather than only those crime types that were included in the BCU’s control 
strategy and intelligence requirement.  As a consequence, the intelligence meetings did 
not correspond to the normative rules of the NIM.  The senior analyst (N022) said that the 
unit focused on collecting intelligence around priority crime but this was not borne out by 
my own observations.   
During the course of the fieldwork for this study the commander adopted 
anti-social behaviour (ASB) as a BCU priority.  This meant that the unit had to cast its net 
even more widely for intelligence.  The BCU commander (N027) described his inclusion 
of ASB in the control strategy as “one of the most fundamental strategic decisions this 
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force and I have made in terms of resource deployment”.  He said that the decision 
demonstrated his personal commitment to public reassurance and there is no doubt that it 
represented a significant change in focus for the BCU.  For her part, the senior analyst 
(N022) was not convinced that the inclusion of ASB in the control strategy was justified 
by her intelligence analyses.  Of course, the requirement to collect more data also 
contributed to the “overloading” of the BCU’s intelligence databases (described later in 
this chapter by an intelligence analyst (N023)).       
Notwithstanding the senior analyst’s findings, according to the commander 
(N027), his “professional judgement” was that meeting the needs of his communities took 
precedence over the intelligence assessment.  Coming from someone who had expressed 
such support for intelligence analysis, the commander’s statement that this decision 
reflected a need for “more sophisticated” intelligence products was surprising.  However, 
it also emphasises that even the most ‘enlightened’ commander may exercise their 
prerogative to take decisions regardless of intelligence assessments.  I argue that what is 
important is that they are held to account for those decisions and that, properly 
implemented, the NIM would deliver that level of accountability.  
 
Collation, Analysis and Evaluation in County 
Just as in the Urban BCU, analytical activity was organised around focus desks.  
However, rather than being delineated by crime type as in Urban, four focus desks 
represented each of the BCU’s Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs).   
The senior analyst (N022) said that intelligence analysis was central to the work of the 
focus desks.  Analysts applied some of the nine NIM analytical techniques to the crime 
and crime-related data collected by the force.  As in City, crime pattern analysis and 
network analysis were the techniques used most frequently.  The SARA model was used 
extensively.  Innes et al (2003: 14) have suggested that analytical products may be 
“subject to objectification and reification by the officers who they are provided to” but 
this was not the common experience in either case.    
The County DOI (N032) said the NIM’s ‘demystification’ of analytical products 
misled commanders to believe that they needed to demonstrate their knowledge (and 
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control) by specifying the product they wanted rather than allowing the analyst to decide 
on the most appropriate product for themselves.  However, all the analysts interviewed in 
County agreed that it was their credibility that was central to this debate.  Loveday (2005: 
6) has suggested that the failure of police officers to recognise the value of police staff is a 
wider issue that may suggest “a continuing cultural problem” of the kind explored earlier.  
He noted that the negative perceptions of police staff amongst junior officers previously 
identified by HMIC (HMIC, 2004), may be encouraged by hostility to them at the highest 
levels of the service.  A continuing antipathy between operational police officers and 
civilian intelligence staff may perhaps be inferred from the statements of Urban’s 
intelligence staff in the previous chapter.  In that case the intelligence unit was seen as 
taking up resources that otherwise could be used in the ‘real’ policing of the streets.  In 
this case, the hostility to civilian staff was overt and pointed to a continuing cultural 
divide in policing.  The NIM did not seem to ameliorate that conflict.     
Two analysts (N023 and N024) said that they were often seen by police officers 
simply as people who could provide IT support or act as minute takers.  Though both 
noted that their relations with colleagues outside the intelligence unit improved as they 
became more skilled, they commented on the challenge of convincing police officers to 
accept their analyses (the scepticism of police officers in this context has previously been 
described by, for example, Cope, 2008).  The senior analyst (N022) said that in time, 
some of the analysts’ concerns were addressed by the introduction of a formal process 
that obliged officers to explain and justify their requests for analytical support.  However, 
planning meetings continued to test analysts’ patience and fortitude.   
One analyst (N023) said that when she attended the fortnightly Operational 
Planning Group (OPG) meeting, her judgement was often mistrusted and her reports were 
routinely ignored so that future priorities were decided without any reference to her 
analytical products.45  This left her feeling demoralised and frustrated.  On one occasion, 
she asked those present whether in future, rather than writing the tactical assessment, she 
                                                 
45 Operational Planning Group meetings took place fortnightly in each CDRP.  They were attended by the 
police community team, the CDRP analyst and the borough’s Crime Reduction Manager.  At the end of the 
research period they were replaced by Joint Action Groups (JAGs) which were attended by a wider range of 
partners. 
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“could just go and do something else”.   A second analyst (N024) also expressed concerns 
over the meeting.  She said, “I used to go to OPG and it was just a chance to rip the analyst 
to pieces.  It was horrendous”.  OPG might have been the ‘worst’ example of police 
officers’ belligerence but other interactions with officers could be equally challenging.  
She said: 
We go to meetings and we just get ridiculed, laughed at, continuously spoken over 
when we are trying to present our work.  Spoken down to, to the point that I’ve had 
to have a chief inspector come and apologise to me for the way he has treated me in 
a meeting because it was so blatantly rude.  That I would say is the main problem in 
our job.   
The first analyst (N023) conceded that lacking experience of operational policing, 
she and her colleagues sometimes struggled to balance analytical theory with police 
practice.  She said that there were occasions when officers may have had some 
justification for believing that, despite her evidence-based recommendations, they might 
still know the best way to solve the particular problem under discussion.  However, the 
attitudes and behaviours described by the respondents in this research suggested that 
sworn officers sometimes made it only too clear to civilian staff that their views were not 
valued.  I have highlighted both in this and in the other case, the need for a capable and 
credible intelligence manager to support the intelligence unit’s police staff and to bridge 
the gap between them and the operational milieu.  The events described by the analysts in 
this case demonstrate the paramount importance of that management function. 
Just as in Urban, the techniques used most frequently were network analysis and 
crime pattern analysis.  These have been described as “core business” for analysts (senior 
intelligence official, N050).  Given the difficulty of assessing the success of ILP models 
like the NIM (described elsewhere in this thesis and by, for example, Amey et al, 1996); 
the fact that results analysis was rarely used was disappointing.  The consensus amongst 
the analysts interviewed was that other demands on their time meant that they could not 
reflect on the consequences of operational activity.  However, not being consulted early 
enough in proactive operations also was a factor.  Whatever the reason, normative 
expectations of the intelligence cycle were frustrated.  In particular, just as in Urban, the 
feedback loop that is fundamental to the intelligence cycle and to the model was broken.  
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This can only add weight to my argument in the other case study that, in this period, the 
NIM did not make BCUs any smarter in evaluating their operational endeavours.   
 
Presentation of Evidence in County 
The difficulties in separating the measurement of performance from operational outcomes 
extended to the preparation of the force strategic assessment.  The principal analyst 
(N026) said that initially the force assessment was an organisational rather than a strategic 
assessment.  That is, that the finished document contained priorities identified by the 
force elite (‘top-down’), rather than an evidence-based analysis of County’s policing 
problems identified by its intelligence officers and analysts (‘bottom-up’), as envisaged 
by the NIM.   
She questioned the intelligence value of a document that senior commanders 
authored themselves.  She said that the document was not an intelligence assessment; 
instead “it was just a long list of all the issues” that concerned senior commanders.  With 
her guidance, it evolved to include a greater ‘bottom-up’ element but at the time this 
research was carried out, the document afforded the title of ‘strategic assessment’ 
remained a top-down list of priorities.  The problems described therein represented the 24 
policing priorities identified by County’s elite more often on the basis of performance 
data than on the basis of intelligence products. 
The principal analyst (N026) said that she developed the assessment to be more 
focused and evidence-based.  However, she had not been able to shift senior commanders 
from their position.  The NIM recommends a bottom-up approach as a way of ensuring 
that emerging trends are identified (discussed elsewhere in this thesis).  However 
‘top-down’ analyses of problems are common in policing and County were not alone in 
adopting this alternative approach albeit that the hazards attached to it should have been 
obvious to commanders.  I have commented at several points in this thesis that the police 
are not willing to embrace any form of priority-setting that puts the work of analysts at the 
forefront of their endeavours.   The setting of priorities in County in a way that rejected 
the normative values of the NIM, just as the Urban commanders had done, adds weight to 
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that argument.  I argue that this was a significant factor in the failure of the model in 
County.    
Senior commanders’ continuing focus on those issues that were of greatest 
concern to them rather than to local communities (usually because they had a significant 
bearing on performance) was raised by many in this case study (including the local 
authority CRM, N09 and a County chief inspector, N029).  County’s DOI (N032) wanted 
intelligence work to reflect the concerns of communities.  In her view, information about 
ASB was equally as important as information about organised crime even if it “just goes 
off in different directions and we prioritise it slightly differently and risk-assess it slightly 
differently”.  She believed that (just as in Urban) County had to overcome its “mother 
knows best attitude” to its partners and allow them to play a greater part in decisions over 
priorities.  Foster (2002) highlighted that in their partnerships with local authorities, the 
police often have presented themselves as experts and have been reluctant to cede control 
to others.  The DOI’s words suggest that attitude is still prevalent in policing.   
The local authority’s CRM (N09) also expressed concern over the assessments.  
At 100 pages, the documents were “far too long... packed with police jargon” and had 
improved only marginally over time.  They lacked the “richness” of other data sources 
such as: “census data: the local authority’s ASB data; CCTV data; data regarding 
vandalism on estates; safer routes to school, truancy data and school attainment data, and 
road traffic data”.  He said that the police needed to see “the bigger, wider picture”; the 
link between the environment and people’s wellbeing.  The force assessment was “not 
within the spirit of partnership... and not fit for purpose” because the process was 
managing the people rather than vice versa.   
Foster (2002: 174) has argued that practitioners may construct an “assumed and 
oversimplified world” that ultimately may sabotage efforts to work with communities and 
establish effective partnerships.  The categories of data that the CRM (N09) was referring 
to would allow the police to construct a much more balanced intelligence assessment and 
was just the kind of data that advocates of the NIM wanted the police to collect.  I argue 
that the failure to do so was yet another example of the police’s inability to break out of 
 246 
that investigative orthodoxy that I described earlier and of their failure to establish the 
structure required by the architects of the NIM.  
The DOI (N032) said that she had worked hard to persuade the County elite of the 
merits of the NIM.  She believed that the new force intelligence strategy was focusing 
operational activity more effectively, although senior commanders still demonstrated a 
degree of autonomy “because the chief constable is the chief constable”, which suggests 
that for all policing has changed since Reiner (1991) wrote his seminal text Chief 
Constables, even the most enlightened chief officer may from time to time exhibit the 
characteristics of a ‘Baron’.46 
At the BCU level, County’s analysts compiled all of the assessments required by 
the NIM.  As the only one to have attended a strategic analysis course, the senior 
intelligence analyst (N022) took sole responsibility for producing the strategic 
assessments.  She said that the finished product took a “huge amount of effort” and this 
was evident in the assessments seen in this study which ranged between 61 and 69 pages 
of data analysis, evaluation and control strategy recommendations.  The senior analyst 
said that she received excellent feedback on her assessments from the principal analyst 
and from Centrex but, just like the senior analyst in Urban and the local CRM, she felt 
they were too long and too complex.     
Despite her reservations, the assessment met the BCU commander’s needs and, of 
course, the latter’s wishes prevailed.  The strategic assessments seen in this study 
typically provided a picture of the long-term issues affecting the BCU but they relied 
heavily on police and performance data and opportunities to access a wider range of 
sources generally were ignored.  The senior analyst (N022) recognised this as potentially 
problematic.  She was more unhappy about the way that control strategy priorities were 
agreed, reproving herself for allowing her BCU commander to decide them before the 
document was published so that “my recommendations were in fact theirs”.  This of 
course was exactly the same complaint that was made by the senior analyst in Urban and 
by County’s principal analyst (N026).   
                                                 
46 Reiner (1991: 306) characterised chief constables as either ‘Barons, Bobbies, Bosses or Bureaucrats’.  The 
Baron inter alia likes to lead from the front and to be obeyed. 
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Just like her Urban counterpart, the County analyst felt this undermined her 
credibility because the priorities did not match the intelligence picture drawn by her 
colleagues in the intelligence unit.  Interviewed at the end of the research, she said that she 
eventually had persuaded the commander to take more account of her recommendations.  
However, her words add yet more weight to the argument that the NIM struggled to 
overcome those established values of the dominant occupational culture and the 
hierarchical tradition of the police organisation.   
 
Consultation with Partners in County 
Unlike Urban, County held a force NIM strategic meeting.  It was chaired by County’s 
Deputy Chief Constable (DCC).  Many members of the force elite were present.  They 
were joined by senior managers from the specialist detective force, senior detectives, 
County’s BCU commanders, the force’s DOI (N032) and the principal analyst (N026).47  
Partners were represented by the chair of the local police authority (N011), the local 
authority CRM (N09), representatives of the local Crimestoppers organisation and 
members of local drugs action and youth offending teams and the probation service.   This 
suggests that the County elite was more supportive of the NIM than its Urban counterpart.  
However, as the reader will see, this did not necessarily translate into meaningful 
outcomes.   
There were two distinct phases to the meeting.  The first was given over to a 
presentation of the strategic assessment by the principal analyst.  After this, the partners 
(including the chair of the police authority) left the meeting to the police ‘professionals’.  
It was in this second phase that most of the key decisions about investigative pathways 
and the allocation of resources were made.  Interviewed in 2006, the chair of County’s 
police authority (N011) spoke positively about his relationship with the force elite but 
expressed his reservations about the structure of this meeting.  Reflecting Shapland’s 
(1998 and 2000) and Crawford’s (2001) arguments about the ability of criminal justice 
agencies to maintain control over their own fiefdoms, the chair (N011) believed that the 
                                                 
47 This was the only forum in which specialist detectives were observed, during the fieldwork for this research. 
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division demonstrated that despite the community-focused rhetoric, the police wanted to 
set limits on partnership working.  They still wanted to separate the ‘professional’ from 
the lay perspectives.  He noted: 
I’m not sure what the gain is from them having it in two parts.  I think they would 
probably get a better buy-in, better engagement, if they ran it as a general meeting… 
I think there is too much mystique, too much mystery.  You know ‘let’s keep the 
public out.  This is professional, this is ours’. 
Police respondents believed that dividing the meeting in this way helped senior 
commanders to develop County’s crime strategy, to formulate action, and to identify 
force leads.  They did not anticipate that the division would cause any concerns for 
partners.  However, the chair of the police authority (N011) said that by keeping too much 
of its work secret, County limited real public engagement.  He said that senior 
commanders should be exploiting every opportunity to gain “insights” into policing 
problems from their partners, and that partners’ exclusion from the most important phase 
of the strategic meeting indicated that senior commanders did not afford those community 
insights the importance they deserved.  Under the existing arrangements, partners could 
not be convinced that their views were being properly considered.  He questioned whether 
County simply was paying lip service to the notion of public engagement as “a box 
ticking function”. 
The relationship between force elites and police authorities has been much 
debated.  Reiner (2005: 682-683) argued that in this period the lack of “adequate local 
accountability has been a major factor undermining police legitimacy”.   In County, the 
police authority chair’s failure to confront senior commanders over their monopoly on 
decision-making in this context may reveal something about how the police have 
managed to maintain their spheres of control.  Reiner (1991) is but one of many 
researchers who have questioned whether police authorities have any meaningful 
influence on chief constables in relation to the framing of policy (See also Savage et al, 
2000; Wall, 1998; Savage et al, 1996; and Loveday, 1991).  In this case, even though the 
NIM provided a forum for the chair of the police authority to question a decision that he 
was unhappy with, and arguably had the power to challenge if not change, he spurned the 
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opportunity which lent weight to the argument that police authorities have been the 
architects of their own limited influence (Jones and Newburn, 1997).   
In my view, this demonstrated the persistence in that context of the “compliance 
culture” in which police authority members either find it too difficult or otherwise are 
unable to challenge chief officers, which was first identified 14 years ago by Jones and 
Newburn (1997 cited in Wall, 1998: 83).  That is, some 10 years before this research was 
carried out.  Wall’s argument, that changes to the accountability arrangements wrought 
by the PMCA (intended to encourage more effective partnerships between the police 
authority, chief officer and the Home Office) were unlikely to result in police authorities 
becoming “anything more than junior partners” in those partnerships, had real validity in 
the County case. 
Strategic tasking at the local level was a much more focused and inclusive affair in 
the County BCU selected for study, than that observed either at the elite level in County 
or at BCU level in Urban.  Two of the three strategic meetings held during the period of 
the study were observed.  The BCU commander (N027) explained that he wanted to 
embed the NIM processes to such a degree that each successive year’s plan would 
represent “exactly the same picture of fundamental business process”.   
Each strategic meeting was chaired by the commander and in each case the 
strategic assessment was presented by the senior analyst.  However, it was there that the 
similarities between the County and Urban meetings ended.  Whereas in Urban the 
meeting was open to a wide range of attendees, attendance in County was limited to 
senior managers and key decision-makers.  The first BCU meeting observed was attended 
by the SMT, the senior analyst, chief executives of the local authorities in the BCU’s area, 
the criminal justice unit manager and a representative of the force’s corporate 
communications department. 
In County, there was the same obsession with performance in the context of 
priority crime as there was in Urban.   The senior analyst (N022) began each meeting with 
an overview of the crime recorded by the BCU in the last period and continued with a 
presentation of the control strategy priorities.  She explained what was meant by the term 
‘control strategy’ and described the process by which it had been prepared.  In stark 
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contrast to what had taken place in the Urban meeting, she stressed that the future 
operational focus of the BCU was up for discussion adding “that’s why we need your 
involvement”.   The process by which the control strategy was decided was questioned by 
one of the local authority chief executives (N099) but the executive appeared to be 
satisfied with the BCU commander’s explanation that he had set his priorities on the basis 
of information contained in the intelligence assessment prepared by the senior analyst and 
on his own professional judgement.   
Interviewed after this first meeting, the other local authority chief executive 
(N010) said that his relationship with the BCU commander was “a real partnership 
arrangement”.  Referring to the control strategy, the second chief executive (N010) said 
that (just like the chair of the police authority) he was happy to leave decisions on 
operational priorities to the professional judgement of the police.  He said: 
We might not set their priorities, I’m not sure I’d want to, but equally I think that the 
kind of relationship that we have here… is that there’s enough trust for them to 
come and talk about their priorities and this is what we like to do. 
Gilling (2005: 737) has argued that “trust may be the most important commodity 
in establishing good working relations”.  Both the local authority chief executive (N010) 
and the BCU commander (N027) stressed the significance of building trust in the context 
of their work together and they recognised the importance of their personal relationship.  
However, they both highlighted that they wanted to establish an underpinning structure 
that encouraged and sustained business relationships.  I argue that, properly implemented, 
the NIM could provide a suitably viable structure for those relationships. 
Just as at force level, the BCU commander (N027) had established a practice of 
holding the strategic meeting over two sessions; one attended by the police and the other 
drawing in partners.  However, during the period of this research, the commander 
identified that the structure limited participation in the decision-making process.  He 
changed the structure and content of the meeting so that attendance at the second meeting 
observed was limited to key police decision-makers and partners and was completed in a 
single session (therefore the meeting was exactly as envisaged by the NIM’s architects).   
That meeting was attended by the police SMT, the senior analyst, two local 
authority chief executives, six members of the police authority and three local 
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councillors.   For the first meeting, the BCU’s control strategy comprised ‘the usual 
suspects’ of burglary, robbery, violent crime, street crime, class ‘A’ drug supply and theft 
from motor vehicles.  Twelve months later, it had developed so that it included ASB and 
criminal damage, violent crime (particularly alcohol-related violence in town centres), 
personal robbery, dwelling burglary, vehicle crime and class ‘A’ drug supply (County 
BCU, 2006: 30).     
In this second meeting the BCU commander (N027), rather than the senior 
intelligence analyst (N022), took more obvious ownership of the BCU’s plans for the next 
period by presenting the control strategy.  This generated much more discussion than 
previously and this seemed to make the meeting more of a coming together of equals.  
However, in another example of the ‘compliance culture’, it was noticeable that partners 
continued to defer to the ‘professional judgement’ of the police and their influence on the 
decision-making process was as limited as it was on the first occasion. 
The BCU strategic meeting provided a useful forum for information-sharing and 
consultation but other consultative arrangements also were in place.  For example, each 
month the BCU commander (N027) briefed the chief executive of the county council and 
every two months he met the chief executives of the borough councils at the Responsible 
Authorities Meeting (RAG) which was attended by officials from the county council, 
borough council, the police authority, the local fire service and the local primary 
healthcare trust.  The BCU commander (N027) suggested that he and the local authority 
chief executives within the BCU area understood that they were working together for a 
common purpose.  On the same subject, the chief inspector with responsibility for a 
CDRP (N028) commented rather more colourfully that he and his corresponding chief 
executive recognised that they were “both standing on the same burning bridge” and 
needed the NIM to provide that sustaining framework that I described earlier.    
To summarise, at the highest level NIM strategic meetings, though there was not 
the level of resistance to the model observed in Urban, operational priorities were decided 
in the traditional manner.  The police alone decided how resources would be distributed 
and it was clear that the NIM had not overcome the established values of the occupational 
culture or the hierarchical tradition of the police organisation.  Both the chair of the police 
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authority and the local authority’s CSM questioned the police’s strategic decision-making 
process.  Arguably, the significant difference between the two was that the chair of the 
police authority possessed the executive authority to at least challenge the process.  
However, in the event, the ‘compliance culture’ that had developed meant that neither 
attempted to remedy the defects that they observed.   
At the local level, the BCU commander’s enthusiasm for the NIM was evident.  
He had established and was maintaining clear lines of communication with both the 
police authority and the local authority and for their parts, the representatives of each 
expressed their complete support for the commander and the NIM process.  However, as 
cordial and participative as they were, the meetings did not operate according to the 
normative rules of the model (as set out in the NIM Code of Practice – see NCPE, 2005a) 
because, just as in Urban, decisions over priorities and resources were taken in the 
traditional manner outside the meeting by the BCU commander and his staff.  Therefore, 
those meetings did not represent the inclusive decision-making forums idealised by the 
NIM’s advocates. 
NIM tactical meetings were held each fortnight at force and at county levels.  The 
force tactical meeting is discussed more fully in the next section.  Briefly, the principal 
analyst (N026) said that there was no consultation with partners at these meetings as none 
were invited.  In the BCU selected for study, the BCU commander (N027) chaired the 
meeting and the senior analyst (N022) presented the tactical assessment but otherwise 
County’s tactical meeting was in complete contrast with the tactical meeting held in 
Urban.  Attendance at the County meeting was consistent and was limited to the SMT and 
middle management.  No representatives of partner agencies attended any of the five 
meetings observed.  In other words, in terms of its attendance, the tactical meeting was 
conducted in exactly the same manner as it always had been and otherwise than in 
accordance with the normative rules of the NIM (set out in its code of practice).  
 
Monitoring Problems in County 
I have argued at several points that there is a cultural divide in policing which separates 
the CID and the uniform branch.  That divide has existed almost as long as there has been 
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a detective force.  I argue that it has been exacerbated by the expansion of the specialist 
detective squads and undermines the policing mission in the mainstream.   At the end of 
the last century, researchers found that specialist detectives were able to distance 
themselves from internal scrutiny of their work and that the assistance that they offered to 
frontline policing was extremely limited.   
Chatterton (2008) argued that the promotion of ILP and the NIM led to the 
privileging of the specialist detective force over the rest of the service and also the 
under-resourcing of criminal investigation in mainstream policing.   He suggested that the 
promotion of ILP in general and the NIM in particular led to the development of “a new 
dynamic” in the “squad imperative” (discussed earlier in this thesis).  In Chatterton’s 
research, detective respondents referred repeatedly to the “haemorrhaging of detective 
experience and expertise through transfers and long-term secondments” to specialist 
detective squads and the prioritisation of the needs of those squads over the needs of their 
divisional colleagues (2008: viii).  I argued at the beginning of this study, that for many 
years a form of class system (with the specialist detective force at its apex) has existed in 
policing to the detriment of the police organisation.  Chatterton’s research points up one 
of the greatest paradoxes of the NIM; the model was forced through with some vigour at 
the BCU level yet the specialist detective force was permitted to ignore it, which resulted 
in the model being implemented only partially and half-heartedly across forces.   
The police service’s failure to use the NIM to harness the expertise of its specialist 
detectives for the benefit of mainstream policing mirrors its earlier failure to grasp what it 
truly meant to be intelligence-led.  I argued earlier that police commanders in the 
mainstream seemed content to accept the management data that was a by-product of the 
administrative function associated with ILP but were unwilling or unable to deploy the 
resources needed to secure positive investigative outcomes.  In County, the force’s 
tactical meeting provided compelling evidence of that unwillingness or inability, and of 
the tensions Chatterton (2008) described.  County’s DOI (N032) explained the conduct of 
that meeting.  It was meant to provide an opportunity for both the force’s specialist 
detective units and its BCUs to bid for the force’s headquarters-based resources (such as 
surveillance).   However, she said that the two did not meet on a level playing field 
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because the FIB and the other specialist detective units had developed a covert, 
cooperative, relationship that worked to their mutual benefit and disadvantaged County’s 
BCUs.   
Those units held their own meetings in advance of the main forum so that they 
were able to monopolise the force’s proactive assets.  The limited proactive resources of 
the force usually were deployed against serious and organised crime (which may have 
been perfectly proper) but there was never any real debate about the challenges faced by 
BCUs.  This demonstrated that just, as in Urban, there was a refusal on the part of the 
County elite to rethink their approach to operational policing.  The principal analyst 
(N026) said that whether this was an appropriate use of County’s scarce resources was 
never really considered and the investigative resources that might have been available to 
County’s BCU’s simply were dispersed elsewhere without any real discussion.  Her 
comments mirror Morgan et al’s (1996) observations about the lack of real debate in the 
police service on the continuing utility of the squad system and also, once again, 
demonstrate the durability of the established occupational culture and the hierarchical 
tradition of policing.  
The principal analyst (N026) wondered why nobody was prepared to challenge 
what she termed this ‘investigative orthodoxy’ which seemed to operate to the detriment 
of the wider force.  By the normative rules of the NIM, the tasking meeting chair should 
have taken account of the demands on the whole force; to ensure that its limited resources 
were allocated to the priorities identified by the force intelligence assessments rather than 
those identified by the specialist detectives and to deliver that ‘whole service’ policing 
response that Phillips envisaged the model would deliver.  However, certainly during the 
research period, there was not enough of a challenge to the power of the detectives.  The 
perpetuation of the ‘closed shop’, described by the senior analyst, meant that BCUs were 
unable to obtain additional resources even when they had a pressing need for them.   
The DOI (N032) explained that the specialist CID controlled the tasking process 
to such a degree that if a BCU put in a request for assistance, it would be blocked before 
the force tasking meeting.  The effect was that BCUs just “wouldn’t bother any more”.  
The principal analyst (N026) agreed with the DOI and said that BCU representatives 
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failed to make bids for assistance because they thought “well what’s the point, it’s only 
going to get knocked back anyway”.  The DOI (N032) said that lacking this central 
support, BCUs had been forced to become self sufficient and to develop their own 
strategies (which rarely included proactive investigations).  One can only speculate 
whether the commanders’ failure to challenge the force elite to limit the influence of the 
specialist detectives was an example of their innate conservatism or a general reflection of 
the difficulty of challenging senior officers.  Whatever the reason, local commanders did 
what they thought best served their own needs.  The result was that County’s specialist 
detectives carried on unimpeded, and the force’s intelligence structures developed so that 
they lacked both a corporate identity and a common method of working. 
I argued earlier in this thesis that senior commanders have always afforded the 
specialist detective force the freedom to operate independently in the ways described in 
this chapter.  In my view, this case shows that senior commanders have continued to give 
priority to the resourcing of the specialist detective force over mainstream policing into 
the modern era.  In County, the principal analyst (N026) saw this simply as ‘investigative 
orthodoxy’, doing things the way they always had done but there may be good reason for 
that orthodoxy.  Senior commanders have always been able to rely upon the specialist 
detective force as that ‘safe pair of hands’ that they can call upon to rescue almost any 
situation.  In interview, a chief inspector (N028) colourfully described the specialist 
detective force as policing’s “Praetorian Guard – ready and willing to march out and save 
Caesar” whenever it was needed.  County’s commanders seemed to have little enthusiasm 
for any change to that status quo. 
Though the force tactical meeting departed from the normative rules and values of 
the NIM (as set out in its Code), the BCU’s meeting operated much more closely to the 
NIM ideal than any other arrangements observed in this research.  At the beginning of 
each BCU meeting, the local commander (N027) reviewed the actions he had previously 
allocated and held the plan holders to account for their operational plans.  The meeting did 
not progress, until the results obtained were explained to his satisfaction.  All the 
proactive resources available to the BCU were tasked from the tactical meeting.  The sole 
exception to this rule was the BCU’s ‘crime car’ which was usually tasked from the daily 
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management meeting.  It was noticeable that, just as in the Urban case, in none of the 
meetings observed, was any reference made to obtaining the assistance of the force’s 
specialist detectives or other law enforcement agencies such as SOCA.  
The BCU commander (N027) said that he had worked to get the right people at the 
meeting.  This meant that he needed only to press “one button” if he wanted something to 
be done.  In the meetings observed, each element of the control strategy was discussed in 
turn.  This was followed by a discussion of “non-control strategy” items, ‘special’ events 
(such as football matches and music festivals) and the BCU’s intelligence requirement.  
Meetings always ended with a formal tasking of the BCU’s tactical resources and a final 
iteration of the meeting’s key points by the commander.  The overriding impression was 
of a very structured and focused process that achieved exactly what the BCU commander 
(and indeed, the NIM) intended. 
The commander was keen to emphasise, what I argue is very much a majority 
view in policing, that any BCU commander’s freedom to deploy his or her tactical 
resources, was limited by the ordinary expectations of the police as an emergency public 
service.  The challenge for commanders was to carry out those routine policing functions 
(referred to by a CDRP chief inspector (N028) as “the background policing” and by 
Goldstein (1979: 238) as “the conglomeration of unrelated, ill-defined, and often 
inseparable jobs that the police are expected to handle”) but also to bring “relatively 
small” amounts of resources to bear against high-priority areas.  He believed that “85-90 
percent” of police business would be carried on irrespective of any attempt to manage it 
strategically.  He explained: 
It is all about focus… In effect there’s just loads of stuff happening which you have 
no control over, detectives going to scenes, SOCOs going out, officers arresting 
people… You don’t really have control.  What I think the essence of the NIM is - is 
the 15% that you can control, we do control in terms of resources and where you 
place your emphasis in terms of tackling crime.  
These were particularly revealing comments in this study because they came from 
an avowed supporter of the NIM, who had demonstrated real commitment to the model’s 
aims.  They suggest that even though the commander was open to a degree of change in 
the BCU’s policing style, he was not prepared to contemplate modifying his patrol or 
investigative strategies.  I have argued at several points in this thesis that in the policing 
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mainstream the service is locked into an investigative orthodoxy that prevents it from 
using its intelligence and investigative resources in the most effective, efficient and 
economic ways.  I argue that the commander’s comments provide further evidence to 
support that argument and for all his claimed commitment to the model (albeit those 
claims were made in good faith), they demonstrate that there were always limits on the 
extent to which the NIM would be applied in County.     
The CDRP chief inspector (N028) said that despite the BCU’s workforce being 
comparable to that of the smaller police forces in Britain, its tactical capability was 
limited and was far from “the huge pot of tactical resources” that others might imagine.  
He said that those resources amounted to one inspector, four sergeants and 30 constables.  
He said that the BCU also was able to deploy its roads policing units to certain defined 
tasks (such as road checks and road blocks in high-crime areas) but their primary 
objective was road safety and the BCU was reluctant to over-use them outside that role.  
The BCU commander (N027) said that shortage of resources demanded that those 
available had to be targeted against the BCU’s priorities.  The really crucial question in 
this context was ‘How should those priorities be decided’?  This was exactly the question 
that the NIM was designed to answer. 
 
+IM and +eighbourhood Policing 
A CDRP chief inspector (N029) said that initially the NIM processes seemed to work well 
in County.  However, there was tension between the force’s neighbourhood policing 
programme and the NIM because the requirements of one detracted from the other (for 
exactly the same reasons outlined in the Urban case).  He believed that in County those 
tensions were exacerbated by the fact that each CDRP had its own philosophy and way of 
working.  He said that although both County and its police authority wanted to drive down 
the overall level of crime, nobody had spelt out what that meant in terms of the relative 
importance of the NIM and the neighbourhood policing programme and the relationship 
between the two.  He said that whilst the model encouraged a commitment to crime 
reduction “across the board”, the BCU commander was more concerned to achieve a 
reduction in priority crime and that meant the NIM (as it was applied in County) would 
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always be in conflict with neighbourhood policing with its emphasis on local problems 
(even though the model was conceived in such a way that it would accommodate both).   
A second CDRP chief inspector (N028) said that he was concerned that the NIM 
did not take account of the crime reduction targets set for CDRPs.  Instead it sought to 
meet priority crime targets such as “sanction detections”.  He felt that the NIM made the 
BCU more focused, so that it was “pointing all the ships the same way” (a rather 
interesting way to describe the ‘whole service’ approach) but he was concerned that 
applying the model in its purest form ultimately would mean that the needs of 
communities were disregarded.  He said that it was “unfortunate” that the same amount of 
energy expended on the introduction of neighbourhood policing had not been put into the 
NIM so that the tension between the two “which should have been obvious” could have 
been resolved from the outset. 
Oakensen et al (2002) argued that at a conceptual level there is no such tension, 
the NIM can provide a framework within which neighbourhood policing may operate but 
forces struggled to reconcile the two.  In 2006, ACPO issued Practice Advice on 
Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing, which was intended to 
“integrate neighbourhood policing into mainline [sic] policing by adopting the principles 
of NIM” (NCPE, 2006: 6).  However, this did not appear to have garnered much attention 
in the research cases and, certainly, nobody seemed to understand that the conflict 
between the two might be ameliorated if the NIM was implemented in the way in which it 
was conceived.    
 
County’s Intelligence Architecture  
An intelligence unit analyst (N023) felt that the NIM allowed her to make “informed” 
rather than “random” decisions.  A second analyst (N024) said that the NIM had the 
potential to make the BCU more intelligence-led.  However, she highlighted that this 
relied on the BCU receiving “good quality intelligence” which it generally lacked.   An 
intelligence researcher (N021) said that the increasing fragmentation of the BCU’s staff 
(into the cell team, tactical teams, intervention team, etc.) had meant that it was even more 
difficult to get good intelligence into the system because of poor communication between 
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the teams and the intelligence unit.  He said that the unit had to take the information it was 
given because it would take too much time to train frontline staff.  The second analyst 
(N024) said the result was an overloaded system with information of very little 
intelligence value.  She said, for example, that over a 6-month period she received just 17 
pieces of intelligence on dwelling burglaries (a control strategy priority).   
This ‘clogging up’ of the intelligence system with extraneous information was 
also a problem in Urban and across the police service (see Cope et al, 2003).  Moreover, 
this was one of the major complaints about the old collator system (see for example 
Wilmer, 1970).  This highlights that the change from the collator’s card indices to 
computerised databases did not necessarily bring with it the filtering or the focus that was 
needed.  However, and perhaps more importantly in the context of this research, it also 
demonstrates that commanders are very poor at conveying their priorities and intelligence 
requirements to their staff (at its simplest, the failure to tell people what information you 
want, is almost bound to mean that they do not collect it).  At the very least it indicates 
that County’s internal communication was not as efficient as it needed to be. 
A CDRP chief inspector (N029) felt that an intelligence void had developed 
because the service profile of the force had changed so much.  Older detectives, wedded 
to traditional reactive practice, did not want to change.  Younger uniformed officers 
simply did not understand the intelligence cycle.  All of the uniformed officers 
interviewed said that they understood the need to pass information to the intelligence unit 
but the training that they had received largely was limited to the inputting of information 
to County’s intelligence database.  The schools liaison officer (N074) was the only one of 
the four able to articulate why that might be important.  In Urban, uniformed officers had 
been contemptuous of the local intelligence unit.  However, in County the majority of 
uniform officers interviewed simply had no opinion either of the unit or of intelligence.  
This should have been of concern to the SMT.  
Relationships inside the intelligence unit generally were harmonious.  However, 
the senior analyst (N022) said that the relationship between the civilian intelligence 
manager (N019) and the police FIOs was problematic.  The tension between the manager 
and the FIOs was symptomatic of the kind of cultural tensions I described earlier.  The 
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FIOs, fully trained and experienced sworn police officers, were responsible for 
overseeing the proactive operations that emanated from the unit and for liaising with the 
CID or uniformed investigators.  The senior analyst (N022) said that the FIOs resented 
being tasked by the civilian intelligence manager even though she was the administrative 
head of the unit.   
The senior analyst (N022) said that the FIOs also complained about the increasing 
civilianisation of the unit.  For example, the recruitment of a new assistant analyst was 
questioned by the FIOs.  Jones and Newburn (1997) have argued that there may be a 
variety of motives for the civilianisation of police posts.  Commonly, posts in intelligence 
work are civilianised because it is felt that they can be filled more economically by 
civilians and the sworn officers they replace can be released to operational duties.  
Respondents in both cases questioned whether the balance of intelligence units had been 
allowed to tip too far so that the proactive capability of the intelligence unit was limited 
by the lack of sworn officers available to develop information. 
However, Jones and Newburn (1997) highlighted that for the police 
civilianisation has always meant growth.  The increasing civilianisation of intelligence 
work may explain, at least in part, the size of modern local intelligence units.   The senior 
analyst said that there was a noticeable change in the officers’ attitudes when, in a change 
of policy, the civilian intelligence manager (N019) was promoted out of the unit and was 
replaced by a detective sergeant.  As this change was made towards the end of the study 
period, the reason for it was not fully explored.  However, the antipathy between police 
and civilian staff described here may well have been a factor. 
In County, some training was provided for some staff.  The intelligence manager 
(N019) attended Centrex’s National Intelligence Manager’s Course.  The senior analyst 
(N022) and all of the unit’s analysts completed the National Intelligence Analysts 
Training (NIAT) or the alternative Research and Intelligence Support Centre (RISC) 
courses.  They also completed a variety of short developmental courses.  One of the 
analysts (N023) said that though she had attended the former, she had not received any 
training in the basics of intelligence work.  Another analyst (N024) attended the RISC 
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course but found that it ignored the practicalities of the work and the production of the 
NIM’s key intelligence products.   
The extent to which anyone can learn a job simply by attending a training course 
is debatable and that was recognised by both the principal intelligence analyst (N026) and 
the senior analyst (N022) who at their respective levels provided ongoing support 
programmes for analysts and other intelligence staff.  However, there was evidence that 
despite their best efforts, problems remained.  In a further example of the shortcomings of 
the police’s intelligence structures, a local authority analyst tasked with collecting 
incident data for the county council (N08) admitted that he regularly received police data 
that breached the ‘need to know’ principle and that in some cases revealed personal data 
or sensitive personal data (within the meaning specified by the Data Protection Act 1998).  
This included data that identified police sources, that had not been accurately risk 
assessed and that was transmitted without regard for the GPMS.  I argue that this 
demonstrates that, just as in Urban, despite County’s efforts to professionalise their 
intelligence processes, some fundamental inefficiencies lingered.  
  
Summary of Analysis 
This chapter has shown that just as in Urban, County failed to implement the NIM in its 
purest form.  I have argued that there was not the outright resistance to the model at the 
elite level that was evident in Urban, but efforts to establish it at force level were 
hamstrung by: senior commanders’ failure to grasp what it truly meant to be 
intelligence-led; by an over-emphasis on performance rather than on outcomes; and by 
what one respondent termed ‘investigative orthodoxy’ – doing things the way that they 
had always been done.  The lack of an effective champion for intelligence work and for 
the NIM at the highest level, and also the force’s neighbourhood policing programme 
were significant factors in that failure.  Not one respondent in County questioned the 
appropriateness of the NIM to their work.  In fact, there was a complete absence of 
challenge to the model.  In my view, that says much more about the police hierarchy and 
the difficulty that staff have in challenging senior officers than it does about their real 
feelings about the NIM. 
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On the surface, the NIM seemed to have contributed positively to the development 
of County’s consultative arrangements with policing partners.  However, Senior 
commanders maintained full control over policing strategies, limiting partners’ 
involvement in decision-making forums.  Partners’ willingness to defer to the 
‘professional judgement’ of the police suggested that they too were locked into outmoded 
organisational cultures and traditions.  At the elite level, there was an obvious tension 
between meeting performance targets and responding to evidence-based intelligence 
assessments which had profound implications for resource allocation in mainstream 
policing.   
Despite the best efforts of senior figures in the intelligence milieu, progress in 
implementing the model was extremely slow and there was an orthodoxy about 
investigative practice that masked a continuing struggle for resources between County’s 
specialist detective force and BCUs; a struggle which the BCUs were losing because the 
power of the specialist detectives remained unchallenged by the force elite.  Without such 
a challenge, the specialist detective force played no meaningful part in supporting the 
work of County’s BCUs whose performance suffered, in turn, because local commanders 
were unable to get the operational help they needed.  The County case provided a good 
example of the service’s continuing reluctance to implement meaningful change in that 
context.   
At BCU level, NIM structures and processes were more fully formed than they 
were in Urban.  The significant difference between the two was that in County the 
commander was a far more effective champion for the NIM.  As its most powerful 
advocate in County, he had the inclination, the means and the capability to carry through 
his plan to ‘professionalise’ BCU business through the application of the NIM.  He 
believed that the model had the potential to underpin a new body of professional 
knowledge for the police service, and he took positive action to develop intelligence work 
in his BCU and to reconcile the demands of both priority crime and ASB.   
However, the pressure to meet performance targets and communities’ 
expectations of policing meant that the commander’s aspirations for the NIM were 
limited both by those expectations and by the relatively small number of staff that he was 
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willing or was able  to abstract from the ‘ordinary business’ of policing.  Though there 
was an increasing acceptance of the benefits of intelligence analysis, that did not 
necessarily translate into greater acceptance of the NIM as the organising framework for 
operational policing.  Though local intelligence staff welcomed the model, the evidence 
that it actually delivered real improvements in the intelligence process was, once again, 
limited.  Certainly, some pretty fundamental inefficiencies remained. 
Overall, there was some evidence that the NIM overcame the established values of 
the pre-existing occupational culture and the hierarchical tradition of the police 
organisation.   However, there was little to suggest that the model delivered the 
improvements in mainstream policing that Phillips promised.  Even though County 
expended a great deal of its organisational energy in an attempt to achieve NIM 
compliance, the benefit of its efforts either to County or its policing partners could not 
easily be determined.  Ultimately, just as in the Urban case, it was hard to avoid the 
conclusion that though at the level of presentation everything changed, in reality there 
was little meaningful change in County. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter concludes the thesis by exploring what the story of the NIM reveals 
about the police organisation.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, policing is 
once again under intense scrutiny.  Questions about the capacity and capability of forces 
to respond effectively to the challenges of organised crime and terrorism, whilst meeting 
the crime-fighting and security needs of local communities drive debates about the 
capacity and capability of the existing structure of the service.  The Coalition 
Government’s plans to replace police authorities with elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners occupy the minds of senior commanders and all of this plays out against 
the wider background of the Government’s austerity measures that, according to ACPO, 
threatens the jobs of 12,000 police officers and 16,000 civilian staff over the next four 
years (Dodd and Travis, 2011).   
I have argued that in principle, Phillips’ plans could have allowed the police 
service to meet at least some of these challenges.  The NIM’s focus on inclusivity, 
managing demand and allocating resources in more intelligent ways, promised much.  
However, the previous chapters have demonstrated the failure of the NIM as Phillips 
conceived it.  Given the history of police and public policymaking, the NIM’s failure to 
revolutionise policing should come as no surprise.  I argue that what is important here is 
to identify why the NIM failed and to highlight what the NIM narrative says about the 
culture and organisation of British policing in the modern era.   
This analysis suggested that despite its rhetoric, the service remained wedded to 
orthodoxy.  The Home Office had more control over policing than ever before.  The 
cultural division identified by Vincent in the 1880s, confirmed by the Dixon Committee 
in the 1930s and by King-Taylor in the 1990s still existed at the time of this research.  The 
reactive policing paradigm still dominated and intelligence work continued to be afforded 
low status.  In this concluding chapter, I will synthesise the foregoing data and analysis to 
complete my answer to the research question “What is the National Intelligence Model, 
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why did it emerge and how has it influenced police organisational structures and 
investigative practice”? 
 
ILP in the Modern Era 
The NIM was claimed to represent the apotheosis of ILP in Britain.  Phillips was not the 
first to use ILP strategies in British policing (Charles Vincent could probably lay claim to 
that title) but his belief in the superiority of the proactive paradigm and the utility of 
intelligence-led methods motivated him to become the first chief officer to effect the 
fundamental structural changes in his force that a real commitment to ILP required.  He 
created the KPM and convinced of its success, commissioned the NIM.  He used 
undoubted advocacy and marketing skills to persuade his peers that they too could reap 
the benefits of ILP if they followed his lead.    
The NIM owed its genesis to Phillips’ belief in the value of intelligence work and 
to the popular perception that the strategies he pursued in Kent (that have come to be 
accepted as the standard for ILP in Britain) were qualitatively ‘better’ than traditional 
reactive investigative practices pursued elsewhere.  His policy entrepreneurship was the 
key factor in persuading the ACPO council to ratify the NIM and to support his overtures 
to the Home Office to accept it as the model for operational policing in the new 
millennium but his evidence that it could make a significant difference in the mainstream 
was partial and equivocal.   
I have argued throughout this study that Phillips’ strategies have achieved far less 
than the rhetoric suggests.  Phillips’ evidence for the success of the KPM was equivocal 
and evidence that the NIM could revolutionise policing practice is no less ambiguous.  In 
reality, ILP has not been adopted as a policing strategy to the extent either that its 
supporters have claimed, or some commentators have suggested.  Of course ILP 
strategies are used in mainstream policing throughout Britain.  However, they have 
usually been employed in addition to, rather than as a replacement for, traditional reactive 
approaches and then only at the margins of investigative activity.  They certainly do not 
represent the paradigm shift in investigative practice that some would have us believe. 
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Why have ILP strategies not been used more widely or more consistently?  The 
NIM meetings observed in this study provide some clues.  There was little evidence that 
police commanders wanted to change their approach to the policing problems they faced.  
They dominated the meetings, whose rigid structure and format constrained innovation 
and creativity.  There was little evidence of any enthusiasm for problem-solving and those 
who might have offered novel, perhaps non-police, perspectives were either excluded or 
were discouraged from making any real contribution.  Much of the detail of the meetings 
was pre-scripted and delivered in PowerPoint presentations.  Performance dominated 
both discourse and intent.  Meaningful decisions (such as those around priorities) were 
taken outside the meeting according to well-established (what I have called, orthodox) 
criteria.  The result was that, on the few occasions that operational responses were 
discussed in open forum, it was the same menu of ‘tried and tested’ options (that began 
with ‘high visibility’ patrolling of the problem area) that was explored. 
  Observations of the NIM meetings and of the intelligence units in action, showed 
that the mode of policing shaped the data collected by the police rather than vice versa.  
For example, having well-staffed burglary and robbery focus desks meant that a great 
deal of data was collected on burglary and robbery, which reinforced decisions to focus 
on those offences at the expense of others that communities were arguing were of much 
more concern to them.          
I agree with Williamson et al (2007: 653) that the change from reactive to 
proactive intelligence-led investigations was an attempt to engineer a paradigm shift in 
investigative practice.  Civilian surveillance operatives and analysts did join police 
officers in attempting to convict offenders or at least disrupt their activities but the covert 
methods I described earlier (see Table 1) percolated down to the mainstream much less 
frequently than the rhetoric suggested.  This was because of specialist detective 
commanders’ concerns about compromising those methods (through overuse or through 
the revealing of methodologies) and because they usually required skills, abilities or 
resources (including human resources) that simply did not exist in the mainstream.48  
                                                 
48 The notable exception here is the use of informers which, as I discussed earlier, have been used extensively at 
all levels of the service throughout its history.  
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However, I argue that their limited use in the mainstream also can be attributed to a clash 
of two distinct policing ideologies.  
I argue that ILP has (at least) two dimensions.  Firstly, there is a kind of 
‘administrative’ function, which relies on intelligence analysts and uses analytical 
techniques such as crime mapping and hotspotting (see Figure 1).  Home Office officials 
and the police elite value that function highly because in addition to providing 
intelligence for action, it provides data on police performance which is always at the top 
of their list of concerns and it does not threaten traditional practice.  This kind of ILP 
activity dominated the NIM meetings.  It is more closely aligned with a kind of 
‘preventative proactive policing’ that emerged from the Scarman Report (1981), and 
which pays homage to the policing philosophies of Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
Kenneth Newman and his successors, Peter Imbert and Paul Condon. 
Secondly, there is what I term an ‘operationalised ILP’ which is much more 
explicitly about crime control.  This may also rely, in the first instance, on the work of 
analysts but in this case the emphasis is on techniques such as network analysis (see 
Figure 2) and the targeting of groups or individuals using covert methods with their arrest 
(or some other intervention to prevent further offending) the intended outcome.  That is to 
say that there is a more explicit and direct link between the analysis, the investigative 
action and outcomes.  Though there has been some ‘cross-pollination’, most ILP activity 
observed in the mainstream in this study served the administrative function whilst the 
specialist detective force held a near-monopoly on ‘operationalised ILP’.   
In reorganising the Kent force, Phillips aimed inter alia both to break with the 
traditional reactive investigative paradigm and to galvanise the development of 
‘operationalised ILP’ across his force.  The reader has seen that few other senior 
commanders seemed willing to match Phillips’ commitments.  ILP strategies have much 
to offer in the mainstream, in terms of shaping patrol strategies more effectively and 
contributing to other problem-solving activity.  However, this research suggested that 
police commanders see ILP as a factor only in planned proactive activity.  That 
interpretation of intelligence largely fails to take proper account both of its predictive 
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value and of its capacity to inform strategic decision-making and longer-term 
problem-solving approaches.   
It also significantly underestimates the value of intelligence in managing risk. 
This has meant that ILP has rarely been a significant factor in those situations that involve 
“something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had better do 
something now” (Bittner, 1974: 30), which make up such a large part of police activity.  
As a consequence, by far the greater proportion of the policing effort has continued to be 
directed in the traditional reactive mode, variously described in this research as: the 
“ordinary day-to-day work of detection”; “the background policing”; or the “85 to 90 
percent of police business that had to be carried on” to meet government and community 
expectations of the police as the primary agency of social control.   
Gill (2000) questioned whether ILP really represented a fundamental shift in 
policing or was simply the latest fad to be ‘bolted-on’ to existing structures and processes.  
The case studies in this research suggested that the latter is true; as little as 3.5-5% of 
resources in a typical BCU were likely to be devoted to proactive policing.  Despite the 
rhetoric, the service has continued to put its faith in an orthodox approach that combines a 
‘fire brigade’ response style for the bulk of mainstream policing with a reliance on 
specialist detective squads to combat serious crime.49   
That is an approach that police commanders have relied upon for almost 130 years 
and it is one that they find reassuring and familiar.  Largely, that approach has allowed the 
service to meet the performance targets set by central government (and therefore to avoid 
sanction) and to satisfy the normative expectations of the communities it polices, without 
serious or sustained challenge.  I argue that in fact, it has become a straightjacket; limiting 
and constraining action and preventing commanders embracing a network logic to use 
their two greatest resources, people and knowledge, in the most innovative and 
productive ways.  Maximising returns on police resources is likely to be even more 
important in the rapidly approaching era of austerity for public services.  The police elite 
                                                 
49 I recognise that in the history of public policing there have been variations upon these styles from time to 
time.  However, I believe that this ‘broad brush’ approach describes the major part of police endeavour in that 
period. 
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may yet be forced to revisit the NIM and harness its potential for more effective allocation 
of scarce resources. 
 
Intelligence Work in the Mainstream 
A significant factor in what I argue has been the ultimate failure of the NIM, has been its 
inability to effect meaningful changes in mainstream policing’s intelligence architecture.  
Indeed, the failings of the pre-existing intelligence architecture that have been highlighted 
by so many other researchers (including; Cope, 2008, 2004 and 2003; Maguire and John, 
2006; Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005 and 2003, Grieve, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004 and Gill, 
2000) should have been obvious to the police elite.  The notion that intelligence should 
drive activity in the mainstream has never gained sufficient traction amongst either 
service commanders or frontline patrol officers.  Self-evidently, intelligence should be at 
the heart of ILP, just as it should be at the heart of policing in the modern era.  However, 
as the reader has seen throughout this research, the problems in intelligence work, 
particularly in local intelligence work, run deep.  The capacity of the intelligence system, 
as it was configured during this research, to ‘lead’ either operational policing or 
investigative strategy in the mainstream, was highly questionable.   
The assertion that the information technology revolution altered the “structural, 
symbolic and social organization of policing” (Postman cited in Chan, 2001: 140), was 
not borne out by the local intelligence work examined in this study because few of the 
problems highlighted by other researchers (such as Kleiven, 2006; Innes et al, 2003; 
Cope, 2003), had been resolved.  For example, analysts apart, civilian staff received little 
formal training and sworn officers were still posted to local intelligence units because 
they could not work on the frontline for one reason or another, rather than because of any 
particular skills that they could bring to their new posts.  Moreover, very few detectives 
played any part in local intelligence work.  Respondents described fundamental problems 
in that arena, including matters relating to: the physical security of intelligence units, data 
collection, data management, clashes of culture (between sworn officers and civilian 
staff), and ignorance of the basic tenets of intelligence work and the NIM. 
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The problem of intelligence may not be that the police do not have enough of it but 
that they are unwilling or unable to use it intelligently enough to determine priorities and 
to guide activity.  Certainly, the command teams observed in this research were unwilling 
to look beyond their performance targets, to put their faith in their intelligence analyses 
and short-termism dominated decision-making forums.  Emphasising the importance of 
intelligence to policing, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Sir John 
Stevens (2001), described the structure of an effective intelligence system as a pyramid.   
He argued that the most important part of the system was the local or BCU level because 
it was there that most officers operated and that most intelligence was collected.   
Of course, collection is fundamentally important but it is only one element in an 
effective intelligence management system.  Staff must be properly trained, systems must 
be established so that information can be put in context, so that its provenance can be 
checked, and risks accurately assessed and managed.  Above all, commanders must have 
faith in their intelligence units, and be able to trust the intelligence analyses they generate 
so that they can take decisions that are truly intelligence-led.   However, this does not 
describe the police local intelligence system as it was configured at the time of this 
research.  Taken together with these findings, the failures of NCIS and its successor 
agency, SOCA, (which will soon be subsumed into the new National Crime Agency) I 
suggest that a fundamental re-evaluation of intelligence work in British policing is long 
overdue.  
 
Orthodoxy 
Researchers such as Loveday (1991) and Reiner (1991) noted that police authorities have 
been ineffective in influencing the delivery of policing services because inter alia they 
too often have deferred to chief constables’ ‘professional expertise’.  That deference was 
also identified in this research.  However, I have argued throughout this research that just 
as partners (including police authorities) have deferred to the ‘professional judgement’ of 
the police, so too have the uniformed branch’s commanders deferred to the professional 
judgement of specialist detective commanders without sufficiently rigorous challenge.  
This allowed the detectives to maintain control over a system which largely remained 
 271 
unreformed since the 1960s.  In the process, the ‘class system’ in policing that I described 
earlier, was perpetuated and affirmed to the detriment of a whole service approach.   
In the period of the research, neither the service elite nor its executives 
demonstrated much enthusiasm for making the changes that would deliver the whole 
service approach that Phillips demanded.  Resistance to change has been a characteristic 
of the CID and the specialist detective force, just as (with some notable exceptions) a 
reluctance to enforce change in detectives’ practice has been characteristic of the 
uniformed branch.  For example, the service elite’s failure to force the CID to engage with 
the UBP experiment ultimately meant that it was unable to harness the experience and 
expertise of the detective force for crime-fighting in the mainstream.  Instead, detectives 
(particularly those in the specialist detective force) continued to emphasise their 
separateness and their class superiority over the rest of the service and continued to 
operate in keeping with their own priorities rather than those of the service as a whole.  In 
at least one case, commanders in the mainstream were complicit in this because they 
allowed the detective force to monopolise resources that uniformed commanders needed. 
In the modern era, perhaps the most notable exception to that charge was Sir 
Robert Mark’s whose efforts, in the 1970s, to root out CID corruption challenged the 
power of the CID and had the effect of reforming some aspects of specialist detective 
work.  However, in failing to reform detective work more broadly, Mark never fully 
confronted the isolation and elitism of the specialist detectives.  Consequently it was 
allowed to continue to the detriment of the wider service.  That failure was problematic in 
a number of ways.  Firstly, it perpetuated an action-oriented crime control culture that 
prioritised arrests and seizures of illicit commodities over crime prevention, 
problem-solving and other community-focused activities.  Secondly, it encouraged the 
perpetuation of orthodox organisational responses to policing problems and largely 
ignored the public service reforms of the modern era.  
The tension between the policing of priority and second order criminality has been 
the subject of much research.  That tension was a significant factor in the story of the 
NIM.  The tensions observed by John and Maguire (2004, 2003) in their early evaluation 
of the model, were just as evident in this research.  Operational decisions were frequently 
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made according to the dictum ‘what gets measured gets done’.  Police commanders put 
the bulk of their resources into the policing of ‘priority crime’ because it was measured by 
the Home Office and afforded a lesser priority to the policing of ASB, which seemed to be 
of much greater concern to communities.  Commanders’ concerns about meeting Home 
Office targets above all others, demonstrates their deference to that department and 
suggests a concern to avoid sanction.   
In the eyes of many commanders, the NIM was never seen as anything more than 
an intelligence process and it was accorded the importance that this research suggests that 
intelligence in the mainstream has always been given.  Certainly, it was never seriously 
considered as the organising framework for operational policing that Phillips envisaged.  
Consequently, little thought was given to ways in which it might have been made 
compatible with the neighbourhood policing programme (or vice versa).  Even where the 
benefits of doing so were obvious, few efforts were made to bring the local NIM and 
neighbourhood policing arrangements together.  For example, in the Urban case the 
merging of the NIM tactical meeting and the JAG would have been a positive (and should 
have been an obvious) step in advancing local partnership. 
In neither case study was commanders’ avowed enthusiasm for partnership 
working and inclusiveness, matched by much in the way of meaningful action.  The result 
was that partners had little influence on decision-making or resource allocation or 
decisions about priorities, resources and police operations.  The mainstream milieu was 
dominated by a kind of ‘investigative orthodoxy’ so that strategies were conceived and 
decisions made, in the same ways they always had been.   Concerns about meeting 
performance targets imposed by central government were always at the forefront of 
commanders’ minds and seemed to be the decisive factor in every decision about the 
allocation of resources.  Novelty, creativity and invention were largely absent from 
operational planning forums.   
What was striking in the cases explored was that apart from a little verbal sparring 
over priorities, among the few partners who attended the meetings, the reaction to 
commanders’ intransigence was muted.  Partners generally adopted a passive, deferential 
stance and they seemed unwilling to challenge senior officers’ ‘professional judgement’.  
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I argued earlier that the service’s need to control the operational environment 
demonstrates that it continues to be locked into traditional patterns of behaviour that limit 
creativity and constrain action.  This research suggests that partners too, may be locked 
into outmoded organisational cultures and traditions. 
That suggested a wider problem for the future of local police/ community 
partnerships.  Until the ‘compliance culture’ that I have referred to throughout this thesis 
is challenged effectively, significant operational decisions will continue to be made by the 
police alone and partnership meetings will continue to be little more than talking shops.  
The merging of the NIM and CDA assessments (recommended by the CDA review) has 
the potential to cut costs, save organisational energy and advance the cause of real 
partnership.  However, that will not necessarily remove the tension between central 
targets and local priorities, described in this research, that is part of a much wider debate 
about central control of the public police, the purpose of policing and the utility (indeed 
the necessity) of a ‘whole service’ or ‘single service’ approach. 
 
What Does the +IM Reveal About the Police Organisation? 
It is possible to interpret the Home Office’s codification of the NIM as a further step in the 
centralisation of British policing.  After all, Home Secretary David Blunkett did threaten 
to force the NIM on the service.  However, this study suggests that though the Home 
Office was keen to see the improvements in police performance that the ACPO President 
promised, its plans for the model do not appear to have included any scheme to increase 
its control of operational policing in Britain.  Even if the history of policing might cause 
the reader to infer otherwise.   
It was Sir David Phillips, who provided the inspiration for the NIM.  He had a 
‘grand plan’ for intelligence and operational policing in the mainstream and wanted the 
model to underpin police intelligence work and embed intelligence-led practice in 
policing across Britain.   He was a proactive and committed policy entrepreneur who 
sought to initiate change within the service.  His credibility as an operational leader, his 
powerful advocacy and his professional position made a compelling case for the NIM, 
which ACPO was happy to support.  Particularly, when his plans were backed by the 
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Association’s political masters in the Home Office.  The die was cast when that support 
was translated into a statutory code of practice for the NIM.  However, serious failings in 
the NIM and in the implementation process were identified almost from the outset.  
Despite researchers’ concerns, the Home Office allowed an essentially unreconstructed 
version of the model to be rolled out across Britain because officials believed they were 
endorsing a policy that was uncontroversial and cost-effective.  Above all, they believed 
they were delivering something that the police themselves had demanded.  
For Home Office senior official (N065), the attraction of the NIM was that it 
allowed the department to demonstrate its continuing commitment to efficiency and best 
value in policing and those considerations outweighed concerns (highlighted by 
researchers). About the utility of the model and the potential conflict between it and the 
other significant change programme of that period, neighbourhood policing.  In 
embracing a business model that had already shown itself to be immature and 
underdeveloped and which was bound to conflict with the other change programme in the 
same period, ACPO took the same leap into the unknown as the Home Office.  However, 
beyond the rarefied atmosphere of ACPO, NCIS and the Home Office, the 
inconsistencies and ambiguities of the NIM were obvious to many of Phillips’ peers.   
Yet, there remained a chance that Phillips could achieve his aims and that the NIM 
project could succeed.  As Sabatier (1986) has highlighted, public policies rarely achieve 
their aims without revision and a revised model that incorporated the changes 
recommended by researchers (such as Collier, 2006 and John and Maguire, 2003) might 
just have gained wider acceptance.  However, to have any chance of success, those tasked 
with implementing the NIM needed to take proper account of: the conflicting ideologies, 
interests and values in policing; how underlying factors such as performance and 
financial targets (that featured heavily in accounts in this research) would affect that 
process; how other Home Office-sponsored initiatives (principally in this case, the 
neighbourhood policing programme); and the compromises that would have to be made 
with those who were expected to work with the model.  This research suggests that just 
did not happen in a sufficiently meaningful way. 
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The potential for friction between the NIM and the neighbourhood policing 
programme should have been obvious from the outset.  That two competing and 
far-reaching change policies should be introduced into policing at the same time may 
have been unfortunate.  That there was so little coordination of the programmes is, by any 
objective criteria, inexplicable.  The problems created by such an uncoordinated and 
deficient approach to implementation, were not confined to the day-to-day business of 
reconciling competing demands for staff or resources.  They extended to the very top of 
the police service where competition between the two programmes provided a focus for 
the continuing rivalry between those committed to a public reassurance agenda and others 
wedded to the idea of policing as crime control.   
The two cases studied for this thesis provide good examples of the reality of NIM 
implementation.  In the Urban case, senior commanders simply failed to implement the 
model at the executive level of the force because they saw it both as an imposition and a 
policy that was unsuitable for their needs.  Ultimately, it was ignored at the elite level of 
the force.  Paradoxically, in pursuit of NIM compliance (a topic to which I return later), 
commanders forced through NIM arrangements with some vigour in their BCUs where 
the attention of HMIC inspectors primarily was focused.  In County, there was a greater 
will to implement the model but at the elite level that just was not carried through with 
sufficient vigour or expertise.  There was an ‘investigative orthodoxy’ and an inability to 
comprehend what it really meant to be intelligence-led that mitigated meaningful 
outcomes.  Manning’s (2008: 253) assertion that “organisations do what they have done 
well in the past” had real relevance in that case.   
Beyond the individual cases studied it is difficult, case by case, to unpick the 
reasons for the elite’s rejection of the NIM and I do not seek to generalise the findings in 
those cases to the whole service.  However, my analysis of NIM implementation in 
Chapter 6 together with the two cases detailed suggest that the following (either singly or 
in combination) were significant factors in the ultimate rejection of the model by the elite 
as the template for operational policing in the mainstream: scepticism about its real value, 
some felt the model to be demonstrably under-developed, inefficient and (in the 
management speak of the era) ‘not fit for purpose’; failings in the pre-existing intelligence 
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architecture; a reluctance to see the cost benefits of undertaking significant structural and 
organisational change; and rejection of the NIM on ideological grounds.   
In the previous section, I argued that orthodoxy has constrained innovation and 
creativity in operational policing.  Another dimension to that orthodoxy, which is relevant 
to this study, is the deference of the service elite to central government, a feature since the 
creation of the new police.   Many commentators have highlighted that the history of 
policing has been characterised by a steady accretion of power over the police to central 
government at the expense of chief officers and police authorities (see for example: 
Reiner, 2010; Jones, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1997).  Perhaps that is simply the 
political reality.  The realpolitik, of that relationship may not wholly explain the rejection 
of Phillips’ plans but it is relevant because it may explain why resistance to the NIM, 
largely was covert.  Home Office control over the other parties to the tripartite agreement 
was so complete that, even though the NIM was an explicitly police-led initiative, neither 
chief officers nor police authorities were willing to openly challenge what they 
interpreted as that department’s will.   
Another perspective on covert resistance to rules has been provided by Reiner 
(2010).  He advanced two competing views on the relationship between the rule of law 
and working practice.  The structuralist view is that police break the rules with the tacit 
encouragement of senior officers, the judiciary and the state elite.  The alternative, 
interactionist, view is that formal rules like the NIM’s statutory code are merely 
presentational; they justify conduct but they do not affect practice.  In that context, the 
police subculture (discussed below) is the key to understanding practice.  Given the 
foregoing analysis, the reader can see that for senior commanders the NIM rules did not 
affect practice in any meaningful way.  Even though HMIC inspections of the NIM left 
much to be desired, it is difficult to see that as ‘tacit encouragement’ to break the rules.  
Particularly, when Home Office enthusiasm for the NIM was so clear.        
That unwillingness to openly challenge formal rules which, for a variety of 
reasons, many senior commanders demonstrated little appetite, was the driver of a 
‘compliance agenda’.  Through habit or by design, chief officers’ interactionist response 
was to demonstrate ‘NIM compliance’.  This meant that they avoided official sanction for 
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failing to effect the structural changes in their forces that Phillips’ original plans had 
demanded.  However, compliance brought a significant cost.  Even a half-hearted 
response (sufficient to provide that thin veneer of compliance) required the commitment 
of some staff and some resources (which of course was a world away from the whole 
service response that Phillips had envisaged).    Intelligence assessments would have to be 
prepared and meetings would have to be held, according to prescribed timetables. 
In practice, the result was that orders were passed down the line.  The NIM was 
publicised and marketed across the service even though the implementation strategy, 
freely chosen by ACPO, meant that few of those tasked with promulgating the model in 
forces understood it any better than their audiences.  The absence of a coherent and 
credible intelligence architecture that might drive that ‘whole service’ approach in 
mainstream policing undermined even the best of intentions of frontline staff.  The result 
was that the service did what it has done so often, it muddled through, it got the job done, 
without stopping to ask whether ‘the job’ could be done in a more effective way or to 
question whether it needed to be done at all.  That pragmatism is the product of a tradition 
and culture that has its roots in the history of policing and which continues to underpin the 
rational-legal, bureaucratic, police organisation in England and Wales.  Despite efforts in 
the modern era to reform the service along business lines, elements of the militaristic 
hierarchical ‘force’ remain.  That is to say, that it is common for individuals or teams to 
carry out an act or perform a function simply because they are told to do so.  Establishing 
those orders as part of the rational-legal bureaucracy (as in this case, where the 
requirement for NIM assessments was quickly incorporated into the pre-existing 
collection planning and tasking regime) serves only to reinforce staff compliance. 
  At one level, it is clear that the police service cannot be equated with the armed 
services nor are police staff unthinking and unquestioning automatons.  Police 
professionalism is under the daily scrutiny of the Home Office, police authorities, the 
judiciary and the public who are, variously, customers, adversaries and paymasters (and 
sometimes are all three contemporaneously).  All expect the police to perform their duties 
in efficient, effective, economic and transparent ways.  However it is also true that within 
the service the tradition of respectful deference to senior officers remains a factor in the 
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working lives of police officers.  That should be unsurprising.  It is just one generation 
since new recruits at the Hendon Police College were taught how to salute and to march 
before they were taught anything about policing practice.    
The persistence of an authoritarian command structure in which instructions and 
directives flow one-way, from the top down, represents a kind of operant conditioning 
that  can explain much of what may otherwise be inexplicable in this research.  It explains 
the inflexibility and unwillingness to reach compromises with those expected to operate 
the model, of those tasked with rolling it out.  Deference to those above them in the 
hierarchy, which has those same roots of orthodoxy, explains why no one seems ever to 
have been tempted to tell the emperor that he had no clothes.  It explains, for example, 
why the Urban intelligence manager did not tell his SMT that they were usurping his 
position and undermining his relationship with his intelligence staff.  It explains why 
neither of the senior analysts could tell their respective commanders that they should be 
addressing the priorities identified by their intelligence assessments rather than relying 
wholly on performance data.  It also explains why it took the County DOI almost two 
years to gain control of the intelligence assets that should have been hers from the day that 
she assumed her post. 
The NIM narrative also highlighted that a differential value was placed on 
individuals (at least if judged against the police’s working rules).  Accordingly, staff had 
their particular place in the hierarchy so that a specialist detective was perceived to have 
more organisational value and personal power than a detective constable who in turn was 
more highly valued than a constable who could use an analyst’s desk as a repository for 
discarded; partly-consumed, foodstuffs, without fear of sanction.   
There was little overt resistance to the NIM.  However, I have argued at many 
points that compliance with the rules of the model, rather than a focus on outcomes, has 
been one of the central features of its story.  That compliance concealed a covert 
resistance to the significant structural change that proper implementation of the NIM 
required.  If only incidentally, it also enabled the ACPO membership to escape official 
sanction, to get on with the day-to-day business of policing and to await the next ‘big 
idea’ that surely was not very far over the horizon.  Assessing whether a policy has been 
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properly implemented is difficult because of the normative assumptions of public 
policymaking, the variations possible in the implementation process and the complexity 
of (in this case) the policing institution.  However, here, the NIM codes and guidance 
manuals provided a clear benchmark against which implementation could be judged.  
Ultimately, this research suggested that though a great deal of organisational energy was 
expended on Phillips’ grand plan, British policing ended up looking very much the way it 
had before the NIM story began. 
ACPO’s inability to coordinate the activities of its, traditionally fiercely 
independent, membership will come as no surprise to students of British policing.  
Though its council’s endorsement of the NIM, as the model for policing in the 
twenty-first century, might have been expected to carry more weight with its members.  
The Association’s quasi-official status and its role in determining policing policy has 
come under scrutiny in recent years.  There are concerns that an organisation that speaks 
for the public police service and is itself a private limited company, is exempt from the 
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (and therefore, lacks the level of 
transparency commensurate with its role), and that it engages in commercial activities 
that many consider incompatible with its public role (see for example, Lewis, 2009).   
In August 2010, those concerns led the Home Secretary to commission a review 
of police leadership (and training) by Peter Neyroud, then head of NPIA.  Neyroud’s 
(2011) review envisages the merging of the leadership functions of ACPO into a new 
police professional body (supported by a Royal Charter) that will be responsible inter alia 
for national organisational standards.  He proposes that the ‘executive board’ of the new 
body will have a wide membership that includes external, independent members and that 
it will be advised by a new council of chief constables.  Additionally, Neyroud has set out 
plans for a police professional body that will oversee such items as new national standards 
for policing.  It remains to be seen whether the Home Office accepts Neyroud’s 
recommendations in full.  However, they seem to have been positively received in 
Government and by many in the police service.  Certainly, this research suggests that 
those developments are necessary. 
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It is worth reflecting on the fate of another great hope for policing in the modern 
era that has been referred to throughout this study, COMPSTAT.50  COMPSTAT was 
introduced into the NYPD by Bratton, in the same period that Phillips was formulating the 
NIM.  It was adopted by many police departments in the USA and its putative success 
attracted the attention of academics and police departments across the world (many of the 
UK’s police elite visited New York City to see the system in action).  Bratton’s intention, 
just like Phillips, was that his model should influence decision-making at all levels of the 
police service.  However, researchers found that under COMPSTAT, strategic 
decision-making remained concentrated at the top of the organizational hierarchy rather 
than promoting initiative among frontline staff.  The rank and file were largely oblivious 
to the new model and it intruded little, if at all, into their daily work.  Just like the NIM, 
COMPSTAT departed markedly from what had been promised.  Rather than representing 
“a radical transformation in... business [simply] transplanted some new ways... without 
making much change to some very fundamental structures of police organizations” 
(Willis et al, 2003a: 77). 
As a postscript to the foregoing analysis; paradoxically, a recent redefinition of 
the model by NPIA (2011) means that it could now be argued that the NIM has been 
successfully implemented across Britain.  In contemporary official discourse the NIM is 
now defined as, “an intelligence-led, problem solving approach to crime and disorder 
[that] promotes partnership working and uses the management of information and 
intelligence” (NPIA, 2011: 1).  NPIA’s reinterpretation of the NIM amounts to a 
significant downgrading of Phillips’ plans; best captured by John and Maguire (2004: 9) 
who described  them as “a major effort both to promote effective ILP on a national basis 
and to begin to standardise intelligence-related structures, processes and practices across 
all forces”.   
By its action, NPIA has reduced the NIM to a mere process and, at a stroke, 
removed the need for any restructuring of the police organisation to meet the model’s 
aims.  ‘NIM Mark 2’ (or ‘NIM lite’) represents neither the organising framework for 
                                                 
50 This comparison is given even greater relevance by the appointment of Bratton as an adviser on policing to 
the current Prime Minister. 
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operational policing that Phillips intended, nor the model for policing that the Home 
Office thought it was getting when it included the NIM in the first NPP.   Perhaps, that 
process of redefinition should be viewed simply as the product of the kind of flexibility 
and resourcefulness that Sabatier (1986) highlighted as features of policy 
implementation.  However, as much as anything in this study, such ‘creativity’ 
demonstrates the elite’s rejection of a substantial and significant portion of Phillips’ plans 
for the NIM and for ILP in British Policing.   
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Appendix A – Sabatier’s Model of Policy Implementation 
(from Sabatier, 1986) 
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Appendix B – Thesis Aims and Objectives 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 
16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 
32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 
40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 
65, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 
76, 77, 84, 98, 99.
7, 8, 9, 
10
1.  Undertake case study research that includes 
interviews with:–
a) Members of the service elite, serving & retired 
officers and officials.
b) Police Authority members.
c) Home Office officials.
2.  Carry out site visits and observations.
3.  Undertake secondary research – published research, 
doctrine documents, official reports.
4.  Critically analyse that data through the lens of 
Sabatier’s account of variables in the implementation 
process.
Evaluate the 
implementation of 
the model
5.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 
16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 
32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 
40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 
65, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 
76, 77, 84, 98, 99.
7, 8, 9, 
10
1.  Undertake case study research that includes 
interviews with:–
a) Members of the service elite, serving & retired 
officers and officials.
b) Police Authority members.
c) Home Office officials.
2.  Carry out site visits and observations.
3.  Undertake secondary research – published research, 
doctrine documents, official reports.
4.  Critically analyse that data.
Evaluate the 
impact of the NIM 
on investigative 
practice and 
intelligence work 
in mainstream 
policing.
4.
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 27, 50, 
51, 65.
6, 7, 101.  Interview Sir David Phillips and others involved in 
formulating the NIM.
2.  Interview Home Office officials involved in the 
incorporation of the NIM into the first National Policing 
Plan.
3.  Undertake secondary research – published research, 
doctrine documents, official reports. 
4.  Critically analyse that data through lens of Kingdon’s 
‘Agenda Setting’ approach.
Explain the 
emergence of the 
NIM from that 
milieu.  
3.
27, 29, 33. 35, 36, 53, 
60, 63, 64, 79.
4, 7, 8, 
10
1.  Undertake secondary research – published research, 
doctrine documents, official reports.
2.  Interview serving and former police officers.
3.  Interview serving and former members of the police 
service elite.
4.  Critically analyse that data.
Explain the 
policing policy 
environment at the 
end of the 
twentieth century.
2.
2, 3, 46, 50, 53, 55, 59, 
60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 70.
1, 2, 4, 
10
1.  Undertake primary research of official documents in 
National Archive.
2.  Undertake primary research – audio recordings
3.  Interview former and serving police officers and 
police staff
4.  Undertake secondary research – published research, 
biographies
5.  Critically analyse that data.
Assess the extent 
to which 
developments in 
investigative 
practice and 
intelligence work 
contributed to the 
emergence of the 
NIM.
1.
Research Respondent 
+o.
Ch.ObjectivesDescriptionAim 
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Appendix C – CID Corruption 
 
Corruption amongst the detective ranks has always been a source of concern.  This 
appendix highlights two discrete periods in the history of the CID when corruption led to 
significant organisational change. 
 
The First Detectives 
The first detective officers continued the practices of the Bow Street Runners in 
associating with thieves and informers (Mayne, 1842 cited in Roach, 2004: 193).  Mayne 
conceded that the adoption of these ‘traditional’ practices could lead to “detections that 
might not otherwise have taken place” but he was convinced that the system used by the 
Runners was immoral and in any event would be unable to limit those activities in the 
longer term (1842 cited in Roach, 2004: 193).  Mayne’s instincts were proved correct by 
the Turf Fraud case which showed that the ‘new’ detectives were just as capable as the 
magistrates’ officers of being drawn into immoral and corrupt practices (Mayne, 1842 
cited in Roach, 2004). 
Many of those practices revolved around the activities of ‘common informers’.  
Victims of crime were unwilling to spare the time or the commitment to pursue criminal 
cases through the courts.  By representing an injured party in court, the common informer 
was able to fill a gap in the criminal justice system, receiving as a reward, a portion of any 
fine or other financial penalty imposed on the conviction of the offender (Roach, 2004).  
Predictably, the opportunities for collusion between detectives, victims and informers 
leading to corruption and perjury were “obvious, and were freely taken” (Roach, 2004: 
70).  Continuing public disquiet about detectives’ corruption (exemplified by the conduct 
uncovered by the Turf Fraud trials) finally led in 1878 to the establishment of the Ibbetson 
Commission which enquired inter alia into police corruption (Roach, 2004: 134).51  The 
Commission found that detectives’ relationships with informers were the primary cause 
                                                 
51 This was the result of the uncovering of a fraud network that involved senior detective officers; Nathaniel 
Druscovich, George Clarke and William Palmer (see Wade, S. (2007) Plain Clothes and Sleuths: A history of 
detectives in Britain.  Stroud: Tempus Publishing). 
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of corruption (Morris, 2007).  It recommended the establishment of a detective force that 
would be “solely under the command of other detectives” (cited in Roach, 2004: 143).   
However, Roach (2004: 143) has argued that it was “precisely” this separation of the 
detective force from mainstream policing and detectives’ “inward-looking isolation and 
lack of outsider supervision that opened the door to corruption”.   However, the 
Commission was persuaded of the need for new leadership of the detective force and its 
recommendations led to the appointment of Charles Vincent with a brief to root out 
corruption and reform the detective force. 
 
Robert Mark and CID Reform in London 
From the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s there seems to have been a 
concerted effort on the part of the Home Office to ameliorate the effects of the CID’s 
abuse of its monopoly powers.  In 1969, Home Secretary James Callaghan appointed 
Frank Williamson of HMIC to oversee an investigation into corruption involving three 
Metropolitan Police detectives.  Hobbs (1999:1) has noted that Williamson’s 
investigation was completely undermined by the fact that “information was leaked to 
officers under investigation, crucial documents disappeared, and senior detectives 
conducted a campaign of lies against him”.  This meant that Williamson’s inquiry was 
short-lived and ultimately did not lead to any prosecutions, and Williamson resigned in 
disgust.  However, the particular concerns about the prevalence of corruption amongst 
detectives in the Metropolitan Police raised by the inquiry stimulated the Home Office to 
redouble its efforts to reform the Met’s detective force.   
In 1972, Robert Mark, formerly chief officer of the disbanded Leicester City 
Police and latterly an Assistant Commissioner (AC) in the Met, was appointed out of 
‘left-field’ to the post of Metropolitan Police Commissioner with a mandate to deal with 
detectives’ corruption.  Effectively, given his short Met career, Mark was an outsider but 
he was able to exploit the inside knowledge he had gained in the post of AC to attack the 
CID’s working practices.  He was extremely critical of the CID’s autonomy (see Hobbs, 
1988).   
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The “entire system” of CID corruption practised by the “firm within a firm” of 
London detectives was the major focus of Mark’s time in office (Cox et al, 1977: 5).  Cox 
et al (1977) argued that Mark was aware that CID corruption was a significant problem 
but that he was not aware of its scale or extent until he assumed leadership of the force.  
Early in his tenure, fresh allegations of corruption were made against the Drugs Squad 
and the Flying Squad.  By this time, confidence in the detective force was so low that The 
Times newspaper published “serious allegations” against the detectives of the Obscene 
Publications Squad “because the editor and his legal advisers did not believe that if the 
allegations against the detectives were disclosed properly to the Metropolitan Police they 
would be properly investigated” (Mark, 1978: 107).  Mark suggested that a Home Office 
investigation of The Times was characterised by “ineptitude” but he was satisfied that the 
newspaper’s revelations had “disclosed to the world that there was a widespread and… 
justified lack of confidence in the way in which allegations of crime by Metropolitan 
detectives were investigated” (Mark, 1978: 108).   
Unlike their provincial counterparts the Met’s CID “enjoyed an immunity from 
external supervision and investigation” which facilitated a variety of wrong-doing (Mark, 
1978: 122).  This fell into three categories.  There was a comparatively minor form of 
institutional corruption which included suppressing charges or failing to bring previous 
convictions to notice.   Often this kind of corruption was done under the cover of 
recruiting informers.  Secondly, more “spectacular corruption” affecting senior officers or 
the specialist squads and thirdly, a “widespread general acceptance” that it was 
‘necessary’ to bend the rules (Mark, 1978: 122).  Mark (1978) considered that he owed it 
to the honest detectives to root out the bad.  He was moved to comment that in his view 
the CID at that time was "the most routinely corrupt organisation in London" (cited in 
Hobbs, 1988: 72-73). 
 As part of a wider programme of anti-corruption measures, Mark established 
‘A10’ Scotland Yard’s first internal affairs department to take over the investigation of 
crime committed by members of the CID.    The area detective commanders were relieved 
of their operational duties and instead assumed “advisory and supervisory” roles (Mark, 
1978: 128-129).  He appointed a new CID commander to take charge of the specialist 
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squads and directed that all detectives serving outside the specialist squads were put under 
the command of local uniformed commanders.  In the longer-term, plans were made for 
the routine “interchange” of CID and uniformed officers (Mark, 1978: 128-129).  
Rawlings (2006: 65) has argued that Mark’s efforts in this regard (which mirrored 
Vincent’s efforts almost 100 years earlier) were an attempt to stimulate the “moral 
re-education of detectives” through enforced transfers into the uniform. 
Mark’s reforms brought some success.  Within a year, two officers a week were 
leaving the force “prematurely” and bank robbery, “a crime particularly associated with 
police corruption” had fallen from the 65 offences recorded in the previous year to 26 
offences in 1973 (Hobbs, 1999: 1).  In April 1973, Mark appointed Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner Gilbert Kelland to investigate charges of corruption against Scotland 
Yard’s Obscene Publications Squad (OPS).  Working on information provided by jailed 
Soho pornographer Jimmy Humphreys, Kelland and his hand-picked team of detectives 
exposed a long-standing criminal conspiracy between pornographers and those charged 
with policing them (Tomes, 2004).  The exposure led to the conviction of a dozen 
detectives, including a commander and a chief superintendent.  Kelland’s reward was to 
be promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner ‘A’ department with responsibility for 
uniformed policing and in August 1977 and following Mark’s resignation, he was 
transferred to the post of Assistant Commissioner (Crime) (as the post of Director or 
Chief Constable of the CID had been redesignated) by Mark’s successor David McNee 
(Tomes, 2004).   
It is somewhat ironic that in 1976 Mark resigned from the Met over plans for a 
new police complaints system.  McBarnet (1981) has argued that Mark was not against 
further control of the police, on the contrary he argued for the machinery and procedures 
that could combat police malpractice and corruption.  However, he was against a system 
that, in his view, would undermine internal accountability and reduce his control over his 
force and resigned rather than be forced to work within such a system (McBarnet, 1981: 
116). 
In 1978, Kelland took over the newly formed Special Intelligence Section (SIS).  
The SIS was responsible for collecting and collating all intelligence relating to 
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international crime. To rebuild Home Office, police and public confidence in the CID, 
Kelland separated the SIS from the existing intelligence structure.  He placed the SIS 
under the command of C1 Branch (and thus under the control of the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner (DAC) ‘C’ (Operations) whilst C11 remained under the control of DAC 
‘C’ (Support).  As an additional measure he appointed a senior officer from another force, 
a move almost unheard of in those days, to command the new unit (Kelland, 1986).  
Kelland later asserted that these measures “quelled any rumours and restored confidence 
between the Met and other police forces” (Kelland, 1986: 234).52  
At the time, Kelland’s separation of international intelligence work from the 
mainstream was controversial.  He later recalled that the decision was, “unusual” and “not 
universally popular” but was made “because of my experiences and a gut feeling… that 
some elements of international organised crime might have penetrated our existing 
intelligence system” (Kelland, 1986: 358-359).  Kelland envisaged that the separation 
would be a temporary measure however; he noted that it was six years before there was 
full reintegration (Kelland, 1986: 359).  Mark believed that his changes fundamentally 
altered the balance of power between the CID and the uniformed branch in London 
(Mark, 1878).  Cox et al (1977: 218) have argued that though Mark may have been 
perceived as the “reformers’ champion… some of the people who ought to have been 
punished were so well entrenched that only time, and the formal process of respectable 
retirement, could dislodge them”.  Hobbs (1988) too has argued that despite his best 
intentions, Mark left the elitist detective culture fundamentally intact.   
Certainly, Mark recognised the need to reform CID governance arrangements by 
bringing the department under the control of the, more disciplined and better supervised, 
uniformed branch.  However, this study argues that given the sequence of events that 
culminated in his appointment, it is incongruous that reforms that brought the Met’s 
divisional detectives under the control of local uniformed commanders should leave 
                                                 
52 Kelland was referring to the distrust of the London CID that accompanied two prosecutions of groups of 
Drugs Squad officers for offences of perjury and attempting to pervert the course of justice (Kelland, 1986: 
228-230). 
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specialist squads (perceived to offer the greatest scope for corruption) under the control of 
the CID. 
 
Operation Countryman 
As if to underline Mark’s failure, the resilience of corruption amongst specialist 
detectives at Scotland Yard and the inadequacy of CID governance arrangements were 
demonstrated again in 1978 when accounts emerged of the involvement of Flying Squad 
detectives in armed robberies (Ball, Chester and Perrott, 1979 cited in Reiner, 2010).  
McNee (1983) has recorded that in July of that year, Met officers uncovered corrupt 
relationships between City of London Police officers and career criminals, and brought 
the matter to the attention of that force.  Peter Marshall, the City of London Police 
commissioner asked the Met to investigate but it soon became obvious that Met officers 
also were involved in these practices so a decision was made to seek assistance from 
another force outside London.  Marshall approached the Home Office and eventually, 
under Section 49 of the Police Act 1964, Leonard Burt, an ACC from Dorset Police was 
appointed as the investigating officer with the agreement and assistance of his chief 
constable Arthur Hambleton (McNee, 1983). 
Initially Burt’s terms of reference were set by the City of London Police but when 
it was confirmed that Met officers were involved, the Met Deputy Commissioner Pat 
Kavanagh asked Burt to extend his enquiries to the Met.  The ‘Operation Countryman’ 
team of provincial detectives under his command (at one time numbering more than 90 
officers) commenced their investigation in London.53  In 1979, Hambleton was satisfied 
that “there was some truth in the allegations” that had been made against three 
Commanders, nine Detective Chief Superintendents and Superintendents, 15 Detective 
Chief Inspectors and Inspectors (DCIs and DIs) , 21 Detective Sergeants (DSs) and 14 
Detective Constables (DCs) (Hambleton, 1982: 1).  Those allegations included that a 
                                                 
53 There is disagreement over the origin of the ‘Countryman’ label.  McNee (1983) has argued that this was a 
name that the provincial officers coined for themselves while Hambleton (1982) has suggested it was a 
pejorative label affixed to the inquiry team by Met detectives. 
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senior officer had accepted £20,000 and that “a senior man had accepted the major 
proceeds of a £40,000 robbery” (Hambleton, 1982: 1).   
Later that year, (approximately one year after the inquiry had begun) amongst 
increasing criticism of the Countryman inquiry from senior figures in the Met, Home 
Office officials and even the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Deputy 
Commissioner Kavanagh accused Burt and Hambleton of exceeding their brief and 
directed that any future reports should be investigated by his force.  Hambleton claimed 
obstruction and undue interference by the Met and appealed to the DPP.  However, he was 
overruled and thenceforth all new investigations were adopted by the Met rather than by 
the Countryman inquiry (Hambleton, 1982: 1).  Matters seem to have come to a head 
when in what McNee has described as “an ill-judged, ill-prepared move” the Countryman 
team made its first arrest, of a City of London Police DI, for an offence unconnected with 
the Countryman investigation.54  McNee (1983: 195) records that the “extraordinary 
way” in which the prosecution was conducted led to the DPP stopping the proceedings, to 
the fury of Hambleton. 
Shortly after this event, in late autumn 1979, Hambleton announced that in 
February 1980 he would be retiring from the police service (McNee, 1983).  This was a 
watershed for the inquiry.  Predictably, McNee and Hambleton present conflicting 
accounts.  Hambleton (1982: 1) has complained that the Met deliberately frustrated his 
enquiries into the corrupt activities of Met detectives while McNee (1983: 195) accused 
Hambleton of “conducting a private war directed almost exclusively against the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney General” who were both concerned about 
Hambleton’s lack of progress.  In March 1980, Sir Peter Matthews Chief Constable of 
Surrey took over the investigation and refocused the team’s efforts on the original 
allegations (McNee, 1983).  The Met took over complete responsibility for investigating 
all other allegations into its own officers and shortly after (though not, it is claimed, as a 
direct consequence of that action) a disappointed and disillusioned Hambleton retired 
from the service.  The inquiry continued for almost three more years but without 
                                                 
54 Countryman officers took the City of London officer before a Dorset court and objected to his bail so as to (as 
later admitted by Hambleton (1982)) pressurise him into providing information to the inquiry team. 
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Hambleton or his equally disillusioned deputy Burt (who returned to the Dorset force), 
Countryman ceased to be a wholly independent inquiry.   
Alderson (1982: 1) (Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police 1973-1982) 
has argued that the Countryman inquiry was ‘wound down’ for “political reasons”.  
Initially, the team was tasked with investigating two robberies in London.  However, the 
extent of the corruption that it uncovered was hugely embarrassing for the Home Office 
which was responsible for the administration of the Met.  Alderson (1982:1) noted that he 
knew that the Home Secretary William Whitelaw and a former Minister of State Lord 
Harris “had said that Countryman was getting into channels that it was never intended to 
do, deep into the Metropolitan Police and that it was unlikely that there would ever be 
another Countryman exercise - at least not like that”.  Alderson’s impression was that 
“Countryman was not pleasing the Home Office… because the inquiry was widening and 
becoming so much more serious than anyone had contemplated… it was becoming 
something of a scandal” (Alderson, 1982: 1).  It is reasonable to infer here that Alderson 
included the Met senior officers, the CID and the Home Office itself in his criticism. 
The Countryman inquiry ended after four years in what is commonly perceived to 
be failure.  However, even though it secured only two convictions, the inquiry did cast 
huge doubt on the idea that “endemic corruption in the Yard detective squads had been 
eliminated” (Reiner, 2010: 82).  In the context of this thesis, perhaps of equal if not 
greater concern was that the CID, in particular the specialist squads, remained 
unreconstructed and unreformed and continued to practice what Reiner has termed, the 
“standard method of plain clothes criminal investigation” and he development of close, 
sometimes intimate, relationships with career criminals as informers in ways that 
“operated perennially on the borderline of legality” (2010: 82).   The relationship between 
detectives and informers presents a conundrum for police managers.  On the one hand, 
only those with intimate knowledge of a criminal act make useful and productive 
informers; on the other, those with that level of knowledge are probably involved in the 
act in some way (perhaps as prospective purchasers of illicit goods or as aiders or abettors 
of the principal offender).  This study argues that too often managers have shown 
themselves unable or unwilling to solve that problem. 
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Appendix D - Home Office Committee on Detective Work, 
1933-1936 
 
Chaired by A.L. Dixon a Home Office official, the Dixon Committee’s work is 
particularly significant because it established the pattern of detective work for the rest of 
the twentieth century.  The committee was established on 12th May 1933 to “inquire and 
report upon the organisation and procedure of the police forces of England and Wales for 
the purpose of the detection of crime” (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1).   The committee was 
made up of Home Office officials and chief constables.   
The specific aims of the committee were to: consider the legal and judicial 
difficulties that hampered investigations, the recasting of criminal statistics, and to 
enquire into the relations between the uniform and detective branches and the way in 
which cooperation between the two might be improved in respect of the prevention and 
detection of crime.  Committee members travelled widely in an effort to identify best 
practice in detective work and held many meetings with “principal detective officers” of 
British police forces (MEPO 2/4967).   The Committee sat for more than three years, 
delivering its final report at the end of 1936.  The following paragraphs summarise the 
committee’s most relevant observations in the context of this thesis.   
The collection and sharing of intelligence by and between the different branches 
of the service were issues that particularly exercised the committee.  There was 
“considerable divergence of opinion” on what records should be kept and a “considerable 
variation in practice” across forces (MEPO 2/4967 Sub-Committee B, Section 1 - minutes 
of 28th June 1933).   There was “no systematic use of the records maintained at group 
centres” and even where good records were kept “the investigating officers did not make 
enough use of them and uniform officers hardly made any use of them at all” (MEPO 
2/4967, Section 1 - minutes of 28th June 1933).   The committee also found that “There 
was considerable… divergence in the arrangements for issuing crime information to the 
uniform branch” and that “in many places there was insufficient communication between 
the branches” (MEPO 2/4967 Sub-committee C, Section 1 - minutes of 28th June 1933). 
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 In the committee’s view “efficient detection” depended upon the capacity of the 
police “to obtain, sift and draw deductions from information “and therefore “a state of 
mutual understanding between police and public” was essential (MEPO 2/4967, draft 
final report - 24).  The committee was keen to establish a single system of criminal 
intelligence records as “an aid to investigation and detection”.  It was reported that: 
Every experienced detective has a store of information of this kind but if it remains 
personal to himself it necessarily dies with him and even while he lives and is in 
active service, no use can be made of it except in as far as he can be made personally 
aware of the details of particular crimes which to him (and possibly to him alone) 
suggest a certain individual as the perpetrator (MEPO 2/4967 Sub-committee B, 
Section 1 - report of Sub-committee B).  
The challenge therefore, was to reduce that information to a form in which it could 
be systematically recorded and indexed with a view to recognisable characteristics being 
identified.  This was the “main object that the committee’s work in this context was meant 
to achieve” (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - report of Sub-committee B).  Despite the 
committee’s work, it is debatable whether any progress in this context was made until the 
introduction of UBP some 40 years later and even then it could be argued that progress 
was limited. 
The committee recognised the importance of having local and regional/ national 
criminal records.  Recognising the problem of ‘cross-border’ crime, the committee 
acknowledged that though locally held records were necessary for local criminals “who 
do not habitually travel from place to place” and committed the bulk of crime, 
regional/national records were essential for those who “extend their operation over much 
wider areas” and were often responsible for the more serious crimes (MEPO 2/4967, 
Section 1 - report of Sub-committee B).  Interestingly, in terms of the subsequent 
development of ‘hotspotting’ and intelligence analysis in the modern era, the committee 
were not persuaded of the merits of geographic information systems (GIS).  Members of 
the committee were “disposed to think that no very useful purpose would be served by the 
preparation of elaborate maps or statistics” but it was agreed that this would be explored 
further by considering what forces (particularly the Metropolitan Police) were doing in 
this area (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - of 28th June 1933). 
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From the outset, the Dixon Committee acknowledged that in many forces, 
cooperation between the uniform and detective branches continued to be a significant 
issue and “positive steps” were required to improve it.  At its inaugural meeting on 18th 
May 1933, several chief officers commented upon measures they had taken in their own 
forces to include uniformed officers in criminal investigations as a means of improving 
relations with their CID colleagues.  There was agreement that the fractious and difficult 
relationship between the branches was hindering the investigative effort (MEPO 2/4967).  
CID protectionism was “undesirable” and ultimately inefficient.  It was wrong of the 
department to regard the detection of crime as an entirely specialised form of work to be 
carried out solely by the CID.  The Committee was concerned that where this attitude was 
allowed to prevail, “efficiency suffers” (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report: 36-37).  The 
minority argument that “uniform officers should not be encouraged to concern 
themselves” with crime investigation because “they may, by precipitate or ill-informed 
action, prejudice rather than assist the work of the detectives” was rejected in the cause of 
that efficiency (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report: 39).  
The committee established a definition of a ‘detective’ as a police officer “who 
forms part of the detective organisation of a force which is engaged in specialised crime 
work and not routine police duties other than crime”.  Interestingly in the context of this 
research, a caveat was added that ‘specialised crime work’ extended to “inquiries and 
intelligence work” (MEPO 2/4967, Section 1 - minutes of 28th June 1933).  The precise 
nature of the ‘inquiry and intelligence work’ was not further defined.  However, what is 
clear is that the ‘official’ definition of a detective went beyond commonly accepted 
descriptions of the role at that time.  It may reasonably be assumed that the effect of the 
Committee’s redefinition of the role was to attach the prestigious label of detective to a 
wider range of officers than previously had been the case.  However, what this meant for 
CID/uniform relations cannot now be assessed.  The committee recommended that Chief 
Constables should be encouraged to ensure that uniform officers felt a sense of 
responsibility for the work of crime detection by associating them with detective officers 
in the investigation of specific cases (MEPO 2/4967). 
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Some interesting ideas were advanced about the selection of CID officers.  There 
was no reason why detectives “should not continue to be selected from the plain clothes 
branch” (MEPO 2/4967, page 49, lines 1-11).  However, a minimum of two years 
experience in the uniform branch was considered to be “an essential qualification for a 
detective” (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report: 46-47).  Very much a minority view 
expressed by the chief constable of Derbyshire was that it might be “dangerous to give 
recruits too great an insight into methods of detection, particularly on the technical side, 
since men who were rejected might take to crime and use their knowledge to evade 
conviction”.  Unsurprisingly, given the tenor of the rest of the committee’s work, this 
view was rejected (MEPO 2/4967, minutes of meeting 1st February 1934).  
Stimulating a debate that has continued to the present day, the committee stated 
that too much importance was attached to force boundaries “in the ordinary day-to-day 
work of crime detection” (MEPO 2/4967 page 28, line 36 – page 29, line 22).  Because the 
existing local police system was subject to inherent disadvantages whenever police action 
needed to be applied “to a common purpose over a wide area” no force could be 
self-contained in crime matters (MEPO 2/4967, draft final report page 5, lines 18-35).  
There was a need for the development of “a more effective machinery of cooperation 
between forces and in particular, for an improved system for inter-force circulations of 
informations” (MEPO 2/4967, page 19, line 8-27). 
Indeed, what is remarkable from an examination of the committee’s findings is 
how little the challenges facing the detective force have changed since the 1930s.  The 
committee’s findings still resonate today.  For example, in terms that would be familiar to 
those involved in Operation Bumblebee or any of the many other anti-burglary initiatives 
of recent years, the committee noted that the “unsatisfactory position” with regard to the 
class of offences comprising burglary, housebreaking and shopbreaking constituted “a 
problem upon which the energies of the police throughout the country should be bent” 
(MEPO 2/4967, page 19, line 8-27).55 
                                                 
55 Operation Bumblebee was first introduced in London in 1993 but has recently been revived in the capital city 
(see - http://cms.met.police.uk/news/publicity_campaigns/operation_bumblebee__1 accessed 16th July 2010). 
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In terms of cross-border crime, the committee noted that 73 percent of detected 
crime was committed by people living in the police district in which the crime was 
committed or within 20 miles of its boundary and that “the cases attributable to 
non-residents and travelling criminals are in general the more serious (MEPO 2/4967 
page 16, line 44 – Page 18, line 27).  As those committing serious crime often moved from 
place to place, their investigation merited “concerted measures on the part of all the forces 
over a wide area or the whole of the country [which necessitated] the institution of 
specific machinery of cooperation in every branch of detective work” (MEPO 2/4967 
page 24, lines 6-33). 
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Appendix E - Pen Picture of Sir David Phillips 
 
Phillips began his police career in 1963 in the Lancashire Constabulary.  He reached the 
rank of Chief Superintendent before transferring to Greater Manchester Police (GMP) as 
an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC).  His “first forays” into intelligence work were 
brought about by the Moss Side riots.  As ACC in charge of operations (and responsible 
for the post-event investigation), Phillips assessed that he was “in receipt of no 
intelligence worth a damn” to help him.  The existing intelligence system in GMP was 
“restricted to snippets of clandestine information” and, in his view, was unfit for purpose 
(personal communication with author, 16th April, 2006).   
Phillips committed himself to persuading his colleagues of the need to develop 
understanding of their communities.  He wrote and presented (mainly to police audiences) 
a paper entitled ‘The Middle Ground of Policing" which, aimed to show how different 
elements of the illicit economy were linked together in “a volatile but entirely 
conventional economic arrangement of mutual dependence… [where] black-market 
violence and intimidation replace price and advertising as a form of competition” 
(personal communication with author, 16th April, 2006).  The notion of the late-modern 
city as a market-place or “bazaar” for illicit goods has been explored by Ruggiero and 
South (1997).  Others such as Reuter (1985), Hobbs (1988), Dorn and South (1990), and 
Ruggiero and Vass (1992), have used a market perspective to examine illicit 
entrepreneurial activities in their socio-cultural and socioeconomic contexts.   
Phillips’ thesis focused on the part played by “blundering but well intentioned 
efforts” of police forces in “crisis” law enforcement activities in this milieu.  In his 
opinion, police efforts upset those economies in ways which led directly (and 
unnecessarily) to public disorder.  In Phillips’ view, other political issues (principally 
race) became confused in rationalising explanations of that disorder.  He was concerned 
that the police service should not repeat the mistakes of the recent past (personal 
communication, 16th April, 2006). 
Phillips (2006) said that intelligence was at the heart of his ideas for policing in 
the new millennium.  He considered that at its simplest, intelligence implied knowledge 
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of what was likely to happen if events were allowed to progress unimpeded.  The first 
duty of intelligence was description and for police commanders there should be an 
“inherent assumption” that events could be influenced if they used intelligence properly 
(Phillips, 2006: 9).  Some might argue that (like other chief officers of the period) Phillips 
was simply responding to demands from the Government for better performance in the 
face of ever increasing levels of reported crime and poor detection rates. However, 
perhaps uniquely amongst senior police officers of the time, by his willingness to commit 
his force to significant structural change, Phillips demonstrated a real commitment to 
developing investigation and intelligence systems and showed that he valued intelligence 
work as a “genuine and necessary discipline” for policing (Phillips, 2006: 4).56 
At the same time, as secretary of the ACPO Football Hooliganism sub-committee, 
Phillips established the NFIU where he organised a system of conferences designed to 
encourage cooperation and coordination between forces and policing partners and wrote a 
policy document Policing Football to standardise police procedure in that regard.   He 
believed that as a result of those activities “the first profiling and targeting regimes in the 
police” emerged (D. Phillips, personal communication, with author 16th April, 2006).  
However, that claim should be considered in the light of the developments in intelligence 
work in London described earlier.  1989, Phillips left GMP to take up the post of deputy 
chief constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary and in 1993 he became the chief 
officer control of the Kent Police.   
Accepting the appointment of chair of the ACPO Crime Committee, Phillips 
championed a system of prison intelligence that enhanced the ability of prison liaison 
officers gather intelligence in prisons (Phillips, 2006: 2).  In 2001, he became President of 
ACPO, a position he continued to hold until his retirement on 31st March 2003.  It was 
during this period that Phillips lobbied the Home Office to adopt the KPM (rebranded as 
the NIM) as the standard for operational policing for the new millennium.  In his work 
with the National Centre for Policing Excellence thereafter, he continued to advance the 
cause of intelligence in policing. 
                                                 
56 An abridged version of this work later was published as Phillips, Caless and Bryant (2007). Intelligence and 
its Application to Contemporary Policing. Policing 1(4): 438-446. 
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